Introduction
The terror attack on the Istiqlal Shopping Street in the heart of the Istanbul city in Turkiye on November 13, 2022, was a grim reminder of a similar attack in 2016 outside the football stadium in Istanbul that had killed thirty-eight people and injured around two hundred fifty persons. [i] This time again the target was a commercial town of Istanbul when an explosion tore through the Istiqlal Street, killing six civilians and injuring more than eighty people. In 2016 attack, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) had claimed the responsibility for the attack but this time the government itself took no time in blaming the PKK and its affiliates while the PKK and its allies denied the accusation.
The Istiqlal Street in Istanbul is popular with both the locals and the foreigners where thousands throng the streets every weekend. This is happening at a time when President Tayyip Erdogan is fighting for his political survival against a united opposition and is in pursuit of all means to retain his presidency in the elections scheduled for June 2023. Commenting on the blast, President Erdogan said that this is a ‘despicable act’ and claimed that any attempts to besiege Turkiye with terrorism would not succeed.[ii]
The Istiqlal Street has suffered several such attacks in the past too, and in the year 2016-2017 the city of Istanbul had become a site of frequent terror attacks and then, for most of the bombing the blame was on the ISIS, and the PKK – an outfit designated by Turkiye and its western allies, such as the US and the EU, as a terrorist organisation.
Turkiye, PKK and the Istanbul Blast
It has been almost four decades since the PKK and governments in Turkiye have been at the logger head on issues like demands for more political autonomy for the Kurds-dominated region and denial of linguistic and cultural rights for the Kurds in Turkiye. For long, the Kurds in Turkiye have been seeking more autonomy in their socio-political spheres and very often accuse the regimes of denying Kurds of their political, linguistic, cultural and religious freedoms. And most of the regimes in Turkiye have treated them as the fifth column in national political parlance. The PKK is suspected to be involved in many terrorist and bloody attacks in the past and therefore there was nothing new in the government’s blame on the PKK and its affiliates for the latest attack.
Again immediately after the blast, the Interior Minister of Turkiye, Suleiman Soylu, assumed to be Erdogan’s successor in Turkish national politics, told in a press conference that a Syrian woman national, Ahlam Al-Bashir, along with other forty-two persons have been arrested for this attack.[iii] She, along with other suspects, was nabbed in a flat at the outskirts of Istanbul, and the prime accused was planning to flee to Greece.[iv] According to him, the accused, Ahlam Al-Bashir, an inhabitant of Kobani in Syria, travelled all along from Syria crossing over the Afrin region to enter the city at the behest of the People Protection Unit (YPG).[v] According to Turkish official sources, the main accused has confessed the crime and told that Ahlam had placed a booby-trapped bag beneath a seat where according to Justice Minister of Turkiye, Bekir Bozdag, the culprit had sat there and the bomb exploded only forty minutes after she left, which indicates that the bomb was detonated from some distance.[vi]
But the Commander-in-Chief of YPG, Mazloum Abdi, in a social media statement denied the allegations. He stated in a tweet message that his group has nothing to do with the Istanbul blast. While the PKK leadership said that the government in Turkiye is resorting to this blame game because it is trying to hide the reality of its failure to confront the rational concerns of the Kurds.[vii] Here it can be mentioned that PKK is also alleged of supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria which today along with its armed wing People Protection Unit (YPG) is controlling a large swath of territories in North and North-Eastern parts of Syria.[viii]
What came as a major surprise in the whole incident was the refusal of Suleiman Soylu to accept the condolence message issued by the US embassy[ix] in Ankara in solidarity with the blast victims. Soylu likened the US position to that of the murderer who is always among the first to reach at crime scene.[x] In a statement, Soylu criticised those countries which claim to be friendly with Turkiye but support those organisations, which Turkiye considers as terrorist groups.[xi] The US embassy in response to Soylu’s allegation said that they (US) stand by their NATO ally, and it categorically condemns the attack.[xii] Soylu also said that news of the arrest of the main culprit would sadden the supporters of these terror groups and the arrest of others would further unravel the truth. According to an Interior Ministry report, in this year alone Turkiye has thwarted two hundred such bombing efforts across Turkiye by different extremist groups including the PKK.[xiii]
