Introduction
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has already entered its second year with no sign of an early end after it began in February 2022. When the Russian forces entered Ukraine territory in February 2022, which the global media in general termed an ‘invasion’ while Russian President Vladimir Putin called a ‘Special Military Operation’. It was not assumed that this military adventure would last for so long. Instead of past predictions about the end of the war, one is now only hearing about different strategic options to end this war at the earliest as was the case earlier. The situation on the battlefield is so uncertain and complex that many have their own misgivings about whether this conflict could remain confined to a conventional war alone, and if so, for how long, or whether this would at any time turn into a nuclear war.
The current conflict does not appear to be a Russia-Ukraine military encounter alone, as the US, along with its EU and NATO allies, declared their support for Ukraine soon after the intrusion of Russian forces into Ukraine.[i] Today, anti-Russian rhetoric has been adopted by most of the NATO ad EU allies reflecting the geostrategic, geopolitical, and geo-economic interest of respective countries inhabiting the conflict zone. Currently, the growing and explicit involvement of regional and global powers with different means and objectives is shaping and determining the trajectory of the conflict.
Given Turkiye’s geographical proximity and its strategic location around the war zone, it was perhaps never feasible for the country to either be a party to the conflict or remain an onlooker. Over the years, Turkiye has emerged as one of the most important allies of Russia, and the years of evolving affinity between the two now seem to determine Turkiye’s current stance towards Russia.
Likewise, Ukraine too has remained a close ally of Turkiye. Today, Turkiye is providing a substantial amount of weaponry to Ukraine, including Bayraktar’s TB2 drones, which is significantly helping Ukraine to confront the Russian assault.[ii] It is widely reported that the Turkish drones have delayed the inevitable ascendency of Russia on the battlefield. Since the inception of the conflict, Turkiye has not only called for a de-escalation but was the first to host both Russia and Ukraine for mediation. It played a significant role in the conclusion of the grain deal and prisoner swaps.
This paper primarily aims to explore the contours of the Turkish role in the current conflict and what are the fears, pressures, or advantages prompting Turkiye to invoke its diplomatic and strategic influence in this conflict. The paper also intends to examine how Turkiye, as a NATO member and an EU aspirant country, is navigating an evolving complex geostrategic framework and how far it will succeed in maintaining its neutrality if the orbit of the conflict expands.
Current Conflict and Turkiye’s Mediation:
Given Turkiye’s location on the Black Sea, its geopolitical intersection with both Russia and Ukraine and its burgeoning geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region, it was difficult for Turkiye to remain oblivious to the emergence of new geostrategic realities in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The emerging scenarios first forced Turkiye not to be a part of the conflict and later prompted it to act to end the conflict. Turkiye sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis as both countries are its important allies. Moreover, the region around Turkiye is already surrounded by a series of conflicts, like Azerbaijan-Armenia in the east, Syria in the south, Greece and the Mediterranean crisis, and now Russia-Ukraine in the north, posing a set of security, economic, and political threats to the country.
In pursuit of a preemptive peace drive, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ukraine on February 3, 2022, before the outbreak of the conflict and pledged to host the leaders of Russia and Ukraine to de-escalate the tension.[iii] Later in the first week of the war, on March 1, 2022, Erdogan held a comprehensive telephonic conversation with his Belarusian counterpart, Lukashenko, and offered his services to broker a deal between Russia and Ukraine.[iv] Soon after the war unfolded further, Turkiye positioned itself as a mediator because of its intimacy with both Russia and Ukraine. For the first time, Turkiye hosted Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Kuleba on March 12, 2022, on the side lines of the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, which is an annual diplomatic affair in Turkiye. The meeting was also attended by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu.[v] After the meeting, it was decided that the next round of negotiations would be held in Belarus, where both sides would take the negotiation further, but in future negotiations like Antalya Diplomatic Forum talk , no tangible result could be achieved. The Antalya talks failed to move ahead because Ukraine refused to jettison its objective of joining NATO and recognise Crimea as a part of the Russian Federation, as sought by Russia. It is worth recalling here that the Antalya talks were an outcome of prolonged Turkish efforts when Erdogan had not only called for an immediate ceasefire but also campaigned hard for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor with both of his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts, Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, respectively.[vi]
