The 27^th meeting of the NATO heads that took place at Warsaw from 8-9 July 2016 was largely focused on Russia apart from other security issues confronting the international community. On August 2015, Polish President Andrzej Duda announced stronger NATO presence in form of bases in Central Europe¹ as the priority of discussion at the Warsaw Summit.

Outcome of the Warsaw Summit (8-9 July 2016)

In the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO stated that Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability. This fundamentally challenges the Alliance. NATO feels that Russia’s actions have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten the long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.²  

The Communiqué spoke about the evolving security environment where readiness to meet any kind of challenges and from any side took prominence. Apart from the challenges such as terrorism and refugee crisis, countering assertive Russia by NATO was focused on.

The discussions on Russia led to the conclusion that Moscow failed to strengthen the relationship with NATO, including through the mechanism of NATO-Russia Council (NRC).  It argued that NATO has stood by its international commitments whereas Russia has breached the values, principles and commitments which underpin the NATO-Russia relationship, as outlined in the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 2002 Rome Declaration. NATO feels that Russia has broken the trust and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture.³ 

The members of the Alliance came together and reiterated the need to strengthen military capabilities in order to improve the deterrence and defence capabilities of NATO vis-à-vis Russia.⁴

The highlights of the July 2016 Warsaw Summit regarding Russia were approval of the deployment of four battalions on Russian borders, including the dispatch of 1,000 US troops to Poland, and endorsed the deployment of Patriot anti-missile batteries and radars in Poland and Romania. Also, the Alliance invited the former Soviet republic of Georgia to join the military alliance.⁵ The NATO leaders also agreed to increase air and sea patrols to demonstrate readiness to defend eastern members against the alleged ‘Russian aggression.'⁶

On 4 July 2016, at the pre-Summit of the Warsaw Summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that the Alliance will come to the agreement in enhancing their military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance.⁷ During the Warsaw Summit the members reiterated their decision to strengthen their presence in the east such as:

• the enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), increasing its readiness and substantially enlarging its size, making it a more capable and flexible joint force comprised of a division-size land element with air, maritime, and special operations forces components.
• Created a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), able to begin deployment within two to three days.  
• Established eight multinational NATO Force Integration Units on the territory of Allies in the eastern part of the Alliance to assist in training of Alliance forces and facilitating reinforcements when needed.
• As part of the NATO Force Structure, made the Headquarters of a Multinational Corps Northeast in Poland fully operational, and established the Headquarters of a Multinational Division Southeast in Romania to take command of the NATO Force Integration Units and to provide flexible command and control options in their regions.
• Decision was taken to establish an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to unambiguously demonstrate, as part of the NATO’s overall posture, solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression.  Beginning in early 2017, enhanced forward presence will comprise multinational forces provided by the nations who made the framework on it, supported by other contributing Allies on a voluntary, sustainable, and rotational basis.
• Decision to develop forward presence in the southeast part of the Alliance territory was also agreed.
• At the Summit, the members reiterated that as a means to prevent conflict and war, credible deterrence and defence is essential.  Therefore, deterrence and defence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.
• The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania command and control (C2) is being transferred to NATO for NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability. The Alliance reiterated that it was not against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities.  NATO missile defence is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. According to NATO, the BMD system is not capable against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent and there is no intention to redesign the system to have such a capability in the future.  Hence, Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive.⁸

Before the two-day Warsaw Summit commenced, Mr. Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, on 6 July announced the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on 13 July in Brussels. Setting a positive tone towards the NATO-Russia Council meet, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the same day said that it is clear to all responsible politicians that Russia will never attack any NATO country.⁹

Outcome of the NATO-Russia Council meeting

The main focus for discussion between Russia and NATO during the NATO-Russia Council was on the crisis in and around Ukraine and the need to fully implement the Minsk Agreements; the military activities of both sides based on transparency and risk reduction and the security situation in Afghanistan.¹⁰ During the meeting of NATO-Russia Council, Russia and the NATO deliberated upon the agenda that were decided by both.

