Background
On 28 December 2022, Republic of Korea unveiled the details of its first ever official “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”.[1] The release of the document followed the initial announcement made by President Yoon Suk-yeol on 11 November 2022, at Cambodia during the ASEAN Summit.[2] This unveiling of the Indo-Pacific Strategy means that the Republic of Korea has joined the ever-growing list of countries with official documents on the Indo-Pacific.
Amongst ROK’s neighbours and partners, Japan under late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was the first one to announce its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” at Kenya in August 2016. Even Australia had welcomed the Indo-Pacific geostrategic framework in 2017 through their Foreign Policy White Paper,[3] following which, the United States of America (USA) under former President Donald J. Trump had outlined a vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in November 2017 at Vietnam.[4] India followed suit when Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore during June 2018.[5] The ASEAN grouping had itself adopted the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” in June 2019.[6] Naturally, persisting questions had arisen as to why ROK being one of the central Indo-Pacific countries had delayed advocating their vision of the concept.
Embracing the Indo-Pacific
Instead of directly addressing the Indo-Pacific geostrategic framework, the previous administration under Moon Jae-in had introduced the New Southern Policy (NSP) in 2017. This was at the peak time when countries, such as, Japan, Australia, USA, and India were advocating the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region or were on the verge of announcing their own Indo-Pacific visions through official documents. ROK, instead focused on seeking elevation of its relations with ASEAN and India in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres through the NSP.[7]
Under President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration since May 2022, the aspirations of ROK on becoming a “Global Pivotal State” occupied centre-stage space. Aiming to develop into a “Global Pivotal State” means ROK would set a target of advancing “freedom, peace and prosperity” based on “liberal democratic values and substantial cooperation”.[8] Aspiring to become a “Global Pivotal State” also means that ROK would actively seek out agendas for cooperation and play a larger role in shaping discussions regionally as well as globally.[9] It is important to highlight that the same theme resonates throughout the Indo-Pacific strategy that was unveiled on 28 December 2022. The title of the document “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific”, takes forward the objectives of the “Global Pivotal State”. This Strategy is designed to enhance South Korea's engagement in the Indo-Pacific, an important region for the country due to its economic and security significance.
The new government introduced the “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” based on reviews of how the former NSP of 2017 by the previous administration under Moon Jae-in had not been implemented as effectively. There were challenges in terms of budget allocation, as well as lack of coordination and cooperation amongst the different government agencies responsible for implementing it. In terms of security aspects, the NSP was criticised as being inadequate to incorporate the complexities of the region as well as the different interests of the countries involved. Critically important security issues that were clearly not addressed in the NSP were the South China Sea disputes as well as the North Korean nuclear and arms proliferation crisis. Overall, the NSP was overcompensated with economic diplomacy while circumventing even the slightest indication of mitigating security-based issues.
With the unveiling of the new strategy for the Indo-Pacific, ROK has now declared itself as an Indo-Pacific nation. Through the strategy document for Indo-Pacific, Seoul has prominently addressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific as home to many key strategic shipping routes upon which a significant portion of ROK’s trade is dependent. South China Sea is specifically described as a “key sea route” which accounts for around 64 per cent and 46 per cent of ROK’s crude oil transport and natural gas transport, respectively.[10] North Korea’s advancement of nuclear and missile capabilities is perceived as a threat not only to the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific but also for the entire global community.[11] The strategy document also emphasises upon the technological dependence that the global community has upon the Indo-Pacific region, as it hosts some of the key partners for strategic industries manufacturing semiconductors. The formulation of the Indo-Pacific strategy by ROK has therefore unveiled a “comprehensive regional strategy encompassing the realms of the economy and security”.[12]
Main Components of ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
The “Strategy for Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” is divided into four parts. The first part provides a backgrounder on the strategic significance of the Indo-Pacific for ROK. The second part emphasises the vision, principles of cooperation and regional scope of their Indo-Pacific strategy. The third part highlights the nine core lines of effort that ROK will pursue to implement the strategy. The final part being the conclusion wherein ROK predicts that its efforts will enhance their foreign policy approach and expand the horizon of their partnerships.
