Introduction
On 6 January 2016, North Korea declared to have tested its fourth nuclear weapon-a thermonuclear or Hydrogen bomb. It was an underground nuclear test at Puungye-ri nuclear test site, approximately 50 kilometres from Kilju city.A month later, on 7 February 2016, it claimed to have successfully launched Kwangmyongsong-4 (Bright Star) satellite into the space. The US and South Korea viewed the tests as ‘ballistic missile’ tests, as according to them, the type of rocket used to launch the satellite could also be used to fire a long-range missile. While the North Korean tests have made countries of the region anxious of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the regional strategic situation has also been facing challenges. Such developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, call for a closer look that seems to follow a ‘pattern’ of issuing threat before US-South Korea Joint Military exercises. The paper attempts to seek to understand North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities and its current status. In this context, the brief history of Six Party talk failure and the reasons for the tests conducted by North Korea has been analyzed. It also tries to comprehend the international responses and their subsequent actions acknowledging these tests. This becomes necessary as a part of objective of the paper- to draw the larger picture of nuclear proliferation in the pretext of North Korea’s expanding nuclear and missile arsenal
Background
North Korea had tested three nuclear weapons in the past 10 years – in 2006, 2009 and 2013 – out of which the last one was the largest among the three with estimated yield in the range of 7 to 9 kiloton as calculated by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense. The previous two tests were nuclear fission reaction tests that showed a seismic activity of 5.1 on an average on the Richter scale – a reading closely related to the detonation of nuclear weapons. More recently, on 3 February 2016, Pyongyang informed International Maritime Organisation (IMT) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that it intends to launch an Earth observation satellite between 8 and 25 February 2016, along with exact falling area coordinates. North Korea has claimed that it is putting its satellite meant for ‘scientific and peaceful purpose’ into the orbit and it had informed the international agencies for the safety and security of the ships as well as to avoid cross-satellite interference of transmitting frequencies1 . However, the International community has condemned the tests as they believe these will advance North Korea's military ballistic missile capabilities and could potentially be used deliver a nuclear warhead using the same long range ballistic missile2.
A spokesman for U.S. Strategic Command confirmed that two objects have been detected in Earth's orbit. The two objects appeared to be the satellite and the third stage of the rocket booster as confirmed by arms control expert David Wright, co-Director of the Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program3.
An initial investigation does provide a correlation between the tests and the timings of annual US-South Korean Joint military drills also known as ‘Foal-Eagle Exercises’4. The tests have progressed from being a ‘displeasure5’ shown by Pyongyang against post Foal- Eagle exercises, into an ‘overt warning6,7’ before these exercises. The tests have been a manifestation of constant disregard of Pyongyang’s cautionary by the US and South Korean governments.
North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Capabilities
North Korea has already developed short-range missiles ‘Scud B and C’ having payloads of 1000kms.Currently, North Korea is in the process of developing long-range missile Taepo Dong 2 with the range of 6000kms that can carry a load up to 1000kgs. The missile arsenal threatens South Korea and Japan, but the Taepo Dong-2 missile being developed could reach Alaska and parts of Hawaii. Experts fear that within a decade, a three-stage version could be developed that could deliver a 200 kilogram payload to the United States. But the long-range inter-continental missile needs a lower payload with increased yield and experts are calculating if the current tests are trying to achieve that. In 2015, North Korea revealed that it has been developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability, announcing the first test launch (apparently, an ejection test) in May 2015. The second reported SLBM test in December 2015 was a failure; according to outside analyses of footage that was released by North Korean media8.SLBM technology is extremely difficult to develop as it uses ‘cold-launched’ missiles that are ejected from the canisters by compressed gas before the rocket engines ignite, to the ocean surface from tubes within the submerged vessel. This process is unlike the ‘hot-launched’ ballistic missiles are launched directly from their canisters. The reports of testing do not indicate that North Korea’s prototype ballistic missile submarines present an imminent threat9. In the past, it has tested its missiles of varying capabilities in – 1993, 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2014. The types and range of missiles owned by North Korea have been tabulated as below:
Missile |
Range |
Status |
Scud D |
700 kms |
Operational |
Nodong |
1000 kms |
Operational |
Taeopodong -1 |
2200 kms |
Full capabilities have not been demonstrated |
Taepodong X /Masudan |
Never tested publicly |
Never tested publicly |
Taeopodong-2 |
6700 kms |
Full capabilities have not been demonstrated |
Unha-3 |
Never tested |
Never tested |
U.S. sources estimate that North Korea has deployed over 600 Scud missile variants, about 200 Nodong (Rodong) missiles, and fewer than 50 Musudan and Taepodong missiles, while South Korean sources estimate it to be even fewer10.
