Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: On 7 August, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed a trilateral defence pact based on a collective security approach. While the pact came amid the Houthis’ intense attacks on Saudi infrastructure and shipping in the Red Sea corridor, whether and how it will respond to the Houthis and non-state actors will be noteworthy to see. Yet the uncertainties of the US security commitments to its allies appear to be the core idea behind the Mecca Pact. 

Introduction

West Asia’s security landscape has entered a new phase. Amid escalating regional conflicts, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey came together to form a trilateral defence pact to establish a deterrent against evolving security challenges. The timing of the pact is also significant, as tensions in the Gulf are brewing over Yemen. While the diplomatic means struggle to contain tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran, attention has been shifting to Tehran’s regional proxies, which have been the backbone of Iran’s resistance and deterrence strategy. The shift is marked by the arrival of Houthis in the ongoing tussle, targeting Saudi oil infrastructure and the US’ establishments. After the introduction of Lebanon in the peace deal, which failed to bear fruit, Houthis could become a major pressure point for Iran against the United States and its allies in the region.

Mecca Pact and the US’ Calculations

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed a trilateral defence pact on 7 August that prioritises collective security.  The pact defines an attack on one country as an attack on all three.[i] While the pact is significant amid ongoing tensions in the Persian Gulf, it lacks a concrete objective and purpose. The pact is driven by the desperation of alleviating Western security guarantees rather than by allied and structural commitments.

The pact is more likely a product of the US’ declining security commitments to allies across the region, eroding trust in Washington’s support, its draining arsenal, and Trump’s protectionist approach to US reindustrialisation via its ambitious MAGA initiative. The US military infrastructure and security establishments in the region, once regarded as hallmarks of the US’ commitments, are now in rapid decline. President Trump has also acknowledged the pact and its signatories for investing in their own self-defence.[ii] Trump’s message clearly indicates the mounting pressure on US industries and arsenals, its reluctance to assist partners, and its eagerness to exit Iran.  

Moreover, the pact resembles the repackaging of Cold War-era security alliances, the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), which strive to unite West Asian middle powers. However, unlike the Cold War, in which threat perception was driven by inter-state security challenges, modern-day security threats in the region largely involve non-state actors and extraterritorial groups. It would be noteworthy to see whether, and how, the Mecca Pact would respond to the new security domain, as all three signatories are currently facing security threats from regional non-state actors. Most immediately, how the pact would respond to threats emanating from the Houthis to Saudi Arabia will be seen in the interim. 

Hormuz to Bab-el-Mandeb

On 2 March, Lebanon was drawn into the US-Iran conflict following Hezbollah’s launch of missile attacks in Northern Israel, in retaliation for the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, and Israel’s persistent attacks in Lebanon, arguably a violation of the November 2024 ceasefire.[iii] Though the Hezbollah attacks were limited and sporadic, they were met with heavy military strikes by Israel in Lebanon, which targeted the Hezbollah stronghold. Following the Israeli attacks, Iran directly intervened by attacking Israel and involved Lebanon in a broader peace deal with the United States. Since the beginning of the US and Israel’s conflict with Iran, two major nation-led ceasefires have been agreed upon by Israel and Lebanon, including the latest on 17 June for 60 days, and one local ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah on 16 April.[iv] However, these attempts failed to bring peace amid continuing ceasefire violations.

Once regarded as a key Iranian resistance, Hezbollah has suffered mounting military and diplomatic pressure for disarming and growing dissent from within Lebanon. The declining manoeuvring capacity of Hezbollah has inevitably paved the way for the Houthis to enter the ongoing tensions in the Gulf. Unlike Hezbollah, the Houthis are more resourceful, are equipped with more advanced weaponry, and have also held a military parade showcasing their military potency.

