The Sahel region in Africa spanning from Senegal to the Red Sea, has been facing severe security crisis due to the devastating surge in terrorist attacks.[i] In the past couple of years terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have increased their influence, particularly in the Western Sahel region, through their affiliated groups like JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al Islamwal Muslimin), ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province); etc. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the western Sahel region has been most affected by terrorism, accounting for 70 per cent increase in the fatalities caused by the extremist violence from 2021-22 and more than 2.7 million people have been displaced[ii]. It now accounts for 43% of world’s terrorism deaths. The western Sahel region is vulnerable to extremism as it provides a fertile ground for the jihadist groups to expand- given a combination of factors like- weak governance institutions, limited state capacity, corruption, porous borders and inter-ethnic tensions. The tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has been the epicenter of this crisis.[iii] According to Global Terrorism Index, two western Sahel countries Mali and Burkina Faso are among world’s five countries, most affected by terrorism.
This paper seeks to focus on the rise and spread of terrorism in the Western Sahel, factors responsible for their expansion, terror tactics, finances and their recruitment strategies and the counter terrorism operations.
Rise and Spread of Violent Extremism in Western Sahel
The escalation of extremist violence in western Sahel has its roots in the Libyan revolution and the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011- which led to the proliferation of arms and extremist fighters in the region. The influx of extremists in the Northern Mali reignited the dormant Tuareg rebellion in 2012 which had previously surfaced in 1963, 1990 and in 2006. The Tuareg rebels organized under the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) demanded an autonomous state and aligned themselves with multiple Islamic extremist groups (Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine) - to push government forces out of northern Mali[iv]. In the year 2012, with the military overthrow of the civilian government in Mali led by President Toure, destabilized the country leading to the collapse of the state institutions. This enabled MNLA to capture regional capitals like Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. However, with the transition to civilian led government in Mali in 2013, the government later signed a peace agreement with the Coalition of Tuareg independence groups (CMA) in 2015. According to the Peace Accord, the rebel groups were required to give up their demand for the independence of Azawad and comply with the principles of national unity and territorial integrity. On the other hand, the Malian government committed to ensure better institutional representation of the northern people, adopt policies of economic development in northern Mali and implement decentralization reforms. In this context, it is to be noted that the Coalition distanced itself from the Islamist terrorists as MNLA goal was to establish independent state of Azawad in northern Mali which was in sharp contrast with that of Islamists who wanted to establish the Caliphate. The provisions of this Peace Agreement were partially implemented. The rebel groups believed that the agreement lacked inclusiveness as the northern communities were not involved in the decision-making processes. Besides, people in the southern Mali remained hostile towards the reintegration of the former rebels in the state institutions. This led to tensions between the two.
The extremist groups took advantage of the deteriorating situation in Mali- to expand their operations in the central Mali Burkina Faso and Niger- with Burkina Faso and Niger becoming the new epicenters of regional insecurity[v]. In 2016, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara surfaced in Burkina Faso and launched its first major attack in the city of -Markoye. In Burkina Faso, violence evolved from a spill-over conflict into a full-fledged insurgency by 2018. Both Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Al- Qaeda coalition group Jama’at Nasr al Islamwal Muslimin (JNIM) in cooperation with the local militant group of Burkina Faso Ansaroul Islam expanded their control over the northern and eastern regions of Burkina Faso[vi]. It was for the first time that Burkina Faso authorities lost control over a part of their country’s territory. Since then, Burkina Faso has witnessed massive increase in the armed violence and accounts for 73 percent of deaths caused by the terrorist attacks. In Niger, there is a growing record of violent attacks has been observed in regions like Tahoua and Diffa bordering Nigeria and Chad and hostility towards the state actors has also been recorded.
In addition to this, terrorism has spread to the coastal states of West Africa, in the past couple of years. Coastal states like Benin and Togo experienced major terrorist attacks since 2007. According to Global Terrorism Index, Togo recorded major increase in terrorism, globally, in 2022. This marks further trans nationalization of terrorism across the coastal west Africa. Terrorist groups like JNIM and ISGS are also seeking safe havens and new theatres of operation and many of these new areas are demographically, ecologically and economically similar to that of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso[vii]. The security situation in the region has further deteriorated with the spillover of violent extremism in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivor.
Factors responsible for the expansion of Terrorism
Terrorist groups were able to expand further because of political instability due to military coups, weak leadership and the ethnicization of community conflicts. In this context, it is important to look at the complex set of factors responsible for the further expansion of terrorism.
