Summary of the Brief
Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even tempered is the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.
—Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, 1969.
The above words by former Prime Minister Trudeau, on his first trip to the United States, speak about the relations between the two nations as viewed by Canada as it tries to accommodate and work with its powerful neighbour. Today Prime Minister Justine Trudeau is taking this relationship forward. The question that is being asked by most is, whether under the administration of President Donald Trump there will be a bump in the relationship or will Prime Minister Trudeau be able to build a working relationship with the new Administration in Washington.
The United States and Canada share a relationship based on geographic proximity. The relationship encompasses economic, trade, security, foreign policy, culture and environmental sectors. For the purposes of this paper, the security relationship between the two being studied from the view of their contribution to the continental defence structure of the North American Aerospace and Defence Command (NORAD), the multi-lateral security partnership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and as credible partners in the Arctic region.
The United States and Canada
The countries are geographic neighbours, share resources and much of their culture and a common 5,500 mile border—“the longest undefended border in the world”. The two nations are also linked through trade that is integrated largely through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Apart from sharing democratic political values the two neighbours also cooperate on international security and political issues, both bilaterally and through numerous international organizations. Americans and Canadians have fought side-by-side in both, World Wars, Korea, and Afghanistan. As a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada contributed substantially to the alliance during the Cold War, and more recently in the Libya and Afghanistan conflicts. The U.S. and Canadian armed forces engage in close cooperation, both in defense of North America and in overseas missions. 1 The security relationship that has evolved is thus one that is based on joint border patrolling to joint military exercises to develop inter-operability capabilities. The United States and Canada share common homeland security concerns & interests and cooperation between the two governments is viewed as essential to prepare for potential future attacks.
Source: Google Maps
NORAD
Canadian-U.S. defence relations have continued to improve throughout the decades. The common defence of the North American continent traces its history back to 1940 when Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt met to discuss the war in Europe and mutual defence concerns. In September 1957, the two nations agreed to create the “North American Air Defence Command” (NORAD)2 headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colo. as a bi-national command, centralizing operational control of continental air defences against the threat of Soviet bombers and the atomic bomb test (1949). On May 12, 1958, the agreement between the Canadian and U.S. governments that established NORAD was formalized. The primary missions of NORAD are to provide: (a) Aerospace warning for North America; (b) Aerospace control for North America; and (c) Maritime warning for North America.3 The system is based on a three tiered radar defence across the North America to detect any unwanted entry into the airspace of either of the two countries. The commander of NORAD is responsible to both the U.S. President and the Canadian Prime Minister. The command’s unique design reflects the countries’ shared values and common security challenges, while respecting the sovereignty of both nations. Today NORAD has become an important component of the United States-Canada defence relationship. It has widespread support in both countries.4
With the end of the Cold War and reduced threat perception from Russia, NORAD evolved to address other security challenges. The command became actively involved in detecting small planes used for transportation of narcotics and smuggling activities. As a result of this the NORAD became more active on the southern borders of the United States. There has been a view that the NORAD should expand its membership to include Mexico.
The 9/11 attacks changed the threat perception viewpoint once again. The inability and lack of communication meant that NORAD, a command tasked with Aerospace warning and Aerospace control of North America, was unable to take action against the terrorists. The attacks increased the role of NORAD in security over American cities and involved monitoring of all unknown aircrafts entering its airspace and also taking defensive sorties, if need be. Over the years the NORAD has also started to include the maritime security dimension to its responsibilities. The May 2006 NORAD Agreement renewal added a maritime warning mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas and inland waterways.5
In the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Senate of Canada (2017) it was stated that, “Ensuring the readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces in the context of defending North America is a task that has assumed added urgency in light of Russia’s enhanced assertiveness.” 6
While the organisation is undergoing change in its command structure to better address the evolving challenges, there is a point of divergence between the United States and Canada. The differences arose on Canada’s decision to not participate in the Iraq war or its reluctance to support the United States Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system for North America. Canada had refused to join the BMD programme in 2005 when first asked by President George W. Bush due to concerns that it would lead to the weaponisation of space. There was also public opposition to the system which steamed from an opposition to the policies of the United States and a view that it would undermine Canada’s sovereignty.
