On January 8, 2021, the Central District Court of Seoul ordered the Japanese government to pay 100 million Korean won (US$91,072) each to 12 plaintiffs in damage for the victims of wartime sexual slavery or euphemistically know as the “comfort women”. The issue of comfort women has been a bilateral friction point between South Korea and Japan for quite some time; however, it is the first time that a South Korean court is making a ruling on the matter. The court also issued a provisional execution order, allowing the South Korean authorities to seize Japanese assets in Korea to compensate the victims.[1] A similar suit is also pending in another Korean court, and the verdict is expected in March.
As expected, Tokyo lodged an immediate protest. Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi in a statement said that the ruling “is extremely regrettable and utterly unacceptable” and urged Seoul to “immediately take appropriate measures to correct this state in violation of international law under its responsibility as a state.”[2] Tokyo asserted that the court ruling is a violation of the 1965 diplomatic normalisation agreement between two sides that settled all matters of compensation related to Japanese rule in Korea and the 2015 agreement that “finally and irreversibly” resolved the issue of comfort women.[3]
Tokyo also dismissed the court ruling on the grounds of sovereign immunity, a principle in international law that protects a state from foreign courts’ jurisdiction. However, in its verdict, the Korean court rejected applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity by saying that Japan during its rule in Korea “violated an international norm by committing intentional, systematic and wide-ranging inhuman criminal acts.”[4] While calling for an amicable solution and future-oriented approach to bilateral relations, the Korean government holds the position that it has neither the right nor the authority to interfere in the court’s decisions.[5]
The latest development with the possibility of the Korean court taking further action on liquidating Japanese assets to compensate the plaintiffs can negatively impact the bilateral relations, which are currently at their lowest point in recent history following a similar incident two years ago. In the autumn of 2018 a Korean court’s verdict that ordered Japanese companies to pay reparation to the victims of forced labour during the Japanese colonisation of Korea, triggered a chain of events led to an unprecedented down turn in bilateral relations.[6] Events in 2019 marked a departure from the past redline of maintaining a pragmatic approach in bilateral relations by separating the political tensions from economic and security cooperation. The weaponisation of trade and the threat to scrap a military intelligence sharing agreement were characteristic features of the post-2018 bilateral tension and also indicate the severity and extent of the crisis impacting the whole gamut of Japan-Korea relations.
‘History Wars’ and Japan-Korea Relations
History has been a divisive subject matter between Japan and South Korea. Historical controversy between Japan and Korea or as many call it, ‘History War’ is associated with Japan’s past involvement in the Korean Peninsula, particularly during the thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule that lasted till the end the World War II.[7] At the core of the ‘History War’ are the “official narratives” of the colonial period embedded in political speeches, school textbooks, museums and other sites under government control in both countries. As such, it is less about the past but more about what should be included in the official historical narratives, the portrayal of events and the messages that they should convey.[8] Thus it reveals on the one hand the deeply felt anger among the Korean people about the colonial experiences and the demand for Japan to take responsibility for its past. This sentiment is at the centre of every historical issue, including Japanese school textbooks, comfort women, forced labour, and Yasukuni Shrine visits of Japanese government officials. Given its linkage with national self-esteem and national reputation, the level of bitterness associated with the “history war” is very high and fraught with high political passion and much political calculation in Korea and Japan.
The structure of the current history problem between Japan and Korea also involves the “politics of apology,” which is associated with the parties’ moral stature.[9] An apology consists of an agreement between the two parties that a wrong has committed and one side’s admission of guilt and there by establishes a hierarchy in which the victim takes a morally superior position while the perpetrator becomes morally inferior. An apology can lead to reconciliation if accepted. However, it can lead to outcomes including further worsening of the situation if the apology’s meaning is disputed, leading the aggrieved victim to demand further apologies judging the one given as insincere or insufficient. It could create a situation where the apologiser becoming more resentful for being pestered continuously to do what it has already done. As this vicious cycle continues, the history war gets aggravated as it piles new layers over the existing ones. It is this situation where Japan and Korea have found themselves over the last decade or so.
Interestingly the history controversy between the two countries in the current form is attracting wider public attention and diplomatic confrontation emerged only in the 1990s, four decades after the end of Japanese colonial rule in Korea.[10] This is not to suggest that Japanese colonial rule was not a problem in Japan-Korea relations in the past. The nature of the problem that existed immediately after the end of Japan’s colonial rule, which was a major factor in delaying diplomatic normalisation until the mid-1960s, was however, significantly different from today’s historical controversies. Then the focus issues were reparations and the status of pro-Japanese collaborators in Korea. Following the onset of a military dictatorship in Korea, Seoul and Tokyo normalised their relations in 1965. The Cold War’s geopolitical context and the virtual alliance between Seoul and Tokyo mediated through the concert with the United States (US) provided a structural condition for improving Korea-Japan bilateral relations.[11] The Korean state under successive military regimes saw Japan as an important source of capital and technology for its economic modernization and maintained pragmatic relations with Tokyo at times against popular sentiments.