Istanbul Blast and Operation Claw
Within days of the Istanbul blast, Turkiye launched the military air strikes first against the PKK bases in Northern Iraq and later in Northern and North-Eastern parts of Syria. Turkiye began its military operation called ‘Operation Claw’ on November 19, 2022, to revenge the Istanbul blast and the operation is still underway.[xiv] After Iraq, the operation soon extended to the bases of Syrian Democratic Forces in Northern Syria where Turkiye’s artillery intensively bombed the city of Kobane and other hideouts of Kurdish groups. Turkish Defence Minister Hulsui Akar said that the ongoing operation is the largest, most comprehensive and effective military air operation after the Operation Peace Spring in October 2019 in Syria which was both air and ground operations. He also called upon the US to stop supporting the YPG as they are equal to the PKK of Turkiye which Turkiye and others have already designated as a terrorist block.[xv]
President Erdogan did not rule out the possibility of launching ground attack in addition to ongoing air strike in near future to eliminate the threat emanating from the region. Later Hulsui Akar announced that the ongoing operation killed one hundred eighty-four terrorists belonging to the PKK and its other allies and destroyed around ninety targets including bunkers, caves, tunnels and warehouses.[xvi] Around dozens of armed personnel belonging to the Syrian Arab Army too lost their lives during the operation,[xvii] which might further strain the ties between Turkiye and Syria amidst the diplomatic efforts to improve the relationship.
Both Russia and the US have called for de-escalation. Russia said that it understands Turkiye’s security concerns but urged to avoid escalatory step.[xviii] The US has asked for de-escalation of violence in Syria. It also urged Turkiye not to go for military strike in Kurd-dominated region in Syria.[xix] One US official statement said that it (US) continues to oppose any unilateral military action that violates the territorial sovereignty of Iraq.[xx] On the other hand, President Erdogan said that both President Putin and President Biden know well that Turkiye can implement such design any moment.[xxi] He also said that Turkiye is with the US in NATO but it disproves the US support to Kurds in the region.
The US’s displeasure over Turkiye’s assault against Kurds in Syria and Iraq can be understood well because the US has been an ardent supporter of Syrian Democratic Forces, which was its close ally in its anti-ISIS war there. The Syrian Democratic Forces has already sought the intervention of Syria government to protect them and confront the Turkish incursion in their territories.[xxii] The US State Department said that Turkiye’s current war could distract the ongoing campaign against ISIS. Turkiye has already hinted of launching ground operation in Syria and Iraq, which might flare up the conflict further. Orhon Miraglu, a prominent member of the ruling party in Turkiye, said that Kurds are in control of almost four hundred villages on Turkiye-Syria border which poses a great risk to the internal and external security of Turkiye.[xxiii]
Since 2016, Turkiye has launched major military operations against the Kurds in Syria. In 2018, it carried out Olive Branch operation and again in 2019, it launched Operation Peace Spring to defeat the YPG and its associates on its border and those operations were both air and ground in nature.[xxiv] The US always supported the Kurdish forces with money and weapons and training which caused tension in US-Turkiye ties. In its draft budget of 2023, the US allocated US$450 million for a program to train Iraqi Security Forces, Peshmerga and Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria.[xxv]
The Operation Claw, the third operation by Turkiye, was soon joined by Iran as it began its military offensive in Kurdistan region of Iraq, a shelter for Iranian Kurdish rebels for long. A semi-official news agency of Iran, Tasneem, stated that Iranian Revolutionary Guard began to target with missiles and drones in Kurdistan region of Iraq, occupied by what Iran call a ‘separatist terrorist’.[xxvi] It is worth recalling here that the Iranian government is already confronting two-month long public protest triggered by the alleged killing of a Kurdish woman. The Operation Claw might have prompted Iran to resort to air strikes against the bases of Iranian Kurdish forces, generally known as Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in the region. Iran has already accused the Iranian Kurdish group of seeking refuge in Iraq and fuelling the protest in Iran.