On March 28–29, 2022, a fresh round of talks was held at Dominance Palace on the Bosphorus Strait (Turkiye) between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian side was represented by Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich, who was later, along with many other Russians, sanctioned by the Western countries. This negotiation too suffered the fate of Antalya talk as both sides refused to accommodate the concerns of each other. Turkish President Erdogan had then said that Turkiye had a historic responsibility to stop the current fighting.[vii] Late in November of the same year, CIA Director William Burns travelled to Turkiye to meet his Russian counterpart, Sergey Naryshkin.[viii]
Soon the scope of Turkish mediation started expanding, and after its ceasefire efforts, Turkiye, along with the UN Secretary-General, played a consequential role in the signing of the Black Sea Grain deal in July 2022. Under the deal, Russia was obliged to open three Ukraine ports (Odessa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhne), blocked by the Russian navy since February, for the export of grains to Asian and African countries, which are largely dependent on Ukraine grains. A four-party coordination centre was established under the agreement with its headquarters in Istanbul to prevent arms smuggling in the guise of grain exports.[ix] The deal was hailed by the UN Secretary-General as a ‘beacon of hope’, a possibility, and relief.[x]
The grain deal came as a major diplomatic victory for Turkiye which was concluded only after a month of telephonic diplomacy between Erdogan and his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. Soon after the successful conclusion of the deal, President Erdogan, in mid-August, visited Lviv, a Polish-Ukrainian border town on the Ukrainian side, and met UN Secretary-General and his Ukrainian counterpart in a fresh bid to de-escalate the tension.[xi]
The same grain deal was further extended in November 2022, as the July deal was merely for a three-month period. The deal was renewed again because of Turkish mediation efforts, and the renewed deal was finally signed on November 2, 2022. Hailing the deal, President Putin congratulated Erdogan for the extension of the deal and called him the champion of the world’s poorer countries. The deal has got two-month extension once again after it expired in March this year and again the role of Turkiye along with UN Secretary-General was visible. According to David Beasley, Executive Director of the UN World Food Programme, out of a total of 400 million people dependent on Ukrainian grain, 36 million are likely to benefit from this deal. Russia, before the last renewal had said that the deal has failed to yield any tangible outcome and would not be renewed further if it does not serve the interests of real grain producers.
It is worth mentioning here that an unprecedented hike in natural gas has caused a 45% reduction in the production of ammonia and urea—two major components of agriculture—in Europe, with a huge impact on grain production.[xii] Turkiye not only pressed for the export of Ukrainian grain but also called for allowing Russian exports of grain and fertilisers. It urged the international community to allow the return of Russian banks to the SWIFT system and pressed for easing sanctions against it.[xiii] In addition, Turkiye was also actively involved in the prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine last July, when Russia agreed to set free a few Ukraine leaders detained in Russian Azovstal steel mills in Moscow and were on death row.[xiv] Recently, Erdogan also called for the opening of humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to leave the war-affected zones in Ukraine.
Turkiye’s Balancing Act between Russia and Ukraine: An Indispensable and Lone Option
Since the inception of the conflict, Turkiye has found itself both diplomatically and strategically stuck between the two warring nations because it enjoys deep economic and political ties with Ukraine and also maintains a complex but indispensable relationship with Russia. Despite its claims of neutrality in the current conflict, Turkiye’s multi-level engagement with both the warring sides could be attributed to Turkish decades-old economic and strategic stakes in both Russia and Ukraine.