The divergent views meant that the current BMD system that protects the United States, and by default Canada, is not under the command of the NORAD, but under domestic command of the United States. This means that, while Canada does not participate in the operation of missile defences, Canadians in NORAD support the system by providing warning and assessment of any potential missile attack. For example, a Canadian general officer in command of NORAD would be able to confirm that North America is under missile attack and provide the warning, but must leave it to an American to release the BMD interceptors.7
A July 2014 Canada Senate Defence Committee report on BMD and the evolving threat to Canada, pointed out that it could not be assumed that the United States system would protect Canada and therefore there is a need to participate in the system formally. It was felt that the threats from Russia, North Korea and Iran were as real for Canada as for the United States, thus there is a need to revisit the policy of not joining the BMD system. The Committee stated that, “Canada should fully participate in the United States’ Ballistic Missile Defence program. It believes that it is in Canada’s interest to be at the table as decisions related to the strategic architecture of Ballistic Missile Defence and responses to threats are taken.” It further stated that being able to detect a threat was different from participation in decisions on how to respond tosuch threats. The findings of the report were reiterated in the 2017 Senate Committee report, which recommended that Canada become a full partner with the United States on BMD, provide strategic locations for radar installation and collaborate on joint research and technology partnerships. The current Liberal government has indicated that it is more favourable to the proposition than previous Canadian governments. At a Joint Statement by President Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau, the two sides stated, “United States and Canadian forces jointly conduct aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in defence of North America. We will work to modernize and broaden our NORAD Partnership in these key domains, as well as in cyber and space.” 8 The recently released Canada Defence Policy ‘Strong Secure Engaged’ mentions the proliferation in BMDs and acknowledges that the threats posed by BMDs and cruise missile “has become more complex and increasingly difficult to detect. To this end, Canada and the United States have already launched bilateral collaboration to seek an innovative technological solution to continental defence challenges including early warning.”9 Nonetheless, it makes no references to the possibility of Canada joining the BMD system. It is likely that the decision on the matter will be taken after debate within the Parliament and keeping in mind public opinion. The government would have to put forward its case for Canada to join the US BMD, and also address the issue of how it will contribute to research & development of the system, as also the command responsibilities. There is also the question regarding the costs of the system, especially as the Liberal government wants to control defence spending to enhancing Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) readiness.
Security experts point out that, as the United States invests more in building a robust BMD system; it will be difficult for it to accommodate Canada’s requirements to stay out of it, within the NORAD. This would be especially difficult as the primary function of NORAD is early warning of airborne attack. It could mean that the United States effectively establishes a BMD system that would have no bi-national command or control system in place. Full participation on the other hand would allow Canadian officials, including its military generals, to be at the table to discuss ballistic missile defence, how Canada can be protected and when, where or whether we should intercept a missile heading in its direction.10
Contemporary security concerns have refocused both countries towards evaluating “opportunities for enhanced military cooperation.” An area of interest that is increasing in need of attention is the cyber domain. The first step in this direction was taken in 2012 when the Joint Cyber Centre was set up. The JCC will have three main missions: To better integrate cyber into the headquarters missions by improving situational awareness in the cyber domain, improving the defence of the commands’ networks and providing cyber consequence response and recovery support to civil authorities upon request.11 However, it has been suggested by former intelligence officers such as former US NSA General Keith Alexander, that the two countries work together in the cyber domain. The threat in this area is not just limited to military establishment. The development of new technology and innovations in existing technologies are also at risk of being hacked or stolen from companies. As the cyber network is linked, private and governments have to interface with each other to ensure hackers do not gain entry through any breach in security.
