Introduction
At the opening ceremony of the Second Session of the 21st Century Panglong (second Session)/Union Peace Conference (UPC) which was held from 24th May to 29th May 2017 in Nay Pyi Taw, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said, ‘peace and stability will enable the nation to realize its potential as a strong, prosperous democratic federal union, a union that will be the refuge and the pride of our peoples’. Finding a lasting peace and national reconciliation to end the ongoing armed conflict between the Myanmar Army/Government and the Ethnic Armed Groups/Organisations (EAGs/EAOs) through political dialogue became a priority for the first civilian government formed by National league for Democracy (NLD) in 2015. According to the government, the UPC will help in achieving democratic federal Union based on democracy and federalism as a solution to country’s long-running armed conflict. Whether this initiative will help the government of Myanmar to achieve the goal is the question and the issue brief will touch upon various initiatives taken before the second session of UPC to achieve national reconciliation and the outcome of 21st Century Panglong conferences and few of the key challenges the government has to address to achieve the goal of national reconciliation.
Initiatives taken in the past to achieve national reconciliation
Military/Army rule in Myanmar lasted for nearly six decades after independence in 1948 and this led the country into armed conflict. Lack of development, lack of representation in the decision making process, centralised rule, and politicisation of ethnicity only accentuated the demand for secession by various ethnic groups representing various states and regions. Myanmar has 89.8 per cent Buddhist, 6.3 per cent Christian, 2.3 per cent Muslim, and 0.5 per cent Hindu population.[1] Myanmar has seven State assemblies such as Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Shan and Rakhine and regional assemblies such as Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon and five self administered zones.
The military junta/Army imprisoned political leaders the most prominent among them was Aung San Suu Kyi and suppressed dissent by introducing laws that curbed media freedom and freedom of expression. Popular protests for democracy and transparency since 1990s led by the NLD and other political parties and interests groups pressurised the military junta to embark upon constitutional changes and national reconciliation measures. This resulted in first multiparty elections in 1990 and initiation of constitution drafting process involving various stake holders. However, the military refused to acknowledge the election results that gave mandate to the NLD. To legitimise its rule it introduced a constitution in 2008. The constitution reserved one quarter of the seats in the National Assembly for the military and disqualified a person from the Presidency married to a foreigner and who did not have familiarity with the military’.[2] The clause disqualified the NLD leader Suu Kyi to become a President.
In March 2011, a new semi-civilian government led by President Thein Sein came to power and his government promised to embark upon various reforms to introduce ‘genuine democracy’.[3] Some of the important reforms introduced by Thein Sein government include, for the first time the NLD became legally registered political party; the government extended an invitation for exiles to return home and released high profile political prisoners’.[4] Restrictions on blocked internet sites were also lifted and most importantly, Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was established. These measures however, did not stop popular demand for a change and for more democratic space. It was reflected in April 2012 by elections, in which the NLD secured a landslide victory, winning 43 out of 45 seats.
However, initiatives taken at political reform had not stopped clashes between EAGs and Myanmar Army in frontier areas. Kachin state witnessed violence as well as Rakhine and Shan states. For example, ‘fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw resumed in June 2011 after the collapse of 17-year-old ceasefire. The ensuing violence has resulted in the deaths of thousands and the displacement of over 100,000 civilians’.[5] Communal clashes also broke out in Rakhine state between Buddhists and Muslim communities that led to the declaration of state of emergency in 2012.
Amidst this background the government initiated national reconciliation measures and the first step in this direction was the signing of Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation” on 12th February 2015 and Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which was signed in October 2015.
Signing of Deed of Commitment and the NCA
The Deed of Commitment was signed by representatives from the government, army, political parties, EAGs and ministers. Most importantly, it called for building a Union based on democratic and federal principles in the spirit of First Panglong Conference and in accordance with the outcome of political dialogue to ensure freedom, equality, justice and self determination for all citizens”.[6]
The first 20th Century Panglong Agreement signed on 12th February 1947 tried to find a federal solution. The Conference was attended by General Aung San, leader of the pre-independence interim Government, members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and Chin Hills. The most important aspect of the agreement was that, ‘it allowed full autonomy in internal administration for frontier areas which was accepted in principle’.[7] However, the agreement could not bring peace and stability to the country due to reasons such as politicisation of ethnic identities based on pre and post colonial rule. The British exploited ethnic cleavages and divided the Bamar Nation with other frontier groups such as Shan, Rakhine and Mon for administrative purposes and also used Kachin, Kayin and Chin guerrilla troops against Japanese aggression’.[8] Secondly the Assassination of Aung San, architect of Panglong had an impact on implementation of Panglong agreement. The Panglong Agreement though granted full autonomy to frontier areas, did not deal with the question of the right to secession as demanded by Shan and Kachin ethnic groups. Therefore, issues such as more autonomy and secession had dominated the discourse on building a post colonial state of Myanmar.
Therefore, achieving national reconciliation based on the spirit of Panglong conference provided a basis for government to engage with all EAOs and other stake holders to find a solution to armed conflict. The NCA signed in October 2015 between the Myanmar government headed by Thein Sein and eight out of 21 recognised EAOs had taken the national reconciliation efforts a step forward. The signing of NCA was an important first step in reconciliation process and it lasted for more than a year. The table below provides information on NCA signatories and non signatories as of the end of 2016.
