Background
As the global security environment continually became more challenging and complex, Japan had been seeking to address the existing and future threats through revising its three key security-related documents. These are the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG), and the Medium-Term Defence Programme (MDTP). The NSS edition of 2013 which needed upgradation and is finally revised as NSS 2022, will remain to be Japan’s apex level strategic guidance and security document for the next decade. The two documents, namely the NDPG and MDTP, were last updated on 18 December 2018[1] but with the announcement of the new security policy, the NDPG is now updated and rebranded as the “National Defense Strategy (NDS)”, and the MDTP will become the “Defense Buildup Program (DBP)”. In addition, Japan has been regularly publishing its Annual Defence White Papers titled as “Defense of Japan”, which provides a background of Japan’s defence policies, and the most recent publication was released on 22 July 2022.[2]
Witnessing Japan’s national security environment undergoing dramatic changes since 2013, the green signal for the new NSS by the Fumio Kishida government arrives at an opportune moment. Primarily the NSS highlights how Japan is facing one of the most severe and complex security environments since the end of the Second World War. Significantly, the NSS 2022 has identified Beijing’s current stance of military activities presenting an unprecedented and the “greatest strategic challenge” for Japan’s peace and security.[3] Almost immediately in the introductory parts of the NSS 2022, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been called out for trampling over their “primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security”.[4] Although Russia was not named in the aforesaid statement of the NSS 2022, it is clear that the reference was to Russia when one reads the newly launched “National Defense Strategy (NDS)”. It states, “Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear weapon state that bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability, has openly launched an aggression against Ukraine and repeatedly took actions and sent messages that could be interpreted as threat of use of nuclear weapons, creating an unprecedented situation”.[5]
In addition to China and North Korea as threats, the NSS 2022 recognises Russia as a security challenge in light of the Ukraine conflict. The NSS 2022 also identifies essentially three activities of Russia as areas of strong security concern for Japan. First, “accelerating its military activities in the vicinity of Japan”.[6] Second, “strengthening its armaments in the Northern Territories” (Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, Shikotan Island, and the Habomai Islands). Third, “repeated words or actions that could be interpreted as threats to use of nuclear weapons”.[7] The NSS 2022 similarly expresses Japan’s anxiety with regard to the Russia-China growing strategic closeness and “military coordination”, and its possible impact on the peace and stability for the global community.[8] This article will analyse and highlight the substantial features of the newly revised National Security Strategy announced by Japan.
Defence-Oriented, Compelling Form of Deterrence
The most important question being enquired is whether Japan’s new NSS indicates a departure from its defence-oriented outlook. As per the phrasing in the text of the NSS 2022, Japan has maintained that it will “adhere to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles”.[9] However, there are viewpoints from experts and scholars of Japan who have surmised Tokyo’s revised national security policy as a progression towards a more offensive approach. Nevertheless, the focus of the shift has rather been more towards a compelling form of deterrence. What has been spoken about regarding this form of deterrence can also be revealed from their Annual Defence White Papers of 2020, 2021 and 2022. A comparative analysis of the White Papers since 2020 showcases the repetition of the statement “defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace”.[10] This statement indicates how Japan has maintained to deter and eliminate any threat in the form of counterstrike capabilities.
It is the counterstrike capabilities being promulgated through the NSS 2022, which has somehow constructed an assertion that Japan is evolving towards an offensive policy. As a matter of fact, the counterstrike capabilities are only but an extension of the compelling form of deterrence that Japan has been espousing ever since 29 February 1956 based upon an interpretation of their Constitution.[11] Japan’s lawmakers believed that their Constitution allows for counterstrike capabilities, “as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible”.[12]
Russia’s Violation of International Norms
As mentioned earlier, Russia has been called out for shunning their responsibility of being a permanent member in the UNSC through its aggression towards Ukraine. It is important to recognise that the significance of Russia was recognised in the former NSS 2013 but on a more cooperative level. From a security perspective, Russia has always been seen by Japan through the lens of the long-pending “Northern Territories Issue”.[13] This required Japan to pursue active cooperation with Moscow in order to finalise “attribution of the four islands” (Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, Shikotan Island, and the Habomai Islands) while concluding the peace treaty.[14] Meanwhile, the language over Russia underwent a sharp paradigm shift once the Russian aggression over Ukraine began in 2022.
