Indian Council of World Affairs

The contemporary wars increasingly target the infrastructure that sustains societies rather than the military systems, reflecting a shift from the conquest of territory to the disruption of networks and critical civilian infrastructure that underpin state power. In particular, the Iran War has revealed that the parties to the conflict increasingly target non-military critical infrastructure rather than solely military assets. Telecommunication systems, energy facilities, water supply, health facilities, ports, transport networks, and digital infrastructure are regarded as strategic assets because they underpin a state’s political, economic, and technological strength. The attacks on critical infrastructure are driven by motives, such as undermining the adversary’s capabilities, disrupting trade and investment, shaping the behaviour of the international labour market, intensifying political pressure, and highlighting the state’s strategic determination for diverse audiences. Thus, the Israel-Iran conflict reinforces the view that infrastructure has become a battlefield in which attacks on communications, energy, water, and logistics systems have far-reaching and long-lasting regional and global implications. Parties to the conflict have justified attacks on non-military infrastructure by claiming that such facilities were used as “human shields” or possessed “dual use” capabilities. Against this backdrop, the paper examines the geopolitics of infrastructure, analyses how critical infrastructure has become an instrument of geopolitical competition in the Iran War and explores its broader geopolitical significance. 

Background

The expansion of conflict from military target to non-military infrastructure is not a new phenomenon. Historically, states have targeted their adversaries’ civilian infrastructure to achieve strategic objectives. Infrastructure has long been considered a strategic target in wars because it strengthens a state’s military, economic, and governing capabilities. Therefore, the states do not merely focus on battlefield engagements; they increasingly target the state’s operational capacity by disrupting governance, transportation, production, communications, and energy supply. From military campaigns to target economic and industrial assets during the World Wars to the concerted attacks on oil facilities during the Iran-Iraq War, communication and transport grids during the Vietnam War and Iraq War, and digital network and energy infrastructures in the ongoing Ukraine War, the objective of warfare has increasingly gone well beyond military systems to include the critical civilian assets on which modern societies survive.

Given this backdrop, the intra-state and inter-state conflicts focus on targeting systems rather than only armies, as they are the central element of a state’s capability and determine the outcome of the conflict. These conflicts demonstrates that infrastructure including shipping routes, ports, railways, communication networks, energy systems, and supply chains, is not merely an economic asset but a fundamental pillar of state’s resilience. Infrastructure, therefore, serves as a dual purpose. It enables states to govern their populations, while simultaneously becomes a target of military coercion. Notably, attacks on critical civilian infrastructure have increasingly become a means of coercion by depriving civilians of essential services.

Iran War as a Case Study

Energy Infrastructure

Since the outbreak of the war a series of attacks has targeted Iran’s energy infrastructure, including the South Pars[i] gas field, the refinery hub at Asaluyeh, and the petrochemical complex in Mahshahr. The oil and fuel distribution hubs, such as the Shahran oil depot near Tehran, the Shahr Rey and Najafabad oil refineries, the Fajr-e Jam gas refinery, and the Karan and Fardis facilities, were hit during the war. The Khorramshahr and Isfahan regions, which hold multiple power plant stations, were heavily hit. Several analysts suggest that Israel intended to cripple the Iranian state’s economic lifeline, escalate the public pressure against the government, and signal Tel Aviv’s capacity to reach strategic economic assets.[ii] The attacks were intended to disrupt the oil supplies from the West Asia and drive up the global fuel prices. Adding to the uncertainty in global energy market, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz amid the intensifying conflict with Israel that would further send oil prices soaring.[iii] Iran’s drone and missile response also led to the destruction of Israel’s energy facility, the Bazan oil refinery, dismantling storage tanks, pipelines, and refinery facilities. These attacks illustrate the shift from conventional military targets to critical infrastructure that sustains a state’s economic stability and national power.

Maritime Infrastructure and Chokepoints

Iran has used the Strait of Hormuz as an instrument of strategic leverage. It is one of the world’s most critical chokepoints, through which more than one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas passes. Leading global energy producers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iraq are heavily dependent on the stable functioning of this maritime route. Consequently, the Strait is not only a commercial supply route but also a strategic maritime infrastructure corridor vital to global energy security. Iran has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to disrupt traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. For instance, on 2 March 2026, the Iranian military targeted commercial vessels passing through the strait, following the outbreak of the war on 28 February.[iv] The closure was lifted briefly on 17 April after a temporary truce was concluded in Lebanon. In response to heavy US airstrikes on Iran, its central defence command announced on 11 June 20226 that it would completely shut the strait. It warned against targeting any commercial or oil tanker.[v] Iran’s closure of the strait and the ensuing violence through its deployment of military and naval forces reshaped the strait into a “geopolitical weapon”. Throughout its confrontation with Israel and the US, Tehran showed its capacity to stymie the maritime traffic in the strait, resulting in a significant strategic and economic consequences.