NATO
The two countries also cooperate on security issues of mutual concern through the NATO. Post the Second World War, Canada along with the United States realised that their security was linked with the political integrity and security of Europe. Realising the handicap which will arise in the United Nations as a result of the emerging Cold War political divide, Canada began talks with the United States and later the United Kingdom to build a security arrangement outside of the United Nations. However, the new organisation was not solely to be a military alliance. Canada has been instrumental in building an alliance that would also extend its reach in the political, economic, and social sphere. To ensure this, Canada was instrumental in the addition of Article 212 and Article 413 to the NATO treaty. Article 2 calls on states to develop economic cooperation among themselves, where as Article 4, states that States would come to the aid of a member if their political, independence, integrity and security are threatened. According to the Canada Senate Standing Committee Report (2017), “The Canadian Armed Forces contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability through a range of bilateral, regional and multilateral arrangements, many witnesses observed that Canadian contributions to NATO should be prioritized. ... As a founding member of NATO, Canada’s participation in the military alliance has long been a cornerstone of Canadian defence and security policy.”14
The question that is facing the alliance is on the issue of equal burden sharing that has been raised by President Trump repeatedly. At the Warsaw Summit of the Alliance (2016), member States ones again agreed to their commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defence within a decade. And while defence spending by European allies and Canadian have increased to 3.8 percent of the GDP or USD 10 billion, NATO still does not have fair burden sharing. They also agreed that those not meeting the NATO-agreed guideline of spending at least 20 percent of annual defence expenditure on major new equipment, including related research and development, would aim to do so within a decade.15 The matter has gained prominence with the current United States Administration raising the issue time and again. In response Prime Minister Trudeau has stated that, there are other ways to evaluate the contributions being made to NATO. This statement has been made in lieu of the contributions that Canada has made to NATO operations in Latvia, Ukraine and also Iraq, contributing to combat operations in Afghanistan and intelligence gathering operations against ISIL etc. The Canada Defence Policy Review 2016 consultation document states, “While percentage of GDP is a questionable measure of what a nation can achieve with its defence spending, this aspirational guideline drives debate among our allies. It is also important to recognize that there is considerable variation in how countries calculate their defence budget.... Canada assesses its defence spending in terms of the level of resources required to support an effective and capable Canadian Armed Force (CAF). Ultimately, the level of ambition we define for the CAF must be properly resourced, which will require clear priorities and strategic decisions about how to invest limited resources with maximum impact. What should be the priorities for investment and what are the corresponding trade-offs?”16
Nonetheless, the 2017 Report of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (Canada Senate) states that, “Today, spending on the military is 0.88% of Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP), well short of our commitment as part of the NATO alliance to spend 2% of GDP on our own security and defence needs. Today, Canada ranks 23rd of 28 NATO members when it comes to spending on our own defence. This is unacceptable. (emphasis added)”17 The Committee has recommended that Canada increase its defence spending to meet its national defence needs and international obligations. ‘The Committee is fully aware of the challenges involved in incrementally doubling that level of funding, however, it is convinced that to effectively defend Canada, while honouring our commitment to the NATO Alliance spending must (emphasis not added) increase to 2% of GDP.”18 The Canadian government through its 2017 defence policy review has announced that, “To meet Canada’s defence needs at home and abroad, the Government will grow annual defence spending over the next 10 years from $17.1 billion in 2016-17 to $24.6 billion in 2026-27 on an accrual basis. This translates to a rise in annual defence spending on a cash basis from $18.9 billion in 2016-17 to $32.7 billion in 2026-27, an increase of over 70 percent.” It further states that, “While defence spending is an important part of ensuring appropriate defence capability, it is not the most effective measure of fair burden sharing. Within the Alliance, Canada continues to place a premium on tangible operational contributions, as well as demonstrating a commitment and capacity to deploy and sustain personnel in support of the Alliance.” It also pointed out that, “Canada has been underreporting its defence spending. The key factor related to the under-reporting has been the exclusion of defence spending that has been incurred by other government departments....”19 The government has stated that it will continue to consult with NATO officials to ensure that costs reported are reflective of its contribution to NATO.