First part: Strategic Importance of the Indo-Pacific
The first part of ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy document elucidates what is now common understanding regarding the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific being linked with the realms of economy and security. For ROK, the document illustrates that the Indo-Pacific accounts for approximately 78 per cent of its total exports and 67 per cent of their total imports, majority of which passes through key strategic shipping routes (Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait and the South China Sea). In addition, it highlights that ROK’s top 20 trading partners are located in the Indo-Pacific itself, and how 66 per cent of ROK’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) traverses towards the Indo-Pacific countries. Thus, highlighting the extremely close ties that ROK has as well as the need to further secure the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy calls for a collective effort to find common solutions and the need to build a sustainable, resilient regional order.
Second part: Vision and Regional scope
The second part of the strategy document provides a vision for achieving a “free, peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific”.[13] The document stress that ROK would do so primarily through upholding the international norms and strengthening of the rules based-order based on universal values such as “freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights”.[14] Outrightly ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy takes a stand against any act of force or coercion to unilaterally change the status quo. The notable process of implementing the vision which ROK will be adopting are based on three principles of cooperation – “inclusiveness, trust, and reciprocity”.[15] It has specifically denoted that ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy will neither target nor exclude any specific nation and will remain open to nations with common interests. Case in point would be neighbouring China, with whom it is complex to understand ROK’s position but the document states that China is a key partner for “achieving prosperity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region”.[16] It is most likely that ROK would continue to endeavour to engage China through economic diplomacy to eventually find issues-based mutual resolutions.
The second part of the strategy document also showcases how ROK’s foreign policy regional scope has evolved from the former NSP’s vision. It has vocalised the need to expand diplomatic horizon beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. ROK is expected to deepen strategic cooperation with key regions in the Indo-Pacific, which includes Southeast Asia, South Asia, the African coast of the Indian Ocean, through a network of strategic partnerships tailor-made to each region to eventually build a framework of cooperation for the Indo-Pacific. The strategy document has also emphasised upon working closely with Europe and Latin America to promote a peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific.[17] Apart from the traditional strengthening of ROK-US alliance being promoted within the North Pacific region, it is the statement regarding Japan, Canada and Mongolia which has evoked a novel rationale in ROK’s approach. The importance of seeking a forward-looking partnership with Japan, supportive of common interests and values will prospectively advance bilateral security cooperation in the Korean Peninsula amidst the North Korean threat. Through a comprehensive strategic partnership with Canada, ROK is looking towards “increased cooperation on climate change response, economic security through stabilized supply chains”.[18] In pursuing strategic cooperation with Mongolia, ROK is looking to actively boost cooperation on supply chain issues, especially in relation to rare earth elements.[19] Mongolia being one of the top ten resource rich countries in the world is important for ROK if it were to reduce its dependence on China.
The announcement of the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) as a tailor-made regional policy for ASEAN within the framework of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, has solidified Seoul’s position on perceiving ASEAN as a key partner for building peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.[20] ROK has also reemphasised its support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). It is planning on increasing the ASEAN-ROK, Mekong-ROK cooperation funds that would lead to synchronising ASEAN’s needs with ROK’s strength. For the South Asia region, ROK considers India as leading regional partner with shared values. Seoul believes that India has a great potential for growth through its large working age population as well as cutting-edge IT and space technologies. ROK has indicated that it wants to increase strategic communication and cooperation with India through high-level exchanges in foreign affairs and defence aspects. There is also a recommendation in the document for upgrading the ROK-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to enhance bilateral relations.
For the Oceania region, the Indo-Pacific Strategy document lays down the importance of building ties not only with Australia and New Zealand but also with the Pacific Island Countries (PIC). There is an increasing emphasis that ROK has put forward in terms of addressing climate change, healthcare, oceans and fisheries, and renewable energy issues being faced by the Pacific islands. Seoul has indicated how it wants to assist the Pacific Island Countries in their priorities by supporting the 2050 Strategy for Blue Pacific Continent, as well as the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) initiative. With regard to the African coast of the Indian Ocean region, ROK is keen on elevating as well as deepening ties with countries along the eastern seaboard of Africa. This need for strengthening ties originates from the fact that ROK has to maintain a consistent presence especially along the African Coast of the Indian Ocean region to secure its maritime transport of crude oil, natural gas, coal and other mineral resource trade. The strategy document has mentioned that the ROK-Africa Special Summit will also be held in 2024, to further indicate Seoul’s priority of maintaining ties with African countries.