It was in the Defense of Japan 2022 Annual White Paper where Japan first illustrated some of their strongest views with regard to Russia. This was also due to the fact that the invasion of Ukraine generates a serious apprehension in Japan that the Russian military is likely to increase its operational activities comprising the strategic nuclear-powered submarines around the Sea of Okhotsk, near the northern territories of Japan. The same apprehension has been repeated widely in the revised NSS 2022, where Tokyo openly calls Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as a breach of the “foundation of rules that shaped the international order”.[15]
Such was the concern by Japan vis-a-vis Russia’s actions that the Defense of Japan 2022 paper had an entirely exclusive chapter on “Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine”, underlining the genesis of the Russian aggression, and analysing Russia’s operational goals as well as future outlook.[16] With tensions between Japan and Russia on the rise, especially due to Japan’s vocalisation against Russia’s aggression, Moscow has even increased its presence in the Kuril islands to the north of Japan by deploying its defence missile systems.[17] The islands are part of the disputed Northern Territories between Japan and Russia.
China as the Greatest Strategic Challenge
With regard to China, its military activities have been identified in the new NSS as unprecedented and the “greatest strategic challenge” for Japan’s peace and security. However, when it comes to China, the policy outlook of Japan has vastly remained as it was, i.e., China is considered as a security risk. This can be verified through the previous Defence White Papers of Japan and the previous NSS 2013. The latest NSS 2022 has indeed illustrated a more assertive tone with regard to China’s intensified attempts at unilaterally changing the status quo.[18] Specifically in the maritime and air domains of the East and South China Seas, where China has been intruding into the territorial waters and airspace of the Senkaku islands. The NSS 2022 has highlighted the rapid enhancement of China’s military power, including its missile and nuclear capabilities and the lack of transparency in China’s defence expenditures. Another key concern of Japan highlighted in the NSS 2022 has been China’s efforts in strengthening its strategic ties with Russia and attempts at changing the international order.
While Tokyo encourages China’s participation in international frameworks to address global issues like climate change, it highlights China’s lack of interest where other major official creditor nations take part together. The NSS 2022 has stated how Beijing’s developmental finance assistance lacks adequate transparency, along with how China has taken advantage of other countries’ dependence on them. One of the major concerns of Japan with regard to China has been its latest proclamation of not denying the use of military force for the reunification with Taiwan. China had mounted one of its largest military exercises targeting the waters surrounding Taiwan after the visit of Nancy Pelosi in August 2022. Japan became wary of the consequences of how a military aggression by China against Taiwan can easily breach the sovereign territorial spaces in the surrounding sky and sea. Consequently, Japan considers peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element.
Reliance on US-Japan Alliance, Extended Deterrence
Another area of apprehension for Japan has been the increase in proliferation of nuclear technology and advanced weaponry by North Korea. The test launching of Hwasong-12 Inter-Mediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) by North Korea, which flew over the Aomori prefecture of Japan, covering a total distance of 4600 km had come as a wake-up call for Japan’s security agencies as well as the US. The incident had raked up the issue of whether Japan can maintain a defence-oriented approach or should it adopt a more compelling form of deterrence through counterstrike capabilities. In addition, to tackle a nuclear power state, Japan relies upon its ally in the US. As a sign of reemphasising deepening of US-Japan alliance, the NSS 2022 has also highlighted the importance of the extended deterrence offered by the US, backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear.
