Russia and Europe were struck with national tragedies. The threat to their national security is on high alert and cannot be ignored because of the warnings that the Islamic State (IS), the militant group, has given. The repercussions of the menace created by the IS, an extreme offshoot of Wahabism, are far reaching, engulfing the entire world.
For Russia, the Russian MetroJet plane crash, the Beirut blast and the Paris attack have strengthened Russian resolve to militarily counter IS. The confirmation of the report that the plane crash happened due to the detonation of a bomb and the claims by the Islamic State terrorist group have led Russian President Vladimir Putin to vow to intensify Russian strikes against the group. The Paris attack opened a door for Russia to ally with the West to fight against terrorism and break the ice between them. Russia and the West do not have a congenial relationship due to Moscow’s role in the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea since 2014.
Russia has been suggesting to form a coalition at the international level to fight against the IS, which the West has been rejecting. The Paris attack made Europe to understand the essentiality of coming together with Russia to tackle the IS menace.
Russia and France have been attacking the stronghold of IS in Syria. The CIA showed its support to it. The CIA head expressed his determination to keep the communication open between the intelligence communities of the US and Russia. He said that enhanced relationship between Russia and the US is the key to prevent future terrorist attacks.i However, there are inhibitions within the West for an alliance with Russia to fight against the IS because of Moscow’s insistence on involving the Syrian government under President Bashar al-Assad.
French President Francois Hollande said that Syria is the biggest ‘terrorist factory’ii and sees Assad as a huge stumbling block. He blames Assad as the main culprit for the birth of IS. France is clear in its policy against Assad and has reiterated the fact that it's coming together with Russia to fight against the IS should not be taken as an indication of acceptance of Assad. France regrets the decision of the US non-intervention in 2013. Paris feels that if America would have intervened during that time, then the IS menace would not have emerged.iii Meanwhile, Russia apart from protecting its national interest in that region, sees the overthrowing of Assad as an advantage for the IS group. It would lead to a chaotic situation in Syria, whose repercussions will be far reaching.
Resolving the differences between Russia and Europe is important given terrorism, economic instability and refugee crisis. Russia and Europe are in the forefront facing these crises. The alleviation of tension between Russia and Europe helps in achieving the following objectives:
The resolution of the situation in Syria is important for Russia because of its traditional goals, such as to build a buffer against radical jihadists on its southern flank, to export arms and nuclear energy, to project power in West Asia’s warm waters and beyond and to compete with the West.xix Moscow is in favour of the Assad regime because of the following:
The overthrow of Assad opens up various insecurities for Russia such as:
Russia was able to suppress the insurgency problem through massive infusions of cash. The Russian government spent $30 billion in the North Caucasus from 2000 to 2010, and plans to deliver a further $80 billion of federal funds to the region’s nine million population by 2025.xlvi The amount that has been planned to be delivered by Russia would not be enough given the changing times, further globalization and advancement of information and technology. Another problem that has infested this region and needs to be tackled is corruption at all levels of state administration. It is a major contributing factor to insurgency. Endemic corruption and clanship perpetuate the rule of regional elites whose main virtue is loyalty to the federal centre. This increases citizens’ alienation from the state and promotes the search for alternatives, including an Islamic state and jihad. In recent years, insurgents’ primary capital has come from extortion of officials and businesses linked to the public sector. Until corruption is confronted, including at the federal level, additional government funding will have little impact on the socio-economic problemsxlvii in the region. With unemployment, poverty and corruption, future indicates a bleak picture. Unemployment and poverty become advantageous for terrorist groups for recruitment. On December 8, a homemade explosive got detonated at a bus stop in Central Moscow.xlviii The IS has threatened President Putin of attacks in Russia because of the military intervention in Syria.xlix Another threat whose repercussions might be felt in Russia would be the influence of Jaish al-Islam (The Army of Islam), an amalgam of factions that include hard-line Islamists, which is not listed as a terrorist group.l
Syria’s civil war, has presented a dangerous situation yet dynamic opportunity to Russia in the region. The continuation of a zero-sum game between Russia and the West especially the US is being strengthened. To outdo the US’ influence, which threatens Moscow’s position in the region and to protect its national interest, Russia is trying to manoeuvre between all the countries in the region. Iran, Syria and Libya have been the pillars of Russia’s regional architecture.li Libya and Russia shared a good relationship but with the ouster of the Libyan leader Gaddafi and taking over of the country by the new government is yet to bolster the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Libya, after the 2011 unrest, is yet to be stabilized both politically and economically. Syria is also moving in the same direction as Libya. The West supported Syrian Opposition Coalition and the IS wants the overthrow of Assad regime. However, there are differences amongst the opposition parties of Syria, which is not letting them unite against the regime.