Political Instability due to military coups
Political instability remains one of the major causes of the rise of terrorism in the Sahel region as the terrorists require skills (military and organizational) and the material wherewithal that is easily accessible in a country that is politically unstable. The Sahel region has remained politically unstable for a long period of time due to repeated coups. According to Fragile State Index, the region has experienced 13 coup attempts between 2020 to 2022, of which 7 were successful. These military coups occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad from 2020 to 2022. Coups are product of systemic failures like poor governance, corruption, mismanagement and poverty. Mali, which for instance has witnessed three successful coups since 2012 has witnessed 70% increase in terrorist activities since 2012. While Burkina Faso has witnessed 5 coup attempts from 2015 till 2022 and since 2015 it has also witnessed an exponential increase in the terrorist activities which has almost doubled in 2022, reaching up to 1,100 terrorist attacks[viii]. These unstable regimes are unable to provide effective security and this has encouraged terrorist groups to continue their activity by controlling territory.
Ethnicization of Community Conflicts
Jihadists in this region have taken advantage of social cleavages and inter- ethnic tensions. It is to be noted that the Tuareg question in northern Mali, which has been exploited by the Al Qaida linked militant groups for a decade, was now replaced by ‘Fulani Question’. Jihadists have taken advantage of the political and social demands of the marginalized Fulani Pastoralists and offered them protection and justice. Islamist groups like Boko Haram and JNIM have resorted to the ethnicization of community conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and farmers and have exacerbated the insecurity of the local populations[ix].
Lack of strong leadership
Weak leadership has resulted in the weakening of the state institutions. In most of these states the ruling elites did not pay attention to build the core democratic institutions and have attempted to manipulate the existing institutions in the name of democratic reforms[x]. This has resulted in the counter pressures from the opposition and civil society groups. When the transitional governments have come to power after the military coup, they have passed on the task of strengthening the democratic institutions to be undertaken by the post transitional governments.
Terror Tactics, Recruitment Strategies and Finances
Western Sahel region has been the host to terrorist groups such as JNIM (Jama’at Nasr al Islamwal Muslimin) and ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province), which have been active in northern and central Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and have been expanding their reach. These terror groups have resorted to various terror tactics such as kidnapping, suicide bombing, drug trafficking, illicit smuggling, guerrilla warfare, mass causality bombings etc. JNIM militants, for instance, regularly attacks security forces and executes high profile assaults on political targets. In this context, one could refer to the twin assault at the army posts at the Nassoumbou and Baraboule in Burkina Faso in 2019 just before the ECOWAS Summit. In 2018 it orchestrated a suicide vehicle borne explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a base of the G5 Sahel, regional counter- terrorism force in Mali. They have also have resorted to guerilla style raids when possible. Besides, it also orchestrates high profile kidnappings for example the kidnaping of a French Humanitarian worker or the abduction of the Malian opposition leader Soumaila Cisse in 2020. Through, kidnapping they attain ransom which is a significant source of funding. It is also a significant tactic to instill fear.[xi] ISSP conducts more extreme form of violence and brutality including a greater targeting of the civilian population. It has also been involved in carrying out mass violence against military forces, militias and rival militants. Its preferred modus operandi are ambushes and swarming tactics through motorcycle or vehicle borne armed assaults[xii].
These terrorist groups are also involved in killing the local leaders such as mayors, council members or religious leaders to create a power vacuum in the area that they seek to dominate. Such tactics lead to political, economic and social chaos. In addition to this these terrorist groups rely upon weapons like fire arms and explosives to carry out attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Index fire arms are the most used weapons in the terrorist attacks in the Sahel region.
The extremist groups generate revenue from sources such as donations, money laundering, kidnapping, narcotics, natural resources and commodity trading for funding. Terrorist groups like JNIM and ISSP fund themselves by ransoming captives, taxing locals, smuggling weapons, extorting human and drug traffickers. ISSP also funds itself through cattle theft, extortion and the collection of Zakat (alms or taxes).
Recruitment Strategies-: There is no uniform recruitment process for all the extremist organizations. The recruitment is both voluntary and non-voluntary and it takes place at a variety of social spaces such as mosques, schools, family networks and online. Some of the recruitment strategies include radicalization wherein ideology, religion and politics is being used to radicalize the youth with a promise of martyrdom.[xiii]
The Counter-Terrorism Measures
In order to combat these growing bouts of violence and to root out the extremists several international and regional counter terrorism operations in Sahel. In this context it is important to focus upon the major counter- terrorism operations in Sahel. -:
Operation Barkhane
Operation Barkhane was a counter-terrorism operation which was launched by the French authorities in 2014, it roughly consisted of 3000 French armed personnels. While majority of its forces were deployed in Mali, it also has its permanent bases in Niger and Chad. Operation Barkhane was designed to provide continued support to combat militants and to train the armies of Mali and Niger. Operation Barkhane was successful in limiting the mobility of Al Qaeda linked armed groups beyond the Malian borders but it was not able to eradicate them. However. France failed in Mali due to a combination of factors like operational errors and its failure to understand local conflict dynamics. These efforts did not garner local support. Its approach towards Mali was overtly militaristic based on the assumption that terrorism is the root of instability in the region. Besides, it made a major mistake when it partially renewed its partnership with MNLA, a Tuareg secessionist group which was the primary initiator of the rebellion in 2012.[xiv] This led to rise of anti -French sentiment in Mali.