The yield of the nuclear test conducted on 6 January 2016 is estimated to be 6 kiloton, lesser than the 2013 nuclear test. Nuclear experts all around the world have shown serious doubts on North Korea’s claim of it being a thermo-nuclear/hydrogen bomb. A hydrogen bomb is a combination of fission-fusion nuclear bombs that need more sophisticated technology than a nuclear fission bomb and is high on the yield ranging from 40 kiloton to 15,000 kiloton11 (the H-bombs that the US and former USSR had tested). As the test was conducted underground, it became difficult for the scientists and experts to accurately analyse the nature and composition of the bomb tested. Nonetheless, the preliminary reports state that the yield was similar to the previous one in 2013 that points towards North Koreas the test was conducted underground, it became difficult.
Sources: Federation of Atomic Scientists, IHS Jane's Defense & Security Intelligence and Analysis, atomicarchive.com
A ‘boosted’ fission device works on the principle of standard Teller-Ulam configuration that was used in all Cold War H-bombs. It uses an infusion of Tritium12 that supplies extra neutrons to split heavy atoms more efficiently. The 2016 test was of workable Teller-Ulam configuration and tritium-boosted fission starter device. The seismic activities of 2013 and 2016 were similar and far below than that of a thermo-nuclear device. So the questions that the tests put forth were – whether it was a repeated testing of ‘boosted’ nuclear device or was it a boosted-device driven ‘fusion’ test that failed? Both the interpretations have been reviewed by Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists13and they had provided interesting conclusions based upon nuclear physics: a ’boosted’ tritium device will give different and higher yield than a regular fission device. And if there had been an attempt to use their original fission “gadget” as a fusion-device starter, as a way to accelerate their weapon development, then it raises question on the thermo-nuclear development capabilities of North Korea as the seismic readings were similar to a failed thermonuclear test.
Schematic of three types of nuclear weapon: atomic, 'boosted' atomic and thermonuclear ('hydrogen') weapon.
Source:www.sipri.org
The timeline of Nuclear and Missile tests:
Since 2012, an interesting trend in the timings of the test conducted by North Korea could be observed. A trend has been observed establishing the link between North Korean Missile and Nuclear tests, and US-South Korea Joint Military exercise. The available data on the tests have been tabulated as below:
Year |
US- South Korea Military Exercise |
Nuclear tests timings |
Missile tests timings |
2012 |
June |
|
April-North Korea tested Unha- 2, a three-stage rocket that failed. December- It claimed to have put the three-stage rocket into the orbit. Claim denied by US officials. |
2013 |
30 April 2013 |
February- N Korea conducted nuclear test. |
|
2014 |
February 2014 |
|
February 2014- the North Korea launched four short range missiles |
2015 |
March 2015 |
|
10 January 2015- North Korea said it was willing to suspend its nuclear tests if the US and South Korea suspend their joint military drills March 2015-North Korea launched its two short range ballistic missiles, over Sea of Japan, hours before the starting of the drill. |
2016 |
Joint exercises not announced till the North Korean tests |
6 January 2016- N Korea conducted its fourth nuclear tests, possibly a thermonuclear device |
7February 2016- It launched Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite into space using a long-range missile |
Source: Author’s tabulation from the various sources
These tests cannot be understood in the absence of a context of the failure of the Six Party talks that the participant countries have initiated with the North Korea to address the proliferation issues. The talks failed in 2009 and since then Pyongyang’s tests continued.
The Six Party Talks
The Six-Party Talks that include China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US to negotiate with North Korea to terminate its nuclear weapons programme, discontinued in 2009 after six years of efforts because the Five Parties’ and North Korea could not agree on the verification measures of the North Korean nuclear facilities. The Six Party Talks started in 2003 and came to a halt when North Korea expelled international monitors in Pyongyang from its nuclear facilities and restarted its nuclear reprocessing plan. In September 2005, the US and North Korea issued a joint statement on how to achieve verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula that will form the basis of future negotiations. The negotiations broke down when North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 200614.