The Syrian Opposition Coalition is clear on its stand that Assad’s departure from power has to be simultaneously with the transition period while the Syria-based opposition, National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, which is tolerated by the regime, argues that Assad's fate should be decided by the Syrian people.lii On 10 December, a meeting amongst the opposition parties of Syria took place in Riyadh regarding the fate of Syria. The meeting in Riyadh has brought together publicly for the first time more than 100 Syrian political figures. They include members of the main opposition umbrella group, the Syrian National Coalition and the Western-backed rebel gathering known as the Free Syrian Army, as well as representatives of some of the largest Islamist rebel groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and the Army of Islam.liii However, a consensus amongst all of them was not met. Ahrar al-Sham, one of the biggest armed Islamist groups, which is backed by Turkey, walked out before the Riyadh meeting ended. It objected to the role given to the Damascus-based group, the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change, which is tolerated by Assad.liv On his visit to Russia on December 15, 2015, the US Secretary to State John Kerry said that the US and Russia should find common ground to end Syria’s civil war and instability in eastern Ukraine. The main sticking point between Moscow and the West is on the role Assad himself could play in a future transition. The US and most western countries insist that Assad must leave office. However, suggestions in recent months from this circle have started emerging that Assad might be able to play a transitional role for some period.lv During his annual news conference on December 18, US President Barrack Obama said that Assad has to leave power but, at the same time, added that any solution in Syria would have to ensure that the ‘equities’ of Russia and Iran are ‘respected.’ At the top of the list of equities in Syria for Moscow and Tehran is President Bashar Assad.lvi Although Russia and the US along with the other Europeans are in differing minds regarding Assad’s role, however, the understanding that to tackle the IS menace, it is significant for all the parties to come together is becoming apparent.
The leader of the al-Qaeda-linked rebel group fighting in Syria denounced efforts in Saudi Arabia to unify Syrian opposition groups saying that those involved in talks were committing "treason". Al-Nusra Front's leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani said that the Riyadh conference was part of a "conspiracy" to revive and sustain the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.lvii The disunited efforts amongst these groups create an instable condition within the country when a transitional government comes to power. In such circumstances, Russia is trying to protect its national interest from not being overrun by the West through the establishment of a pro-West government.
Speaking at a meeting with top Defence Ministry officials, Putin said that Russia has provided air cover to a leading Western-backed opposition group in Syria. Putin said that while supporting the Syrian government forces, Russia has backed some units of the Free Syrian Army.lviii The balancing game that Russia has subtly started between Assad regime and the opposition groups indicates Russia’s attempt in protecting its interests in the region. Iran, which remained a bulwark against the influence of western values of democracy and liberal values, is standing its ground against the influence of the West despite the economic hardships. On the Syrian crisis, the statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on November 3 that Russia does not see keeping Bashar al-Assad in power as a matter of principle, which is seen as a divergence from the Iranian perspective, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that ‘another regime change in West Asia could be a catastrophe that "could simply turn the whole region into a large black hole” and that Moscow and Tehran are supporting the Syrian regime and agree that it is up to the Syrian people to elect their President shows an agreement between Russia and Iran over Syria.lix The Russian ship carrying almost all of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium, fulfilling a major step in the nuclear deal struck last summer,lx indicates the willingness on each side (Moscow and Tehran) not to hamper their bilateral relationship. Both the countries are also bolstering their own bilateral relationships through the expansion of both economic and defence deals. Like Russia, Iran also has its interests in Syria. It wants to be the preeminent regional player in the Persian Gulf and ensure that its allies