NCA Group |
Bilateral Ceasefire Group |
Non Ceasefire Group |
Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) |
United Wa State Army (UWSA) |
Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO)/(KIA) |
Karen National Union (KNU) |
Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) |
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) |
Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) |
New Mon State Party (NMSP) |
Arakan Army (AA) |
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) |
National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) |
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) |
Chin National Front (CNF) |
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) |
Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) |
Pa-Oh National Liberation Front (PNLF) |
Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP) |
|
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Peace Council |
|
|
Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) |
|
|
Source: Burma News International, Myanmar Peace Monitor
The NCA ‘guaranteed political dialogues and monitoring ceasefires and it also guaranteed the amendment of the constitution’.[9] Importantly NCA process mechanism has been ratified into Law with the support of international community. The signing of NCA was witnessed by China, India, Japan, Thailand, UN and the EU along with Diplomats from forty five countries. Various mechanisms political and technical were established to oversee the implementation of NCA such as Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCM) the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) and the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC).
Elections in 2015
The Thein Sein government also conducted multiparty elections in 2015 as part of its political reform agenda. This paved the way for formation of democratically elected government in 30 March 2016 led by first civilian President Mr. Htin Kyaw. Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed as a State Counsellor as she was barred by 2008 Constitution to become a President. In 2015 elections NLD got ‘80 percent of votes and out of 224 total seats in upper house the NLD secured 135 seats and military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 11 seats. In lower house out of 440 seats the NLD got 225 seats where as the USDP could secure 30 seats’.[10] Even though these election results were important to solve country’s long standing civil war, election results did not alter the influence of military in parliament as 25% of seats in both the houses are reserved for the Army through Constitution.
The NLD Road Map for Peace
The NLD fought the elections in 2015 on the platform of achieving ‘peace and national reconciliation through political dialogue based on Panglong spirit; establishment of genuine federal democratic union based on the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination; resolution of problems between ethnic groups through dialogue based on mutual respect and balanced development of all the States and Regions.’[11]
The road map proposed by NLD to achieve peace is as follows:
Therefore, in line with the road map the ‘UPDJC was reformed, National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) was established replacing previous Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC). NRPC became a government organisation under the Ministry of State Counsellor’s office’.[13] Sub-committees were also formed to hold discussions with indigenous armed organisations that have signed the NCA as well as with those organisations that have not signed the NCA. In parallel with the political dialogues the government also encouraged to set up Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Forums.
To have the maximum stake holder representation in peace process, State counsellor Suu Kyi also met the delegation of United Nationalities Federation Council (UNFC) led by its chairman U N’Ban La. The UNFC represented the EAOs in peace process. The ‘meeting was first of its kind between new government and non signatory groups of NCA. She also met leaders of UWSA and National Democratic Alliance Army –NDAA (Mongla) to discuss their participation in UPC’.[14] According to the government UWSA assured that ‘they will not ask for secession from the country’. [15]
Apart from changes to various structures to the peace process as mentioned above, to take the Panglong spirit forward the NLD government conducted first and second session of 21st Century Panglong Conference/UPC in 2016 and in 2017. It was attended by the President, the State Counsellor, the Vice Presidents, the UNSG, Hluttaw Speakers, the Commander-in-Chief, and representatives from ethnic armed organisation, political parties, the government and Hluttaw, diplomats and UN officials. The NCA signatories and non-NCA EAOs have also attended the conference.
Outcome of the 21st century Panglong conferences/UPCs (first and second session)
The first and second UPCs provided a platform to implement government’s road map to peace.
First Session Outcome
At the first UPC held on 31st August 2016 in Nay Pyi Taw a common understanding was reached to conclude political dialogue within three to five years; to convene a second UPC; to enable 30 percent women’s participation and to honour and “put on record” NCA signatories. Though the issues agreed upon presented a positive picture, various views pertaining to nature of the state, role of Army, question of secession from the union and separation of powers between centre and states indicated that road map to peace in Myanmar was a complex process. For example, representatives from Army and USDP reaffirmed the need to adhere to the 2008 military-drafted constitution and basic principles of the NCA, whereas EAOs leaders and ethnic political parties called for greater separation of power between the state and central government.
The EAOs such as UNFC presented a 10-point agenda to bring the armed forces under civilian administration. It also demanded to reorganise the country into 14 states, with the seven current states preserved, and the seven regions turned into “states of nationalities”. Another EAO ‘the NDAA urged the government to ensure the future inclusion of the “Northern Alliance” (comprising AA, TNLA and MNDAA) in peace processes’.[16] The AA, TNLA, MNDAA and NSCN-Khaplang group chose not to attend the conference.
Process followed to have inclusive Second session of UPC
Based on the outcome of the first UPC and to make the peace process more inclusive, the NLD government decided to have three types of dialogues at regional, national and ethnic levels. The Joint Coordinating Body (JCB) for peace process funding was also formed in 20 December 2016 and the funding was allocated to four sectors which were the Ceasefire Sector, the negotiation and dialogue sector, the peace supporting development sector; peace making process of the national reconciliation and peace centre-NPRC sector’.[17] Many countries contributed to the peace funding and major donors are China (US$ 3 million) and Japan (granted more than US $12 million to MPC in 2013, in 2016 US$31.7 million donation to UN operations and $7.73 billion over five years to support its peace-building and development).
The government also formed ‘five working committees to deal with political affairs, social Affairs, economic affairs, security affairs and land and natural environmental affairs. These committees are formed to compile suggestions and proposals concerning the matters assigned to them for instance through national-level political dialogues’.[18] These efforts by the government helped to organise the second UPC in May 2017. Before convening of second secession of UPC the government maintained that, “without the commitment of the ethnic organisations for non-secession from the union, they cannot move forward for discussing related issues such as constitution of respective states, equality and self-determination”. [19]
Outcome of the second UPC
37 agreements were approved by the UPC and were signed as a part of the Pyidaungsu Accord/Union Accord
Pyidaungsu Accord
“The Accord mentions that it is looking forward to non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of the sovereignty, based on freedom, equality and justice. The Union Peace Conference—21st Century Panglong 2nd session was held for building up the Union in harmony with the Panglong spirit, based on democracy and federalism which guarantee democracy, national equality and self-determination, in accord with the outcomes of the political dialogues”.
