While the return of relative peace and stability is somehow progressing in the larger Arab world, as reflected in the return of Syria to the Arab League, major headway in the Yemen peace process, and resumption of Iran-Saudi diplomatic ties, Sudan seems to be slumping into fresh violence and political chaos. It all started on 15 April 2023, when the two Generals, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chief of the Sudanese National Army and the head of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), and the other general Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, head of the militia-turned paramilitary force, Rapid Support Force (RSF), his deputy in the Sovereign Council[i] and arch political rival of Al-Burhan, entered into an all-out war against each other. Both sides are using warplanes, missiles, tanks, advanced weaponry, and whatever other ammunition they have at their disposal. The country is subjected to this fresh violence after having gone through a protracted phase of tussles between the civilian groups and armed forces over the transfer of power. Both generals are fighting to exclude each other from power, monopolise authority for themselves, and extend their political and military influence across the country. As a result of the current conflict, Sudan’s bumpy transition to democracy seems to have come to a halt.
It could be recalled that after the removal of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, a Transitional Military Council (TMC) made up of civilians, represented by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and the army, was established in August 2019, and Abdalla Hamdok, a former World Bank executive, was made Prime Minister.[ii] But later in October 2021, Hamdok was removed in a political coup plotted jointly by Al-Burhan and Dagalo. The removal of Hamdok was followed by large-scale street protests seeking an immediate transfer of power to the civilian authority. Thereafter a prolonged phase of political uncertainty and intense negotiations between TMC and FFC followed, and at last a Final Political Framework Agreement was prepared, which was scheduled to be signed on 1 April 2023,[iii] and 6 and 11 April were fixed for the signing of the interim constitution and the installation of the new civilian transitional government, respectively.[iv]
The fighting started on April 15 when RSF invaded Merowe town in the north of the capital city and tried to capture the airport there. In the ongoing conflict, more than six hundred people have lost their lives including school children and women; millions have been rendered homeless; and hundreds of thousands have fled the country in search of a safe shelter in contiguous countries like Chad, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Egypt. Much of the fighting is taking place in urban areas, and both sides are trying to take control of each other’s facilities and soldier camps, which are close to residential zones. Civilian casualties are rising, critical infrastructure like hospitals and schools are being targeted, and people are subjected to severe water and electricity crises. Incidents of looting and rampage are constantly coming from the ground, and both sides are using civilians as shields against the assault of each other. Citizens in the war zones are being forced to take sides in the power tussle between the two. Dagalo is claiming himself to be an anti-Islamist, while Al-Burhan is claiming to be the protector of the Sudanese revolution.[v] The conflict is likely to spread across the region, and the power struggle between the two seems to be acquiring an ethnic dimension. There is apprehension that this violence might soon turn into a full-fledged ethnic war, as seen in the past. There are reports that the forces of Dagalo are already targeting non-Arab African tribes in the Darfur region.
In last one month since the clash began, many ceasefires have been declared but have failed to stop the mutual attacks, and many parts of the country are still witnessing airstrikes and shelling. The first round of Saudi-US-led negotiations has failed to achieve any visible outcome except both sides agreeing to facilitate emergency humanitarian assistance[vi] as neither side is ready to lay down arms with both believing that victory for them is very much around. Israel has also invited both warring factions to Jerusalem to hold direct negotiations.[vii]In response, one of the advisors of Dagalo said that Sudan is exposed to a similar threat that Israel has been facing for decades and alleged that Islamic extremist groups of Omar Al-Bashir’s era have further strengthened under the patronage of Al-Burhan.[viii]
Hamdan Dagalo is an untrained army professional but has gradually achieved the higher military rank without graduating from any military college. [ix] Currently, Dagalo is leading the RSF, which was created as a state proxy or militia in 2013 by Omar al-Bashir to suppress the rebellion in Darfur, and Dagalo, then a veteran Janjaweed commander,[x]was elected its leader. His forces allegedly committed all sorts of atrocities against the rebel forces in Darfur. Later in 2017, RSF was codified by state law. [xi] Gradually, the group enhanced its position, particularly after it became part of the state apparatus.[xii]Over the years, its arsenal, business, and intervention in several affairs of the country increased. Today, Dagalo heads a contingent of almost 200,000 trained tribal militias and is in control of major gold mines in the country. The current conflict between the two can be attributed to ambitions to have control over these resources. Sudan is also rich in fertile lands, water, uranium mines, gas, and more, due to the presence of the huge amount of untapped wealth[xiii] in the country, which is also dragging these two to the battlefield.