rule in the region. It also wants to protect its Islamic interests throughout the region.lxi The deployment of IRGC Ground Forces to conflict abroad is a notable expansion of Iran’s willingness and ability to project military force beyond its borders. Apart from Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi‘a militants are also fighting in Syria in support of Assad. Their presence became overt in 2012 with the formation of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, a pro-government militia that is a conglomerate of Syrian and foreign Shi‘a fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraq-based Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah.lxii The Assad regime is important for Iran because of the economic engagements both the countries have. Iranian public and private institutions have been active in all areas of the Syrian economy, such as taking on large-scale contracts regarding property estates, etc. It has also extended $1 billion of credit to the Syrian regime.lxiii Adib Mayalah, the Governor of the Central Bank of Syria announced that Iran has given ‘preliminary approval’ for a new credit line to the Syrian government for $1 billion, which would be used to help finance imports. This will be the third such loan since the uprising began in March 2011. The first loan, which amounted to $1 billion, came in January 2013. The second was of $3.6 billion loan that came in August and was earmarked mainly for the purchase of oil products.lxiv The fall of Assad regime and replacement of the government with Syrian Opposition Rebels, who belong to Sunni sect, weaken Iran’s ambitions both religious and strategic.
The attempt to protect its interests in the region can be seen by Russia’s moves of trying to win other powerful West Asian countries’ support or non-interference including countries like Israel that did not have a good relationship with Syria. For example, Egypt, a Sunni dominated country and a strong ally of the US, has shown support to Russia’s intervention in Syria.lxv It is carefully trying to toe the line between the Shi’ite axis of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah and the opposing Sunni forces led by Saudi Arabia. A kind of sympathy can be seen in Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s attitude as both the countries are facing a Sunni Islamist insurgency that includes Islamic State, and both have a common enemy in Turkey’s Islamist regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which is a backer of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists throughout the region.lxvi
With Israel, Russia’s relationship is complicated. A modus vivendi sort of agreement can be seen between both. During the UNSC vote against Russia for its annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Israel maintained abstention, which was highly appreciated by Moscow.lxvii Tel Aviv’s abstention can be seen from its own ambitions on West Bank and Gaza Strip. Both the countries reached an agreement on a mechanism to avoid military confrontations between Russia and Israel in Syria. It is a complicated scenario for both the countries as Israel is striking the Syrian army from stopping any arms transfer to Hezbollah, which poses a threat to Israel. In a meeting between Putin and Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu in September, the latter told Putin that Iran and Syria have been arming Hezbollah with advanced weapons, thousands of which were directed at Israeli cities. Putin replied by saying that the ‘Syrian army was too bogged down in its own civil war to deal with fighting against Israel’.lxviii Israel called for Assad to be ousted after the civil war began, but the Netanyahu government has recently preferred neutral rhetoric even though Western powers continue to demand an eventual change of leadership in Syria.lxix
With the spat between Russia and Turkey, a closer cooperation between Moscow and Tel Aviv can be foreseen in future, which might become a game changer in the region. With the oil discovery in the Levant, bolstering relationship with Greece and Cyprus (both countries follow Orthodox Christianity that traces its lineage to the Byzantine Empire (Russia’s lineage of its Christianity is linked with Byzantium) and close cooperation with Tel Aviv can be a reality (Israel has a vibrant Russian Diaspora. Also in Russia, there are estimated almost 1 million Russian speaking Jews who are active in the society. In the past five years, the number of distinct Jewish communities in Russia has swelled from 87 to more than 200. Fifteen years ago, there was not a single Jewish school in all of Russia. Today, more than 15,000 students attend such schools.lxx Meanwhile in Israel, almost 21 percent of 8.4 million population are Russian immigrants)lxxi.