Russia and NATO discussed the decisions taken at the Warsaw summit by the Alliance. Russia pointed to NATO’s direct responsibility for a possible escalation of military and political tension on the European continent as a result of the build-up of the bloc’s military capability and its activity in the regions bordering Russia, and the continuing deployment of the US/NATO missile defence system in Europe.¹¹ Before the meet, Mr. Lavrov on 6 July expressed his discontentment over NATO’s military build up. He said that the build up contradicts the Alliance’s promotion to cooperate with Russia in combating terrorism and in other areas.¹²

To arrive at a workable relationship between the two, Russia proposed practical steps to improve trust that included flights of military aircraft in the Baltic region with their transponders on and pursuant to the Niinistö Plan to enhance air safety in the Baltic region that Moscow supports. The Niinistö Plan was proposed by the Finnish President Sauli Niinistö during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 2016. The proposal was intended at reducing the number of military flight incidents.¹³ It expressed willingness to continue an in-depth discussion on the array of military-political issues at the military expert level.¹⁴ However, the outcome of the meet could not reach the optimal level. Disappointment was voiced by the Russians.

Russia’s Reaction

Experts from the Russian military circle viewed the NATO Warsaw Summit as being anti-Russia in nature. For example, Alexander Grushko, Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, called measures such as the deployment of additional forces — four battalions totalling up to 4,000 troops — to north-eastern Europe on a rotating basis to support Eastern European member states against perceived threats from Russia as ‘confrontational.’¹⁵ He stressed that the decisions taken at the Warsaw Summit ran counter to the NATO-Russia Foundation Act.¹⁶ Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Russia analysed the outcome of the NATO Summit and was not pleased with it. According to her, NATO’s objective of maintaining peace and stability in Europe is becoming questionable as the Alliance rather than concentrating in the south, specifically the West Asian region, is focusing on the East which is Russia. She said that by projecting Russia in a negative image, NATO is trying to divert its public from the problems that some of the members of the Alliance have created.¹⁷ Alexander Zimovsky, a military expert, said that “NATO’s insistence on their right to expand its sphere of influence and at the same denies Russia’s right to protect its interests”¹⁸ is unjustified.

Problems between Russia and the NATO

Since the post-Cold War, events such as the Georgian War of 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 have weakened the fragile relationship between Russia and NATO. The fragility of the relationship is rooted in the origin of the formation of the Alliance, which was to counter the Soviet Union.

The relationship that has been existing between Russia and NATO is hard to comprehend because of the mixed signals that come from the actions of both the sides. The indicators of events between Russia and NATO have been both belligerent as well as that of appeasement.

It is seen that Russia’s reactions have been guided by the actions taken by NATO. The two main factors apart from various other reasons that trouble Kremlin and have not helped in building a conducive relationship between both are—the enlargement programme of NATO and the deployment of the missile defence systems. Both of these factors put Russia in an uncomfortable position and do not allow the country to feel secure. Russia feels that there has been a breach of trust on both the issues. On the enlargement issue,  from the time of the Soviet Union, Russia felt that NATO in 1990 gave them a promise of no further expansion of the alliance in return for the unification of Germany.¹⁹

With the end of the Cold War, Russia thought that there was no threat from NATO because of the rapprochement between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the West. USSR attempted periods of rapprochement with NATO such as in 1953-54, through the proposed concept of a 'common European Home' and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki in 1972-75.  In 1989, the Soviet Union and NATO signed the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament  and  in  1991  Russia  became  a  member  of   North  Atlantic  Cooperation  Council (NACC). These events indicate a move towards a period of reconciliation. That did not, however, happen.

Since the late 1990’s, NATO went ahead with its enlargement and the modernization and upgradation of its military capacity. For Russia, it was a period of hardship both economically and politically as it was undergoing the period of transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in the Balkan region, tensions were flaring up in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina which saw the military intervention of NATO. Russia, which had interest in the region, did not react strongly because of the domestic conditions. Apart from the economic problems, it was involved in the Chechen War (1994-1996) which dragged Russia into a period of chaos and violence. Although there were complaints from Kremlin side but no untoward actions were seen.

It appears that there is an ongoing game of brinkmanship between Russia and NATO. Both sides carry on their ambitions which run contrary to each other especially that of NATO’s. However, both the sides also restraint each other from going into war.  Both sides have nuclear arsenals. The control from both the sides is because of their understanding of the impact their actions would have over the peace, security and stability of Europe and trans-Atlantic region. Russia and NATO are aware of the international challenges such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, religious extremism etc. and the impact on Russia and Europe. Both are interdependent. Hence, both the sides have shown restraint against each other and have worked to keep a working relationship going between both. For example, during the Kosovo crisis dialogue was kept open between Russia and NATO. Russia joined the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) on 1994. In 1997, Russia and NATO signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which states that both the parties are not adversaries. The Act helped in establishing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. However, at the same time, NATO went ahead with its enlargement programme which is a sensitive issue for Russia.   