While Japan’s revised NSS 2022 has indeed marked a shift in tone and language, it still remains to be seen if Japan will be able to adopt a more compelling form of deterrence. This is due to the fact that the security strategy document once again highlights Japan’s over-reliance upon the US-Japan alliance. It notes, “the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the provision of extended deterrence, will remain the cornerstone of Japan's national security policy.”[19] The NSS 2022 has once again exhibited a reiteration of beliefs and statements drawn from the previous Defence White Papers of Japan, especially with regard to the US-Japan security arrangements. The document has reemphasised the importance of the US remaining committed to the region to realise a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). There is also a brief mention of building a multi-layered network, expanding them, such as Japan-US-Aus and Japan-US-ROK, to further strengthen deterrence. The Quad partnership has been mentioned only once, perhaps signalling that the areas of operation of Quad is not viewed in the perspective of their immediate neighbourhood.
Economic Security
Another area of concern that has been essential for Japan’s national security is to secure its energy and food resources. The NSS 2022 talks about diversification of supply sources, advancing ties with resource-rich countries. It is pushing forward measures to improve Japan’s self-sufficiency ratio, while stating their intention to build a robust supply system that can withstand contingencies.
That leads to the policies of economic security, which Japan has been promoting through its economic security law passed in May 2022. In short, the economic security law has been implemented to enhance Japan’s self-reliance and to secure its technological advantages. An area of priority that emerged out of the Covid-19 pandemic was supply-chain resilience. Through the economic security law, Tokyo is now focussing on curbing excessive dependence on specific countries. It is putting efforts into setting up next-generation semiconductor development and manufacturing bases. The need to secure a stable supply for critical goods including rare earth and promote capital reinforcement of private enterprises with critical goods and technologies has been identified as a crucial path forward. Japan is looking to strengthen the function of policy-based finance, in pursuit of protecting and nurturing critical goods through its economic security promotion.
On the global economy, Japan’s NSS 2022 has introduced a concept of maintaining and strengthening an “open and stable international economic order”.[20] What it tries to emphasise from the statement is the prevention of non-military pressure by certain donor states, which impedes the autonomous national interests of recipient states. To further reiterate its objectives, Japan declares that it would spearhead global efforts to ensure that states follow a transparent, fair mode of development finance while complying to the international rules and norms. This is to make sure that certain recipients from the developing countries do not fall into “debt traps” due to ambiguous forms of assistance by some states.[21] This statement in Japan’s NSS 2022 is indicative of China’s opaque financial assistance programme.
Defence Budget
All of the NSS 2022 objectives can be achieved only when the defence budget is able to match the projected expenditures. The deliberations on the defence budget to be raised to 2 per cent of GDP had been one of the most ardent sticking points. The increase of the defence budget will mean that the amount available for Japan’s security will now increase from 5.4 trillion yen to more than 6.5 trillion yen (USD 47 billion) in fiscal year 2023.[22] Gradually, the aim is to increase the annual defence budget to reach close to 9 to 11 trillion yen, which will be equivalent to 2 per cent of the GDP target. The increase would also mean that Japan will now be on par with the defence budget to GDP shares of NATO member countries, for the next five years.[23] The government of Japan is indeed seeking to spend a total of 43 trillion yen (USD 322 billion) in defence spending over the next five years until fiscal year 2027.[24]
The rise in defence budget would be a welcome change which is vital for Tokyo to improve the country’s defence capabilities especially amidst the growing China threat, along with North Korea’s nuclear capable missile development. However, finding stable sources of finances can prove to be an impediment for the increase in defence spending. With the approval ratings of the Kishida government at 30 per cent, it is likely that the budget allocations may not flow seamlessly, thus leading to slight delays in upgrading their defence preparedness.[25]
Conclusion
The NSS 2022 showcases Japan’s anxiety about the increasing security concerns in the international environment. It also reveals that Tokyo is on an ambitious drive to extricate itself from their past and take its defence-oriented approach towards a more compelling form of deterrence with counterstrike capabilities. Already there have been various reactions to Japan's newly revised NSS by several countries. Russia has strongly voiced its opinion that Japan is embarking upon an unprecedented build-up of its military power, which could inevitably provoke new security challenges.[26] China also released a statement whereby it expressed its regret that Japan had termed it as an “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” in the NSS. Beijing Foreign Ministry spokesperson justified its defence building and military activities as “normal”, while blaming Japan’s collusion with certain forces and countries to cause trouble in the East China Sea and create tensions in the South China Sea.[27]