Amid escalating tensions, Houthis entered the Iran conflict on 28 March, following missile attacks on Israel; however, the attacks were limited and intercepted by Tel Aviv.[v] The Houthis’ role became prominent in July, when an Iranian flight landed in Sanaa, the first direct flight in a decade, reportedly to receive the Houthi delegation to attend the funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei. Whereas the Saudi-supported Government of Yemen called the flight that transported the IRGC’s personnel and materials to Houthis, and accused those of violating the UN’s arms embargo on Houthis. Later, when another flight took off from Iran, ostensibly to return the Houthis’ delegation, the Saudis attacked and destroyed the runways at Sanaa and Hodeidah airports in an effort to disrupt any direct airbridge between Sanaa and Tehran.[vi]

Since then, the Houthis’ attack on Saudi Arabia has become intense. Houthis claimed attacks on the Saudi oil refinery in the city of Jazan and the Yemeni port city of al-Mokha, backed by the Saudi forces. Besides, the Houthis also announced a sea blockade targeting Saudi vessels and shipments in the Red Sea corridor. In response, the Saudi authorities reinforced their commitment to safeguard their commercial navigation. Moreover, on 30 July, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a maritime coalition to defend freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. For the coalition, 43 countries were invited, of which 14 have joined, including Pakistan and Turkey,[vii] with which Saudi Arabia signed a tripartite defence pact on 7 August.  

The Houthis occupy territory adjacent to Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s major chokepoints. The narrow corridor connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden also serves as a gateway to the Suez Canal. Houthis have already demonstrated their capability in the Red Sea when they attacked Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians and also disrupted over 100 commercial ships near Bab-el-Mandeb.[viii] If navigation in the Red Sea were disrupted for an extended period, it would undoubtedly have a severe impact on the global supply chain and impose a significant burden on the United States, Asia, Europe, and Africa. Moreover, it could prompt the United States to take charge of the vital chokepoint, potentially expanding the scope of the ongoing conflict. The Houthis’ attacks have sent a strategic signal regarding their role in the Gulf crisis. If the situation is not contained, the Houthis’ military actions could turn Bab-el-Mandeb into another Hormuz with lasting repercussions.   

Should India Worry?

While the pact is significant in creating political deterrence, it is less likely to have a direct security impact on India. However, India should be cautious of the pact’s potential indirect impacts. India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been cordial and have reached new heights in recent years. However, Turkey’s obsession with Pakistan and its interventions on the Kashmir issue, an undisputed territory of India and a matter of a bilateral issue with Pakistan, has been concerning for New Delhi.[ix] While both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan face security challenges from regional groups, the Mecca Pact is indeed an opportunity for Turkey to reassert its influence in the region and the Islamic world.

Despite being a member of the US-led NATO, Turkey has maintained healthy relations with both Russia and China. Turkey has become a major global defence player, transforming from a heavily reliant foreign importer to an emerging defence exporter. According to the SIPRI 2025 report, Turkey has ranked 11th among global arms exporters, accounting for 1.8 per cent of global arms exports between 2021 and 2025, up from 0.9 per cent between 2016 and 2020 (a 122 per cent increase over the last five years).[x] During 2021–2025, Turkey’s major export destinations include Pakistan (16 per cent), the UAE (12 per cent), and Ukraine (8.4 per cent).[xi] In FY 2025–2026, Turkey exported over $11.2 billion in arms. According to Turkish Trade Minister Omer Bolat, the rockets, missiles, and smart munitions emerged as the top category of Turkish exports, generating $3.7 billion in sales in 2025, while UAV exports reached $2.1 billion.[xii]

For Pakistan, Turkey’s defence capabilities and Saudi Arabia’s deep pockets could be an opportunity to grab its interests, building on its self-proclaimed image as a leader of the Islamic world. It could earn millions of dollars by deploying its soldiers to Saudi territory as part of a separate deal with Riyadh signed last year. Moreover, Turkey’s role is key to revamping Pakistan’s defence capabilities. Pakistan is a significant market for the Turkish defence industry, accounting for over $112 million in exports between 2021 and 2024.[xiii] The two countries have signed several defence agreements, including the procurement of MILGEM-class corvettes for the Pakistani Navy, ATAK helicopters, and an upgrade package for F-16 fighter aircraft for the Pakistan Air Force, among others. Besides, Pakistan has acquired Bayraktar TB-2, Akinci and Aksungur UAVs, a few of which were used during Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos against India in May 2025.[xiv] Moreover, the two countries are also collaborating to co-develop twin-engine fifth-generation fighter aircraft under the KAAN Project.[xv]   

Historically, acquiring advanced and offensive weapons has been among Pakistan’s top priorities behind joining a military alliance. Since Cold War days, Pakistan has evidently used the US-supplied military articles against India, despite end-use monitoring clauses that mandate them to be reserved for counterterrorism operations and not to be deployed against India.[xvi]^,[xvii] Additionally, Pakistan may raise the Kashmir issue at the pact’s meetings, as it already did several times on UN and SAARC platforms. Consequently, New Delhi should remain vigilant, as the pact would enhance Pakistan’s defence capabilities, potentially leading to their use against India.