During the Kosovo crisis, there was the suspension of PJC between Russia and NATO, a period of ‘cold peace’ between Russia and NATO started. While the Kosovo Crisis was going on, NATO decided to open the door of membership to the three ex-Soviet allies—Poland, Czech republic and Hungary, leading to the period of coldness between the two. Russia views NATO’s policy as ‘interest-driven’ while NATO looks at its own policies and actions from ‘value-driven’ policy approach.²⁰ The understanding of ‘interest-driven’ and ‘value-driven’ policies dominates the relationship between both the parties which makes it difficult for them to cooperate with each other. Interestingly, during this period of crisis, Kremlin did not stop its interaction with the Alliance.²¹

Russia was fighting the Chechnya war and was economically facing a recession. In this fragile backdrop, it was uncomfortable and suspicious of NATO taking advantage of the Chechnya war to work against Russia. In the first Chechen war of 1994-1996, the separatists were suspected of receiving help from US and Turkey.²² In the second war too, Russia had the same fear. Since the change in the leadership in Russia, pragmatism was shown by President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin started to re-engage with  NATO.  NATO  saw  the  friendly side  of  Russia.  When   9/11 happened, President Putin was the first world leader to offer condolence and help to the US. President Putin suggested Russia’s membership to NATO during this period which culminated into Russia-North Atlantic Council (RNAC) and later to NATO-Russia Council in 2002.

The NATO-Russia Council was supposed to provide the foundation for equal partnership between the two. The aim of it was to bring new quality to Russia-NATO relations. A NRC Action Plan on Terrorism was launched in December 2004 and NRC Counter-Narcotics Training Project was launched in December 2005 to help address the threats posed by trafficking in Afghan narcotics. During the Afghanistan War, they worked together where Russia allowed NATO to use the country as a transit route for non-military goods for the Alliance forces in Afghanistan. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009 proposed a new Euro-Atlantic security order. The proposal also coincided with the US’ ‘reset’ policy. NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to help the Afghan Armed Forces to operate and maintain their helicopter fleet was officially launched in March 2011. However, these periods of reconciliation have not been enough for both Russia and NATO to alleviate the mistrust they have for each other rather it has strengthened especially with the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. The estrangement had started since 2007 when President Putin issued a decree declaring a suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty obligations. The reaction from Russia was thought to be because of the then US President George W. Bush’s decision to deploy a missile defence system in Eastern Europe to intercept missiles coming from Iran²³ followed by the Georgian war of 2008. 

Back in 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on her way to an emergency NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on the crisis in South Ossetia and Georgia that Russia “was playing a very dangerous game” with the US and its allies. She said that the US would not allow Moscow to win in Georgia, destabilize Europe and draw a new Iron Curtain through the continent. She said that the US was determined to deny Russia their strategic objective, adding that any attempt to re-create the Cold War by drawing a "new line" through Europe and intimidating former Soviet republics and ex-satellite states would fail including in Georgia and Ukraine.²⁴

Apart from the enlargement issue, the other important factor that troubles Russia is the deployment of defence missile system in Europe. Since the US officially announced the deployment of BMD in Europe in 2004, Russia has persistently referred to the project, run by NATO, as a demonstration of anti-Russian intent.²⁵ During 2009, when the Obama administration came up with the ‘reset’ policy with Russia, the Kremlin seems to have misinterpreted the meaning behind the policy. It might have thought that the US would not deploy the system but America did not dismantle the missile defence system. The US cited Iran as a threat for the deployment of the system, which did not help Russia to feel secure or trust NATO.

NATO in order to appease Russia, in 2010²⁶ during the Lisbon Summit of NATO invited Moscow to engage with the Alliance for missile defence cooperation.²⁷  Till 2012, they held five exercises in this area to develop, explore and assess various options for conducting missile defence in Europe.²⁸ On October 2013, NRC defence ministers exchanged views on pressing events on the international agenda, including Syria, and transparency on military exercises. They also  discussed ways to widen practical cooperation including plans to work together to dispose of excess ammunition in Russia, possibly through a new NRC Trust Fund project. However, since the Ukrainian crisis, the practical cooperation under NRC was suspended.  The channels for political dialogue were however still kept open.²⁹

At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO condemned Russia for its actions and involvement in Ukraine. It expressed its concern at the increased military presence along NATO borders and upgradation of Russian defence forces. It was uncomfortable with Russia’s involvement in Syria and demonstration of its improved military capabilities. However, perhaps due to the increasing menace of ISIS, the terrorist attacks within Europe, the refugee crisis in the region, the stalemate in the Ukrainian crisis and the resurgence of Taliban issue in Afghanistan the NRC met after two years of gap in April 2016.