The reaction from Tokyo’s ally the US was as expected, where the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan delivered a statement congratulating Japan on taking a bold and historic step.[28] The statement highlighted how Japan’s objectives to significantly increase defence investments would also strengthen and modernise the US-Japan alliance.[29] The US statement also commended Japan’s support for Ukraine while signalling that the new NSS would help in achieving lasting peace, stability and prosperity.[30]
The NSS 2022 seems to have caused much disquiet to Russia and China. With Japan upping the ante on its tone and language regarding the deteriorating nature of the global security environment, it has set forward the agenda for Japan’s national security priorities. Counterstrike capabilities are now being promulgated more vociferously by Tokyo as a response to the unprecedented challenges emerging in terms of global and regional security. The announcement of the steps being undertaken especially in terms of counterstrike capabilities and additional defence build-up will need to be matched with a proper allocation of defence budget. It has been additionally stated that Japan and the US would cooperate in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles and others.[31] It is highly likely that Japan would procure long-range counterstrike capabilities through the purchase of Tomahawk missiles from the US.[32] As stated clearly in the NSS 2022, the counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japanese constitution and international law, while maintaining Japan’s exclusively defence-oriented policy.[33]
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*Dr. Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[1] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2018, “National Defense Program Guidelines (Dec. 18, 2018),” https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_policy/national.html, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[2] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, Defense of Japan 2022, 22 July 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[3] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Defense Strategy,” 16 December 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[6] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[7] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[8] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, Defense of Japan 2022, 22 July 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[11] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Northern Territories Issue,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[14] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2013, “National Security Strategy (December 17, 2013),” https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2022
[15] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[16] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, Defense of Japan 2022, 22 July 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full.pdf, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[17] Japan Today, 2022, “Russia deploys defense missile system on Kuril island near Japan,” 6 December 2022, https://japantoday.com/category/politics/russia-deploys-defence-missile-system-on-kuril-island-near-japan1, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[18] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Kyodo News, 2022, “Japan to boost defense spending to 6.5 tril. yen in FY 2023,” 12 December 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/12/238def3fc9d0-japan-eyes-higher-corporate-tobacco-taxes-to-fund-defense-spending.html, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[23] Nikkei Asia, 2022, “Japan lawmaker says more military spending needed amid China threat,” 11 December 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-lawmaker-says-more-military-spending-needed-amid-China-threat, Accessed on 19 December 2022
[24] Kyodo News, 2022, “Japan to boost defense spending to 6.5 tril. yen in FY 2023,” 12 December 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/12/238def3fc9d0-japan-eyes-higher-corporate-tobacco-taxes-to-fund-defense-spending.html, Accessed on 20 December 2022
[25] The Japan Times, 2022, “Kishida Cabinet approval slips below 30% for first time in Jiji poll,”13 October 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/10/13/national/politics-diplomacy/kishida-approval-rate/, Accessed on 20 December 2022
[26] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2022, “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on Japan's newly revised security and defence doctrines,” 22 December 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1844902/, Accessed on 23 December 2022
[27] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference,” 16 December 2022,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202212/t20221216_10991370.html, Accessed on 23 December 2022
[28] The White House, 2022, “Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Japan’s Historic National Security Strategy,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/16/statement-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-japans-historic-national-security-strategy/, Accessed on 26 December 2022
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 26 December 2022
[32] Michelle Ye Hee Lee and Ellen Nakashima, 2022, “Japan to buy Tomahawk missiles in defense buildup amid fears of war,” The Washington Post, 12 December 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/12/japan-tomahawk-missiles-ukraine-war/, Accessed on 26 December 2022
[33] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan,” December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, Accessed on 26 December 2022