Conclusion

At first glance, the Mecca Pact seems like a shield without a clearly formidable enemy. However, the pact could, conversely, create a security dilemma for countries in the region. While such pacts, based on a collective security approach, have historically carried state-centric security concerns, whether they will act against proxies or non-state actors remains a major question. And, if it doesn’t, then why was the pact signed at a time when Gulf tension escalated to involve non-state actors? The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea corridor could unfold another major crisis over Bab-el-Mandeb.

The uncertainties regarding the US’ security commitments to its allies are perhaps the primary justification for Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Mecca Pact. The pact is a win-win for both Turkey and Pakistan, who had already established a formidable bilateral relationship. Driven by its limitations and calculations, the United States has also applauded the pact and acknowledged its members for building their own self-defence.

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*Dr. Mukesh Kumar is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Alhasan, Hasan and Wajid, Asna. International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye: A New Defence Pact.” IISS, August 2026. IISS article

[ii] Hussain, Abid. “Trump Hails Mecca Pact: Can It Replace the Region’s US Security Umbrella?” Al Jazeera, August 17, 2026

[iii] Salhani, Justin. “Is Lebanon Included? Country Hopeful for US-Iran Ceasefire, despite Doubts.” Al Jazeera, June 15, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/15/is-lebanon-included-country-hopeful-for-us-iran-ceasefire-despite-doubt

[iv] “The US-Iran Deal Leaves the Future of Lebanon Uncertain and Subject to Israel Playing the Spoiler.” The Conversation. Accessed August 19, 2026. The Conversation articl

[v] Alley, April Longley. “The Houthis Join the War.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1, 2026. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthis-join-wa

[vi] Ratney, Michael. “The Houthis Enter the Iran War, and Everything Gets Worse.” Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 13, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/houthis-enter-iran-war-and-everything-gets-wors

[vii] Ratney, Michael. “The Houthis Enter the Iran War, and Everything Gets Worse.” Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 13, 2026. https://www.csis.org/analysis/houthis-enter-iran-war-and-everything-gets-wors

[viii] Gardner, Frank. “Houthi Attacks Raise Fears of Wider Middle East Conflict and More Global Economic Damage.” July 24, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgve0vxy1yo

[ix] Anas, Omair. “Expert Explains: What Plagues India-Turkey Relations, and Why a Reset May Be of Common Interest.” The Indian Express, April 20, 2026

[x] George, Mathew, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman. Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025. SIPRI Fact Sheet. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2026. SIPRI repor

[xi] ibi

[xii] Akin, Ezgi. “Turkey’s Defence Exports Reach Record $5.79B in First 7 Months of 2026.” Al-Monitor, August 4, 2026. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/turkeys-defense-exports-reach-record-579b-first-7-months-202

[xiii] Al-Estiklal Newspaper. “How Far Has Turkiye-Pakistan Military Cooperation Challenged India?” Al-Estiklal Newspaper. Accessed August 19, 2026. https://www.alestiklal.net/en/article/how-far-has-turkiye-pakistan-military-cooperation-challenged-indi

[xiv] Ibid

[xv] Middle East Monitor. “Turkiye, Pakistan to Establish Joint Factory for Production of KAAN Fighter Jet.” Middle East Monitor, January 22, 2025

[xvi] Panigrahi, P. K. “INDO- U.S. RELATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN.” India Quarterly 52, no. 3 (1996): 81–96. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45073108.

[xvii] The Hindu. “Balakot Air Strikes: US Seeks Detail of Misuse of F-16 Fighter Aircraft.” The Hindu, February 28, 2019. The Hindu article