Part One of the Pyidaungsu Accord approved and signed in the conference were ‘twelve agreements on principles of political sector; eleven agreements on principles of economic sector; four agreements on principles of social sector and ten agreements on principles of land and natural environment sector’.[20] State Councillor and Chairperson of UPC said that these agreements will form part of the future Union Accord’.[21]
Table below provides information about some of the salient principles agreed upon on four sectors mentioned above, to be based in Federalism.
Political Sector
|
Economic Sector
- draw firm policy, law , by-law, rules and regulations at every level such as Union, Regions and States and Self-administered Regions/Zones and promulgate them in order to be able to implement the market economy effectively. - target to alleviate the poverty, to raise the living standard of the people, to narrow down the socioeconomic gap between the rich and the poor and finally aim to achieve sustainable development in promoting the private sector of national economy in line with the policy, law and by-law already set before.
|
Social Sector
|
Land and natural environmental sector
|
The issues agreed upon in the agreement provided a broad consensus on issues the centre and states and regions will have to adhere, to achieve national reconciliation. For Myanmar government agreement on the principles mentioned above was a major step forward in its peace road map. However, there are several challenges the NLD government will have to address to complete the peace road map which include participation of non-NCA signatories in peace process, role of Army, solving of Rohingya issue and involvement and role of external actors in peace process. These key challenges are discussed below.
Key Challenges
Participation of non-NCA signatories in reconciliation process
Overall fifteen ethnic armed groups attended the UPC, including eight signatories to the NCA and seven non signatories who were allowed to participate in the peace conference as observers or guests. These include, UWSA, KIO, SSPP-North and Mongla's NDAA, TNLA, Kokang's MNDAA and AA. Reaching an agreement with these ethnic armed groups based in North-Eastern region of Myanmar is going to be a challenging task for the government. EAOs that have not signed the NCA account for more than eighty percent of country’s armed rebels. The Army has been insisting that these EAOs have to denounce their arms before joining the peace process which is not acceptable for these groups.
Pangkham Agreement
Before the second secession of UPC, non-signatory groups of NCA led by UWSA held a conference from 22nd to 24th February 2017 in Pangkham to present an alternative approach to the NCA. The agreement reached at the conference argued that “in spite of NCA deliberation, the armed conflict along the Burma-China border in Kachin and Shan States have escalated with no sign of stopping”. Therefore, the Agreement demanded the following:
- Immediately withdraw the identification as terrorist groups of MNDAA, TNLA and KIA of December 7, 2016 by the Shan State Parliament that is against the will of the people.
- Immediately stop all military offensives, in order for the country to be peaceful and start the reconciliation process.[26]
- Regarding the NCA, the agreement stated that the government could not replace the historic Panglong Agreement with the NCA and it should be replaced with more justified ceasefire agreement.
- The statement also called upon on the government to include the United Nations and People’s Republic of China as arbitrator in Burma’s peace process.
- The groups which participated in the meeting formed Union Political Negotiation Dialogue Committee (UPNDC) and insisted that they have to be represented by this formation in peace talks.
- Regarding capital investment and developmental projects the EAOs participating in the conference opined that, “China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy is peaceful equal development of all neighbouring countries. This policy is necessary for Burma’s economic development and security and as well benefits the arbitrator”.[27]
Other challenges are rivalry within EAOs for leadership and differences regarding government initiated peace process are also obstacles in achieving the goal of participation of all EAOs in talks. For example, among the EAOs, “UWSA is the strongest armed ethnic group with an estimated strength of 30,000 fighters (30,000 on reserve) and enjoys its autonomous enclave along the China-Myanmar border’.[28] This group emerged as an important player in representing the EAOs and increasingly taking a leadership role and has become a threat to the UNFC which represents the EAOs in peace process. The future of the UNFC is in doubt in wake of suspensions and resignations from the council such as KN, Pa-o National liberation Organisation (PNLO), CNF, MNDAA, TNLA and KIO and Wa National Organisation (WNO)’.[29] These groups had left the Council due to reasons such as disagreement over the management of the organization, rivalry for leadership and differences over the strategy to deal with military attacks on areas occupied by EAOs.
The KIO is the second largest ethnic organisation and it is unlikely to sign any agreement with the government as long as the other EAOs such as TNLA and AA are excluded from the peace process and NCA. These groups conduct joint military operations and use their territory for defence. The State Counsellor met with the KIO before the second UPC to convince the organisation members to join the NCA, which was not fruitful.
Though some of these non-signatory groups had sent their representative to participate in UPC there is a clear dissatisfaction and disagreement about the government’s peace road map. Government’s handling of political dialogues in states and regions where there is, substantial presence and influence of EAOs was criticised as non-transparent by ALA and KNU. For instance, ‘Myanmar government expressed its reservations about conducting national level political dialogue by ALA, the NCA signatory. In another instance, the government allowed RCSS to hold a dialogue but refused to grant permission to hold a dialogue in Arakan as proposed by RCSS as it was a sensitive area’. [30] Due to this, only six of the EAOs that signed the NCA could hold the national level political dialogue. The KNU leader Naw Zipporeach Sein said that the UPC ‘second session had little to offer to the EAOs instead allowed the military to dominate and proper mechanisms were not followed in conducting the UPC such as signing of NCA, drafting a framework for political dialogue and its adoption; holding of national level (ethnic nationality level) political dialogue and convening the UPC’ as proposed by NCA document’.[31]
The above mentioned positions taken by some of the EAOs and government’s response to these positions in the future will have an impact on holding a future UPC.
