Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea in June 2026 highlighted the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) growing ability to shape its external environment. Pyongyang, having deepened cooperation with Russia, is simultaneously improving ties with China. The Summit reflected North Korea's success in positioning itself as a strategic partner that both Beijing and Moscow seek to cultivate. This article argues that Pyongyang has acquired greater diplomatic leverage in recent years and is setting the terms of engagement with its major partners to secure economic benefits, strengthen political legitimacy and reduce external pressure over its nuclear programme. 

Introduction 

On 8 June 2026, the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping, arrived in Pyongyang for his first state visit to the DPRK or North Korea in seven years.[1] This visit was highly anticipated, particularly after the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, last paid a visit to China from 2 September to 4 September 2025 to attend the “80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War” held in Beijing.[2] The reciprocal visit by the Chinese leader signalled Beijing's intention to reinvigorate ties with Pyongyang, after a period in which China-DPRK relations appeared to have lost some momentum, particularly amid North Korea’s deepening military and political alignment with Russia following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. 

Significance of the Visit 

The two-day visit of Xi Jinping, from 8 to 9 June 2026,[3] signalled a commitment to revitalise bilateral ties and ushering in a new era of strategic cooperation. Official statements emphasised political trust, practical cooperation and a shared social identity.[4] The two leaders discussed ways to expand economic ties and increase people-to-people exchanges by reopening border crossings and resuming flights.[5] It is also important to underscore that China has remained the DPRK’s traditional economic benefactor, and the recent Kim-Xi Summit indicates that Pyongyang is seeking to strengthen economic cooperation with China, even as it deepens its military alignment with Moscow. 

Kim Jong-un also praised Xi Jinping for choosing Pyongyang as his first official overseas destination in 2026, highlighting the value and priority Beijing is attaching to building relations with Pyongyang.[6] To further emphasise the importance affixed to Xi Jinping’s entourage to Pyongyang, it included his wife, Peng Liyuan; Cai Qi, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee; Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chinese foreign minister;[7] and Admiral Dong Jun, Defence Minister of China[8] suggesting that Beijing attached greater intra-party and strategic importance to this visit. 

Strategic Implications and Takeaways from the Kim-Xi Summit 

Kim Jong-un organised a grand welcome for Xi Jinping with an exceptionally elaborate military honour to mark the occasion.[9] The visit also coincided with the 65^th anniversary of the signing of the “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance”[10] between China and North Korea, a pact that is still China’s only defence agreement with another country.[11] The timing, therefore, carried considerable symbolic and strategic significance. 

Kim Jong-un is said to have given his explicit support to the ‘One-China’ principle and China’s core interests.[12] The first time that Kim mentioned the One-China principle was in April 2026, during the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Pyongyang.[13] The reiteration of the principle at the Kim-Xi Summit underscores Pyongyang’s growing political alignment with Beijing on issues of sovereignty, signalling North Korea’s willingness to publicly support China’s core interests in return for continued political and economic backing grounded in fundamental, long-term interests. 

This development also coincides with Pyongyang’s March 2026 amendment to its Constitution, which removed all references to unification, including “peaceful reunification” and “great national unity” with South Korea.[14] North Korea's growing diplomatic engagement with non-US-aligned states such as China and Russia further constrains Seoul's ability to sustain the long-held aspiration of eventual reunification, reinforcing the “de facto two-state reality” on the Korean Peninsula.[15]

Furthermore, during the Kim-Xi Summit of June 2026, Beijing refrained from making any public reference to denuclearisation or Pyongyang’s nuclear programme.[16] This refrainment was in stark contrast to Xi Jinping’s 2019 visit, when he publicly acknowledged North Korea’s efforts to promote dialogue and advance the denuclearisation process on the Korean Peninsula.[17] China's recent reluctance to publicly endorse denuclearisation as a priority in its engagement with North Korea reflects broader strategic considerations. Additionally, Kim Jong-un had already made a pledge to “beef up North Korea’s nuclear arsenal at an exponential rate”.[18]

The deepening strategic alignment between Pyongyang and Beijing raises important questions about the future of inter-Korean and multilateral denuclearisation diplomacy. As North Korea becomes more closely integrated with China politically and economically, Seoul may find it increasingly difficult to incentivise Pyongyang’s return to negotiations.