Conclusion

NATO Warsaw Summit strengthened the tension and mistrust between Russia and NATO rather than alleviating it. It strengthened the basic difference of understanding between each other which has been present through the Soviet Union period and became stronger since the 1999 Kosovo crisis.

Former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev reportedly said after the Warsaw Summit that the decisions made at NATO summit in Warsaw should be regarded as a preparation for a “hot war” with Russia. According to him, “by irresponsibly deploying four multinational battalions to Russian borders, ‘within shooting distance’, the alliance draws closer another Cold War and another Arms Race.” He also called on Moscow not to respond to provocations but to come to the negotiating table. He called upon the UN to intervene to alleviate the tension.³⁰

The escalation of the tensions between Russia and the NATO puts their agenda of collaboration with each other with regard to combating international terrorism including their cooperation to defeat the ISIS in Syria, in question.

Russia is trying to protect its national interests in a similar manner as the rest of the countries in the region or Europe or the US itself would do. For instance, despite the standoff between Russia and Turkey, a NATO member, the leaders of both the countries have reconciled. 

Can there be a genuine cooperation between Russia and the Alliance? The answer to it is that genuine normalisation of the relationship is difficult between Russia and the NATO at least in the near future, given the defence build-up from both sides to counter each other along with the West’s non-recognition of Russia’s influence of ‘near abroad’ and also the differences in their understanding on issues such as democracy, rule of law and human rights.

Preventive diplomacy is the³¹ key to douse the spark between the both parties. Confidence building measures of joint military exercises and exchanges in political and cultural level should be encouraged. The prism of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ should be removed.

Russia and the West must have educational and cultural exchanges to study the ‘value system’ of each other and focus on the positive aspects of both the sides rather than degrading each other’s value system. It is important because of their influence in the world order. Genuine transparency between each other’s military build up and also constant open dialogue is important because a misreading or misinterpretation of each others’ moves or defence development might make things complicated for peace and stability in the region.

However, escalation of tensions between them might not lead to an armed standoff because of the various bilateral national interests and stakes the NATO members individually have with Russia. For example, the relationship between Russia and France or Russia and Germany or Russia and Greece etc. are multivector engagements. Prevention though is better than cure. Focus should be more into genuine cooperation and confidence building measures. It is noticed that though actions of Russia and the NATO against each other are often unpredictable and overtly aggressive, however, at the same time, they also try to cooperate with each other during the times of crisis. For example, Russia cooperated with the Alliance during the crisis in Iran, Libya and Afghanistan. Hence, rising above tensions will be mutually beneficial for both sides and the world.    

***

* The Authoress is Research Fellow  with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

Disclaimer: Views expressed are of authors and do not reflect the views of the Council.

Endnotes: 

1The Polish President Andrzej Duda for a stronger Nato presence in his country to counter a perceived military threat from Russia. “Poland's new president calls for stronger Nato presence to counter Russia”, The Guardian, August 6, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/poland-president-andrzej-duda-stronger-nato-presence-counter-russia (Accessed on October 13, 2016).

2“Warsaw Summit Communiqué”, NATO Press Release, July 9, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (Accessed on July 10, 2016).

3Ibid.

4Karl-Heinz Kamp, “The agenda of the NATO summit in Warsaw”, Security Policy Working Paper No. 9/2015, Federal Academy for Security Policy, pg.1. https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_security_policy_9_2015.pdf (Accessed on July 10, 2016).

5“Nobel Peace Laureate: US, NATO Playing Nuclear Brinkmanship with Russia”, Sputnik, 12 July 2016. http://sputniknews.com/military/20160712/1042803284/US-NATO-Nuclear-Brinkmanship-Russia.html (Accessed on July 14, 2016).

6“Gorbachev: ‘The Next War will be the Last’”, Sputnik, July 10, 2016. http://sputniknews.com/world/20160710/1042719574/gorbachev-on-nato-decisions.html (Accessed on July 14, 2016). 

7“Pre-Summit press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”, NATO, july 4, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_133053.htm (Accessed on July 17, 2016).