Recently, the Canada forces were deployed in Latvia as part of NATO’s assurance and deterrence measure for Central and Eastern Europe. They form part of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle-group. The deployment is open ended for the moment with no fixed timeline on when the troops will be withdrawn. Every six to nine months, a fresh batch of Canadian troops will be rotated through the battalion until NATO decides to dissolve the brigade. The deployment is part of the need to build capacity in the face of possible Russian aggression. The Liberal government has stated that while Canada needs have dialogue with Russia due to their shared interest in the Arctic, in counter terrorism etc, however, it would not mean that Canada would support the policies of Russia towards Eastern Europe. Canada has opposed the ‘annexation’ of Ukraine and Crimea as well as the support being extended by Russia to President Bashar al- Assad in Syria.
The Arctic
Both countries, the United States and Canada desire a secure and prosperous Arctic. They are key partners in the region, which is witnessing decreasing seasonal ice. This would require the two nations to increase cooperation to coordinate naval activity and, most likely, international freighter traffic in the region. It will also lead to increased research activity to understand the effects of climate change. The change in the climate leading to lack of ice formation will also increase the possibility of more tourist activity in the region. This would mean an enhanced capability to conduct search and rescue operations as well as maintain Arctic security. Both countries coastal and naval security forces would have to operate with each other to provide sea-borne surveillance and domain awareness of the activities in the Arctic waters.
Arctic security forms a core part of the Canada-United States defence relationship. Nowhere is this more apparent than in joint efforts to renew the North Warning System (NWS) and modernize elements of NORAD. As the security dynamics in the Arctic evolve, Canada and the United States will continue to work side by side to secure their shared northern air and maritime approaches. NATO has also increased its attention to Russia’s ability to project force from its Arctic territory into the North Atlantic, and its potential to challenge NATO’s collective defence posture. NATO has been clear that the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches to Allied territory in the North Atlantic.20
For Canada, the Arctic is important. “Canada is a maritime nation. This is not just because it borders on three oceans, the world’s longest coastline. Neither is it simply a reflection of our (Canada’s) history, although sea-power played a fundamental role in shaping North America’s political destiny. Canada is a maritime nation because it trades. Defending Canada’s sovereignty entails a wide range of activities and responsibilities including protecting and exercising sovereignty over the Arctic.”21 The 2017 Canada defence policy review stated that, “The Canadian Armed Forces, through NORAD, has a duty to monitor and control all of Canada’s territory and approaches. In order to fully execute this mission and provide effective aerospace warning and control for all of North America, Canada will expand the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) to cover the entire Canadian Arctic archipelago. The current CADIZ is based on the capabilities of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line radars which were replaced in the late 1980s by the North Warning System. ... An expanded CADIZ will increase awareness of the air traffic approaching and operating in Canada’s sovereign airspace in the Arctic. The Canadian Armed Forces will also introduce a number of new Arctic-focused capabilities including naval vessels such as the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, space-based surveillance assets such as the RADARSAT Constellation Mission, polar satellite communications, Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems, operational support sites including the Nanisivik Naval Facility, and a family of new ground vehicles capable of navigating the harsh landscape of Canada’s North.”22
The United States Department of Defence in its ‘Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region’ (December 2016) stated that the United States’ “desired end-state for the Arctic: a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.”23 The document is in keeping with the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR)24 and the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive 66/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, Arctic Region Policy25. The NSAR states that the United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region.... The United States security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national defence26. The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight. The United States also has fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region.27
Together with Canada, the United States is a member of the Arctic Council, the leading international body to discuss and cooperate on Arctic issues, in particular on sustainable development and environmental protection of the Arctic. The effects of global warming have meant that the Arctic is getting warmer and this is causing changes in the region. This includes the melting of the ice that surrounds the Arctic causing a rise in sea level. It is also consequently a loss of habitat for Arctic wildlife. The Arctic is also home to a number of indigenous tribes that face challenges to their life and livelihood. Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access to resources. Continued reduction of sea ice is likely to lengthen the navigation season and increase access to the Arctic’s marine resources; reduced sea ice is likely to increase offshore oil and gas extraction projects; and sovereignty, security and safety issues, as well as social, cultural and environmental concerns, are likely to arise as marine access increases.28