The disputed province of Crimea was once an integral part of the larger Ottoman Empire. Even today, around 5 million Crimean Tatars live in Turkiye. Turkiye did not recognise Crimea as a part of Russia after it was integrated into the Russian Federation in 2014. Since 2017, both Turkiye and Ukraine have had a passport-free entry system for their citizens, and only a national identity card is required for entering each other’s country.[xv] A week before the conflict, both Ukraine and Turkiye had signed a free trade agreement, with the promise of doubling the current volume of trade worth 4.5 billion Euros. In 2021, Turkiye was the largest foreign investor in Ukraine with an investment of 4.1 billion Euros.[xvi] Currently, around 700 Turkish companies are operational in Ukraine, and Turkcell, a Turkish brand, owns the third largest mobile operation in Ukraine.[xvii] Turkiye is also dependent on both Ukraine and Russia for grains, and around 13.4% of Turkish grain imports come from Ukraine.[xviii] The country is a major destination for Ukrainian tourists and consequently a vital source of foreign reserves. Only after the success story of Turkish Barakat drones on the battlefield did Ukraine order the import of Turkish-made warships to bolster its defence position in the ongoing conflict with Russia in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.[xix] Turkiye has a plan to join Ukraine in its production of Ukrainian Antonov aircraft and invest in the Ukrainian engine manufacturer Motor Sich.[xx] Over the years, Turkiye has expanded the orbit of military cooperation with Ukraine, and before eth outbreak of the conflict, two sides had signed a series of memorandums of cooperation in the field of armaments and defence industries. That time only, Turkiye was very close to concluding a defence deal with Ukraine for manufacturing the fighter plane after it had been removed from a joint US-Turkiye manufacturing of the F-35 in the wake of the Turkish S-400 Missile Deal with Russia. But now this deal might be jeopardised, and its revival might take time. Ukraine is playing a major role in the military industrialisation of Turkiye, and today it is a major supplier of defence equipment to Turkiye. During Erdogan’s February 3, 2022, visit to Ukraine, several strategic documents were signed to boost defence cooperation between the two.[xxi]
The current Ukraine-Turkiye affinity can be owed to the common threat perceptions shared by both in the wake of the growing military presence of Russia in the Black Sea region and an unprecedented militarisation of Crimea. Turkish policy seems more driven by its defined strategy of not allowing Russia to expand across its own sphere of influence.
Like Ukraine, Turkiye’s economic and geopolitical necessities vis-à-vis Russia seem to prevent Turkiye from joining the Western anti-Russian chorus despite being a NATO ally. Turkiye, despite being a NATO member, is more geared towards maintaining a balance with both sides as it shares the maritime border with both in the Black Sea.
Both Russia and Turkiye have, in the recent past, had convergence on complex issues in the volatile WANA and Mediterranean regions. At present, Turkish trade with Russia is six times higher than it is with Ukraine. Turkiye imports more than a third of its energy requirements from Russia. In 2021, Russia’s export of natural gas to Turkiye increased by 63%, and it again emerged as the largest supplier of gas to the Turkish market.[xxii] Russia is involved in the construction of the first-ever Turkish nuclear energy station, which would cover around 30% of Turkiye’s energy needs by 2030.[xxiii] There are 150 Turkish projects worth $21 billion underway in Russia.[xxiv] Russia is a source of around 64.6% of total Turkish grain, and like Ukraine, it is a major destination for Russian tourists, and overall Turkish tourism sector accounts for 4% of Turkish GDP.[xxv]
After Germany, Turkiye is the biggest investor in the Russian real estate sector. Due to an already diving economic graph and declining tourism, Turkiye cannot afford to enter into any direct conflict with Russia, either by openly siding with Ukraine or joining the Western sanctions.
Current Conflict and the Turkish Economy: A Story of Loss and Gain
Since the inception of the conflict, the biggest challenge for Turkiye has been to prevent the further decline of its economy. Turkiye’s balancing act and hectic mediation efforts could also be seen in the light of its concern for the adverse impact on its already tattering economy. To evade the economic impact of the conflict, Turkiye did not join the anti-Russia sanction club, which imposed a series of sanctions against Russia, most prominently economic ones. The economic sanctions against Russia could have inflicted unprecedented damage to Turkiye’s own banking sectors; its business, trade, and commerce could have been under scanner if the orbit of sanctions would expand further, what are referred to as secondary sanctions.[xxvi]
As mentioned earlier, today Turkiye runs a large number of economic ventures in Ukraine and Russia, and over the years, the country has worked to diversify its economic engagement with both. The Turkish tourism sector is likely to be affected most because of the ongoing conflict and harsh sanctions against Russia. In 2021, around 3 million Russian tourists visited Turkiye, but this number would drastically come down amid the crisis. Russia spends around $70 billion a year on travel and tourism in Turkiye,[xxvii] and any disequilibrium would cast Turkiye dearly. A Joint Tourism Action Plan was signed between Russia and Turkiye in 2021[xxviii] to boost tourism, but it is likely to witness a downward trend. A series of sanctions against Russia have already dissociated the country from “Swift”, causing a further devaluation of the Lira and inflation in Turkiye. The Turkish lira is reported to have lost 5% of its value immediately after news of Russian military intervention started flashing.[xxix]
Over the years, Ukraine had emerged as a major destination for Turkish agricultural exports, most prominently vegetables, and it was also a significant source of Turkish agricultural imports. In 2021, Turkiye received 80% of its grain imports from Russia and Ukraine alone.[xxx] But the crisis has weakened this trade, and Turkish grain markets are bearing the brunt of dislocations in the supply chain.[xxxi] The disruption in Turkish agricultural exports to Russia and Ukraine might also affect the political prospects of President Erdogan in next month’s presidential elections because most of the vegetables and agricultural export items are grown in rural areas,[xxxii] which happen to be the vote base of the ruling AKP party. Turkiye is likely to lose a major source of revenue from Ukraine tourists, whose numbers in 2021 were 2 million.