The domino effect of the conflict and its potential for escalation spread across Europe, Asia, and other regions raising concerns about the reliability of energy supplies and strategic petroleum reserves and prompting states to seek alternative routes to secure their energy supplies and diversify their suppliers. The higher shipping and insurance costs resulted in a sharp increase of energy prices, transportation costs, inflation, and uncertainty in global commodity markets, indicating that the impact of the conflict was well beyond the gas and oil sectors, leading to the disruptions in trade flows, consumer prices, and manufacturing costs.[vi] Traders added geopolitical risk premiums into calculations of the pricing of oil and gas because financial markets not only responded to the actual conflicts but also to the potential threats of conflict which may lead to the disruption of maritime routes.[vii] The disruption of the route has led to the sharp rise of oil and other basic goods prices, burdening the states’ exchequers dearly and threatening the political stability in many countries owing to the growing dissatisfaction among the people against the state authority. Thus, the crisis heightened the importance of energy security as an aspect of national security rather than a mere economic concern.

Critical Civilian Infrastructure

Though critical civilian infrastructure was not initially the primary target of the parties to the conflict, it gradually became one as a strategy to increase pressure on the adversaries. For instance, the first widely reported direct attack on water infrastructure was on the Bamani Water Reservoirs, based in Sirik County of the Hormozgan Province of Iran, which were allegedly targeted by the US on 10 June 2026, following the shooting down of a US Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz. The attack led to the loss of access to drinking water for more than 20,000 people.[viii] Iran alleged that US-Israeli air forces attacked its Qeshm Island Desalination Plant on 7 March 2026, disrupting water supplies to more than 30 villages.[ix] The US and Israel denied responsibility for these attacks. However, this was one of the first attacks on a desalination water facility, highlighting the weaknesses of the water security infrastructure in the Gulf region, affecting large numbers of civilians who depend on it in semi-arid and arid regions. This incident also indicates that water infrastructure has come under retaliatory escalation cycles. On 8 March 2026, Iran’s drones struck a desalination plant in Bahrain.[x] Later, Iran launched drone attacks on a joint electricity-water desalination plant in Kuwait on 3 April 2026.[xi] Such attacks have highlighted the concerns regarding the attacks on civilian infrastructure, which directly intensify the humanitarian crisis. These instances illustrate how water facilities are susceptible to international targeting or collateral damage during warfare.

Health infrastructure was another crucial sector that came under sustained attack during the conflict. On 15 June 2025, Israeli military attacked Iran’s Farabi hospital.[xii] It was followed by the Iran’s ballistic missile attack on Israel’s Soroka Medical Center on 19 June 2025, known as the largest medical facility in southern Israel, serving more than a million people.[xiii] Since the re-escalation of conflict in February 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported that more than 13 hospitals and health facilities have sustained damage as a result of  US-Israel military campaign in Iran.[xiv] Reports indicate that several health facilities, including Gandhi Hospital; cancer drug producing facility-Tofigh Daru; century old Pasteur Institute; and other primer medical and pharmaceutical institutions were affected by collateral damage, disrupting the health services.[xv] The Red Crescent in Iran confirmed that nearly 20,000 civilian buildings and 77 healthcare facilities have been damaged during the war.[xvi]

The targeting and damage of health infrastructure during the Iran War reflects how humanitarian infrastructure has changed from an insulated humanitarian space providing care and support to the wounded and affected people into a strategic pressure point. The attack on health infrastructure undermines civilian resilience and reduces the state’s capacity to manage public health emergencies. It increases the humanitarian pressure as the mortality rate increases and disrupts the process of emergency care, surgeries, and access to medicines. Collectively, these incidents suggest that attacks on hospitals and other medical facilities are intended to weaken state’s resilience, erode public confidence, and increase the humanitarian cost of war.