Apart from the collaboration the two countries have in the region, the United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary disagreement in the Beaufort Sea. The United States policy recognises a boundary in this area based on equidistance. However, Canada objects to it and insists that equidistance rule does not apply because it is contrary to the UNCLOS provision of the “special circumstances”. The original source of the dispute can be traced back to the wording of the 1825 Anglo-Russian treaty, written in French, between Russia and Great Britain. These treaty rights were later inherited by the US in 1867, and Canada in 1880, from Russia and Great Britain respectively. Canada claims that the treaty delineates the boundary at the meridian line of the 141st degree on both land and sea; whereas the US claims that it is simply a land boundary and that normal maritime boundary delimitation applies beyond the coast. These different positions only came to a head in 1976, when the US took issue with the boundary line that Canada was using in issuing oil and gas concessions in the Beaufort Sea.29
The disagreement on the border has been relatively passive. The difficulty in oil exploration and the less than favourable oil prices have meant that the two countries have not pursued the matter much. Oil exploration in the region was further made difficult for the United States as a result of President Obama’s executive order banning all exploration and extraction activities off Alaska’s coastline. However, President Trump in his Executive Order titled ‘Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy (April 2017) has asked the “The Secretary of the Interior ... (to)... immediately take all steps necessary to review the Final Rule entitled "Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf....”30 In explaining his order, President Trump stated that it “...reverses the previous administration’s Arctic leasing ban, and directs Secretary Zinke to allow responsible development of offshore areas that will bring revenue to...(US).. Treasury and jobs to ...(US)... workers.”31 It will take the United States administration some time to build plans for these off-shore drilling sites. For the industry, at the moment, the costs out way the benefits, but the oil in the region may gain importance if oil prices were to rise, reigniting interest in extracting offshore oil reserves from the region. The 2014 Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region of the United States32 does mention that it would “Work toward a maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea that is agreed between the United States and Canada.”
Nonetheless, the US Department of Defence Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region (2016)33 states that, “The United States has protested these (claims by Canada and Russia over the Arctic) excessive maritime claims as inconsistent with international law and does not recognize them.” It further states, “In support of the U.S. national security interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace recognized under international law, DoD will preserve the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic, as in other regions. This includes conducting Freedom of Navigation operations to challenge excessive maritime claims when and where necessary.” While not exclusively for Canada, but it may be with reference to Canada’s claims to the Northwest Passage and Russia’s claims to the Northern Sea Route. For the moment the dispute remains unresolved.
Conclusion
In his remarks at the State dinner hosted by President Obama (2016), Prime Minister Justine Trudeau quoted President Harry Truman and said, “President Truman, who shared these words with the Canadian parliament nearly 70 years ago. He said that Canada’s relationship with the United States “did not develop spontaneously ... (It) did not come about merely through the happy circumstance of geography,” but was “compounded of one part proximity and nine parts good will and common sense.” It’s that enduring good will and common sense that I believe defines our relationship to this day. It’s what makes our constructive partnership possible.”34
The relationship between the two countries is longstanding, complex and multi-faceted; the relationship is such that much of the closeness can be taken for granted, but it is rarely forgotten. Yet, for all the closeness between the two countries, the American-Canadian political relationship is far from a stable affair. Depending on the political leaders and the political climate, relations can be closer or more distant, pleasant or strained.35 President Trump has differing opinions from Prime Minister Trudeau on a number of issues, such as refugees, trade and NATO funding, however, the two leaders have maintained that they desire to work together to build bridges of cooperation and collaboration. They share common values that include maintaining peace and security in the north Americas. The neighbours are partners in a number of international security and political issues, both bilaterally and through numerous international organisations. The defence relationship is not only extensive but also equally important for both countries. The future direction of this relationship could include cooperation on improved security in the aerospace, maritime, land, cyber, and civil support domains. It could include shared responsibility in the Arctic. The United States and Canada will face similar challenges in the region with their respective indigenous communities to protect the Arctic bio-diversity, which is also linked to the livelihood of the people here.
As John F. Kennedy put it, when he addressed the Canadian Parliament in 1961, “Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies....”36 Despite difference the two will continue to be the closest of allies and essential partners for each other’s prosperity and security.
