On 21 November, 2022, China’s important development aid agency, China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), hosted an ‘Indian Ocean Region Forum’, for the first time, in the city of Kunming. The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson in a regular Press Briefing on November 23, 2022, said that the first ‘China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development and Cooperation’ was held as part of series of events under the 6th China-South Asia Expo.[1]
A multi nation forum on the Indian Ocean region (IOR) can be seen as the latest initiative of China’s expansive strategy for the IOR. Important to note is that, the Forum was organized by the CIDCA, which is a government agency, established in 2018, directly under China’s State Council with an aim to formulate strategic guidelines, coordinate and offer advice, and supervise implementation for foreign aid-related issues.[2] Luo Zhaohui, the current Chairman of CIDCA, has formerly served as the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China till 2021 and also has been China’s Ambassador to India.
In his opening speech at the Forum, Luo Zhaohui mentioned about China’s ‘Maritime Silk Road, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI)’, he also said that “We propose to hold the China-Indian Ocean Region Development Cooperation Forum on a regular basis”.[3]
The joint statement put up on CIDCA’s website after the Forum meeting, read that “the China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development Cooperation was held in hybrid way under the theme of ‘Shared Development: Theory and Practice from the Perspective of the Blue Economy’. It was also mentioned that, “high-level representatives of 19 countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan, Iran, Oman, South Africa, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Djibouti, Australia and representatives of 3 international organizations were present at the Forum”.[4]
However, soon after the statement was out, Maldives and Australia denied the reports of any official participation at the Forum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Maldives issued a statement on 27 November 2022, responding to the claims of CIDCA, alleging the participation of Maldives. The statement mentioned that “the Ministry would like to clarify, that the Government of Maldives did not participate in the Forum and had communicated its decision to not participate to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the Maldives on 15 November 2022”.[5]
According to media reports Maldives' former President Mohammed Waheed Hassan and Australia’s Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd joined the Forum virtually.[6] Maldives Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement also clarified that “the participation by individuals or group of individuals from the Maldives does not constitute official representation by the Maldivian government”.[7]
On the same day, Australian High Commissioner to India, clarified through a tweet, on 27 November 2022, that “contrary to media reports, no Australian Government official attended the Kunming China-Indian Ocean Forum on Development Cooperation”.[8] He also added that the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Tim Watts, attended the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Ministerial Council on November 24 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, the only ministerial-level forum for the Indian Ocean region.
The Kunming joint statement mentioned that issues including climate change, disaster resilience and blue economy were discussed at the Forum. China proposed to “establish a marine disaster prevention and mitigation cooperation mechanism between China and countries in the Indian Ocean region” and also “a blue economy think tank network”. It also mentions that “a few countries expressed their readiness to host the next China-Indian Ocean Region Forum”.[9]
The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming the focus of strategic and economic attention in regional and international affairs and is perceived as the emerging center of gravity, more so in the context of the Indo-Pacific. One of the key factors that have been consequential in influencing the geopolitics of the region has been China’s asymmetric rise and its increasing foothold across the Indian Ocean region. The Ocean plays an important role in the world energy production and global maritime trade. It serves as one of the world’s busiest trade corridors, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are the world's most important strategic chokepoints by the volume of oil transit. Given critical economic and geostrategic significance of the Ocean, the littoral countries, as well as extra-regional powers, have been showing greater interest.
In recent years, Beijing, in its bid to become a global power, has been pushing for a greater role in the IOR. China has gradually developed a modern and advanced naval force to project power beyond its shores. PLA navy is well equipped with force projection capability such as aircraft carrier, attack and conventional submarines, long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and a large number of ocean-going platforms coupled with considerable sea-lift capabilities.[10] In recent years, Beijing has stepped up its deployments in the Indian Ocean. Recently, Yuan class of strategic ships of PLA Navy have been frequenting the Indian Ocean like the recent passage of ballistic missile, satellite tracking and seabed mapping ship ‘Yuan Wang 5’, near Sunda and Lombok Straits.[11] Alongside, China with its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), an integral part of its BRI initiative, is using its financial muscle and economic diplomacy to gain geopolitical clout in the region. Beijing has launched a number of expansive, non-transparent and unsustainable projects under the rubric of MSR in the IOR.