Role of Army
Another challenge in achieving national reconciliation is to manage military-civil relations as well as Army’s influence in security matters of the country. Some argued that “the good outcome of the conference was due to the changing policy and attitude of the Tatmadaw and its ardent desire to achieve peace”.[32] However, the fact is the ‘military is a dominant institution in the country for most part of its history’[33] and the NCA was initiated under the military regime of Thein Sein. Therefore, the Army has a stake in the peace process and non participation in peace process would have led to the isolation of the army from national reconciliation process and eventual dominance of civilian government in future affairs. Army is well aware of this fact and its participation in peace process will ensure a say in the outcome.
At the same time, the Army has also involved in continuous clashes with the EAOs in frontier areas for control over territory and economy. For example, the KIA was involved in 82 clashes with the Myanmar Army in 2016 and with the Northern Alliance more than 136 clashes took place. Since 2011 EAOs had expanded in numbers. For example, ‘during 2011-2016, KIA increased its strength from 4000 to 10,000. Other EAOs such as the TNLA increased from 1500 to 5000, the UWSA from 20,000 to 30,000 the SSPP from 1000 to 8000 and the RCSS from 4000 to 8000’.[34] Therefore, the Army will continue to pressurise the EAOs to disarm and participate in peace process and adhere to ceasefire.
Solution to Rakhine issue
Another key challenge in achieving reconciliation in Myanmar is to find a political solution to violence between the Muslim and Buddhist communities in Rakhine state of Myanmar. Since ‘2012 the state witnessed violence leading to displacement and refugee flow to neighbouring countries’. [35] Even under the NLD rule, the Rakhine State witnessed violence and in October 2016 attacks allegedly by Rohingya militants group Harakah al-Yaqin on security forces had prompted a new large-scale security crackdown by the Army in northern Rakhine. And 65,000 Rohingya Muslims have sought refugees in neighbouring Bangladesh after the military crackdown.
In response, the State Counsellor said that her ‘government is committed to resolution of the complex issue but need time and space to tackle the issue’.[36] To find a lasting solution the government established an Advisory Commission on Rakhine State led by Kofi Annan Foundation composed of three international and six national persons of eminence’.[37]. The NLD government also constituted various mechanisms such as Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Central Committee for the Implementation of Peace and Development in Raphine State and a Commission headed by Vice President Myint Sew to look into the ways to find a solution to violence.
The government had refuted the charges of UN and human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch which held the Army responsible for violence in Rakhine state particularly burning of Muslim houses, killings, disappearances in north Maungdaw. In March 2017 the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution to send ‘an international fact-finding mission to Myanmar to investigate atrocities that the country’s army is said to have committed against Rohingya Muslims’. In response, the State Counsellor, ‘said they have disassociated themselves from the resolution because they do not think that the resolution is in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground’.[38] In an interview to BBC in April 2017 she also said, ‘there is no ethnic cleansing in Rakhine state’.[39]
The government denied visas to UN fact finding mission appointed in May 2017 that was formed to compile a report on Rakhine state affairs. UN appointed Marzuki Darusman, a former attorney-general of Indonesia, Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka and Christopher Dominic Sidoti of Australia to serve as the three members of the UN mission’[40].
The Stand taken by the NLD government was criticised by many as it seem to be overlooking the real situation on the ground and the role of Army and hard-line Buddhists groups such as Ma Ba Tha in the past in marginalising and in instigating violence against majority Rohingya Muslim community in Rakhine state. This community are seen by many as illegal migrants from Bangladesh. The problem also ‘lies in the fact that more than one million people in the Rakhine state have denied citizenship and basic rights. Some argue that the marginalised population are becoming easy targets for recruitment by jihad groups’.[41]
Amidst this background, violence in Rakhine State intensified after the attack on Myanmar military by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on 25th August 2017 and resulted in killing of twelve personnel. In counter attack by Myanmar military, according to the government, around 77 ARSA cadre were killed’.[42] The military operations that were undertaken to flush out the ARSA militants/terrorists after the incident led to more than thousand civilian deaths largely belonging to Rohingya Muslim community and large scale migration of the community to neighbouring Bangladesh numbering more than 400,000. According to human rights bodies, there is an evidence of systematic attack through persecution and burning of properties by military to drive the Rohingya Muslim community from the State.
The government’s silence to the plight of Rohingya Muslims was widely criticised by international actors such as UN and many countries expressed their concern on the issue such as India, US, UK, Sweden, Germany, Maldives, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. India expressed concern on refugee flow to neighbouring Bangladesh and asked the Myanmar Government to take measures to stop the refugee flow. India also “urged a solution based on respect for peace, communal harmony, justice, dignity and democratic values”.[43] The UN condemned the Government of Myanmar for not controlling the situation and said that it is a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”.[44] Bangladesh ‘passed a unanimous motion in Parliament asking the government of Myanmar to take back Rohingyas’.[45] The Kofi Annan Commission made number of significant recommendations on wide ranging issues concerning Rakhine State such as the economic and social development of Rakhine State, citizenship issue, on IDPs, humanitarian and media access, drugs, intercommunal cohesion, security sector, access to justice and border issues and the bilateral relations with Bangladesh.