In February 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with the ‘Five Parties’ to implement the 2005 Joint Statement on denuclearisation. In December 2008, the Six Parties met, but did not reach the agreement on verification measures.
DPRK tested its third nuclear device in 2009. The Six Party Talks have not been held since 2009, but the US and other countries have held bilateral talks with North Korea. Since 2010, there was some certainty that North Korea has plans as well as the parts for a Uranium program15. It has been estimated that the Highly Enriched Uranium for the program is simultaneously developed in the clandestine enrichment facilities in the country16.
In 2012, North Korea violated its Missile moratoria when it conducted a failed satellite launch. After the 2013 nuclear test, North Korea claimed to have developed ‘smaller and light’ warhead that could be mounted on a long range missile. In April 2009, a long range missile named Taepo-Dong 2/ Unha-3 was unsuccessfully tested17 by Pyongyang. The testing point towards North Korea’s learning of ‘miniaturization’ of nuclear weapons.
The Leap Day Agreement
In February 2012, shortly after the death of Kim Jong-il, the previous leader of North Korea and father of Kim Jong-un, talks between the US and North Korea resumed. The so-called “Leap Day Agreement” committed North Korea to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activities at the Yongbyong nuclear facility, and opening its facilities for inspection by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. In return, the Obama Administration pledged 240,000 metric tons of ‘nutritional assistance’. North Korea abandoned the deal only two months later by launching a long-range rocket, followed by a third nuclear test in February 2013.
The Levels of Analysis of North Korea’s Nuclear Test
The timing of the tests can be attributed to three levels of analysis, namely, international, domestic and personal. At the international level, the North Korean leader has always considered the US as a threat to its regime and carried out tests mostly before or during the US-South Korea Joint Military exercises. Kim had earlier declared that North Korea is a ‘nuclear armed’18 country that is ready to detonate a nuclear bomb to defend the sovereignty and dignity of the country. The declaration, without any doubt, was targeted towards the US. The timing of the 2016 tests a few weeks before the commencement of US 2016 Presidential elections19 suggests North Korea’s attempt to seek Washington’s attention. Second reason is its rocky alliance relationships with both Russia and China caused Kim to question the credibility of Moscow's and Beijing's commitments to aid Pyongyang in the event of another war.
At the domestic level, in April 2013, North Korea resumed the operation of Plutonium production reactor at Yongbyong that stopped working after its cooling tower was destroyed under international agreement in 2008. It is estimated to provide one bomb’s worth of Plutonium20 every year. Another reason is that North Korea is planning to have the seventh Korean Workers Congress in May this year, first time in 36 years21. According to the Ministry of Defence of South Korea, the 2016 nuclear test was successfully performed following a ‘strategic resolution’ of the WPK. The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is the founding and ruling political party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). The WPK is the sole governing party of North Korea. It was founded in 1949 and Kim Jong-un is the current WPK leader, serving as the First Secretary. Like his father and grandfather, both of whom were the leaders of North Korea, Kim Jong-Un envisages portraying his capabilities to the people of his country and gain legitimacy and popularity.
When Kim Jong-Un declared in his speech on 1 January 2016 that North Korea is ready for a ‘war’ if provoked by ‘invasive’ outsider, the international community didn’t seem to take the threat seriously. Kim Jong-Il, his father, who died in 2011, could never test a Hydrogen bomb. Kim has ruled brutally, carrying out large-scale purges and even killing of senior officials. He has also declared a two-track policy (the Byungjin line) that pursues economic development and nuclear weapons development22. Therefore, whether a miniature nuclear test or H-bomb, the tests are seen as a great boost for his image, portraying him as a powerful ruler.
North Korea’s Current Nuclear and Missile status
The Federation of Atomic Scientists 2015 states that North Korea has a fledgling nuclear weapons programme. Its arsenal probably comprises fewer than 10 warheads but is not clear whether it has the capability to deliver them. It is neither a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) nor the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). However, North Korea claimed for membership in the ‘Outer Space Treaty’23 in advance of the launch of the Unha-3 SLV in an attempt to "contribute to promoting international confidence. It had withdrawn its membership from NPT regime in 2009.
