The Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, undertook an official visit to Islamabad on 20-21 July 2023. It is only the second ministerial visit from Ukraine to Pakistan since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1992.[i] In 2016, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine had undertaken a maiden visit to Pakistan, and amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Foreign Minister visited Islamabad last month. On the one hand, Islamabad has continued to supply defence material to Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and on the other hand, it has bought discounted oil from Russia that has benefited both Islamabad and Moscow. This background needs to be kept in mind while analysing Minister Kuleba’s recent visit.
Identifying Kyiv’s two major agendas
Ukraine and Pakistan share relations that are described as “a dynamic process based on traditionally high level of cooperation in political, military-technical, trade and economic, humanitarian spheres as well as on effective collaboration within the framework of international organizations”.[ii] Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began last year, there have been some key developments in the Ukraine-Pakistan relationship. However, Mr Kuleba’s visit was largely dominated by two Ukrainian agendas that pertain to the ongoing situation.
First, Kyiv is seeking further defence assistance from Islamabad. Pakistan has been supplying war material to Ukraine via some of its Western partners. Reportedly, containers that carry ammunition such as artillery shells, high explosives, etc. are being routed from the Karachi port via Poland’s Gdansk port and Germany’s Emden port to Ukraine. For instance, Pakistan Ordinance Factory signed a contract with the UK’s Defence Ministry in December 2022 to supply 200,000 rockets worth $300 million as part of an initiative to provide military aid to Ukraine amidst its defence against Russia.[iii] By April 2023, there were further reports of Pakistan sending 230 containers of military equipment to Ukraine.[iv] Most of these arrangements are being made under the US-led consortium, Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). Mr Kuleba’s recent visit is said to have initiated another defence delivery from Pakistan to Ukraine, this time of 200 containers that are being sent via Poland.[v] Ukraine and Pakistan have maintained that no new defence agreements have been signed between the two countries. However, it may be pointed out that Ukraine and Pakistan have a multi-million-dollar tank contract signed in 1996.
The second crucial issue discussed during Minister Kuleba’s visit is the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). BSGI is a deal that was brokered by the UN and Turkey in July 2022, to ensure safe passage to ships carrying grains from Ukraine amidst the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As per the BSGI, Russia had agreed to conditions where three ports of Ukraine, namely Odesa, Chornomorsky, and Pivdennyi, would be able to send or receive ships carrying grains, after due inspections. In July 2023, Russia refused to renew the deal, causing it to expire. This has led to concerns over a shortage of grain exports from Ukraine to countries mostly in Africa and Asia, including to Pakistan. Therefore, Mr Kuleba sought support from Pakistan to help renew the BSGI.
An assessment
The Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s maiden visit to Pakistan and Kyiv’s efforts at seeking support and assistance at a time when the country is at war are well understood. However, it is also important to analyse Pakistan’s reasons for partnering with Ukraine, especially when its biggest ally, China, is supporting Russia.
One rationale for Pakistan’s decisions is Islamabad’s need to have better ties with the West, particularly the UK and the US. It may be kept in mind that an economically weak Pakistan is also dependent on the IMF’s Extended Facility Fund, the ninth tranche of which is still due, despite Islamabad managing to receive $3 billion as part of a Stand-by Agreement with IMF in July 2023. Secondly, given that a major part of aid to Ukraine is taking place under the US-led USAI, Pakistan’s support for it is indicative of Islamabad trying hard to signal to the West that it is not wholly under Chinese influence, a position that is nevertheless difficult to accept. As the US-China rivalry on the international stage has been growing, Pakistan finds itself in a need to balance between the two very carefully. This partly explains why Islamabad has carried on business with Moscow as well. Even though Pakistan’s military support for Ukraine and close ties with Kyiv are visible, a deal to buy discounted oil from Russia was struck in April this year. By June 2023, the first cargo of discounted oil from Russia arrived at the Karachi port, which Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif declared as “the beginning of a new relationship” between Islamabad and Moscow.[vi] Pakistan is making payments in Chinese Yuan for such imports from Russia. Just days before the arrival of Minister Kuleba to Islamabad, Pakistan’s Petroleum Minister, Musadiq Malik, noted that Islamabad was negotiating with Moscow to buy a second shipment of discounted oil, which he assured was benefiting Pakistan.[vii] These simultaneous developments are clear signs of Pakistan playing in both camps in the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the one hand and trying to work with the US and the West, while getting all the benefits from Beijing as its ‘all weather friend’, on the other.
To conclude, one may say that during the Foreign Minister’s visit to Islamabad, Ukraine’s agenda was to receive more defence supplies from Islamabad as well as gain support for renewing the BSGI,. But Kyiv should be well aware of Pakistan’s dual position in the current context and should therefore not be surprised at Islamabad’s continuing business with Moscow, especially at a time when Pakistan is reeling under great economic, political, and security stresses itself.
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*Dr Shrabana Barua is a Research Fellow at Indian Council of World Affairs.
The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Embassy of Ukraine to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, “Political relations between Ukraine and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, 6 May 2020, URL: https://pakistan.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/political-relations-between-ukraine-and-islamic-republic-pakistan. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]
[ii] Embassy of Ukraine to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, “Political relations between Ukraine and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, 6 May 2020, URL: https://pakistan.mfa.gov.ua/en/partnership/political-relations-between-ukraine-and-islamic-republic-pakistan. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]
[iii] Dipanjan Roy Chaudury, “Pakistan signs pact with UK for supply of rockets to Ukraine”, The Economic Times, 19 April 2023, URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-signs-pact-with-uk-for-supply-of-rockets-to-ukraine/articleshow/99604254.cms?from=mdr. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]
[iv] Dipanjan Roy Chaudury, “Pakistan to ship 230 containers of defence items to Ukraine in April”, The Economic Times, 10 April 2023, URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-to-ship-230-containers-of-arms-to-ukraine/articleshow/99362810.cms?from=mdr. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]
[v] Dipanjan Roy Chaudury, “Pakistan prepares fresh arms supplies to Ukraine as Kuleba makes ‘emergency visit’ to Islamabad”, The Economic Times, 20 July 2023, URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-prepares-fresh-arms-supplies-for-ukraine/articleshow/101966693.cms?from=mdr. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]
[vi] Dipanjan Roy Chaudury, “Ukraine to supply Mi-17 helicopter engines and spare parts to Pakistan”, The Economic Times, 27 April 2023,URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/ukraine-to-supply-mi-17-helicopter-engines-and-spare-parts-to-pakistan/articleshow/99795815.cms?from=mdr. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]
[vii] Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan negotiating second cargo of discounted Russian crude”, Reuters, 12 July 2023, URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/pakistan-negotiating-second-cargo-discounted-russian-crude-2023-07-12/. [Accessed on 2 August 2023]