When it comes to Europe, it is suggested that ROK would seek heightened substantive cooperation with France and Germany. Furthermore, it has mentioned the United Kingdom, as a country with whom it shares core values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. One of the major outcomes is that Seoul from its relationship with Europe is to bolster partnership with NATO. Yoon Suk-yeol in June 2022 became the first ROK President to ever attend the NATO Summit. As a result, in November 2022, Seoul established its Embassy in Belgium as ROK’s Diplomatic Mission to NATO.[21] With the aspirations of becoming a “Global Pivotal State”, ROK is now looking to take advantage of NATO’s New Strategic concept of June 2022, which highlighted the importance of strengthening “dialogue and cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests”.[22]
ROK’s further outreach towards Latin American and Caribbean countries as mentioned in the Indo-Pacific Strategy can be seen in the light of how Seoul is targeting to achieve its objectives as a “Global Pivotal State” to “actively seek out agendas for cooperation and play a larger role in shaping discussions regionally as well as globally”.[23]
Third part: Nine Core Lines of Effort to Pursue
The third part of the document can be considered as outlining the most significant aspect of ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. It provides nine core lines of effort that ROK will adopt to implement the Indo-Pacific Strategy. These are given as:
From the details of the nine core lines, it can be interpreted that ROK is looking forward to increasing cooperation networks with the United States and Japan in order to tackle North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, supply chain disruptions, cyber-security, climate change, health crisis, and other emerging regional and global issues. Furthermore, it aims to promote rule of law and human rights, for which ROK has laid emphasis on the adherence to “the principles of international law and the covenants adopted by the United Nations” while addressing conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.[24]
In the fourth core line of effort, namely for expanding comprehensive security cooperation it can be seen that ROK is now openly addressing the security challenges of the 21st century. There is stress upon the need to implement disarmament and strengthen the non-proliferation norms in the Indo-Pacific especially in the context of North Korea. While acknowledging the inter-connectedness of the Indo-Pacific region by oceans, Seoul is seeking to expand its comprehensive security cooperation to reaffirm the importance of peace and stability in the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait for the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. The importance of adhering to the principles of international law enshrined in the UNCLOS 1982 has been firmly stated. There is a recommendation on facilitating real-time maritime information sharing and even developing a potential Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) system. Moreover, with an aim to enhance operations, improve interoperability, and bolster its warfighting capabilities ROK has underlined that it would regularly participate in multinational combined exercises hosted or joined by Indo-Pacific nations such as RIMPAC and the Pacific Dragon. Considering the significant number of cyber threats, the strategy document has reiterated ROK’s active participation in discussions at the UN to develop norms for ensuring a secure cyberspace.
One major highlight is the elucidation of how ROK wants to gradually expand nodes of cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Currently, the strategy document only mentions exploring of cooperation with the Quad in areas of infectious disease, climate change, and emerging technologies. In ROK’s perception, the Quad could be utilised as a platform to tackle comprehensive regional security threats and challenges. President Yoon Suk-yeol had emphasised his interest in the Quad in May 2022 during President Joe Biden’s visit to ROK.[25] Later in June 2022, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin attended the Asan Symposium to celebrate Korea-US 140 years of relations, he had stated ROK’s desire of promoting cooperation with the Quad.[26] It remains to be seen, how would the rest of the Quad members respond to ROK’s interest of joining.
