After seizing power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban has attempted to transform itself from a guerrilla force into a functional government. There have been reports about difference of approaches on certain issues within the Taliban. Amidst these speculations about differences within the Taliban leadership, on 17 May 2023, the Taliban appointed Maulvi Abdul Kabir, as the new caretaker Prime Minister, replacing Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who had been in charge of the interim government since the group seized control of the country in August 2021. Kabir’s appointment came through a special decree by the Taliban’s Supreme leader Hibatullah Akhunzada.[i]
Who is Maulvi Abdul Kabir?
Maulvi Kabir has held crucial positions in previous and current Taliban administrations. He hails from the Zadran tribe of Pashtun ethnicity. He was the Deputy Prime Minister (Political Affairs) before his appointment as the Prime Minister. Earlier he had served as the acting Prime Minister of the Taliban regime between April 2001 to November 2001. Earlier, Abdul Kabir was appointed the governor of the Nangarhar province along the country’s eastern border adjoining Pakistan in 1996. He took shelter in Pakistan after the Taliban government was toppled in a US-led invasion in 2001. He was part of the Taliban Doha political office that negotiated the agreement with Washington that paved the way for the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan after 20 years of war. The United Nations Security Council listed Kabir as a sanctioned person in January 2001 for his concurrent roles in the first Taliban regime as the Second Deputy of economic affairs, Member of the Council of Ministers, Governor of the Nangarhar province, and head of the Eastern Zone.
What does the change in leadership signify?
Since the Taliban recaptured power in Afghanistan Abdul Kabir has played a crucial role in negotiating with the Western countries and his diplomatic acumen and ability to negotiate with countries could have been one of the factors behind his appointment. According to Hassan Abbas, author of the book titled Return of the Taliban; other two contenders for the position were Mullah Baradar (current Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs) and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai.[ii] Despite being one of the founding members of the Taliban movement, Mullah Baradar is currently seen as a pragmatist, who wants engagement with the West; on the other hand, Ishaqzai is viewed as one of the most conservative and orthodox figures hailing from Kandahar. It is believed that the selection of Maulvi Kabir, was an indication that Akhunzada opted for a middle path. While Kabir is known to be among the conservative elements he is also aligned to those who are in favour of engagement with the West. Given the fact that he hails from the Zadran tribe, like that of the Haqqanis, and had replaced Mullah Akhund; belonging to the Durrani tribe also paved way for further speculations about intra-tribal rivalries and power struggles between Kabul and Kandahar based Taliban leadership. Taliban however was quick to deny such claims and forwarded clarifications that it was a “temporary change” as Mullah Akhund was not keeping well.[iii]
Kabul Versus Kandahar Debate
Experts have argued that the Taliban, predominately made up of Pashtuns, is divided along ethnic, regional, and tribal lines.[iv] Despite maintaining cohesion, according to various reports,[v] differences in approach on certain issues seem to have divided the Taliban’s top-tier leadership into two blocs: the pragmatists and the ultraorthodox.[vi] Broadly the Taliban leadership based in Kandahar is viewed as more orthodox, dogmatic and more inward looking as compared to the regime’s political and diplomatic dispensation in Kabul. Those who are holding important positions in Kabul[vii] are apparently more open to conversations, dialogue and relatively more flexible.
On 1 June 2023, the UNSC’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted its 14th Annual Report about the current situation in Afghanistan.[viii] One of the key observations in the report was about the internal rift within the leadership and the report stated that the group was “battling internal conflict over key policies such as the centralisation of power and the control of financial and natural resources in Afghanistan”.[ix] It also observed that the past seven months have witnessed a greater transfer of power from the capital Kabul to the southern city of Kandahar, a Taliban heartland and the base of the group’s supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.
In recent months at least two spokespersons based in Kabul were asked to shift to the southern city of Kandahar, while high-profile delegations visited the city, further fueling speculations about the transfer of power from the capital to Kandahar. In April 2023, the Taliban’s main Spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, was asked to work from both places, while Inamullah Samangani, another deputy Spokesman of the Interim Government, was transferred to Kandahar.[x] The Taliban’s Information Ministry, however, did not provide any reasons for the transfer. Decrees, such as those excluding women and girls from education and work, were issued from Kandahar instead of Kabul. [xi] On 13 May 2023, the Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Bin Abdul Rahman Al-Thani, visit to Kandahar to meet with Taliban officials was seen as an important signal to suggest that Kandahar has become an important power center in Afghanistan.[xii] Evidently, there are indications to suggest that Kandahar is returning as an important seat of power — like it was during the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan in the 1990s. However, at this point; perhaps it would be fair to assume that both Kabul and Kandahar remain important power centers in Afghanistan.