Some of the recommendations are[46]:
Responding to the situation, Myanmar State Counsellor addressed the diplomatic community on 19th September 2017. She said that,
“We condemn all human rights violations and unlawful violence. We are committed to the restoration of peace, stability and rule of law throughout the State. The security forces have been instructed to adhere strictly to the Code of Conduct in carrying out security operations, to exercise all due restraint, and to take full measures to avoid collateral damage and the harming of innocent civilians”. We feel deeply for suffering of all the people who have been caught up in the conflict.”[47]
State Counsellors position has been reiterated again at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21st September 2017 by the H.E. U Henry Van Thio, Vice-President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. He also, elaborated on initiatives taken by the Government to tackle the problem such as ‘adoption of an integrated national strategy to address the problem, launch of a committee chaired by the Union Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement to implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission’. At the UN Assembly, countries such as UK, Indonesia, Mauritius, Bangladesh, Denmark, Turkey, Comoros, Pakistan, Maldives, Thailand, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore have spoken on the developments in Rakhine State and asked the Myanmar Government to take humanitarian measures to address the situation and solve the problem. Implementation of Kofi Annan Advisory Commission recommendations was also proposed as a solution to the problem.
Support of neighbouring countries
Apart from the above mentioned key challenges another challenge for the government is to get the support of neighbouring countries to its national reconciliation efforts. Myanmar share borders with India, China, Thailand Laos and Bangladesh and ethnic groups share cultural and historical links across the border. Continuous conflict in Myanmar is driving refugees and migrants particularly to China, Thailand and Bangladesh.
India
India supported the peace process initiated by the NLD Government in 2016. The joint statement issued after the visit of Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw to India on 26th August 2016 as well as the joint statement issued during the first bilateral visit of Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi to Myanmar on 5-6th September 2017 specifically mentioned about the ongoing peace process and India’s support to the national reconciliation and peace process of the Government of Myanmar under the "21st Century Panglong Conference”.[48] India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Mr. Ajit Doval was present during the signing of NCA in October 2015. Indian delegation also attended the peace conference. Peace and stability in Myanmar is a priority to India as it shares 1,624 km border with Myanmar. Both the countries are fighting the insurgency/militancy along the border and have been conducting joint military operations along the border to tackle the insurgency. For example, In June 2015 surgical strike inside Myanmar was carried out by a team of about 70 commandos of the Indian Army which shot down several Naga insurgents belonging to the NSCN-Khaplang militant group along the India-Myanmar border. In September 2017, Indian Army also shot down several Naga insurgents belonging to the same group.
There is an understanding between India and Myanmar to tackle the insurgency along the borders and the joint statement during the visit of PM of India to Myanmar in September 2017, recognised that ‘maintenance of security and stability along the common border is essential for the socio-economic development of the peoples of the border areas’. In this context, Myanmar reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India”. Both the countries also ‘upheld the policy of not allowing any insurgent group to utilise and undertake hostile acts against each other’. After the outbreak of violence in Rakhine state of Myanmar in the last week of August 2017, after ARSA attack on military and subsequent refugee flow to Bangladesh in large numbers, ‘India condemned the terrorist attack and expressed its concern on refugee flow and asked the Myanmar Government to take measures to stop refugee flow to Bangladesh’.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh is home to large number of Myanmar population numbering 800,000 and above (undocumented Myanmar nationals and Rohingya Muslims, including the refugee flow after the 25th August 2017 violent incident). This population is mainly staying in Cox’s Bazar in two registered camps and makeshift settlements. The Foreign Minister Mr. A H Mahmood Ali, while briefing the diplomatic community in February 2017, on the situation of Myanmar refugees and undocumented Myanmar nationals in Bangladesh said, “the presence of huge number of Myanmar Nationals in Cox’s Bazar district has not only created formidable challenges for the authorities to manage humanitarian assistances, but also created a number of adverse effects on the overall socio-economic, political, demographic, environmental, humanitarian, security, and also negatively affecting the eco-tourism prospects. Citing the vulnerable nature of this population, networks have emerged in this area for the purpose of human trafficking and smuggling of narcotic drugs”.[49] The statement reflects the problem that exists in bilateral relations with Myanmar. The government of Bangladesh is trying to relocate the refugees as well as unauthorised Myanmar nationals residing in Bangladesh to Thengar Char, an Island next to Hatia Island in the Bay of Bengal, after the necessary infrastructure development.
Bilateral political visits between the two countries after the NLD formed the government in 2106 suggested that, both the countries are willing to solve differences through discussion and are interested in enhancing security cooperation along border areas. Bangladesh also assured Myanmar that ‘it will not allow any activity in its territory inimical to the interest of Myanmar’.[50] In this context, Bangladesh asked for the early repatriation of entire Myanmar population and urgently address the “root cause” of the problem in the Rakhine State so that Rakhine Muslims are not required to desperately seek shelter across the border’[51].
Till 2005, ‘Bangladesh had repatriated over 236,599 Rakhine Muslims and UNHRC provided support in the process. However, the Myanmar government in 2005 took a unilateral decision to halt repatriation of Rohingya Muslims’.[52] Even though the Government of Bangladesh is providing required humanitarian assistance with the help of UN agencies, repatriation of refugees might become a thorny issue in bilateral relations. In a situation where, there are no proper mechanism in place to screen refuges and for identification, repatriation will take time. Speaking at the UN General Assembly Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina proposed actions which should be taken to deal with the Rohingya crisis such as unconditional stop to the violence and the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine State, UN fact-finding Mission to Myanmar; creation of “safe zones” under the UN supervision; return of all forcibly displaced Rohingyas, and the implementation of Kofi Annan Commission Report.
The Myanmar Government at the UN proposed the establishment of a joint working group for implementation of repatriation process, ‘based on the experience of 1993, which might address the problem to some extent’. During 1992-93, Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed that, “Myanmar will take measures to halt the outflow of refugees to Bangladesh, and to accept, after scrutiny, all ‘those carrying Myanmar identity cards’, ‘those able to present other documents issued by relevant Myanmar authorities’ and ‘all those able to furnish evidence of their residence in Myanmar’ and ‘all those willing to return to Myanmar”[53]. UNHRC was involved in resettling and in repatriation process in 1990s.