On the other hand, Al-Burhan is a trained army personnel and has been at the helm of national politics since the ouster of Al-Bashir.Presently, he has an Army at his disposal, which ranks 75th on the list of the most powerful armies in the world[xiv] with a force of 205,000 soldiers and owns 191warplanes and 170 tanks.[xv]
Both Al-Burhan and Dagalo coexisted in partnership for more than three years to delay the democratic process, and in the removal of Omar Al-Bashir, Dagalo’s RSF had played an equally significant role. RSF was also involved in the June 2019 massacre, when hundreds of protestors were killed during a sit-in against the delay in the handover of power to the civilian authority Over a period, the war of supremacy and rising ambition to monopolise power led to tensions between the two. Today both have differences over the modalities of governance, and the principal rift revolves around the mechanism of the integration of the RSF into the Sudanese regular army. Al-Burhan wants the process of integration to be completed within two years, while Dagalo is seeking a ten-year timeframe for the final assimilation of the RSF into the Sudanese army.[xvi]Both also differ over the command and control of the armed forces; Dagalo wants the RSF to be accountable to the civilian authority, while Al-Burhan wants to keep the RSF under the control of the armed forces.[xvii] Recently, a new blame game also started as Dagalo accused Al-Burhan of installing al-Bashir’s men in key positions and trying to exclude him from the political process.[xviii]
Amidst the growing differences between Dagalo and Al-Burhan, there were some visible divisions among the civilian groups which further empowered Al-Burhan and offered him a new opportunity to renege on the democratic process and consolidate his position against Dagalo.
The last decade of conflictual politics in the region has shown that no act is devoid of external or regional intervention and the same holds true in today’s Sudan. In its first major strike against its external adversaries, RSF on April 13, 2023 stormed into an Egyptian army base near Khartoum and captured many of its soldiers, accusing them of fighting along with Al-Burhan’s army.[xix]The support of Egypt for Al-Burhan can be attributed to Egypt’s current battle over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with Ethiopia, as the regime of Al-Burhan could be very instrumental in resolving the crisis.
There are reports that the head of the RSF, Dagalo, enjoys a good relationship with the Russian mercenary Wagner Group, which is reportedly extending full military support to the RSF in preventing Al-Burhan from controlling the country’s gold mines.[xx]The Russian Wagner Group is reportedly engaged in similar gold mine exploration operations in other African countries as well to support the Russian war in Ukraine. For the sake of having access to the gold mines in Sudan, the UAE too is facilitating the dominance of the RSF, and in October 2022, the country has made an investment of half a billion dollars in Sudanese gold enterprises. It can also be recalled that it was the RSF that had joined the UAE forces in their war in Yemen.[xxi] As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, it does not seem to be taking sides in this war, unlike the UAE or Egypt, because it cannot afford to enter into a fresh conflict after its long and exhaustive war in Yemen and, moreover,its recent decision to revisit its overall regional policy.
Given the complexity of current politics and the proliferating dimensions of the ongoing conflict, it seems difficult to say precisely anything about the timeframe of the end of the war. For both Al-Burhan and Dagalo, this is a very decisive moment for their political survival, and perhaps no one knows better than them that if they lose the ground at such a critical juncture, their revival or reinforcement would almost be impossible in the future. The crisis can only be resolved if some mediation efforts involving all stakeholders succeed, and this can only happen if all actors are promised an equal distribution of powers and national resources. The examples of Yemen, Syria, and Libya are before us, where it took more than a decade to see some reduction or ease in conflict, while many had then predicted that the conflict would end soon. What adds further to the complexity of the ongoing conflict in Sudan is that it is a war between the two generals, and this peculiarity renders the ceasefire or the end of the crisis more tricky.The current clash is in part the result of a power tussle between two autocrats who command vast armies and control huge resources, and in addition, the current political vacuum has paved the way for these two to dictate the trajectory of national politics for their own narrow political and economic gains.