There are some positive aspects as well for Turkiye in its economic prospects arising out of the current conflict. There are reports that Turkish territories are being used as an outlet or a conduit for Russian exports. Today, Turkiye is reported to have merged as a safe haven for Russian investments. Russia and Ukraine both have past experiences with local currency-based transactions to evade the sanctions, which today could yield a good economic outcome for both countries. There are reports that Russian oligarchs are using Turkiye as a safe haven to bypass the sanctions. Between January and September 2022, a large sum of untraceable foreign cash worth $24.9 billion has reportedly flown into Turkiye, helping the country to redress its current account deficit.[xxxiii]
The Russian Foreign Minister, in a statement recently, said that Russia-Turkiye trade in the first quarter of 2023 doubled, and there are talks of using the Russian MIR payment system in Turkiye to boost trade amid the sanction regime. After the imposition of Western sanctions against Russia, Erdogan urged Russia to switch to the national currencies or gold in their transactions in lieu of the dollar or Euro.[xxxiv] Reportedly, Russia opened thousands of new companies in Turkiye just within three months of the conflict.[xxxv] Russia is already planning to shift the headquarters of its 43 leading ventures from their current European locations to Turkiye. Further, while Europe is badly hit by the energy deficit and exorbitant price hike, Turkiye is enjoying both easy access and getting Russian energy on a lesser price . In 2022, Russia not only accounted for 45% of the energy requirement of Turkiye but also agreed to defer its payment until 2024.[xxxvi] Russia has also proposed that Turkiye become a hub for the sale of Russian energy to European markets, which of course would be a major economic boon for the country.
Turkiye, NATO, and Current Conflict
When the conflict broke out, the biggest challenge for Turkiye was to evade the politics of encampment, and Turkiye was able to overcome it. Turkiye could not be dragged into one single camp because it had good working relations with both Russia and Ukraine despite being a NATO member.
Amid the conflict, Turkiye continues to supply its sophisticated Bayraktar drones, along with MRAP vehicles and a multi-launch rocket system, to Ukraine.[xxxvii] It also closed the Bosphorus straits within days of the conflict, and in turn, Ukraine President Zelensky thanked President Erdogan for this favour and stressed that the people of Ukraine will never forget this. [xxxviii] Turkiye did not approve of Russia’s Special Operation in Ukraine and termed the Russian invasion a war[xxxix] and a blatant violation of international law. Turkiye also rejected Russian recognition of the independence of Donetsk and the Luhansk People’s Republic.[xl] Turkiye also took part in the Alliance’s decision to bolster its deterrence and defence in the face of an unfolding crisis. Turkiye also hailed NATO’s position on Ukrainian sovereignty and its territorial integrity.[xli]
Meanwhile, Turkiye did not hesitate in expressing its displeasure over the imposition of Western sanctions against Russia.[xlii] Along with siding with Ukraine, Turkiye also accused the West of imposing war against Russia and called the current conflict a provocative one.[xliii] Erdogan said that those who are undermining Russia are wrong, and the weapons Ukraine is receiving from the West are merely scraps.[xliv] Turkiye only joined UNSC-approved sanctions against Russia and kept its burgeoning economic relations with Russia unaffected. In October 2022, Turkiye’s exports to Russia jumped to 86%, while imports from Russia doubled.[xlv]
Turkiye has more than once asserted that its defence cooperation with Ukraine does not affect its relations with Russia. Both Putin and Erdogan seem to offer a unique model of political engagement. After their open confrontations in Syria, Azerbaijan, and Libya, the two leaders are often seen sitting, negotiating, and working out a solution to the current crisis.