Developing regional economic security networks have also been given an impetus in order to stabilise supply chains of strategic resources. The newly launched Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is being prospectively observed to evolve into an effective economic forum in the Indo-Pacific. Apart from the IPEF, it is stated that Seoul will be promoting free trade and address protectionism through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as well as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Through these platforms ROK is counting on joining global efforts in building an open and dynamic system of economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
With ROK being renowned as a global leader in science and technology, it comes as no surprise that they are aiming to fully utilise their expertise in critical fields such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum science, advanced biology, space and telecommunication, to close the digital gap in the Indo-Pacific region. These technologies will be vital for national security and essential for future competitiveness. The notion espoused is that ROK will be supporting various Indo-Pacific nations especially the developing countries to build high-end emerging technologies in full compliance with international rules, norms and values. This step is aimed to enable various developing countries to enhance digital access for the socially and economically vulnerable groups, and create greater digital connectivity.
One of the most pressing threats that is facing the global community at large is regarding climate change. ROK in its seventh core lines of efforts has emphasised on leading regional cooperation on climate change response/adaptation, energy transition as well as energy security. With its expertise in science and technology, ROK will be making efforts for future cooperation in the areas of electric vehicle infrastructure with primary focus on technology standardization, and battery recycling. The instability in the global energy market in the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict has also highlighted how traditional energy sources such as fossil fuels have been strategically weaponised. Such unprecedented developments can only be overcome with closer international cooperation to stabilise energy supply through clean energy transition. Seoul has voiced their eagerness in strengthening international cooperation to stabilise the Indo-Pacific energy market through focusing on clean energy to achieve decarbonisation and look into the potential of developing a hydrogen-based economy.
Additionally, Yoon Suk-yeol, in his election pledge, had vowed to resurrect the nation’s nuclear energy sector after he assumed presidency in May 2022. After his official appointment, the Ministry of Trade, Energy and Industry on 5 July 2022, announced ROK’s new energy policies focusing on “increasing nuclear power utilization in view of carbon neutral and energy security”.[27] In another announcement on 12 July 2022, ROK further emphasised that the first aim was “to increase the share of nuclear power to over 30 percent and reinforce the national energy mix”.[28] ROK is also firm on resuming the constructions of Shin-Hanul No. 3 and No. 4 nuclear reactors targeted to be completed by 2024, along with continued operation of existing nuclear power plants.[29] Therefore, it was not surprising that through the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Seoul is now openly showcasing support for regional capacity-building in nuclear energy safety and nuclear security. Seoul states that it is looking at these measures in order to contribute to the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Finally, the eighth and ninth line of efforts are mutually converging as both express ROK’s objective to engage in developing tailor-made cooperation/partnerships that would promote mutual understanding and exchanges as a part of “contributive diplomacy”.[30] It also displays ROK’s growing confidence to showcase its political and economic stature to seek out agendas as a “Global Pivotal State”. Priority in building such cooperation will be focused within the Indo-Pacific where fourteen of the twenty-seven priority development partners of ROK are located. ASEAN which accounts for 31 per cent of ROK’s bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) will be given precedence for an increase in assistance in areas such as digital education, climate change, smart city, and transportation. ROK’s focus on South Asia will be in the areas of health and sanitation, transportation, regional development, and energy. For the Pacific Island countries, it has stressed the importance of addressing climate change responses and low carbon energy transition. As explained earlier as well, ROK has also set itself to enhance its efforts implementing SDGs for the East African region.
Fourth Part
The fourth part of ROK’s “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific” concludes with a note that the relevant ministries of their government will prepare detailed implementation plans based on the strategy document focusing on the nine core lines of efforts. It has also stated that the Korean-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) would also be formulated in detail for effectively implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Conclusion
Overall, ROK through its newly unveiled strategy for the Indo-Pacific can be stated to have shed its previous inhibitions on acknowledging the increasing security challenges globally as well as in the Indo-Pacific. The Yoon Suk-yeol government is showcasing its readiness as an important player seeking agendas for cooperation in economic and security terms to fulfil its aspirations of a “Global Pivotal State”. Being able to officially connect the economic and security implications of safeguarding the Indo-Pacific oceans can be seen as a paradigm shift in ROK’s foreign policy approach in comparison to the previous administration.