Taken together, these developments suggest a progressively narrowing diplomatic space for the international community and, specifically, South Korea's efforts to break the cycle of hostility on the Korean Peninsula through Lee Jae-myung’s much-acclaimed “Exchange, Normalisation and Denuclearisation (END)” vision.[19] Considering that Beijing prioritises improving relations with Pyongyang, there is speculation that Kim Jong-un may seek to leverage China's strategic interests to secure tacit recognition of North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state.[20] Russia is already on board, as Moscow previously stated that they “respect and understand” the DPRK’s actions and reasons to carry out their nuclear programme.[21]

Xi Jinping’s first official overseas visit in 2026 to North Korea speaks volumes about the evolving balance of influence on the Korean Peninsula.[22] The frequency of official high-level visits between North Korea and Russia since 2024 had also become a concern for Beijing and likely encouraged Xi Jinping to undertake this trip. This visit further underscored China’s goal of ensuring that Beijing does not lose its leverage even as North Korea expands ties with Russia.[23]

The June 2024 pact between Pyongyang and Moscow, together with their expanding political, military and economic cooperation, has enhanced North Korea’s leverage and provided[24] Kim Jong-un with greater room to manoeuvre between the regions’ major powers. As a result, with Pyongyang proactively pushing for the gradual normalisation of its nuclear status, Beijing's strategic imperative to preserve influence in North Korea is seemingly constraining its willingness to publicly advocate denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion

Neither of the leaders’ statements on this visit referenced denuclearisation at all, unlike Xi Jinping’s 2019 trip to Pyongyang.[25] The Chinese leader gave four proposals for developing China–DPRK relations, including to “consolidate the foundation of political mutual trust”.[26] The proposals also included statements issued “to maintain close strategic communication” and to guide the relations to a “new era”, while “strengthening exchanges in diplomacy, law enforcement and the military.”[27] However, reports suggest that the North Korean official summary omitted Xi’s proposal to enhance “military affairs” exchanges, even though the Chinese leader made his proposal public.[28] The omission of the details on military exchanges in its domestic coverage was perhaps a signal to Beijing that North Korea will protect its defence autonomy.[29]

Overall, the developments from the Kim-Xi Summit suggest that Pyongyang is operating with greater diplomatic leverage. DPRK is utilising its strategic autonomy to at least manoeuvre the terms of engagement for the scope and direction of its partnership with China. The enhanced bargaining position has allowed North Korea to frame the Summit and its relationship with China on terms that reinforce its political legitimacy, while simultaneously reducing external pressure on its nuclear programme.

***** 

*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[1] Woo Jae-yeon (2026), “N. Korea, China vow new era of ties in Kim-Xi summit: KCNA,” Yonhap News Agency, June 9, 2026, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260609000653315?section=nk/nk (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China (2025), “Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the Reception Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War,” September 3, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202509/t20250903_11701302.html (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China (2026), “Xi Jinping Returns to Beijing after State Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” June 9, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202606/t20260610_11941611.html (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[4] Jung Min-kyung (2026), “Kim, Xi vow stronger North Korea-China ties, silent on denuclearization,” The Korea Herald, June 9, 2026, https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10767475 (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[5] Anton Sokolin & Shreyas Reddy (2026), “Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping hold talks on boosting ties, but ignore denuclearization,” NKNews, June 8, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/2026/06/kim-jong-un-xi-jinping-kick-off-summit-talks-in-north-korean-capital/ (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[6] Woo Jae-yeon (2026), “N. Korea, China vow new era of ties in Kim-Xi summit: KCNA,” Yonhap News Agency, June 9, 2026, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260609000653315?section=nk/nk (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[7] Xinhua (2026), “Xi returns to Beijing after state visit to DPRK,” Global Times, June 9, 2026, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202606/1363129.shtml (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[8] Seong Hyeon Choi (2026), “Was Xi’s stance on China-North Korea military ties also a message for US, Russia?,” South China Morning Post, June 11, 2026 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3356659/was-xis-stand-china-north-korea-military-ties-also-message-us-russia (Accessed June 18, 2026)