China
Myanmar’s relations with China have travelled a complicated path for many years owing to factors such as China’s alleged support to EAOs, drug and arms trade in frontier areas, opposition to China’s investments and instability in border areas.
The EAOs who are not part of NCA are present in border areas of Myanmar and China. The UWSA and MNDAA were formed after the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegration in late 1980s. The CPB was supported by China during cultural revolution’.[54] The EAOs share historical, cultural, political and economic linkages with the ethnic groups across the border with China’. Many reports suggest that many interests groups in China (with or without government backing) had financially supported and supplied arms to insurgent such as ‘KIA, UWSA and MNDAA’.[55]
Another thorny issue in the peace process is control of drug trade along the border. Drug trade along the border areas is a main source of finance for some of the Border Guard Forces (BGFs), for Myanmar military and for interests groups in China particularly in Yunnan Province. The frontier states with China and Laos are known for production of illicit drugs and Myanmar remains the largest producer of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia. According to a UN report, ‘the Shan state in the north of Myanmar, which hosts a number of conflict areas and ceasefire groups, remains the centre of the country’s opium and heroin trade, accounting for 91 per cent of opium poppy cultivation’.[56] In Myanmar, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that there are over 133,000 opium producing households. Both the EAOs and Myanmar Army are trying to have control over drug trade leading to occasional clashes. Apart from drug trade, ‘the northern states of Myanmar are also known for many illicit and undercover industries, such as jade and gold mining, timber and opium which has become a lucrative financial source’[57]. For the last few years attempts have been made to control the drug trade and the Myanmar government with the help of UN is trying to implement a drug reform policy that can contain its production. In June 2017 Myanmar along with Thailand and Cambodia destroyed nearly US $ one billion worth narcotics to show governments’ resolve against the trade’[58]. Illegal mining and logging in Northern Myanmar by companies based in Yunnan is also an issue. In the past, Yucheng Group in Yunaan province reportedly donated 10 million RMB to MNDAA in 2015.
Above factors are also contributing to unstable border areas due to spill over effects. For instance, in March 2017, clashes between Myanmar Army and MNDAA resulted in refugee flow to China numbering 20,000. According to UN estimates the ‘Myanmar and China border (representing Kachin and Shan states including Kokang region) is home to more than 200,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)’.[59] Continuous displacement and refugee flow along the border had compelled China to get involved in talks between the government of Myanmar and EAOs in the past. For example, after the clashes broke out between Myanmar Army and groups such as KIA and MNDAA, China had sent Chinese special envoy Sun Guoxiang o talk to UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance –Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS) to ensure groups participation in UPC. Some reports suggest that the Northern Alliance participation in second UPC was due to China’s persuasion. Therefore maintaining peace and stability in border areas and continuation of economic cooperation between ethnic communities are some other issues in which Myanmar expects cooperation from China.
The changed political environment in Myanmar and country’s willingness to open its market as well as willingness to engage with international actors for investments in various sectors are attracting many outside powers. China would like to tap the opportunity for investments and will try to secure its investments in Myanmar, which saw a set back during the rule of Mr. Thein Sein. For example, the NLD government showed its willingness to negotiate a much controversial US $ 3.6 billion Myitsone dam project which was cancelled by previous government due to environmental reasons. Peace and stability in Border States in changed political environment is a basic necessity to complete China backed projects such as US $6 billion Mong Ton hydropower facility and oil and gas pipeline projects. China is also investing a lot of money in Kyaukpyu special economic zone which is where the pipeline starts’.[60] The proposed gas and oil pipeline is passing through the conflict affected Kachin and Shan states.
Therefore, on second session of UPC, China took a position that ‘the 21st Century Panglong Conference was significant and will enhance the mutual understanding and trust between relevant parties, advance the peace process and promote national reconciliation in Myanmar. China appointed Mr. Sun Guoxiang, Special Envoy of Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to lead the delegation to the UPC’.[61] The increasing interest of West, particularly the US is also a concern for China and it does not want the US to involvement in peace process. For example, ‘it strongly objected to the KIA proposal to invite, US and UK as observers in peace process in 2013’.[62] Above reasons indicate that China has a complex role to play in Myanmar peace process. Whether the government of China will prevail upon the EAOs to participate in peace process to secure its economic investments or will it allow various interests groups in China to continue to influence EAOs for various political ends will determine the progress of peace process in Myanmar.
Thailand
As far as the Thailand is concerned, it shares more than 2000 km border with Myanmar. The border areas are hub to drug smuggling and human trafficking. The conflict in Myanmar led to significant presence of refugees and migrants in Thailand. According to UN estimates, Thailand is home to some 103,300 Myanmar refugees, living in nine camps along the Thailand-Myanmar border and composed mainly of Karen, Karenni, Burmese and Mon ethnicity. Refugees first arrived in Thailand in the early 1980s after fleeing ethnic conflict in south-eastern Myanmar due to the clashes between KNU and Myanmar Army and some of the EAO’s along the border are KNU, New Mon State party (NMSP) and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). In the past, both the countries accused each other of supporting EAOs to destabilise governments’ and to control drug trade.
After the formation of NLD government and as Myanmar ‘opens to the world, ethnic groups are seen as an impediment to cross border trade and investment opportunities’.[63] Successful peace process as both countries realise would bring mutual economic benefits. In this context, during the visit of State Counsellor Aung San Suu kyi to Thailand in July 2016, both the countries have agreed to renew negotiations over disputed border demarcations and repatriation of refugees. Myanmar shares its Eastern and South-Eastern borders with Thailand and some territory is under the control of EAOs to which the Thai government had also staked its claims. For example, area near Three Pagodas Pass and the UWSA military bases on the Thai-Burma border in Thailand’s northern provinces of Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Song are some of the disputed border areas. More than a dozen UWSA bases are in southern Shan State, on or over the Thai border’.[64] Therefore, security and stability in border areas is dependent on cooperation between EAOs, Myanmar military and Thailand government as well as cessation of hostilities and participation of EAOs in national reconciliation process.