Kurds in Northern Iraq almost enjoy autonomous status which they achieved during the presence of the US forces in Iraq for more than a decade. In response to Iran-Turkiye’s military operation in the region, Iraqi government announced to redeploy its forces on the border with both Iran and Turkiye. The Iraqi side of the border with Iran and Turkiye is controlled by Kurdish Peshmerga – a military force of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – but working under Iraqi Ministry of Defence. The decision to redeploy its forces on Iraq-Iran-Turkiye border was taken in a meeting of Ministerial Council of National Security,[xxvii] which was attended by the representatives of KRG as well. It was also decided that KRG would send its Peshmerga too to protect the national border.
President Erdogan, June Elections and the Blast
Perhaps the blast in Istanbul has posed one of the biggest security challenges to Turkiye in recent past and could be a major source of worry to President Erdogan in the June elections which is likely to determine his place in the annals of Turkish politics. This would be perhaps his last election and in last two decades since he became Prime Minister in 2002, he has lost no elections. Though the government has already blamed the PKK for this blast but whichever forces might be behind this act, could harm Erdogan’s future political prospects, particularly when the elections are around the corner.
Choosing the commercial capital of Istanbul as the target was largely aimed at further weakening the national economy as President Erdogan is already being criticised by different political quarters for the bad shape of the national economy. The Lira (National currency) in recent years has lost 30 % of its value against the US dollar.
The blast in Istanbul – a major destination for both indigenous and foreign tourists – would no doubt hurt the tourist sector, a significant source of national revenue. Only recently the tourism sector has started reviving after a two-year lull due to COVID-19. In 2021, this sector has earned revenue worth US$25 billion which still appears quite low when compared to the figure worth US$34.5 billion in a pre-COVID-19 year.[xxviii]
Much of Erdogan’s foreign policy pursued in last decade is under attacks from different political blocks. Since the suspect in the Istanbul terror attack is believed to be of Syria origin, his political opponents might see it as a sign of revenge against Turkiye’s military action in Syria and, in all probability, the opposition could claim during the election campaign that Turkiye’s current operation in Syria is causing insecurity in the country.
Not only Turkiye’s military operation or the occupation of some of the Kurd-dominated towns in Northern Syria and its support to extremist groups in different parts of Syria but the arrest of many Turkish parliamentarians belonging to the People’s Democratic Party, a party sympathetic to the Kurdish cause in Turkiye, might have triggered this attack as well.
Many of his opponents are already critical of Erdogan’s Syria-centric policy in the region and according to them, the presence of millions of Syrian refugees in the country are burden on state exchequer which is already in a poor condition.
President Erdogan’s Syria policy seems to have faltered over the years, and there are reports of his desperate efforts to reach out to President Assad who has his own set of demand before going for any reciprocity with his Turkish counterpart. President Assad on his part does not want to give him an easy path for victory in the next elections and he is said to have asked Turkiye for complete withdrawal of its military forces from Syria, stopping support to rebels in Idlib and around Aleppo, pledging US $ 500 billion in construction program of Syria before entering into any such negotiations.[xxix]
A six-party coalition at the behest of the Republican People’s Party (an ideological Kamalist party) under the leadership of current Istanbul Mayor Akram Imamoglu has been formed to confront Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) for June elections. It is worth mentioning here that Akram Imamoglu had won the Istanbul mayoral re-elections against Erdogan’s AKP candidate Binali Yildrim in June 2019 after Turkiye Supreme Election Board, allegedly at the behest of President Erdogan himself, had nullified his win in March elections in 2019. But Akram Imamoglu was re-elected in a span of three months. It can also be mentioned that the path to the Presidency in Turkiye perhaps goes through Istanbul only because President Erdogan himself was mayor of Istanbul before becoming the Prime Minister and later the President.
Conclusion
In the light of above, it can be concluded that any Istanbul-like incident in future is likely to have an adverse impact on the political prospects of Erdogan who is facing hard time in national politics due to poor economy, his declining political graph and the formation of six-party strong coalition against him for 2023 elections. His foreign-policy pursuit across the region is under attack both internally and externally and the economy is already in a bad shape, and all these would be questioned during the course of the 2023 election campaign, particularly as he will be facing a unified opposition. A series of operations in Syria and Iraq launched by the incumbent President has failed to improve the economic lot of the people and hence his long-time rhetoric against terrorism and his anti-Kurd war is less likely to appeal to the masses who seem keen to have new politics. His opponents would turn to the masses with the promise of new politics which would likely appeal to the people. Moreover, his retaliatory actions in Iraq or Syria might backfire and these forces could unleash themselves which would make the country further vulnerable as witnessed in the middle of the previous decade. The security vulnerability, poor economic index, a mix of indecisive and hesitant foreign policy and the presence of strong opposition forces in the country all have the potential to weaken Erdogan’s prospect or force him to alter his political course before the June elections.