International reactions:
The 2016 North Korean nuclear and missile tests have received much international attention and condemnation by countries and international organisations. The recent test of its nuclear device and the long-range missile has intensified the debate about nuclear deterrence and proliferation issues.
China
China has voiced its opposition towards North Korea’s recent nuclear tests. In 2013, China stated that it ‘resolutely’ opposes the tests conducted by North Korea. Nonetheless, China has given vacillating reactions towards North Korean tests. Along with Russia, it showed objections to the ‘use of force’ clause in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718(8) (a). The resolution referred to the inspection of cargo related to heavy arms, nuclear, ballistic missile and other WMD-related programs. China also did not participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a US led coordinating mechanism to guide interdictions of proscribed WMD and missile related goods. At the same time, Beijing understands the destabilising effects of the tests within the region that will lead to a larger regional crisis, such as the humanitarian dilemma. Due to these reasons, China remained committed to the Six-Party Talks. China, that was the only supporter of North Korea in the United Nations Security Council in the past, passed the resolution against the former to impose sanctions after the 2013 tests. Though China has once more denounced the recent tests, but it has not explicitly mentioned its retaliatory actions against North Korea.
India
India, too, is deeply concerned and repeatedly criticized the North Korean nuclear ambitions, and worries about the proliferation links between North East Asia and its own neighbourhood, an apparent reference to Pakistan as it will lead to nuclear proliferation within the region24. India’s neighbour, Pakistan is already expected to have its Tactical Nuclear Weapons research and development going on clandestinely. North Korea and Pakistan have ties25 that can become stronger, if North Korea has indeed come closer to developing a miniaturised nuclear bomb.
Pakistan
In 1996, North Korea had reached an agreement with Pakistan to trade their long-range missile technology in exchange for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. The architect of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, AQ Khan, had even sold designs of uranium enrichment centrifuges to Korea. Pakistan had modified Korean missile design to develop its mid-range surface-to-surface missile Ghauri. However, unlike other countries, the North Korean tests did not elicit any palpable messages from Pakistan. In an official press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan criticized the North Korean nuclear test and stated that Pakistan regrets that the Government of DPRK has conducted underground nuclear test, in 2013. Again in 2016, a brief statement by Foreign Office said, ‘Pakistan has consistently supported a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula as agreed by all parties. It strongly believes that all countries should comply with their respective international obligations’. Nonetheless, developments in North Korea might have a cascading effect on the neighbouring countries particularly, South Korea and Japan.
Japan
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe described the test as a "grave defiance of international efforts toward nuclear non-proliferation" and declared that the nation would make a "firm response" to the test. It has also vowed to shoot down any missiles or rockets fired over its territory after North Korea announced to launch a satellite over coming days. No official statement has yet come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on its actions against the recent tests. PM Abe had reshuffled Japan’s Security policy in 2014 and though, there is a speculation on Japan rearming itself with nuclear weapons in the North Korea and China context, there is no statement by its government on its current position. Though Japan’s Constitution26 neither allows building up nuclear weapons nor are the plans to build any known, it has been argued that Japan has enough raw material, capital as well as resources to build a nuclear weapon in a year’s time. Currently, Japan is under the ‘nuclear umbrella’ that is provided by the US to its allies to protect their sovereignty27 and there is no compulsion for Japan to embark on its nuclear programme. The U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement that came into force in 1988 allows Japan to recover and store plutonium derived from fuel the United States supplies for Japan’s power plants. It is set to expire in 2018 and expected to be renewed. Though Japan’s Constitution and US nuclear umbrella provide strong incentivisation for not arming itself, the double threat of nuclear China and now North Korea in its backyard, deincentivises the entire situation.