Conclusion
The 21st Century Panglong Conference initiated by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2016 was a major initiative to achieve national reconciliation. However, the path to peace in Myanmar is complex involving a large number of stake holders. The conflict in Myanmar is the result of colonial and post colonial rule which demarcated boundaries by giving scant regard to traditional boundaries and people to people relations. The UPC has provided a platform to discuss all contentious issues. However, the signing of NCA has not ceased hostilities at frontier areas. At present there seem to be an understanding between the civilian government and the Army regarding the need for a peace process. The situation might change depending on compromises the NLD government is willing to make with the EAOs to include them in peace process. The Accord that was signed in second UPC has not dealt with security issues which might be included in the next UPC. Military has control over defence, border affairs and home. Military’s response to violence in Rakhine State in August 2017 was an example. In this context how the government is going to negotiate on security related issues in the future will determine the outcome of UPCs as amendment to the constitution is opposed by Army.
Moreover, a few of the points agreed upon on power sharing between centre, state and regions in UPC and its actual implementation are fraught with problems as some of the EAOs are asking for more autonomy and control over self administered areas. Demilitarisation, resettlement, rebuilding of areas damaged by conflict and rights violations are some other basic issues which need the attention of government in conflict zones. The UPC also brought onto the surface the ideological differences between EAOs and brining all under one platform is going to be an enormous challenge for NLD in the next UPC. As far as Rakhine State stability is concerned, implementation of Advisory Commission recommendations led by Kofi Annan might provide solutions to the problem.
Abbreviations
All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF)
Arakan Army (AA)
Arakan Liberation Army (ALA)
Border Guard Forces (BGFs)
Chin National Front (CNF)
Chin National Front (CNF)
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)
Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA)
Ethnic Armed Groups/Organisations (EAGs/EAOs)
Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCM)
Joint Coordinating Body (JCB)
Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM)
Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO)/(KIA)
Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNLA-PC)
Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP)
Karen National Union (KNU)
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)
Lahu Democratic Union (LDU)
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC)
National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)
National Democratic Alliance –Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS)
National league for Democracy (NLD)
National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC)
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
New Mon State Party (NMSP)
New Mon State party (NMSP)
One Belt One Road (OBOR)
Pa-o National Liberation Organisation (PNLO)
Pa-Oh National Liberation Front (PNLF)
Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS)
Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA)
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
Union Peace Conference (UPC)
Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
United Nationalities Federation Council (UNFC)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
United Political Negotiations Dialogue Committee (UPNDC)
United Wa State Army (UWSA)
Wa National Organisation (WNO)
****
* Dr. Samatha Mallemapti, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are that of the Researcher and not of the Council.
End Notes
[1] The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census, http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Report_Religion_-_Census_Report_V2-C_DOP_Jul2016_ENG.pdf
[2] Shankari Sundararaman , “From SLORC to SPDC: Political Continuity Versus Economic Change in Myanmar”, https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan10.html
[3] “Reforms in Myanmar: One Year On’, International Crisis Group, 11 April 2012, https://d2071andvipowj-cloudfront.net/b136-titu-pdf, p.1
[4] “Reforms in Myanmar: One Year On’, International Crisis Group, 11 April 2012, https://d2071andvipowj-cloudfront.net/b136-titu-pdf, p.1-2
[5] PEACE POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF WE WANT IT: STATE COUNSELLOR, 29 march 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/785
[6] Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, Burma News International, P.26, http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/books/dm%20peace%20process%20a%20reference%20guide%202016.pdf
[7] Panglong Accord document, 1947
[8] Maung Maung Than, “the Essential Tension: Democratisation and the Unitary State in Myanmar (Burma)”, South East Asia Research, Vol.12, No.2 (July 2004), PP.187-212, P. 190.
[9] “Peace Possible, but Only if we want it: State Counsellor, 29 March 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/785
[10] “Myanmar's 2015 landmark elections explained”, 3 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036
[11] National League for Democracy 2015 Election Manifesto Authorised Translation, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/NLD_2015_Election_Manifesto-en.pdf
[12] “An Uphill Mission But Not Mission Impossible”, 31st October 2016, http://mail.brudirect.com/news.php?id=17123
[13] “New Name for Peace Centre”, 17 May 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/23
[14] “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi talks with non-Signatory Armed Groups”, 17 July 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/160
[15] “Gover,Wa,NDAA (Mongla) meeting Brings Step Closer to Peace”, 29 July 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/173
[16] Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, Burma News International, p.58, http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/books/dm%20peace%20process%20a%20reference%20guide%202016.pdf
[17] FUNDS FOR PEACE PROCESS TO BE ALLOCATED INTO FOUR SECTORS, 21 December 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/535
[18] FORMATION OF WORKING COMMITTEES, 16 February 2107, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/687
[19] UPDJC Reaches Agreements on most Issues Except Secession”, 29-5-2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/902
[20] “37 POINTS SIGNED AS PART OF PYIDAUNGSU ACCORD”, 30 May 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/904
[21] BIRTH OF PYIDAUNGSU ACCORD FOR PEACE, 30 May 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/906
[22] “37 POINTS SIGNED AS PART OF PYIDAUNGSU ACCORD”, 30 May 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/904
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] ibid
[26] Sai Wansai, “THE PLOT THICKENS: Wa-led ethnic armed organization leaders unveiled a new peace process game plan”, 27 February 2017, http://english.panglong.org/2017/02/27/the-plot-thickens-wa-led-ethnic-armed-organization-leaders-unveiled-a-new-peace-process-game-plan/
[27] ibid
[28] “UWSA hosts conference for non-signatories”, 20 February 2017, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/25009-uwsa-hosts-conference-for-non-signatories.html
[29] Sai Wansai, “UNFC’S FUTURE: Waning political clout or revamping the organization’s image?”, 1 July 2017, http://english.panglong.org/2017/07/01/unfcs-future-waning-political-clout-or-revamping-the-organizations-image/
[30] “ALP Does not expect a good outcome”, from the panglong meet: Interview”, 30 March 2017, http://karenews.ord/2017/05/ ALP Does not expect a good outcome”, from the panglong meet: Interview.html/
[31] “Karen Leader- Union Peace Conference 21st century Panglong gives ethnic armed organsaitions little but lets military dominate”, 6th July 2017, http://keren news.org/2017/07/ Karen Leader- Union Peace Conference 21st century Panglong gives ethnic armed organsaitions little but lets military dominate.