Being the guardian of the Black Sea, Turkiye closed its straits to Russian military vessels within days of the crisis. When Turkiye was criticised for this, its official statement said that the time of war differs from the time of peace. Similarly, when Russia expressed its displeasure over the Turkish supply of drones to Ukraine, Turkiye remarked that it sells its weapons to all customers and that this does not mean that it is aligning with Ukraine. It is as similar as the PKK in northern Syria, which is seen using Russian and American weapons. [xlvi]
Despite its seeking EU membership and being a NATO ally, the country projected itself as an honest mediator between Russia and Ukraine and hosted a series of meetings between the two countries. It was because of Turkiye’s membership in NATO and its proximity to both camps that the Western sanctions were selectively eased for grain shipment across the Ukrainian ports. Turkiye is an important member of NATO, but often it has pursued a policy independent of NATO and even counter to the position of its US and European allies (Russia and Iran are cases in point). Its stand-alone or segregated policy is once again well evident today.
Turkiye has leveraged its connectivity to both the Russian and US camps to enhance its position as a regional power. The conflict and Turkish mediation helped mend Turkiye-NATO ties to some extent after years of frosty relations due to differences on a series of strategic and diplomatic issues. These mediations and diplomatic manoeuvres by Turkiye amid the conflict are likely to help Turkiye reinvent itself, particularly when many NATO members have already questioned its credibility as a member of the Trans-Atlantic alliance.
Turkiye is still haunted by the conspicuous silence of NATO when the country was almost on the verge of war with Russia in 2015 after it mistakenly shot down a Russian fighter plane. The current conflict has further deepened Turkish faith in its own geostrategic capability and its diplomatic, cultural, and economic strengths.
Turkiye has been appreciated by the US and its Western allies for acting as an honest broker, and senior American diplomats have made several visits to Turkiye since the conflict started. US officials have even suggested that Turkiye transfer its S-400 missile system to Ukraine.[xlvii] Western countries see Turkiye as the only capable country that could deter the conflict from spilling over into larger European territories. The current situation has also elevated the diplomatic stature of Turkiye in the eyes of Russia, which is increasingly reliant on Turkiye as a lone window to the Western world. Turkiye has emerged as a country that can address Russia, NATO, the West, and the US in an equal manner.
Conclusion
As the current conflict, defying all the predictions about the timespan of the war, has already entered its second year, Turkiye has gradually become a swing player. Today, the country is involved, both willingly and forcefully, in the conflict on numerous fronts, from weapons supply to Ukraine to energy cooperation with Russia to standing with NATO despite some reservations to serving as a diplomatic hub for most negotiations, rendering it the most active and front player in the emerging strategic template.
The extent of Turkish involvement has come both as a challenge and an opportunity for it. On the economic front, Turkiye seems to be both a loser and a gainer. If Turkiye, because of the conflict, has lost some outlets for its agricultural exports and tourism, it has meanwhile deepened its economic and energy ties with Russia, which continue to benefit it. Because of its emergence as a major energy hub for Russian gas, Turkiye has evaded the energy crisis being suffered by many European countries. No doubt, Turkiye has been able to mend its past bitter ties with NATO and other EU countries but has failed to win the full trust of Russia and is still seen by Russia as a close NATO ally. Despite all its affinity with Russia and its refusal to join the sanctions, Turkiye, like NATO, has also termed the Russian military operation a war and, after early reluctance, decided on the closure of straits for Russian warships, which contradicted Turkish claim of being an honest or neutral actor in Russian eyes.
Further Turkish mediation efforts in the grain deal and prisoner swap are likely to enhance expectations among stakeholders. How Turkiye would fulfill these expectations without antagonising its old allies would be another challenge.
Until now, Turkiye has succeeded in maintaining equidistance from the battlefields of both Russia and Ukraine. It remains to be seen if it could continue with the present level of neutrality if the war drags on for a long time. Turkiye might also confront the challenge of preserving its economic interests and containing the security threat to itself in case the tension further intensifies. Turkiye may then be faced with the binary option of choosing between Russia and Ukraine or between NATO and Russia. Of all, an immediate challenge for Turkiye is the presidential election next month (May 14). The conflict, its economic impact, and the emanating security threat have all the potential to be used by Erdogan’s political opponents to narrow the prospects of his victory. For President Erdogan, this election is a question of his political legacy and an imprint on the political history of Turkiye.
*****
*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui is a Senior Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
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