However, there are loopholes in the relationship between Russia and Israel. Firstly, the deployment of S-400 defence missile system in Khmeimim after the downing of Su-24 jetlxxii creates insecurity for Israel. It fears that all Israeli combat planes that would take off, from the Uvda air base in the Negev to the military airports in Israel’s north, can be immediately picked up by the Russian radar system. Israelis are also concerned that the Russians will transfer sensitive intelligence that they gather to agents that are hostile to Israel.lxxiii Secondly, the Iran-Hezbollah axis is always a threat to Israelis. For Russia, the rapprochement between Israel and Turkey at this time could prove a discouragement to Moscow’s ambitions. On December 14, Turkish President Recep Erdogan spoke positively of normalizing relations with Israel, which has been soured since the Marmara incident of2010.lxxiv
Meanwhile, Russia has been able to have a dialogue with Qatar. Both the countries agreed on what they could do to encourage the Syrian opposition to sit down for talks with the Syrian government. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hosted Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammad al-Attiyah in Moscow on December 26. The Russian envoy said that he is seeing more willingness from Assad's opponents, like Qatar, to launch the talks between the Syrian government and the opposition.lxxv Although they are in opposite camps regarding the fate of Assad, however, the success in hosting a dialogue carries importance for the Kremlin. Other Arab countries, such as United Arab Emirates along with Egypt and Jordan views Russia's actions in Syria with optimism.lxxvi Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has not been positive because of the Syrian crisis and Riyadh’s action to keep the oil price low in support with other oil-producing Gulf countries last year. In the mid year of 2015, the relationship was thought to have become positive with Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Moscow in an apparent bid to persuade Russia to play a role in a post-Assad scenario.lxxvii The outcome of the meeting was not successful and with the military intervention of Russia since September, the relationship between the two countries has again deteriorated.
A contest for dominance in Europe’s oil market is heating up between Russia and Saudi Arabia, which is not a positive trend in the barometer of the bilateral relationship. Saudi Arabia is now targeting countries like Sweden and Poland, where Russia has long been dominant. Both Russia and Saudi Arabia produce more than 10 million barrels of oil a day, and this production has contributed to a global oversupply, keeping prices below $50 a barrel.lxxviii However, at the annual meeting of the OPEC in Vienna in November, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak announced Russia’s readiness to cooperate with Riyadh on supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG). He said that Russia’s ‘main strategic area is the construction of LNG plants and added that ‘in case Saudi Arabia’s needs arise’ Moscow would ‘be ready to consider commercial agreements as well.’ Both sides agreed to set up a ‘working group’ to review issues related to oil and gas markets.lxxix
At the same time, Putin’s recent visit to Tehran to attend the session of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Tehran in November highlighted a steady rapprochement between the two nations. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said at the forum that ‘it is necessary for countries that produce and export energy to coordinate policies for the sake of stability and balance of the market’. The Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh emphasized that ‘Russia is considered a long-term and strategic partner for Iran in all areas.’lxxx Vladimir Kozhin, Russian presidential aide on military-technical cooperation said that Russia would continue deliveries of S-300 air defense systems to Iran through 2016.lxxxi
Although Israel has an issue with the S-300 missile system being delivered to Iran but the cooperative relationship between Moscow and Tel Aviv currently could give Russia an opportunity for becoming a mediator between Iran and Israel to resolve the challenges between them. Russia might try to boost trilateral relationship between Moscow, Tel Aviv and Tehran and economically engage each other that might lower the insecurity and mistrust both Israel and Iran has against each other.lxxxii If such a kind of arrangement becomes possible, then it will be a victory for Russia. Its position would become strengthened in the region, which would strengthen its bargaining position with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, who are against Moscow’s intervention in the region. The mechanisms used by Russia in the region by the expansion and strengthening of the network is a part of Moscow’s grand strategy in the region.
Russia’s intervention since 2011 in Syria was firstly on the ground of soft power diplomacy based on negotiations and veto. The Kremlin government defended its stand based on the aftermath of disaster in Libya. However, since the emergence of the IS, its atrocities and quick expansion made Russia insecure. The group’s declaration on June 2015 of making North Caucasus an Islamic State Waliyat or province has made Russia to take stock of the situation. Moscow understands that demographic crisis, economic disparity, unemployment and drug trafficking makes the country and its provinces an easy target for the terrorist groups. Hence, the Russian plane crash and the Paris attack have created an opportunity to defend its image in the international arena as a country trying to combat international terrorism.