Russia
Russia's foreign ministry statement states that if the test is confirmed, it would be a new step for Pyongyang and a "flagrant violation of international law" that stand to aggravate tensions on the Korean peninsula. President Vladimir Putin has given instructions to thoroughly study data of all monitoring stations, including seismic, and analyze the situation. Similar to Pakistan, North Korea shares diplomatic relations with Russia that goes back to 1948. Presently, Russia has invested in North Korean mineral resources and long term infrastructure projects Hasan-Rinjin gas pipe-line, installation of power lines from Russia to South Korea via North Korea. Apart from that, in 2012 and 2014, Russian Duma agreed to write-off as much as 90 per cent of debt that North Koreas owed to it. In March 2015, a Russian official said that Moscow and Pyongyang have agreed to discuss the creation of advanced development zones in Russia’s Far East and North Korea.
South Korea
South Korean President Park Guen Hye declared that the government of Korea would closely work with the International community to ensure that North Korea paid the consequences, in response to the January 6, 2016 nuclear tests. In a Joint Statement of the Defence Ministry of US and South Korea, US reconfirmed its ‘airtight’ defence pledge for South Korea including ‘extended deterrence’ that refers to the nuclear umbrella provided by the US to its allies against hostile nuclear countries. South Korea also stated that Pyongyang will pay a severe price if it goes ahead with the long-range missile test. President Geun-hye said that the country would take decisive measures against any additional provocations and is said to have discussed with the US, the possibility of the latter adding strategic weapons on the Korean peninsula. Apart from tough military stance, it is working on a ‘comprehensive security and diplomacy policy’ towards North Korea.
USA
The press statement released by US Department of State in response to recent nuclear tests by North Korea states, “We do not and will not accept North Korea as a nuclear armed state, and actions such as this latest test only strengthen our resolve. We will continue to work closely with our partners in the U.N. Security Council and in the Six-Party Talks to take appropriate action.” The United States deployed a B-52 bomber on a low-level flight over its ally, the Republic of Korea (RoK) on January 10, a show of force following the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s nuclear test last week. On January 11, it carried out a ‘mock’ nuclear test on the new B61-12 over Nevada desert. This new weapon is ‘precision-guided’ and is equipped with features like ‘dial-a-yield’ facility to adjust blast yield, manoeuvrable sensors for maintaining ‘strategic stability’. The use of B-61 is ‘worrying development’ according to Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director of ICAN28 as this new, smaller nuclear weapon could lower the threshold of use, and will increase tensions and risk of use when stationed in European NATO-bases. However, whether US would undertake any counter-measures both in terms of sanctions, in consultation with China and curbing the nuclear programme in future, only time will tell.
Defying the Logic of ‘Deterrence’
The results can even be deleterious, when they are seen at the pan-Asian level. Nuclearisation of North Korea will lead to proliferation of small or miniature nuclear weapons throughout Asia. The main logic behind nuclear weapons was the ‘deterrence’ value that these weapons have. It is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, as Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always ready, yet never used. Nuclear weapons are seen as a threshold to conventional wars. The bigger/deadlier the weapons, the more the deterrence value.
But miniaturization of nuclear weapons will threaten deterrence by making small-level nuclear/theatre wars possible between the countries. In other words, the nuclear weapons will no longer be as deterrent as they were thought to be. It will lead to nuclear proliferation among other countries within the region. Countries can trade this technology, blueprints or the raw materials as well as the parts needed to make the mini-nuclear bombs. Such a situation will be extremely difficult to be thwarted due to a number of state and non-state actors involved in today’s situation. Similarly, there might be a trading of missile technology or parts within the region that will be in violation of UN treaties. In the past, North Korea is known to have sold ballistic missiles and associated materials to several West Asian countries like Iran, Egypt, Libya, Burma, Pakistan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen and Syria. According to CRS Report, North Korea has provided support to Hamas and Hezbollah29. On 10 December 2002, Spanish and U.S. naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship So San en route to Yemen. The So San cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of "inhibited red fuming nitric acid," which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel.
Nuclear Security Issues
The nuclear proliferation brings us to another dangerous situation linked to the nuclear weapons. Kenneth Waltz had rightly pointed out that small nuclear countries will be unstable in handling the nuclear weapons, raw materials and related technology. It might fall into the hands of non-state actors that can use them for their ulterior motives. Given the surging cases of ‘violent extremism’ from groups like Islamic State, Taliban and so on, security issues with a miniaturised nuclear weapon may be aplenty. The Asian region has been the breeding ground for several of the extremist groups due to socio-political instability within the region. These groups have both money and resources to build the weapons and threaten states’ security. Till date, the countries having nuclear weapons were responsible for handling the weapons and never used these against one another. But given the current changed context, actual nuclear bombing using a mini bomb seems plausible by the extremist groups. Also, the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons will make the detection of the proliferation very difficult. As earlier stated in the paper, even if North Korea does not sell its nuclear weapons and fissile materials, there are reasons to believe that it could sell the designs, blueprints as well as parts of the missile and nuclear technology for monetary purposes.
