The High National Election Commission (HNEC) of Libya, on December 23, 2021, announced the postponement of the Presidential election scheduled on December 24, 2021, for a month due to disagreements between several political forces on the legal basis of the poll. It is over a month now, the issues and disputes remain unresolved, and HNEC has further postponed the elections until June 2022. The Presidential election was seen as a key aspect of the ongoing efforts to stabilize and move the country forward from the chaos and division that the country witnessed since the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. This delay has cast further doubt over the prospects of elections and political stability in Libya. The paper, thus, examines the causes behind the failure of the Presidential election in Libya.
Backgrounder to the December 24 Presidential Election
Colonel Gaddafi’s regime followed authoritarian measures to maintain stability in Libya. Following the demise of Gaddafi in 2011, Libya witnessed the political vacuum caused by the absence of the central authority. Consequently, several political factions and tribal militias struggled to control political power through violence. The prospects of political stability further became bleak with the regular interventions of the external actors. The primary political opponents were Prime Minister (PM) Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA)[i] and Warlord Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). Previously, Libya held several Parliamentary elections that failed to install political stability and reduce the political division between GNA and LNA. The result was that the protracted civil war between GNA and LNA further deepened the political division in the country.
The Libyan civil war and its spillover effects threatened the region’s political stability. Consequently, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intervened in Libya to assuage the political differences between GNA and LNA by establishing the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) on September 16, 2011. It was a political mission to support the country’s political transition.[ii] After the series of initiatives, such as the Skhirat Agreement (2015), Libyan National Conference (2018), and Berlin I Conference (January 01, 2020), the first major political breakthrough came on February 20, 2020, to bridge the political division, when the “permanent ceasefire” agreement was signed between the GNA and LNA at Geneva under the auspices of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC).[iii] Subsequently, the United Nations (UN) launched the Libya Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)[iv] on November 9, 2020.[v] The dialogue called for the establishment of the interim Government of National Unity (GNU)[vi] after the dissolution of the GNA. On March 10, 2021, GNU was established, which consisted of a Presidential Council headed by Mohammed al-Manfi and a cabinet headed by PM Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh.[vii] The UN mandated the GNU to run the interim government and create a conducive environment for holding a free and fair Presidential election on December 24, 2021.
During the Gaddafi era, only parliamentary elections were held, and it was for the first time that Libya Libya was going to hold the Presidential election. The High National Election Commission (HNEC) required a voting law to conduct the Presidential election. The House of Representatives[viii] (HoR) was the legislative authority to enact the law for the electoral process. On September 12, 2021, HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh Issa unilaterally ratified the Presidential Vote Law. Subsequently, the HNEC moved ahead with the nomination process to conduct the election.
Presidential Vote Law and Controversies Surrounding the Nomination Process
The Speaker, Aguila Saleh Issa, allegedly sympathetic to the warlord Haftar. He was keen to protect Haftar’s interest. To ensure Haftar’s victory, Saleh unilaterally ratified the Presidential Vote Law that further increased doubts about the success of the Presidential election.[ix] Saleh instead of passing and ratifying the law through the legislative proceeding, used the Facebook platform to pass the law, which entirely bypassed the stipulated review process from its opposition body, the High State Council (HSC),[x] which was the UN-mandated Libya’a advisory body. Al-Mishri, the chairman of HSC, rejected the law and boycotted the election on the pretext that Saleh’s unilateral move to enact the law was primarily designed to confirm the victory of Haftar.
The controversy surrounding the law was not only regarding Saleh’s motive and how it was passed, but also regarding two aspects of the law relating to eligibility criteria. One, the law required candidates to relinquish from their government positions three months before nomination. Second, those candidates who were convicted of crimes would not be allowed to contest the election.[xi] These aspects of the law generated controversy regarding the eligibility of the three candidates who filed their nominations.
The first controversy was related to Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam[xii] whose candidature was rejected on the grounds of convictions in past for several crimes.[xiii] Saif al-Islam moved to the local Sabha Appeal Court to revoke the HNEC decision. Amidst the hearing, Haftar’s forces stormed the court premises and blocked the proceeding to prevent the court from giving a verdict favouring Saif al-Islam.[xiv] However, the dramatic showdown at the court indicated what would have happened if the election had been held.
The second controversy was regarding PM Dbeibeh’s candidature. PM Dbeibeh filed the nomination to contest the election without relinquishing the interim Prime Ministerial post three months before the Presidential election.[xv] The third controversy was related to the candidature of Warlord Haftar. While filing his nomination, Haftar’s LNA also fought the GNU in Tripoli. Haftar’s forces spearheaded the re-emergence of violence indicated that the election would lead to more violence.[xvi] However, all these three candidates were later accommodated in the final list of the seven candidates.[xvii]
Notably, the candidates’ controversy, the fear of violence, and division forced the HNEC to postpone the Presidential election until June 2022. Now the future of the interim government, which was headed by Dbeibeh, whose role was to facilitate the election, became the central issue of political conflict. Given the Dbeibeh’s nomination for the Presidential election, the HoR has announced in a public statement that the mandate of the Dbeibeh government has expired and called for forming the new cabinet.[xviii] The HoR also asked the Governor of the Central Bank to stop the disbursing of financial resources to the Dbeibeh government.[xix] However, the international community, including the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France, Italy, and the United States (US), in a joint statement, has called on the Dbeibeh government to remain in power until the next presidential election. The HoR was of the view that this move of the international community was interference in the country’s domestic policy.[xx] In the present scenario, the political logjam between HoR-Haftar and Dbeibeh has brought the country back to the brink of a civil war again, reducing the prospects of holding election any time sooner.