***
* The Author is Research Fellow with the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are of author and do not reflect the views of the Council.
End Notes
1 Carl Ek, and Ian F. Fergusson, “Canada-U.S. Relations,” https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-397.pdf, Accessed on 24 May 2017.
2 In the post Cold War years it was renamed as the North American Aerospace Defence Command.
3 North American Aerospace Defense Command, “NORAD Treaty,” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/69727.pdf, Accessed on 13 June 2017.
4 Ray Walser, James Carafano, Jena Baker McNeill and Richard Weitz, “Expand NORAD to Improve Security in North America,” http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/expand-norad-improve-security-north-america#_ftn1, Accessed on 16 June 2017.
5 NORAD, “History of NORAD,” http://www.norad.mil/About-NORAD/NORAD-History/, Accessed on 16 June 2017.
6 The Honourable Daniel Lang and The Honourable Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Senate Canada, “Military Unfunded: The Walk Must Match The Talk: The Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence,” https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/SECD/Reports/DEFENCE_DPR_FINAL_e.pdf, Accessed on 16 June 2017.
7 Joel Sokolsky, “U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, NORAD and the Canada Conundrum,” U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, NORAD and the Canada Conundrum, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
8 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Joint Statement From President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/13/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-justin, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
9 Government of Canada, “Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada Defence Policy,” http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
10 The Honourable Daniel Lang,and The Honourable Roméo A. Dallaire, Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, “ Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence: Responding to Evolving Threats,” https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/Committee/412/secd/rep/rep10jun14-e.pdf, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
11 NORAD News, “NORAD, USNORTHCOM Joint Cyber Center stands up,” http://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Article/578606/norad-usnorthcom-joint-cyber-center-stands-up/, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
12 Article 2- The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
13 Article 4- The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
14 Op.Cit 06, The Honourable Daniel Lang and The Honourable Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Senate Canada.
15 NATO, “The Secretary Generals Annual Report 2016,” http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_SG_AnnualReport_2016_en.pdf#page=29, Accessed on 16 June 2017.
16 Op.Cit 09, Government of Canada.
17 Op. Cit 06, The Honourable Daniel Lang and The Honourable Mobina S.B. Jaffer Senate Canada.
18 Ibid.
19 Op. Cit 09, Government of Canada.
20 Ibid.
21 Op.Cit 06, The Honourable Daniel Lang and The Honourable Mobina S.B. Jaffer, Senate Canada.
22 Op. Cit 09, Government of Canada.
23 Department of Defence, “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region (Dec. 2016),” https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2016_ArcticStrategy-Unclass.pdf Accessed on 20 June 2017.
24 Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf
25 Available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=232474
26 The White House, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
27 The White House, “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD – 66 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD – 25 Arctic Region Policy,” https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=232474, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
28 Rob Hueburt, “Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict,” http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/huebert.pdf, Accessed on 15 June 2017.
29 Greg Sharp, “An old problem, a new opportunity: A case for solving the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute,” http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/an-old-problem-a-new-opportunity-a-case-for-solving-the-beaufort-sea-boundary-dispute/, Accessed on 16 June 2017.
30 The Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Presidential Executive Order Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/28/presidential-executive-order-implementing-america-first-offshore-energy, Accessed on 29 June 2017.
31 The Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Order on an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/28/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-america-first-offshore, Accessed on 28 June 2017.
32 Available at http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/national-strategy-arctic-region.pdf
33 Available at https://www.sullivan.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2016_ArcticStrategy-Unclass.pdf
34 Prime Minister of Canada Office, “Prime Minister's remarks at State dinner; Official visit to the United States,” http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/speeches, Accessed don 09 June 2017.
35 Cameron D. Anderson and Laura B. Stephenson, “Moving Closer or Drifting Apart? Assessing the State of Public Opinion on the U.S.-Canada Relationship,” https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Moving%20Closer%20or%20Drifting%20Apart,%20Anderson%20and%20Stephenson%20April%209.pdf, Accessed on 20 June 2017.
36 Ibid.