The way ahead: Recommendations
The testing of nuclear bomb as well as the missile has once again brought a lot of connected issues to the fore. Whether it is a hydrogen bomb or a ‘boosted’30 prototype testing for a miniature nuclear bomb or not – this condition has stirred the troubled waters of international security at large and Asian security in particular. Though several agencies are calling it a bluff31, but none of them denied that there has been an underground nuclear test by North Korea. The nuclear test came despite sanctions and other international pressure.
The trends of testing of nuclear devices and the missiles since 2009 suggest that North Korea is opposing the US-South Korean joint military exercises32 and the sanctions imposed by US –led United Nations33. During the initial years, the testing came after the issued warning before the exercises, or as displeasure, once the exercises were over. However in the recent times, Pyongyang is not issuing any statements for the US and South Korea showing a more gutsy side34. This attitude cannot be sidelined anymore even though the US experts and analysts believe that current tests do not pose any threat to its administration.
In March 2016, UN Security Council unanimously adopted harsher sanctions against North Korea35. It mandates cargo inspections for all goods going in and out of North Korea by land, sea or air, chokes off supplies of most aviation fuel for its armed forces, and bans the sale of all small arms and conventional weapons to Pyongyang. It also prohibits transactions that raise hard cash for North Korea through sales of its natural resources36.
The resolution was presented by the United States with the support of China; a backpedalling given Beijing has been a longtime support of DPRK. Although the United States has long had an embargo on trade with North Korea, China has provided food and fuel and has been a key trading partner37.
There are some recommendations for the International society to curb the North Korean tests. Blocking the trade of nuclear raw materials, missile technology, chemical, biological weapons and other arms etc. can be expected to cut-off the lifeline of Pyongyang’s income. However, the food and fuel sanctions might exacerbate the lives’ of people of North Korea than its ruling elite38. Therefore, US and the rest of international community needs to re-engage with Pyongyang with talks instead of imposing harsher sanctions that seem to have no impact on the DPRK regime. Another effort could be to ensure ‘tangible’ statements from all the stakeholder countries against DPRK to curb its tests and to stop any ‘backdoor’ assistance to Pyongyang regime. Thirdly, US needs to be transparent and careful in its approach to military drills, so as not to threaten any country’s sovereignty within the region. Lastly, India needs to work with the countries of Six Parties Talk and garner their support, especially from South Korea that is facing a threat from a nuclear armed neighbour, akin to India’s own situation. Arousing sensitivity towards the issue by drawing analogies might be helpful in understanding the issue and formulating policies together.
***
* The Authoress is a Research Intern at Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The Views expressed are that of the Researcher and not of the Council.
Endnotes:
2 CNN News, 7 February 2016, ‘North Korea launch: Satellite or warhead”. Accessed online. URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/06/asia/north-korea-satellite-background/
3 Ibid.
4 The timeline suggesting the relation between the US-South Korea joint exercises to the North Korean tests are given later in the paper.
5 BBC News (Feb 2014), “North Korea tests missiles amid S Korea- US exercises”. Accessed online. URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26372311
6 Conlon, K. (16 Aug 2015),”North Korea threatens to attack US”, CNN News. Accessed online. URL: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/15/world/north-korea-threats/
7 Reuters (24 Jan 2014), “North Korea warns US- South Korea military drills could spark disaster”. Accessed online. URL: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa-un-idUSBREA0N1HF20140124
8 Sang-Hun, C.(2015),”North Korean Missile Test was unsuccessful: South says”, The New York Times. Accessed online. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/world/asia/north-korean-missile-test-was-unsuccessful-south-says.html
9 Chanlett- Avery,E. , Rinehart, I and Nikitin,M.(January 2016), “North Korea : US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy and Internal Situations”, Congressional Research Service. URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf
10 "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 20 January 2011.