Russia, which is under economic sanctions, has increased its budget in the defence sector, which surprisingly has not met with an objection from the Russian public. A sum of Rbs3.15tn ($51bn) has been earmarked for national defence expenditure in 2016.lxxxiii It is an increase by 0.8 percent in 2016,lxxxiv falling far short of the estimated 10 percent annual budget increases required over the next five years to hit equipment modernization targets.lxxxv The Russian military spends each year an amount equivalent to 60 per cent of the national defence budget on arms procurement, maintenance and development. The Kremlin administration to garner support for its campaign in Syria has taken the help of social media to garner support from the public. The state television constantly gives coverage to the bombing campaign in Syria as a fight against evil. The independent pollster, Levada, found that support for Moscow’s military action had soared from a mere 14 per cent in late September to more than 70 per cent. Meanwhile, Putin’s support ratings had hit an all-time high of 89.9 per cent according to the state-backed pollster VTsIOM.lxxxvi
An important observation that holds true for Russia is regarding sunk cost in defence. ‘Sunk cost’ is a ‘sunk cost’ in an economic and business term that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered.lxxxvii Russia is aware of the costs involved in the Syrian war. The awareness is also part of the strategic culture of Russia. Russian political and foreign policy cultures have always had some element of messianism, that is, a sense of national and international mission beyond security and prosperity for the country. Military power has long been seen as a means for pursuing messianic goals or as a protective base from which to pursue them by other means, such as diplomacy, political action (overt or covert), and foreign assistance. Political culture is itself very ‘martial’ or harmonious with military values in that it is grounded in the principle of kto-kovo (literally “who-whom), i.e., who dominates over whom by virtue of coercive power or status imparted by higher authority.lxxxviii
In recruitment in defence, Russia is witnessing an increase in voluntary entry than conscription. In June, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu announced that Russia’s armed forces have many applicants for professional soldier posts. General Mikhail Mizintsev, the head of Russia’s new government-run National Center for Defense, reported that Russia’s armed forces hired 70,000 contract soldiers in 2014, which, he said, marked the first time modern Russia has had more contract soldiers than conscripts.lxxxix The rise in contract soldiers might indicate to a rise in the nationalistic fervour within the Russian youths. It is because conscription in Russia was a dreaded subject and till 2005, there was less enthusiasm towards joining the armed forces. Conscription had become abusive in Russia.xc Another reason apart from nationalism and patriotism is also from the perspective of employment. During the 1990s, serving in military had lost value due to less funding and less attention in the modernization of that sector. However, since 2000, there has been a change in the outlook. There has been an increase in the pay scale and basic amenities to this sector have been addressed. Also, staging military exhibitions open to public has brought a transformation in the attitude of the Russian people.xci Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) presents the data of the survey describing how the attitudes of Russians concerning the role of the army in the youth education have changed over the recent twenty-five years. Russians think that since the Perestroika period, the living conditions of the low rank army personnel have considerably improved: 65 per cent think the living conditions are “good” or “very good” compared to 19 per cent in 1990. Russian opinion regarding the impact of the army on the young generation also differs from that of the 1990s: the percentage of those who think that army gives moral and physical strength to young people has doubled (from 33 per cent in 1990s to 64 per cent 2000s).xcii In future, if there is a steady flow of professional soldier, then it will strengthen the military prowess of Russia’s hard power that would embolden its position in the international community.
Russia’s Futuristic Plans
The Paris attack opened an opportunity for Russia as the tragedy pushed US President Barack Obama and Putin, supported by France, to talk and work together to stem out the IS. International terrorism has pushed Russia and the West to work together. Russia will try to build the case for Assad’s staying in power with some kind of arrangement for the opposition rebels, all in the name of protecting the world from terrorism. At the same time, the reports of helping the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to fight against the terrorist groups in Syriaxciii also shows a pragmatic and long-term strategy on Kremlin’s part of protecting its interest in the country. Russia’s objective in Syria, with or without Assad, would be to maintain a client regime in the region,xciv which would help the Kremlin in economic, strategic and also countering terrorism. If the support to FSA (which the group has denied) is true, then it is clear that Russia is willing to have a working relationship with the next government post-Assad. Post-Assad situation might be a similar situation that Russia shares with the Libyan transitional government post-Gaddafi. In 2015, a number of Libyan politicians approached Russian officials proposing official interactions and consideration of potential avenues for trade and economic cooperation. In the course of these contacts, they floated concepts of reinstating the economic contracts lost by Russian companies after Gaddafi’s ouster.xcv The outcome of these official interactions is yet to become functional. As the situation in Syria is about saving face for both Russia and the West, especially the US because of their standings in the international community, hence a balanced solution might be in the future.