Takuba Task Force
Takuba Task Force is the European military task force which was established to assist and advise the Malian Armed Forces and works in coordination with the G5 Sahel. It had its bases in Mali and Chad. It was setup in March 2020 and 14 European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and UK) were part of it. The Task Force along with the Malian armed units continually disrupted terrorist activities However, the Task Force suspended its joint operations in mid-2022 due to the rupture of relations between France and Mali.[xv]
G5 Sahel Joint Force
The G5 Sahel Joint Force was established in 2017 to combat terrorism and drug trafficking in the Sahel region. The heads of the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) launched this initiative to enhance security of their people by pooling and multiplying their national efforts to fight against the militants. However, it faced a number of challenges. It has been built from the pre-exiting national armies of the G5 states and, therefore, it was facing similar structural and operational challenges as those of the national armies that have established the task force. The number of military personnels were limited for instance there were 20 to 25 soldiers per thousand inhabitants in the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu in Mali. It has also been severely constrained when it comes to financing, which means that it did not have material wherewithal to combat this crisis. The money which has been mobilized as a part of the defense budget or through the capacity building programs by the G5 states, has not been effectively utilized due to poor governance and corruption.[xvi]
Conclusion
Western Sahel region has become a hotspot of violent extremism. Local and regional terrorist groups continue to adapt their tactics, looking to exploit political vacuums. Some of the states like Mali and Burkina Faso share similar internal dynamics wherein the state power is concentrated in the southern and urban areas while the northern or rural areas remain underdeveloped and ideal for the exploitation by the extremist groups. The counter- terrorism operations have been partially successful but they have not been able to stop the spread of violent extremism in Western Sahel. Thus, there is a need to have Africa centric counter terrorism measures.
*****
*Dr. Gauri Narain Mathur, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Violent Extremism in Sahel’. Global Conflict Tracker. Council of Foreign Relations. 27 March 2023. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel
[ii] ‘Global Terrorism Index 2023’. Institute For Economics and Peace. 1 March 2023. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf
[iii] Slavia D’ Amato and Edorado Boldaro.’ Counter -Terrorism in Sahel: Increased Instability and Political Tensions’. International Center for Counter Terrorism. 7 July 2022. https://www.icct.nl/publication/counter-terrorism-sahel-increased-instability-and-political-tensions
[iv] Ibid
[v] Giovanni Carbone and Camillo Casola. ‘ Sahel: 10 Years of Instability’. ISPI. 1 October 2022. https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/10_years_instability_sahel_report.ispi_.2022_0.pdf
[vi] Violent Extremism in Sahel’. Global Conflict Tracker. Council of Foreign Relations. 27 March 2023. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel
[vii] Global Terrorism Index 2023’. Institute For Economics and Peace. 1 March 2023. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf
[viii] ‘ Political Upheaval and Counter Terrorism in Burkina Faso between Rock and Hard Palace.’ International Center for counter Terrorism. 1 February 2022. https://www.icct.nl/publication/political-upheaval-and-counter-terrorism-burkina-faso-between-rock-and-hard-place
[ix] Modibo Ghaly.’ Understanding Fulani Perspective of Sahel Crisis’. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 22 April 2020. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-fulani-perspectives-sahel-crisis/
[x] Giovanni Carbone and Camillo Casola. ‘ Sahel: 10 Years of Instability’. ISPI. 1 October 2022. https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/10_years_instability_sahel_report.ispi_.2022_0.pdf
[xi] Jared Thompson.’ Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al- Islamwal Muslimin’. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 15 July 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin
[xii] ‘ The Islamic State Sahel Province’. ACLED. 13 January 2023. https://acleddata.com/2023/01/13/actor-profile-the-islamic-state-sahel-province/
[xiii] Dr. Tochukwu Omenama, Cheryl Hendrics and Nnamdi Ajaebilli. ‘ Recruitment Strategies: al shababand Boko Haram’. Peace and Conflict Studies Journals. Vol 27. No 1. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol27/iss1/2/
[xiv] Catrina Doxee, Jared Thompson and Marille Harris. ‘The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counter Terrorism in Mali’. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2 March 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/end-operation-barkhane-and-future-counterterrorism-mali
[xv] ‘EU’s Takuba Task Force Quits Junta Controlled Mali’. France 24. 1 July 2022. france24.com/en/africa/20220701-eu-s-takuba-force-quits-junta-controlled-mali
[xvi] ‘Project supporting the G5 Sahel Joint Force with Implementation of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Compliance Framework’. United Nations. 31 March 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africa-region/project-supporting-g5-sahel-joint-force-implementation-human-rights-and-international-humanitarian