India has very old political tie with the country and over the years India’s economic relation and development cooperation has also deepened. Since 2021, India has established 49 bilateral projects in Sudan in field of energy, transport and agribusinesses on concessional credit terms. The Red Sea region is also crucial to India’s maritime security strategy and hence from maritime security point of view, stability in and around Sudan are very significant for India. The current crisis in Sudan put thousands of Indian lives in danger. Soon after the fighting intensified, India launched its ‘Kaveri’ operation to evacuate Indian workers employed in different companies there and almost 3800 Indians have been successfully evacuated by sea and by air. In this operation India worked with the government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. India’s prime interest has been to secure the safety of its citizens in Sudan. India has supported UN’s call for ceasfire through diplomatic process and the next step of creating corridors for safe movement of people.
The situation in Sudan continues to unfold as the clashes continue. The ongoing violent and armed power struggle in Sudan acquire a deeper significance given its strategic location in a volatile region bordering Red Sea, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa and creates yet another hot-spot in a world characterised by geopolitical turmoil and fissures.
*****
*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Sovereign Council was formed in October 2021 after Hamdok was removed
[ii]Sudan Created a Paramilitary Forces to Destroy Government Threats-but it became a major threat itself, The Conversation, April 23, 2023, accessedhttps://bit.ly/3MdnDmZMay 2, 2023.
[iii]Sudan Created a Paramilitary Forces to Destroy Government Threats-but it became a major threat itself, The Conversation, April 23, 2023, accessed https://bit.ly/3MdnDmZMay 2, 2023.
[iv]Nada Wanni, A Political Press Besieged, Sudan Transparency and Political Tracker, April, 2023.
[v] Ahmad Soliman & Yusuf Hassan, Resolving Sudan’s Crisis Means Removing Those Fighting, Chatham House, April 21, 2023, accessed https://bit.ly/3LRIg6Z May 2, 2023.
[vi] Jennifer Hansler, Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Forces Sign Agreement, CNN, 11 May 2023, accessed https://cnn.it/42LIzqL May 12, 2023
[vii]Israeli Mediation Offer to Two Generals, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 25, 2023, accessed https://bit.ly/44IieLY May 11, 2023.
[viii]Israeli Mediation Offer to Two Generals, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 25, 2023, accessed https://bit.ly/44IieLY May 11, 2023.
[ix]Abdul Bari Atwan, War in Yemen Ends and another Begins in Sudan,Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 17, 2023, https://bit.ly/3plVoJP May 6, 2023.
[x] Janjaweed are the Arab armed militia from Darfur region in western Sudan.
[xi]Ahmad Soliman & Yusuf Hassan, Resolving Sudan’s Crisis Means Removing Those Fighting, Chatham House, April 21, 2023, accessed https://bit.ly/3LRIg6Z May 2, 2023.
[xii]QasiHamroor, Clanging of Weapons and Noise of Politics, Al-Taghyeer (An Arabic Daily) April 20, 2023, accessed https://bit.ly/42JgTTw May 2, 2023.
[xiii]Egyptian Analyst: Don’t leave Sudan Alone, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), May 9, 2023,accessed https://bit.ly/3pyttGC May 11, 2023.
[xiv]Abdul Bari Atwan, War in Yemen Ends and another Begins in Sudan, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 17, 2023,https://bit.ly/3plVoJP May 6, 2023.
[xv]Abdul Bari Atwan, War in Yemen Ends and another Begins in Sudan, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 17, 2023,https://bit.ly/3plVoJP May 6, 2023.
[xvi]Nada Wanni, A Political Press Besieged, Sudan Transparency and Political Tracker, April, 2023.
[xvii]Ahmad Soliman & Yusuf Hassan, Resolving Sudan’s Crisis Means Removing Those Fighting, Chatham House, April 21, 2023, accessedhttps://bit.ly/3LRIg6Z May 2, 2023.
[xviii]Sudan Created a Paramilitary Forces to Destroy Government Threats-but it became a major threat itself, The Conversation, April 23, 2023, accessedhttps://bit.ly/3MdnDmZMay8, 2023.
[xix]Abdul Bari Atwan, War in Yemen Ends and another Begins in Sudan, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 17, 2023,https://bit.ly/3plVoJP May 6, 2023.
[xx]Abdul Bari Atwan, War in Yemen Ends and another Begins in Sudan, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 17, 2023,https://bit.ly/3plVoJP May 6, 2023.
[xxi]Abdul Bari Atwan, War in Yemen Ends and another Begins in Sudan, Rail Youm (An Arabic Daily), April 17, 2023,https://bit.ly/3plVoJP May 6, 2023.