Adroit diplomacy from Russia’s side has helped the country to mitigate and heal the bruised relationships with many countries, such as Israel. However, Russia needs to be prudent in its strategies. It should not play the ‘Christian card’ as its repercussion in the future would be dangerous. For the time being, all the countries, out of fear of their security, are coming together to fight the ISIS, but the religious card of Christian against Muslim will not help in the future.
To keep a foothold in West Asia, Russia will be needing Iran and other regional powers including Turkey. It is because Ankara can create problems for Russia by blocking the Black Sea and ratchet up the Nagorno-Karabakha incident. Nagorno-Karabakha is important for Russia because of its goal to carry out military-political expansion in the South Caucasus.xcvi Iran is playing its geostrategic card of protecting its own interests by resolving the nuclear issue with the West and bolstering its relationship with Russia. Foreign policy and relations to a large extent are unpredictable, hence a balanced approach with focus on protecting its national interest and its image in the region would be the objective of the Kremlin.
***
* The Authoress is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are that of the Researcher and not of the Council.
End Notes
iAroan Mehta, “Could US and Russia Enhance Intel Relationship?” Defence News, November 16, 2015. http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/11/16/deeper-us-russia-intel-relationship-developing/75873908/ (Accessed on November 18, 2015).
iiHenry Samuel, “Francois Hollande Calls on Russia and US to Unite to Defeat Islamic State,” The Telegraph, November 17, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11999553/Hollande-calls-on-Russia-and-US-to-unite-to-defeat-Isil.html (Accessed on November 18, 2015).
iiiYaroslav Trofimov, “France Wants Alliance with Russia, but Divisions over Assad’s Future a Hurdle,” The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/assads-future-may-be-stumbling-block-in-plan-to-fight-isis-1447791663 (Accessed on November 18, 2015).
v“Economic Impact on the EU of Sanctions over Ukraine Conflict,” EPRS, Briefing, October 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf (Accessed on November 18, 2015).
viAlexey Khlebnikov, “European businesses adapt,” op.cit.
viiIana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu, “Do Sanctions against Russia Work?” Brief Issue, European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2014. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_35_Russia_sanctions.pdf (Accessed on November 18, 2015).
viiiMartin Russel, “EU-Russia Trade: At a Glance,” EPRS, May 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/557023/EPRS_ATA(2015)557023_EN.pdf (Accessed on December 2, 2015).
ix“EU and Russia Interdependencies,” Parliament UK, 2013. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/11505.htm (Accessed on December 2, 2015).
xRussel, “EU-Russia Trade,” op.cit.
xi“EU and Russia Interdependencies,” op.cit.
xviiOzan Serdaroglu, “The EU-Turkey Summit: A Possible Turning Point – with Major Pitfalls,” Middle East Eye, December 2, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/eu-turkey-summit-and-refugee-crisis-1620163997 (Accessed on December 3, 3015).
xviiiMary Atkinson, “Caught at Sea: Russia to Deport Syrian Refugee Who Tried to Swim to Europe,” Middle East Eye, June 4, 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-deport-syrian-refugee-who-tried-swim-europe-1587755597 (Accessed on December 2, 2015).
xix Dmitry Adamsky, “Putin’s Damascus Steal,” Foreign Affairs, September 16, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-09-16/putins-damascus-steal (Accessed on December 3, 2015).
xx “Search for Stimulating Trade between Russia and Syria,” SANA, April 3, 2015. http://www.sana.sy/?p=162675 (Accessed on November 29, 2015).