In the meantime, the HoR appointed Fathi Bashagha as interim Prime Minister in place of Dbeibeh.
Conclusion
The post-Gaddafi Libya is facing a deep political turmoil emanated from the political rivalry that has torn the country apart into different autonomous regions. Libya is no longer a state in its modern form because a unified central government does not rule it; no constitution is accepted as the rule book to govern and unite the fractured country. Besides, the role of Russia, France, the US, Qatar, Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey in Libya’s domestic politics reveals that it is no longer enjoying the sovereignty that a modern state does. On several occasions, the international community failed to create a consensus among the stakeholders to put Libya on the path of democratisation, including through the December 24, 2021, Presidential election. The division between Haftar, controlling the eastern region, and Dbeibeh, controlling the western region deepened after the enactment of the controversial vote law. Neither of the two can assert their authority over the entire country. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for political actors in Libya to create a genuine reconciliation process and take state-building initiatives before HNEC announces the next election.
*****
*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] It was an interim government formed under the Libyan Political Agreement (Skhirat, Morocco), mandated by the UN on December 17, 2015.
[ii] United Nations Support Mission in Libya, accessed https://unsmil.unmissions.org/mandate, January 2, 2022.
[iii] The 5+5 JMC consisted of the five senior military officers of GNA and the five senior military officers of Haftar’s LNA. It was proposed by the United Nations Special Mission in Libya at Berlin Conference on January 20, 2020.
[iv]The LPDF brought seventy-five participants from Libya to discuss social and political issues. It aimed to speed up the process of elections and accord democratic legitimacy to the institutions in Libya.
[v] Libyan Political Dialogue Forum kicks off in the Tunisian capital and discusses a draft political roadmap, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, November 10, 2020, accessed https://bit.ly/31EZi4B, December 18, 2021.
[vi] LDPF’s main aim was to merge the GNA (Tripoli) and House of Representatives, and Warlord Haftar’s LNA supported Tobruk- based government in eastern Libya.
[vii] Wolfram, Lacher. Libya’s Flawed Unity Government, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 22, 2021, accessed https://bit.ly/3lI4VpT, December 19, 2021.
[viii] HoR was the main legislative body, formed on June 25, 2014. Its members claimed to follow the secular ideology.
[ix]Aguila Saleh: Who is Libya’s House Speaker, Al Jazeera, November 18, 2021, accessed https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/18/aguila-saleh-who-is-libyas-house-speaker, January 17, 2022.
[x] The HSC was formed on April 5, 2016. It was dominated by the members who followed Islamist ideology.
[xi] Controversy over voting law overshadows Libya election, France 24, accessed https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210916-controversy-over-voting-law-overshadows-libya-election, January 16, 2022.
[xii] Saif al-Islam belonged to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Libya Party.
[xiii] Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi disqualified by election commission from standing in presidential elections, Libya Herald, November 24, 2021, accessed https://bit.ly/3dunQjv, January 3, 2022.
[xiv] UNSMIL alarmed by reported attack on Sebha court looking into Saif Qaddafi's election disqualification appeal, Libya Herald, November 27, 2021, https://bit.ly/3DB6Typ, January 5, 2022.
[xv] Libyan appeals court rejects petition to cancel Dbeibeh’s candidacy, Daily Sabah, December 01, 2021, accessed https://bit.ly/343yfBm, January 18, 2022.
[xvi] Revealed: Leaked tapes expose Western support for renegade Libyan general, Middle East Eye, July 29, 2016, accessed https://bit.ly/3owkMK9, January 6, 2022.
[xvii] The other four candidates were selected in the final list for the Presidential election, namely, Aref Ali Nayed, the founder of the Center-Right Iheya Party, while Aguila Saleh Issah, Ahmed Maiteeq, and Fathi Bashagha filed their nomination as the independent candidates.
[xviii] Group of Libyan deputies supports Dbeibeh gov’t, Daily Sabah, January 23, 2022, accessed https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/group-of-libyan-deputies-supports-dbeibah-govt.
[xix] The UN’s unceasing support for the holding of elections in Libya, Atalayar, January 24, 2022, accessed https://atalayar.com/en/content/uns-unceasing-support-holding-elections-libya, February 2, 2022.
[xx]UN special adviser on Libya notes significance of country’s current government, Russian News Agency, January 20, 2022, accessed https://tass.com/world/1390611, January 21, 2022.