Along with the diplomatic Normalization Treaty the two countries also signed an agreement ‘Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation’, which deals with claims arising from Japanese colonial rule in Korea. According to the settlement agreement Japanese government provided Korea an economic cooperation package of USD 800 million. Currently Seoul and Tokyo are engaged in an international legal dispute over the interpretation of the terms of the settlement agreement.[12]
The controversy over Japanese history textbooks in the 1980s was the first major history issue between Japan and Korea.[13] The diverging perceptions of history emerged to become a major point of contention over the next three decades and other issues also surfaced including Yasukuni Shrine visits, the comfort women and forced labour and received much wider attention in both countries. Though there is no straight forward explanation on what triggered their history debate between the two countries, some developments reflecting international and domestic changes could shed light in understanding the context in which it emerged. At the international level, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War lessened external rationale for suppressing the unfinished issues of the past. The democratic transition of Korea from the late 1980s was another critical factor that created conditions that allowed civil society activists including women rights movements to demand justice for the victims of colonial practices including comfort women and forced labour. The 1990s also witnessed the emergence of a new generation of leaders in both countries challenging the status-quo and calling for a relook at official history narratives. The rapid economic growth in Korea brought about an upsurge in national confidence and pride, and was influential in reconstructing Korean national identity by laying the foundation for an assertive nationalism and of national self-esteem.
Despite the periodic setbacks caused by the conflicting readings of the past, the bilateral relations between the two both sides also put in efforts to address historical issues. There was also significant improvement in security cooperation, especially after the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1994) at the bilateral and trilateral format involving the US. However, a chain of events in 2012 involving the issue of comfort women and differences over territorial issue led to a rapid cooling of bilateral relations accompanied by a high level of political tension and diplomatic standoff.[14] In 2015 through US mediation Seoul and Tokyo reached a breakthrough on the comfort women issues by signing an agreement that declared that the two countries put an end to the dispute ‘finally and irreversibly’.[15] However, in 2017 following political change in Korea, the comfort women issue stirred up once again, highlighting widespread popular disapproval of the agreement.[16] According to a survey, about 56 per cent of the Korean people disapproved the deal, and 75 per cent also viewed that that issue “has not been resolved”.[17]
In 2018, the Korean government dissolved the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, which was central to implementing the 2015 agreement. From a Japanese perspective, the dissolution of the Foundation meant suspension of the “comfort women” agreement, amounting to a violation of an international agreement.[18] Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who spent much political capital in getting the 2015 deal done, had to face heavy criticism domestically. Abe’s strong response following the 2018 court verdict ordering Japanese companies to pay reparation on the forced labour suit was indeed a knee-jerk reaction to recuperate lost political capital. Tokyo’s tit-for-tat response led to the crossing of the past redlines of separating political and economic/military aspects of the bilateral relations.[19]
Strategic Divergence and Growing Mistrust
The current state of Japan-Korea relations can be best described as ‘complex multiple fractures’. While issues related to history are the immediate and persisting cause of the bilateral relations’ downward spiralling, it is also symptomatic of the changing structure of their bilateral relations. The evolution of Japan-Korea relations was framed by the structural logic of the Cold War and their respective alliance with the US. Even after the end of the Cold War, the North Korean nuclear challenge incentivised the continuity of a US-led security order in Northeast Asia, where Korean and Japanese strategic and security interests were aligned. However, recent years have witnessed divergence in Japanese and Korean strategic interests on several regional issues, including China, North Korea and the emerging regional order.
A shared interest in deterring North Korea was a significant factor driving security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo over the past three decades. However, Korean and Japanese policy vis-à-vis North Korea, particularly after the beginning of the US-North Korea dialogue in 2018, appear to be moving along different tangents showing a great deal of mistrust.[20] Under President Moon Jae-in, Korea has prioritised improving inter-Korea relations and normalisation of North Korea as equally as denuclearisation. However, Japan, under its previous Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has had its emphasis on priority in achieving a complete and verifiable denuclearisation of North Korea through a maximum pressure posture. Tokyo fears that Seoul’s overtures to Pyongyang could undermine its interests. The divergence of Seoul and Tokyo is further reflected in their respective diplomatic positions. In 2018 Japan declared Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programme as an “unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat”,[21] while South Korea no longer sees North Korea as its “enemy”, otherwise a designation that it has assigned to its northern neighbour for years.