xxiii Borzou Daragahi and Henry Froy, “Russia Tightens Links to Bashar al-Assad with Syria Energy Deal,” Financial Times, December 26, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e8040e0-6e3f-11e3-8dff-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3uYs2VBO9 (Accessed on December 17, 2015).
xxv Daragahi and Froy, “Russia Tightens Links to Bashar al-Assad,” op. cit.
xxvii Jeremy Bender, “Report: Russia is Building a Second Military Airbase in Syria,” Business Insider, December 3, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.in/Report-Russia-is-building-a-second-military-airbase-in-Syria/articleshow/50035318.cms (Accessed on December 6, 2015).
xxix Alexei Malashenko, “Changes in Kremlin’s Rhetoric,” Russia in Global Affairs, September 23, 2014. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Islam-in-Russia-17002 (Accessed on December 6, 2015).
xxxiiTim Junio, “Strategic Framework and Consequences of the Sykes-Picot Agreement,” Syriawide. http://www.syriawide.com/junio.html (Accessed on December 8, 2015).
xxxiii“Turkey Has No Legal, Economic Basis to Close Bosphorus for Russian Ships”, Sputnik, November 26, 2015. http://sputniknews.com/politics/20151126/1030827768/turkey-russia-bosporus-strait.html (Accessed on December 8, 2015).
xxxiv “Russia Loses $4 Billion in Libya because of Gaddafi,” Pravada.ru, February 2, 2012. http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/economics/02-02-2012/120401-russia_libya_gaddafi-0/ (Accessed on November 29, 2015).
xl Poll: Russians Continue to Lose,” op. cit.
xlivKathrin Hille, “Chechnya’s economic recovery tested by slowdown”, FT, April 28, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/8233d33c-ecd0-11e4-a81a-00144feab7de.html#axzz3uYs2VBO9 (Accessed on December 18, 2015).
xlv “Security and Human Rights in Chechnya and the Situation of Chechens in the Russian Federation – Residence Registration, Racism and False Accusations,” Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Moscow, Grozny and Volgograd, the Russian Federation: From 23 April to 13 May 2014 and Paris, France 3 June 2014, 1/2015, January 2015, pg.60. https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/662FD8CA-B89C-438C-B532-591500571951/0/ChechnyaFactfindingreport26012015FINALinklforside.pdf (Accessed on December 18, 2015).
xlvi Judah, “Putin’s Medieval Peace Pact in Chechnya,” op.cit.
xlvii “North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (IV): Economic and Social Imperatives,” Europe Report N°237, International Crisis Group, 7 July 2015, pg. Ii. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/237-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-iv-economic-and-social-imperatives.pdf (Accessed on January 5, 2016).
xlviii “Moscow Blast: 5 Injured in Explosion at Bus Stop,” The Indian Express, December 8, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/five-injured-in-bomb-blast-at-moscow-bus-stop/ (Accessed on December 9, 2015).
l “Syria's Divided Opposition Seeks to Unify Stance,” Al Araby, December 6, 2015. http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/12/6/syrias-divided-opposition-seeks-to-unify-stance (Accessed on December 14, 2015).
li Adamsky, “Putin’s Damascus,” op.cit.
lii “Syria's Divided Opposition Seeks,” op.cit.
liii “Syrian Opposition Groups Begin Talks in Riyadh,” Euronews, December 10, 2015. http://www.euronews.com/2015/12/10/syrian-opposition-groups-begin-talks-in-riyadh/ (Accessed on December 13, 2015).
liv Ibid.
lvi Anshel Pfeffer, “America Falls Into Line with Russia on Syria,” Haartez, December 20, 2015. http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-1.692559 (Accessed on December 22, 2015).
lvii “Al-Nusra Front Leader Condemns Saudi's Syria Talks,” Aljazeera, December 13, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/al-nusra-front-leader-condemns-saudi-syria-talks-151212210441946.html (Accessed on December 14, 2015).
lviii Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin: Russia Provides Air Cover to Syrian Opposition Group,” Desert News, December 11, 2015. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765682538/Putin-Russia-provides-air-cover-to-Syrian-opposition-group.html?pg=all (Accessed on December 13, 2015).