[32] BIRTH OF PYIDAUNGSU ACCORD FOR PEACE, 30 May 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/906
[33] “Myanmar’s military Back to the Barracks?”, International Crisis Group, Update Briefing, 22 April 2014, http://d207/andviOwj.cloudfront.net/ Myanmar’s military Back to the Barracks-pdf, P.1
[34] Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, Burma News International, P.5-6 http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/books/dm%20peace%20process%20a%20reference%20guide%202016.pdf
[35] Deciphering Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016, Burma News International, P.15, http://mmpeacemonitor.org/images/books/dm%20peace%20process%20a%20reference%20guide%202016.pdf
[36] RAKHINE EFFORTS NEED TIME AND SPACE: STATE COUNSELLOR, 20 December 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/532
[37] ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RAKHINE STATE, 23 August 2016, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/227
[38] “Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi rejects UN Rohingya investigation”, 3 May 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/03/burmas-aung-san-suu-kyi-rejects-un-rohingya-probe/
[39] “Aung San Suu Kyi: No ethnic cleansing of Myanmar Muslim minority”, 6th April 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39507350
[40] “Myanmar slammed over visa refusal to UN Rohingya probe”, 12th July 2017, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/myanmar-slammed-over-visa-refusal-to-un-rohingya-probe-9026512
Read more at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/myanmar-slammed-over-visa-refusal-to-un-rohingya-probe-9026512
[41] “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State”, 15 December 2016, International Crisis Group Report N 283.
[42] “STATE LEADERS TAKE CHARGE AFTER VIOLENT ATTACKS IN RAKHINE STATE”, 26th August 2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/1005
[43] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Press Releases, “Situation in Raphine State of Myanmar”, 9th September 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/press- eleases.htm?dtl/28931/Situation_in_Rakhine_State_of_Myanmar
[44] “Darker and more dangerous: High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on human rights issues in 40 countries”, Human Rights Council 36th session, Opening Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 September 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true
[45] “ Parliament passes resolution urging UN to mount pressure on Myanmar”, 11 September 2017, http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/09/11/pm-shelter-rohingya-temporary/
[46] Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, http://www.rakhinecommission.org/
[47] “Statement by H.E. U Henry Van Thio, Vice-President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, at the General Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly”, 21-9-2017, http://www.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=briefing-room/news/2017/09/21/id-7713
[48] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India- Myanmar Joint Statement during the visit of the President of Myanmar to India (29 August 2016)”, 9th August 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27343/India+Myanmar+Joint+Statement+during+the+visit+of+the+President+of+Myanmar+to+India+29+August+2016.
[49] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, “Foreign Minister briefed the members of the diplomatic community on the situation of Myanmar refugees and undocumented Myanmar nationals”, 5th February 2107, http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/foreign-minister-briefed-members-diplomatic-community-situation-myanmar-refugees-and
[50] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, “National Security Adviser of Myanmar met Bangladesh Foreign Minister”, February 2017, http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/national-security-adviser-myanmar-met-bangladesh-foreign-minister-0
[51] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, “Bangladesh demands early repatriation of all Myanmar citizens from Bangladesh”, 31st December 2016, http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/bangladesh-demands-early-repatriation-all-myanmar-citizens-bangladesh
[52] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, “Foreign Minister A H Mahmood Ali, MP urged the UNHCR to call upon the Government of Myanmar to take meaningful measures to ensure return of all Myanmar nationals staying in Bangladesh to their homeland in Rakhine State”, 8th July 2017, http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/foreign-minister-h-mahmood-ali-mp-urged-unhcr-call-upon-government-myanmar-take-meaningful.
[53] “Repatriation of refugees to Rakhine in the pipeline”, 25th September 2017, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/repatriation-refugees-rakhine-pipeline.html
[54] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, March 2017.
[55] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, March 2017.
[56] “Opium production in Myanmar and Laos are stable at high levels, new UN report shows”, 16 December 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52838#.WYFgLYiGMdU
[57] David Shaw, “Drugs and bullets in Myanmar”, 8th February 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/12/drugs-bullets-myanmar- 161220064632150.html
[58] “Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand burn $1billion of narcotics as police struggle against growing industry”, 26th June 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/26/myanmar-cambodia-thailand-burn-1billion-narcotics-police-struggle/
[59] “Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees”, Myanmar Peace Monitor.
[60] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on May 31, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1466669.shtml
[61] “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on May 24, 2017”, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1464941.shtml
[62] Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, March 2017.
[63] Brian Mccartan, “Chinese Shadow Over Myanmar’s Wars”, 22 may 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/chinese-shadow-myanmars-wars/
[64] “Thailand and Burma Restart Border Demarcation Talks”, 29mJune 2017, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/thailand-and-burma-restart-border-demarcation-talks.html