11 As thermonuclear weapons represent the most efficient design for weapon energy yield in weapons with yields above 50 kilotons, today virtually all the nuclear weapons deployed by the five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT are thermonuclear weapons using the Teller–Ulam design.
12 A radioactive isotope of hydrogen
13 Fyffe, S (2016), “Hecker assesses North Korean Hydrogen bomb claims”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Accessed online. URL: http://thebulletin.org/hecker-assesses-north-korean-hydrogen-bomb-claims9046
14 Nikitin, M.(2013), “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues”, Congressional Research Service. Accessed online. URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf
15 In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf
16 Nikitin, M.(2013), “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues”, Congressional Research Service. Accessed online. URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf
17 Ibid.
18 A 2012 Constitutional change in North Korea changed its nuclear status from ‘nuclear-capable’ to ‘nuclear-armed’.
19 The first Presidential caucus 2016,i.e. Iowa Caucus took place on 1 February 2016.
20 A Plutonium bomb needs 6-8kgs of Plutonium for a bomb whereas Uranium bomb needs as much as 35kgs of HEU as fissile material.
21 The 6th meeting was in 1980.
22 Chanlett- Avery,E. , Rinehart, I and Nikitin, M.(January 2016), “North Korea : US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy and Internal Situations”, Congressional Research Service. URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf
23 Officially known as ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space’.
24 Ministry of External Affairs, India. URL: http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/26335/Statement_on_the_DPRK_Rocket_Launch
25 In 2004, Abdul Qadeer was arrested for transferring nuclear technology to other countries. Khan visited North Korea at least 13 times and is suspected of having transferred enrichment technology to that country. His laboratory also developed Pakistan’s Ghauri ballistic missile with help from the North Koreans.
26 Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and the Three Non-Nuclear principles of non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons.
27 The nuclear umbrella is a centerpiece of the U.S.-Japan security alliance," Bradley Roberts, a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, said in a written response to The Asahi Shimbun’s questions in July 2013. He also added that ‘the United States does not provide a nuclear umbrella to its allies for the purpose of preventing them from choosing to have a nuclear deterrent of their own. It does so in order that they remain safe and secure, as part of its commitment to the defense, integrity and sovereignty.”
28 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons or ICAN is a global campaign coalition working to mobilize people in all countries to inspire, persuade and pressure their governments to initiate and support negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons. The campaign was launched in 2007, and now has more than 400 partner organizations in 95 countries.
29 Congressional Research Service Report (2015), ‘North Korea: Back on State Sponsers of Terror List?’ http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/CRS-terror-list-2015-1.pdf
30 A boosted fission weapon is a fission bomb that increases its explosive yield through a small amount of fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the efficiency of the fission bomb.
31 Lassina Zerbo, head of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation; 38 North, a North Korea project at Johns Hopkins University in Washington.
32 Sang-Hun, C.(6 March 2016), “North Korea threatens nuclear attack as US-South Korea begin drills”, The New York Times. Accessed online. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/07/world/asia/north-korea-threatens-nuclear-attack-as-us-and-south-korea-begin-drills.html?src=recg&_r=0
33 UNSCR 1540(28 April 2004), UNSCR 1695 (15 July 2006) , UNSCR 1718 (14 October 2006)
34 Referring to 2016 nuclear test.
35 Morello, C. and Mufson,S. “UN adopts sweeping new sanctions on North Korea”, The Washington Post. Acessed online. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-adopts-sweeping-new-sanctions-on-north-korea/2016/03/02/309f0514-dfc8-11e5-846c-10191d1fc4ec_story.html
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Over time, the country has been able to sustain minimal economic growth, estimated to be 1.1% in 2013. Growth was based on agricultural output, construction, manufacturing, mining and remittances. At the same time, the economy has been vulnerable due to crop failure and an overreliance on aid, as well as a limited number of trading partners. Furthermore, due to the domestic reallocation of resources to urban areas, economic hardship is mainly impacting rural communities – and conditions may get even worse if UN agencies active in North Korea decide to terminate operations.
Berger, B (July 2015), “Sanctions against North Korea: A Tricky Dilemma”, European Union Institute of Security Studies. Accessed online. URL: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_23_DPRK_sanctions.pdf