Even though Seoul and Tokyo’s approaches to a rising China are complex and multidimensional, there also appears to be mutual mistrust reflecting their growing policy divergence from a strategic perspective. Much of this assessment is based on Seoul’s approach of cementing relations further with China during President Park Guen-hye in the mid-2010s, while Tokyo was embroiled in a territorial and diplomatic standoff with Beijing. Apart from an overwhelming economic engagement, Seoul looks at Beijing as a critical partner in resolving the North Korean issue. Growing convergence between Seoul and Beijing on history issue against Japan further deepens the faultlines with Japan. Lately, there has been some convergence in their respective position on China, particularly after Seoul’s standoff with Beijing on the THADD missile issue and Japan’s rapprochement with China. However, many strategic commentators in Tokyo still worry that Korea might accept Chinese regional hegemony.[22]
Another important area that Seoul and Tokyo do not see eye to eye is their respective approach to regional order and their diverging perspectives on the US’s regional role. While Washington and Tokyo are spearheading the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific regional order, Seoul has been ambiguous in its approach.[23] It is yet to endorse Indo-Pacific concept despite pressure from Washington. Korea sees its alliance with the US as an essential pillar of its security, but, limits its scope to the Korean Peninsula. The divergence between Korean and Japanese views of the US’s regional role is also becoming starker with Korea being absent from many US-led regional initiatives.
The deterioration of the US-led order in Northeast Asia under President Donald Trump also contributed to the weakening of the structural foundations of Japan-Korea relations. In the earlier phases of polemics between Japan and Korea, the US was a stabilising factor. For instance, the 2015 comfort women agreement between the two countries was possible on account of US interest. However, the Trump administration’s general neglect of the alliance and its lack of interest in maintaining the cohesiveness of the trilateral framework involving Japan and Korea has also contributed to the weakening of bilateral relations.
Another factor that is wreaking Korea-Japan relations’ is the relative decline of their mutual importance in their respective economic development. In the past, an important factor that pushed Korea to normalise its relations with Japan during the Cold War was its demand for Japanese technology and capital for its economic modernisation. With its own rapid economic growth and internationalisation, Korea no longer depends upon Japan; in fact, they have become competitors in many sectors. As compared to the past, the share of their economic exchange with each other as a percentage has substantially reduced. For instance, between 1993 and 2018 Korea’s share of trade with fell from 18 to 8 per cent, on the other hand, Seoul’s trade share with China is more than its trade with Japan, and the US put together.[24]
Conclusion
2020 has been quite calm as far as Japan-Korea relations is concerned since the two countries were largely focused on addressing the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective countries. It was hoped that political change in Japan following the resignation Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could provide some fresh momentum in improving bilateral relations. During his call with President Moon Jae-in, the new Prime Minister Yoshihito Suga mentioned that Tokyo and Seoul “cannot leave our current very difficult relations where they are now,” indicating his willingness to work with Seoul to improve the relations.[25] However, he also insisted that Korea make the first move. Prime Minister Suga’s firm position on the comfort women and forced labour issue highlighted that he is as tough on Korea as his predecessor. This was further made clear when Japan stated that Prime Minister Suga will not attend the Trilateral Summit between China, Japan and South Korea hosted by Seoul, unless Korea offers some guarantee that the assets of Japanese companies will not be seized to compensate the victims of forced labour as ruled by the Korean court in 2018.[26] The inauguration of the Joe Biden administration also creates possibilities improve relations between Japan and Korea as he has promised to repair relations with allies and promote trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea. However, prospects of this will depend on the extent to which the new administration can focus on foreign policy given the grave situation in the US because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the highly nationalist sentiments attached to “history” issues, the leadership on both sides cannot make any more concessions or appear to be weak. Taking all these aspects into account the prospect of Japan-Korea relations looks grim in the context of the new development on the issue of comfort women as it has the potential to derail the relationship further.