*****
*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
End Notes
[i] Istanbul Blast: Culprit Nabbed, Sky News (Arabic), November 14, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3h6EMCi December 2, 2022
[ii] Turkiye Claims Blast Accused is a Syrian, France 24 (Arabic), November 13, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3YetHzQ November 28, 2022
[iii] What is Truth about Turkiye’s Claim of US being behind the Blast, Railyoum, November 15, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3Y37yEk December 1, 2022
[iv] Turkiye Claims Blast Accused is a Syrian, France 24 (Arabic), November 13, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3YetHzQ November 28, 2022
[v] The YPG is a North Syria-based armed wing of Syrian Democratic Forces, which apparently enjoys the support of the US, and itself is affiliated with the principal Kurdish party, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkiye
[vi] Istanbul Blast: Culprit Nabbed, Sky News (Arabic), November 14, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3h6EMCi December 2, 2022
[vii]Ibrahim Al-Alabi, How Istanbul Blast will impact Election Campaign in Turkiye, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 16, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3UIfuYO December 2, 2022
[viii]Kurds Denies Their Involvement in Istanbul Blast, Independent (Arabic), November 14, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3P8x7jx November 24, 2022
[ix] What is Truth about Turkiye’s Claim of US being Behind the Blast, Railyoum, November 15, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3Y37yEk December 1, 2022
[x] Ibrahim Al-Alabi, How the Blast will Reflect on US-Turkiye Relation, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 16, 2011, Accessed https://bit.ly/3HdtHKl December 5, 2022
[xi] Turkiye’s Interior Minister: We Reject US Condolence, CNN (Arabic), November 13, 2022, Accessed https://cnn.it/3F7s7a4 December 4, 2022
[xii] Ibrahim Alabi, How the Blast will Reflect on US-Turkiye Relation, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 16, 2011, Accessed https://bit.ly/3HdtHKl December 5, 2022
[xiii] Ibrahim Alabi, How Istanbul Blast will Impact Election Campaign in Turkiye, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 16, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3UIfuYO December 2, 2022
[xiv] Turkiye Terms ongoing Operation on as one of the Biggest Military Operation in Recent Past, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 22, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3XX1VHX November 30, 2022
[xv] Ibid
[xvi] Ibid
[xvii] Abdul Bari Atwan, What could be the Catastrophic Outcome of Turkiye’s Military Offense in Syria, Railyoum (Arabic), November 20, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3iyAX9 December 2, 2022
[xviii]Turkiye Terms ongoing Operation on as one of the Biggest Military Operation in Recent Past, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 22, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3XX1VHX November 30, 2022
[xix] Ibid
[xx] Washington Sends Sincere Condolence for the Blast Victims, Daily Sabah, November 20, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3P4W3Z3 November 29, 2022
[xxi] Erdogan: Operation Sword Claw will not Remain Confined to Air Strikes Only, Anadolu Agency (Arabic), November 21, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3h4vRBj December 5, 2022
[xxii] Abdul Bari Atwan, Why Egypt and Syria are Taking so Long to Respond to Erdogan’s Request, Railyoum (Arabic), November 26, 202, Accessed https://bit.ly/3VCrI6D December 8, 2022
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] Ibrahim Al-Alabi, How the Blast will Reflect on US-Turkiye Relation, Aljazeera (Arabic), November 16, 2011, Accessed https://bit.ly/3HdtHKl December 5, 2022
[xxv]Ibid
[xxvi] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Launches Fresh Attack against the Kurdish Bases, Monte Carlo, November 22, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3BhUmlc November 29, 2022
[xxvii] Iraq to Deploy its Forces on Borders, Railyoum (Arabic Daily), November 23, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3Uy5JfB November 26, 2022
[xxviii] What is Truth about Turkiye’s Claim of US being behind the Blast, Railyoum, November 15, 2022, Accessed https://bit.ly/3Y37yEk December 1, 2022
[xxix] Ibid