Apart from health and water, other critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications and digital infrastructure, electricity and power infrastructure, transportation facilities, ports and logistics infrastructure, and civil aviation came under attack during the Iran War. These attacks on non-military infrastructure violated international humanitarian law, considering them a war crime.[xvii] The assaults on basic human core values indicated the commission of war crimes. They undermined the public confidence in government and imposed long-term economic and environmental costs.

Conclusion

Infrastructure is no longer merely a collateral damage; it is increasingly targeted as an instrument for achieving geopolitical objectives. The Iran War clearly illustrated this transformation in which critical infrastructure, including energy facilities, maritime routes, ports, health and water infrastructure, and communication systems, has become a geopolitical instrument and military target. The Iran War has exposed the growing weaknesses of maritime routes and associated infrastructure, such as ports, offshore energy installations, oil tanker routes, commercial lanes, LNG export terminals, and undersea communication cables and energy pipelines. The escalation of the conflict disrupted global oil markets, as threats to close the Strait of Hormuz increased shipping costs and undermined broader economic stability. Although on 14 June 2026, the US and Iran reached an agreement to halt military operations and permanently reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the long-term implications of infrastructure destruction are significant, as Iran alone would require 300 billion dollars for reconstruction and rehabilitation, highlighting the enduring cost of targeting critical infrastructure. Thus, the Iran War shows that modern warfare does not abide by international humanitarian law, leading to the disruption of systems, energy, health, water, and mobility, which sustain life.

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*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i]It is world’s largest gas field with two-third of Iran’s gas production.

[ii] Al-Hashemi, M. (2026, March 19). Israel's strike on North Field–South Pars: Energy war and global risk. Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3tmks4hu, May 22, 2026

[iii] Al Jazeera. (2025, June 15). Which Iranian oil and gas fields has Israel hit and why do they matter? Accessed https://tinyurl.com/bdzpkcmz, May 27, 2026

[iv] Al-Hashemi, M. (2026, March 19). Israel's strike on North Field–South Pars.

[v] Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, June 15). Iran's war with Israel and the United States. Global Conflict Tracker. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3y3dvac3, May 29, 2026

[vi] SBI Mutual Fund. (2026, March 25). 2026 Middle East conflict and its implications. SBI Mutual Fund. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/mpb33d9j, May 28, 2026

[vii] Mdhlalose, D. (2026). The ripple effects of the Iran–Israel shadow war: A quantitative analysis of spillover effects on global energy markets, supply chains, and financial stability (Version 1) [Preprint]. Research Square. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9259162/v1

[viii] Tondo, L. (2026, June 11). Military strikes on water facilities in Iran may constitute a war crime, experts say. The Guardian. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/5afskp2w, June 14, 2026.

[ix] Michel, D. (2026, March 19). Could Iran disrupt the Gulf countries' desalinated water supplies? Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Accessed https://tinyurl.com/mt7b5xv2, June 3, 2026.

[x] Nereim, V., & Abdulrahim, R. (2026, March 8). Vital desalination plants in Iran and Bahrain are attacked. The New York Times. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/46sbv6eb, June 6, 2026.

[xi] Al Jazeera. (2026, April 3). Kuwait desalination plant, oil refinery hit by missile and drone strikes. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/mrya3kry, June 5, 2026.

[xii] Iran International. (2025, June 16). Iran says Israeli strike hit hospital in Kermanshah, calls it a war crime. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/zm65mmpr, June 18, 2026

[xiii] Birger, A., & Borschel-Dan, A. (2025, June 19). Israeli hospital had taken patients underground hours before missile hit. Reuters. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/337m9754, June 5, 2026.

[xiv] World Health Organization. (2026, June 3). WHO launches $ 2 million emergency intervention to prevent disease outbreaks and sustain essential health services in the Islamic Republic of Iran. WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/yeryzku2, June 7, 2026

[xv] Al Jazeera. (2026, March 2). Iran demands international action after attacks impact hospitals, schools. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/3r8xu2bs, June 8, 2026

[xvi] ANI. (2026, March 11). US-Israeli airstrikes damage over 19,000 civilian buildings across Iran: Red Crescent. Asian News International. Accessed  https://tinyurl.com/4xepu7mf, June 12, 2026

[xvii] International Committee of the Red Cross. (n.d.). Rule 7. The principle of distinction between civilian objects and military objectives. Customary IHL Database. Accessed https://tinyurl.com/473kwaca, June 12, 2026