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*Dr. Jojin V. John, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
[1] "South Korea ‘comfort women’ ruling risks deepening Japan dispute", Financial Times, January 8, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/3e05a6a7-e56e-4fe7-9e89-0fea6ebbe6aaAccessed on January 29, 2021
[2] "Japan urges South Korea to "immediately" act over comfort women ruling", Kyodo News, January 23, 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/01/78f5c234c406-japan-urges-s-korea-to-immediately-act-over-comfort-women-ruling.html?phrase=Abe%20ulcerative%20colitis&words=Accessed on January 29, 2021
[3] "South Korea seeks 'amicable solution' with Japan over 'comfort women' issue", Japan Times, January 24, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/24/national/south-korea-japan-comfort-women/ Accessed on January 29, 2021
[4] "In a first, South Korean court orders Japan to compensate former 'comfort women'", Japan Times, January 8, 20211, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/08/national/first-south-korean-court-comfort-women/ Accessed on January 28, 2021
[5] "South Korea seeks 'amicable solution' with Japan over 'comfort women' issue", Japan Times, January 24, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/24/national/south-korea-japan-comfort-women/ Accessed on January 29, 2021
[6] Alexandra Sakaki (2019), Japan-South Korea Relations – A Downward Spiral, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C35_skk.pdf Accessed on January 29, 2021
[7] Michael Lewis (2017), 'History Wars' and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea: The Roles of Historians, Artists and Activists, New York: Palgrave Macmillan
[8]Peter Duus (2017), “Introduction: History Wars in Postwar East Asia,
1945–2014”, in Michael Lewis (ed), 'History Wars' and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea: The Roles of Historians, Artists and Activists, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
[9]For more discussion on “politics of apology” see; Peter Hays Gries, China’s NewNationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
[10]Kan Kimura (2019), The Burden of the Past: Problems of Historical Perception in Japan-Korea Relations, University of Michigan Press.
[11] Victor D. Cha (1996), “Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea—Japan Normalization Treaty”, Korean Studies , 1996, Vol. 20, pp. 123-160
[12] Jinyul Ju, "The Japan-Korea Dispute Over the 1965 Agreement", The Diplomat, October 23, 2020 https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/the-japan-korea-dispute-over-the-1965-agreement Accessed on February 268, 2021
[13] Op.cit Kan Kimura (2019),
[14]Alexandra Sakaki and Junya Nishino, Japan's South Korea predicament, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 4, July 2018, Pages 735–754, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy029 p.739 Accessed on January 28, 2021
[15]Ankit Panda, "The ‘Final and Irreversible’ 2015 Japan-South Korea Comfort Women Deal Unravels", The Diplomat, January 9, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/the-final-and-irreversible-2015-japan-south-korea-comfort-women-deal-unravels/ Accessed on January 30, 2021
[16] Alexandra Sakaki, Japan-South Korea Relations – A Downward Spiral More than “Just” Historical Issues SWP Comment 2019/C 35, August 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C35/ Accessed on January 29, 2021
[17] The 5th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2017), https://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/170721_en.pdf Accessed on January 29, 2021
[18] Ibid
[19] In the early months of 2019, the dispute between Japan and Korea over Korean Supreme Court’s order to pay compensation to the victims of forced labour during Japanese colonial period remained largely a war of words in public and in diplomatic channels. In July 2019, the Japanese government imposed export restrictions on three chemicals critical to South Korean high-tech manufacturing. Tokyo referred to national security considerations instead of the forced labor dispute as the reason for its move. However, the move was largely seen as retaliation against Seoul’s failure to handle recent rulings by South Korean courts ordering Japanese firms to pay compensation to Korean forced labour victims. Furthermore, in August, Japanese government removed Korea from the "white-list"- list of countries that have the most-favoured status as trade partners. In response Korea also announced its move to drop Japan from its “white list” of countries. Korea later announced the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is an agreement signed in November 2016 between the two countries to share sensitive information about threats from North Korea. The decision to terminate GSOMIA was reversed later through the intervention of the US.
[20] Op. cit Alexandra Sakaki and Junya Nishino.
[21]"North Korea still ‘serious and imminent threat’: Japan", The Hindu, August 28, 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/north-korea-still-serious-and-imminent-threat-japan/article24799036.eceAccessed on January 29, 2021
[22]Op.cit Alexandra Sakaki, p.6
[23]Jojin John "South Korean Approach to Indo-Pacific: Engaging without Endorsing", 20 June 2020, /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=5023&lid=3656 Accessed on January 29, 2021
[24]Op.cit Alexandra Sakaki, p.6
[25] "PM Suga talks with Moon for first time but signals no fresh start", Japan Times, September 24, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/24/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-suga-south-korea-moon-first-call Accessed on January 29, 2021
[26] "Japan, China and South Korea to delay trilateral summit to 2021", Nikkeei Asia, December 3, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-China-and-South-Korea-to-delay-trilateral-summit-to-2021 Accessed on January 29, 2021