It is also important to keep in mind that the Taliban are serious about projecting their unity and cohesion, and in the past, the group has isolated or pushed out individuals who have spoken against their policies. They would not risk split because they know there’s far greater benefit in being in the group than otherwise. Moreover, the central tenet of the movement has been their absolute obedience to their Emir. The office of the Emir has always been a symbolic process around which the movement has found its identity. They simply cannot afford to have their leadership hierarchy disintegrate. The undoing of this central tenet may lead to the disintegration of the Taliban and a spiral into a civil war among competing factions, although this scenario is quite unlikely in the short to medium term.
Conclusion
It has been almost two years since the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan and the situation continues to evolve in the country. The Taliban now faces its most daunting challenge yet, in figuring out how to move from a globally condemned insurgency to a recognized political entity responsible for governing Afghanistan. It is important to recognize, despite reports of political rivalries and internal rift within Taliban, their messaging to the outside world has remained consistent. The Taliban is aware that if it wishes to attain internal legitimacy and international recognition, it will have to resolve any dispute without jeopardizing its regime’s stability.
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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Who’s Maulvi Abdul Kabir, Afghanistan’s new Taliban-appointed PM? Al Jazeera, May 18, 2023. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/18/whos-maulvi-abdul-kabir-afghanistans-new-taliban-appointed-pm
[ii] Hassan Abbas, “ The Return of the Taliban :Afghanistan after the Americans Left” speaking at a webinar at SOAS, Universty of London, June 5, 2023. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTfgKEdbl9k&ab_channel=SOASUniversityofLondon
[iii] “Who’s Maulvi Abdul Kabir, Afghanistan’s new Taliban-appointed PM?” Al Jazeera, May 18, 2023. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/18/whos-maulvi-abdul-kabir-afghanistans-new-taliban-appointed-pm https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-rifts-exposed-afghanistan/31880018.html (Accessed on 16. 6.23)
[iv] ‘Unprecedented Differences’: Rifts Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open, , Radio free Europe, June 2, 2023. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-rifts-exposed-afghanistan/31880018.html (Accessed on 14. 6.23)
[v] “Growing rift between Taliban supreme leader, senior officials”. EFE, Feb 27, 2023. Available at: https://efe.com/en/other-news/2023-02-27/growing-rift-between-taliban-supreme-leader-senior-officials/. “‘Unprecedented Differences’: Rifts Within The Taliban Come Out In The Open”. Radio Free Europe, June 2, 2-23. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-rifts-exposed-afghanistan/31880018.html. “WILL THE TALIBAN REVOLT AGAINST ITS LEADERSHIP?” Foreign policy in Focus, April 123, 2023. Available at: https://fpif.org/will-the-taliban-revolt-against-its-leadership/
[vi] Atal Ahmedzai, “WILL THE TALIBAN REVOLT AGAINST ITS LEADERSHIP?” Foreign policy in Focus, April 123, 2023. Available at: https://fpif.org/will-the-taliban-revolt-against-its-leadership/
[vii] It is important to note that Kandaharis also hold important positions in Kabul. So, there is no water tight compartmentalization between the two. The point being made is that the existing narrative on this issue hint at these broad and simplistic divisions.
[viii] “Taliban back to exclusionary, Pashtun-centred policies of late 90s: Report”. Business Standard, June 12, 2023. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/taliban-back-to-exclusionary-pashtun-centred-policies-of-late-90s-report-123061200061_1.html. (Accessed on 13. 6.23)
[ix] Ibid
[x] Taliban top spokesman Mujahid asked to work from Kandahar. Al Jazeera, June 12, 2023. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/6/taliban-top-spokesman-mujahid-asked-to-work-from-kandahar.
[xi] “ Taliban Slam ‘Baseless and Biased’ UN Report About Rifts in Their Ranks”. The Diplomat, June 12, 2023. Op.cit. (Accessed on 14. 6.23)
[xii] Qatar PM meets senior Taliban officials in Kandahar. Middle East Monitor, May 13, 2023. Available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230513-qatar-pm-meets-senior-taliban-officials-in-kandahar/ (Accessed on 14. 6.23)