[9] Caolán Magee (2026), “‘As close as lips and teeth’: The highs and lows of China-North Korea ties,” Al Jazeera, June 9, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/9/as-close-as-lips-and-teeth-the-highs-and-lows-of-china-north-korea-ties (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[10] NHK World Japan (2026), “China's Xi arrives in North Korea for summit with Kim,” June 8, 2026, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20260608_13/ (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[11] Amy Hawkins and Alastair McCready (2026), “Xi Jinping arrives in Pyongyang on trip to revitalise China-North Korea ties,” The Guardian, June 8, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/08/xi-jinping-kim-jong-un-meeting-north-korea (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[12] Chad O'Carroll (2026), “The real message of Xi’s summit with Kim Jong Un was what they didn’t say,” NK PRO, June 9, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/pro/the-real-message-of-xis-summit-with-kim-jong-un-was-what-they-didnt-say/ (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[13] Korea JoongAng Daily (2026), “Kim Jong-un references 'one-China' principle for first time, signalling deepening ties with Beijing,” April 24, 2026, https://www.koreajoongangdaily.com/korea/kim-jong-un-references-one-china-principle-for-first-time-signaling-deepening-ties-with-beijing/12538477 (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[14] Woo Jae-yeon (2026), “N. Korea's revised constitution defines territory, drops unification references,” Yonhap News Agency, May 6, 2026, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260506006600315 (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[15] Jooheon Kim (2026), “Seoul ministry acknowledges two state ‘reality’ with North Korea,” NKNews, May 19, 2026, https://www.nknews.org/2026/05/seoul-ministry-acknowledges-two-state-reality-with-north-korea/ (Accessed June 10, 2026).

[16] Anthony Kuhn and Jennifer Pak (2026), “China re‑centers North Korea ties as nuclear silence reshapes balance,” NPR, June 10, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/06/10/g-s1-127013/xi-jinping-visits-pyongyang-china-north-korea-ties (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[17] Ben Blanchard (2019), “China's Xi says world hopes North Korea-U.S. talks can succeed,” Reuters, June 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-china/chinas-xi-says-world-hopes-north-korea-us-talks-can-succeed-idUSKCN1TL03D/ (Accessed June 17, 2026)

[18] Hankyoreh (2026), “Kim Jong-un puts nuclear program front and center ahead of summit with Xi,” June 5, 2026, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/1262160.html (Accessed June 11, 2026).

[19] Anna J. Park (2026), “Lee outlines vision to end hostility on Korean Peninsula,” The Korea Times, September 24, 2025, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250924/lee-outlines-vision-to-end-hostility-on-korean-peninsula (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[20] Don Huh (2026), “China, North Korea to expand cooperation after Xi-Kim talks,” DW, June 9, 2026, https://www.dw.com/en/china-north-korea-xi-jinping-kim-jong-un-relationship-nuclear-program/a-77477935 (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[21] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2025), “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions following the second round of Russia-DPRK strategic dialogue at the level of foreign ministers, Wonsan,” July 12, 2025, https://mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/2035711/ (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[22] Gabriela Bernal (2026), “Pyongyang’s Great Power Strategy,” Peninsula Dispatch, June 8, 2026, https://www.peninsuladispatch.com/p/pyongyangs-great-power-strategy (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[23] Tom O'Connor (2026), “Xi’s North Korea Trip Puts Kim Jong Un at the Center of the World,” Newsweek, June 8, 2026, https://www.newsweek.com/xis-north-korea-trip-puts-kim-jong-un-at-the-center-of-the-world-12039191 (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[24] Tom O'Connor (2026), “Xi’s North Korea Trip Puts Kim Jong Un at the Center of the World,” Newsweek, June 8, 2026, https://www.newsweek.com/xis-north-korea-trip-puts-kim-jong-un-at-the-center-of-the-world-12039191 (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[25] Lee Ha-won (2026), “9·19 Joint Statement System Ends as Xi Omits Denuclearization,” The Chosun Daily, June 15, 2026, https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/06/13/76UAKMFVARG2JBIS76ZTW56T44/ (Accessed June 17, 2026)

[26] Huaxia (2026), “Xi puts forward four proposals on developing China-DPRK relations,” Xinhua, June 8, 2026, https://english.news.cn/20260608/c17e379900e945afb3e4a827d54cb470/c.html (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[27] Jesse Johnson (2026), “What was left unsaid may be biggest takeaway from Xi-Kim summit,” The Japan Times, June 9, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/06/09/asia-pacific/politics/north-korea-china-xi-kim-nukes-analysis/ (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[28] Rachel Minyoung Lee (2026), “Pyongyang Prioritizes Restoration of Ties, but Questions Remain,” 38th North, June 10, 2026, https://www.38north.org/2026/06/tbd-kim-xi-regional-roundup/ (Accessed June 12, 2026).

[29] Kim Min-seo (2026), “North Korea Omits Xi's Military Exchange Remarks,” The Chosun Daily, June 9, 2026, https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/06/09/Q4JGHXZGSFGEDKJYFXEEAMSIIA/ (Accessed June 18, 2026)