8“Warsaw Summit Communiqué”, NATO Press Release, op.cit.

9“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview to Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper and radio, Moscow, May 31, 2016”, The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 31, 2016. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2298019 (Accessed on July 25, 2016).

10“Statement by the Secretary General on NATO-Russia Council meeting”, NATO Press Release (2016) 125, July 6, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132936.htm (Accessed on October 13, 2016).

11“Russia-NATO Council meeting: Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, July 14, 2016”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, July 14, 2016. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2354135 (Accessed on July 15, 2016).   

12“Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview to Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper and radio, Moscow, May 31, 2016”, The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, op.cit.

13Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański, “Russia’s ‘Niinistö Plan’”, OSW, August 25, 2016. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-08-25/russias-niinisto-plan (Accessed on October 14, 2016).

1414“Russia-NATO Council meeting: Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, July 14, 2016”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit.

15“Moscow slams NATO’s ‘confrontational’ plans for military buildup near Russia”, Press TV, July 14, 2016. http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/07/14/475118/Russia-NATO-Grushko-Poland-Ukraine (Accessed on October 13, 2016).

16“Interview by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO A. Grushko to the TV Channel ‘Rossiya-24’”, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO, July 11, 2016. http://www.missiontonato.ru/en/news/917/ (Accessed on October 13, 2016).

17“Comment by Russian MFA Spokesman M.V.Zaharovoy in connection with the NATO summit in Warsaw”, The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, July 10, 2016. http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2350611 (Accessed on July 16, 2016).

18“’Summit of War’: Why NATO Prefers Escalation with Russia over Normalization”, Sputnik, July 9, 2016. http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160709/1042707386/nato-summit-russia.html (Accessed on July 14, 2016).

19According to NATO, the debate about the enlargement of NATO evolved solely in the context of German reunification. In these negotiations Bonn and Washington managed to allay Soviet reservations about a reunited Germany remaining in NATO. This was achieved by generous financial aid, and by the “2+4 Treaty” ruling out the stationing of foreign NATO forces on the territory of the former East Germany. However, it was also achieved through countless personal conversations in which Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were assured that the West would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weakness and willingness to withdraw militarily from Central and Eastern Europe. It is these conversations that may have left some Soviet politicians with the impression that NATO enlargement, which started with the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, had been a breach of these Western commitments. “NATO enlargement and Russia: myths and realities”, NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/nato-enlargement-russia/en/index.htm (Accessed on 16 August 2016).

20Ibid, pp-57-58. 

21One might think that the reason behind the continuity in interaction with NATO was due to Russia’s domestic problems.  

22“Russia’s approach to ISIL: the hidden benefit of evil”, NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/ISIL/Russia-Syria-Putin-ISIL-Chechnya-Middle-East/EN/index.htm (Accessed on August 22, 2016).

23Line Tresselt , “The NATO-Russia Council – a Success?” Institute for Forsvarsstudier (IFS) Oslo, May 14, 2010, pg. 54. https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/12944/ThexNATO-RussiaxCouncilx-xaxSuccess.pdf?sequence=1 (Accessed on August 26, 2016).

24“If NATO punishes Russia, Russia will punish NATO Back”, Pravada.ru, August 19, 2008. http://www.pravdareport.com/world/americas/19-08-2008/106137-nato_russia-0/ (Accessed on July 15, 2016).

25“How Putin uses missile defence in Europe to distract Russian voters”, NATO. http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/Ballistic-Missile-Defence-Putin/EN/index.htm (Accessed on August 26, 2016).

26Just after the Georgian war, dialogue was kept opened between the two. The NRC meeting took place in 2009 where the focus was on achieving a Euro-Atlantic security.  

27“176 DSCFC 11 E Rev.1 Final-Missile Defence: The Way Ahead for NATO”, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2011 Annual Session. http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2591 (Accessed on August 26, 2016).

28“NATO-Russia practical cooperation”, NATO, December 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_12/20131127_131201-MediaBackgrounder-NRC_en.pdf (Accessed on August 26, 2016).

29“Statement by the Secretary General on NATO-Russia Council meeting”, NATO, July 6, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132936.htm (Accessed on July 16, 2016).

30“Gorbachev: ‘The Next War will be the Last’”, Sputnik, July 10, 2016. http://sputniknews.com/world/20160710/1042719574/gorbachev-on-nato-decisions.html (Accessed on July 14, 2016).

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