Chinese naval facilities at strategic locations, including in Gwadar, situated near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, in Hambantota in Sri Lanka overlooking the most strategic sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and its first overseas base at Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, are not only to serve its economic interests, but also to give it strategic leverage to emerge as a major maritime power in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Many of the ports in Africa being built by China’s assistance have also been visited by Chinese naval vessels or are dual-use civilian-military ports.[12] Notwithstanding the actual or stated motive of the projects, it is quite clear that the scope and scale of the projects could bestow China with powerful long-term strategic influence in the IOR, which has regional countries concerned about the projects.[13]
It is important to recall that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi had visited Maldives and Sri Lanka from 7-9 January 2022. In Colombo, he had announced China’s intention of creating a forum for Indian Ocean “island countries” to promote common development.[14]
The recent Kunming forum can be seen as Beijing’s attempt to further its reach and outreach in the IOR and probably an attempt to create another platform in the region, which already has established regional organisations, the most representative being the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), where India has been a founding member and plays an important role and most of the IOR countries are members. Although, China also is a Dialogue partner of the IORA. In addition, India has launched positive initiatives in the IOR like the ‘SAGAR’ announced by PM Modi in 2015. Under the vision of SAGAR (Security And Growth for All), India endeavors to strengthen economic relations and development in the IOR, in a mutually supportive and cooperative manner. This spirit is further enhanced under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) announced in 2019. India engages with regional partners to help build economic capabilities and improve maritime security, improve connectivity and collective security through multilateral platforms like the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). So clearly, any meeting related to the Indian Ocean where India is not present is, inconsequential.
Conclusion
Of late, China has been bolstering its presence in the Indian Ocean. Chinese belligerence in the IOR has caused apprehensions among the regional countries and has led to a situation where the region is becoming increasingly securitised. The IOR, therefore, is becoming an increasingly contested space, with security balances in the region looking uncertain. By organising an IOR Forum, in the garb of shared development, China intends to widen and assert its sphere of influence in this strategic maritime region.
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*Dr. Pragya Pandey, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
[1] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on November 22,2022,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202211/t20221122_10979312.html
[2] UNIDO and the China International Development Cooperation Agency to strengthen South-South and triangular cooperation, https://www.unido.org/news/unido-and-china-international-development-cooperation-agency-strengthen-south-south-and-triangular-cooperation
[3] Speech by Mr. Luo Zhaohui at the Opening Ceremony of the China-Indian Ocean Region Development Cooperation Forum, 21 November 2022, http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2022-11/22/c_833009.htm
[4] Kunming Joint Press Statement of China-Indian Ocean Region Forum on Development Cooperation, 22 November 2022, http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2022-11/22/c_832998.htm
[5] Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Maldives' alleged participation in the China-Indian Ocean Forum on Development Cooperation, 27 November 2022, https://www.gov.mv/en/news-and-communications/statement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-concerning-maldives-alleged-participation-in-the-china-indian-ocean-forum-on-development-cooperation
[6] After Maldives, Australia Denies Participating In China-Led Indian Ocean Forum Meet, November 28, 2022, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/after-maldives-australia-denies-participating-in-china-led-indian-ocean-forum-meet-3558846
[7] I.bid.
[8] Twitter, https://twitter.com/AusHCIndia/status/1596877776749236226
[9] Ibid. no. 3
[10] GVC Naidu, “India and Maritime Silk Road”, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for India’, (ed.) Manish, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2021.
[11] PLA spy ship, Yuan Wang 5, mapping Indian Ocean for Chinese submarine operations, 14 December 2022,https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pla-spy-ship-yuan-wang-5-mapping-indian-ocean-for-chinese-submarine-operations-101671003213852.html
[12] Assessing the Risks of Chinese Investments in Sub-Saharan African Ports, June 4, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-risks-chinese-investments-sub-saharan-african-ports
[13] Shishir Upadhyaya, “The Maritime Dimension of China’ BRI: Implications for India”, in ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for India’, (ed.) Manish, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2021.
[14] No ‘third party’ should interfere in China’s Sri Lanka ties: Wang Yi, 10 January 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/no-third-party-should-interfere-in-chinas-sri-lanka-ties-wang-yi/article38217745.ece