Before raising alarm, the need of the hour is to see the complexity of ROK’s security challenge from Seoul’s lens. They are geographically disadvantaged with a neighbour which has been sabre rattling through test-firing a record number of missiles, recently flying drones into South Korean territory, whose non-proliferation record is questionable, and nuclear ambitions are well known.[31] Amidst the growing tension between US-China relations, Seoul is in a tight spot to find the right balance to uphold its Treaty alliance with Washington, and maintain its economic relations with China, which remains as the top trading partner for ROK in the past 20 years.[32] As Seoul reaffirms the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, while opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by force, there arises an understanding that ROK is perhaps deciding to no longer sit idly by but deciding to strengthen deterrence measures by itself. Republic of Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy is designed to enhance the country's engagement in a strategically important region while declaring its readiness to become a pivotal state for promoting regional stability and prosperity.
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*Dr Tunchinmang Langel is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
Endnotes
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133&page=1 (Accessed on 28 December 2022).
[2] Yonhap News Agency. 2022. “Yoon unveils S. Korea's strategy for free, peaceful, prosperous Indo-Pacific”, 11 November 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221111009500315 (Accessed on 28 December 2022).
[3] Australian Government. 2017. “Foreign Policy White Paper”,23 November 2017, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/minisite/static/4ca0813c-585e-4fe1-86eb-de665e65001a/fpwhitepaper/foreign-policy-white-paper/prime-ministers-introduction.html (Accessed on 30 December 2022).
[4] Department of State, United States of America. “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, 4 November 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf (Accessed on 30 December 2022).
[5] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2020. “Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, 7 February 2020, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf (Accessed on 30 December 2022).
[6] ASEAN. 2019. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, 22 June 2019, https://asean.org/asean2020/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (Accessed on 30 December 2022).
[7] Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. 2020. https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Republic_of_Korea-New_Southern_Policy_Information_Booklet.pdf (Accessed on 3 January 2023).
[8] Yoon Suk-yeol. 2022. “South Korea Needs to Step Up”, Foreign Affairs, 8 February 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step (Accessed on 3 January 2023).
[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133&page=1 (Accessed on 28 December 2022).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ankhtuya. 2022. “South Korea strengthens cooperation with Mongolia on mining”, NewsMN, 2 September 2022, https://news.mn/en/797838/ (Accessed on 4 January 2023).
[20] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=20230106093833927.pdf&rs=/viewer/result/202301 (Accessed on 4 January 2023).
[21] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “Republic of Korea opens diplomatic mission to NATO”, 22 November 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_209320.htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed on 4 January 2023).
[22] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2022. “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf (Accessed on 5 January 2023).
[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=20230106093833927.pdf&rs=/viewer/result/202301 (Accessed on 5 January 2023).
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “ROK-US Leaders’ Joint Statement”, 21 May 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5476/view.do?seq=319612 (Accessed on 6 January 2023).
[26] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Congratulatory Remarks H.E. PARK Jin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Asan Symposium “Celebrating Korea-US Relations: 140 Years and Beyond”, 3 June 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5689/view.do?seq=319588 (Accessed on 6 January 2023).
[27] Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Korea's new energy policies are announced”, 5 July 2022, https://english.motie.go.kr/en/pc/pressreleases/bbs/bbsView.do?bbs_cd_n=2&bbs_seq_n=1008 (Accessed on 12 January 2023)
[28] Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Republic of Korea. 2022. “MOTIE presents work report under new regime”, 12 July 2022, https://english.motie.go.kr/en/pc/pressreleases/bbs/bbsView.do?bbs_seq_n=1017&bbs_cd_n=2¤tPage=1&search_key_n=&search_val_v=&cate_n= (Accessed on 12 January 2023).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region”, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=20230106093833927.pdf&rs=/viewer/result/202301 (Accessed on 20 January 2023).
[31] Ji Da-gyum. 2022. “N. Korean drones cross border”, The Korea Herald, 26 December 2022, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20221226000574 (Accessed on 20 January 2023).
[32] Jun Min-kyung. 2022. “South Korea’s exports to China jump 162-fold over 30 years”, 23 August 2022, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220823000680 (Accessed on 20 January 2023).