lxi Jubin Goodarzi, “Iran and Syria,” Iran Premier (United States Institute of Peace), June 2015, pg.1. http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Iran%20and%20Syria.pdf (Accessed on December 28, 2015).
lxii Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” A joint Report by AEI’s critical threats project & Institute for the Study of War, May 2013, pg. 6. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf (Accessed on December 28, 2015).
lxiii Samer Abboud, “Is Iran Really Pulling out of Syria?” Al Jazeera, December 14, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/analysis-iran-pulling-syria-151214055704354.html (Accessed on December 29, 2015).
lxvii Adamsky, “Putin’s Damascus Steal,” op.cit.
lxix Dan Williams, “Israel Quiet over 'Hotline' with Russia on Syria,” Reuters, October 22, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-israel-analysis-idUSKCN0SG1G320151022#ZlkHMe3A30FeUlim.97 (Accessed on December 9, 2015).
lxx Michael Mainville, “100,000 Former Soviet Jews in Israel Return to Russia,” The Toronto Star, April 5, 2015. http://rense.com/general65/100000formersovietjews.htm (Accessed on December 14, 2015).
lxxi “Latest Population Statistics for Israel,” Jewish Virtual Library, September 2015. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/newpop.html (Accessed on December 14, 2015).
lxxv Russia Identifies Groups behind Egypt Plane Crash,” Alarabiya, December 24, 2015. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2015/12/24/Russia-says-identified-groups-behind-Egypt-plane-explosion.html (Accessed on December 28, 2015).
lxxvii Simeon Kerr and Heba Saleh, “Saudi Arabia under Pressure to Defend Syria Rebels from Russia,” Financial Times, October 7, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1fb51ca-6cd6-11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a.html#axzz3tp7wiyrO (Accessed on December 9, 2015).
lxxix Sergei Strokan and Vladimir Mikheev, “Russia Playing Energy Chess Game with Iran and Saudi Arabia,” RBTH, December 3, 2015. http://rbth.com/international/troika/2015/12/03/rusia-playing-energy-ches-game-with-iran-and-saudi-arabia_547235 (Accessed on December 14, 2015).
lxxxiiThe scenario of mitigation between Israel and Iran coming together seems impossible but unpredictably in international relations is an important policy.
lxxxiii Kathrin Hille, “Russia Defies Recession to Fund Syria Conflict,” FT, October 25, 2015. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f9c21fa-7957-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89.html#axzz3t8aaUML0 (Accessed on December 15, 2015).
lxxxiv According to a SIPRI report, in real terms, spending on Russia’s 'national defence' will fall by 12.8 per cent in 2016, 2.8 per cent in 2017 and a further 6.4 per cent in 2018. Julian Cooper, “Military expenditure in the Russian Ministry of Finance's new 'Basic Directions of Budget Policy for 2016 and the Planned Period 2017 and 2018' ; A Research Note,” SIPRI, July, 2015. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/military-expenditure-in-the-russian-ministry-of-finances-new-basic-directions-of-budget-policy-for-2016-and-the-planned-period-2017-and-2018-research-note-july-2015 (Accessed on December 30, 2015).
lxxxviHille, “Russia defies recession to fund Syria conflict”, op.cit.
lxxxvii Dumitru Minzarari, “Russia's Strategic Culture and its Hybrid Warfare in CIS Area,” Paper Presentation in the International Conference on ‘Culture and Russian Society’ in the Aleksanteri Institute, 21-23 October 2015.
lxxxviii Fritz W. Ermarth, “Russian Strategic Culture: Past, Present, and… in Transition? “Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 31 October 2006. pp. 6-7. http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/russia.pdf (Accessed on December 15, 2015).
xcii“Army and Society: Together or Apart?” Press release №1788, Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM), October 28, 2015. http://www.wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1197 (Accessed on December 30, 2015).
xciiiVladimir Isachenkov, “Putin: Russia provides air cover to Syrian opposition group”, Desert News, December 11, 2015. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/765682538/Putin-Russia-provides-air-cover-to-Syrian-opposition-group.html?pg=all (Accessed on December 13, 2015).