Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: Japan has relaxed its export control restrictions on lethal arms, allowing transfers of finished military platforms and equipment to 17 countries with which Tokyo has signed defence cooperation agreements. 

On 21 April, Japan’s Cabinet under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi relaxed its long-standing restrictions on arms exports, marking a significant shift in its defence and security policy.[i] The decision allows the export of lethal military systems, such as aircraft, warships, tanks and missiles, to 17 countries that signed a defence and technology agreement with Tokyo, including the Philippines, Indonesia and members of QUAD and AUKUS, among others. Following World War II, Japan has maintained a pacifist approach, with cautious militarism, a security alliance with the US, and a pivot towards economic statecraft under the Yoshida Doctrine, which was followed by strict arms export controls in later years.[ii]

Since then, amendments to export control restrictions have been under consideration for years due to rising regional security concerns, including China’s emergence as a revisionist power. Amid Tokyo’s recent decision on arms exports, the US’s nod is undeniable, besides its own security arrangements. Given its own security paradigm, Japan would not only rebuild its domestic defence industry but also support the US in its bilateral and multilateral alliance commitments.

Shrinking Pacifism and Decisions’ Inevitability

Japan’s export control restrictions were announced in 1967 by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato under the “Three Principles on Arms Exports”, which banned arms exports to communist countries, countries under UN arms embargoes, and countries involved in conflict.[iii] However, in 1976, under the Takeo Miki administration, the rules expanded to include all countries, and imposed a blanket ban on overall defence exports.[iv] However, Japan and the US continued their bilateral defence cooperation, including equipment manufacturing, with Washington sharing the major stakes.

The earliest decision to revise export controls came under PM Shinzo Abe in 2014, allowing limited exports of non-lethal arms with caution. After years of pacifist policies, PM Shinzo Abe replaced the previous frameworks with the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology” in 2014.[v] However, the new iteration of “Three Principles” did not comprehensively remove restrictions, but allowed the controlled transfer of non-lethal military equipment to partners for peacebuilding purposes. The reforms remain highly selective and regulated, considered on a case-by-case basis, subject to careful assessment. Overall, the reforms were intended as a period of policy adjustment before any broader removal of blanket restrictions.

Continuing reforms, the Fumio Kishida administration adopted the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2022, along with the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Build-up Program.[vi] The NSS highlights China and North Korea as its most serious challenges, while the other two documents acknowledge a more assertive military role and the need to build critical defence capabilities. Later, export controls were revised in late 2023, allowing exports of defence equipment manufactured under licence in Japan back to the licensor country. In particular, the reforms enabled the manufacture and export of Patriot interceptor missiles to the US, whose stockpiles had been depleted by military assistance to Ukraine.[vii]

Unlike the 2014 decision, the 2026 relaxation permits the export of complete finished defence items, licensed goods, and broader support, including the next-generation combat aircraft jointly developed by Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom under the Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP).[viii]

Japan’s Emphasis on Self-Defence

The primary reason behind Japan’s decision to export arms could be its preparations and arrangements for self-defence against growing regional threats, exacerbated by China’s military dominance in the South and East China Seas, as well as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programme. These are common concerns for the US, Japan and their regional partners in the Indo-Pacific. However, the decision upheld Japan’s decades-old commitment to peace principles and continuing ban on arms exports to countries involved in any conflict.

Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi posted on X that “No single country can now protect its own peace and security alone, and partner countries that support each other in terms of defence equipment are necessary.”[ix] Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary and former defence minister, Minoru Kihara, also mentioned the regional security dynamics, calling the decision “intended to safeguard Japan’s security and further contribute to the peace and stability of the region”. In response, China described it as “reckless militarisation”, calling “blindly entrusting their own security to another country, or even tying themselves to another country’s war chariot, will only end up backfiring.”[x]

Recently, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) took part in an annual war game between the US and the Philippines in the latter’s waters, which are claimed by China. It was Japan’s first direct participation rather than a mere observer status. Amid regional security threats, the US's weakening security assurances and reluctance to provide critical military support have further pressed Japan to revise its arms strategy. Subsequently, Japan’s decision will also provide it with an opportunity to diversify its arms partners and reduce dependence on the US.

Takaichi’s recent decision is not sudden, but built on years of reassessments made under various administrations. For instance, Japan’s cabinet approved a $58 billion defence budget for FY 2026, 9.4 per cent higher than the FY 2025 budget,[xi] aimed at strengthening Japan’s missile defence capabilities. The hike was part of the 2022 NSS’s target to raise Japan’s defence spending to 2 per cent of its GDP by 2027.[xii] Additionally, greater emphasis was placed on boosting Japan’s coastal defence through a layered drone wall under the Synchronised, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defence (SHIELD) programme. Costing around $640 million, the programme aims to deploy large numbers of aerial, surface and underwater drones for surveillance and other defensive purposes by 2028.[xiii]

By the end of 2026, Japan will have taken several significant steps to boost security cooperation and build a strong defence industry. On 18 April 2026, Japan and Australia signed a $6.5 billion warship deal to build 11 Mogami-class frigates for the Australian Navy, with the first three to be manufactured in Japan.[xiv] Additionally, the Philippines, Indonesia and New Zealand have expressed interest in acquiring Japanese naval and air equipment.[xv]

The Burdens of the US’ Expectations

Japan’s decision to ease export controls cannot be understood solely in terms of its domestic reform and national necessity but also as an adaptation to the US’s security expectations, alliance commitments and payback for its long-standing security assurances to the Indo-Pacific. It could be a secondary yet crucial factor in the decision to relax the export controls. China’s rapid military modernisation, regional dominance, pressure on Taiwan and maritime assertiveness in the East and South China Seas led the US to encourage Japan to assume a greater role in ensuring regional security beyond its territory. The US has firmed up its stance that allies must proactively contribute to balancing regional security, rather than merely being beneficiaries of the American security umbrella.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the Indo-Pacific, the US accounted for 95 per cent of Japan’s arms imports, followed by Taiwan (96 per cent), South Korea (93 per cent), Australia (85 per cent) and the Philippines (15 per cent) between 2021 and 2025.[xvi] However, its involvement in Afghanistan and West Asia (in the past two decades) and now in Ukraine and the Gulf has made it difficult for Washington to manage the Indo-Pacific, leading to delays in arms supplies and constraints on supporting regional partners’ security needs. The Russia-Ukraine conflict reinforced the US’ view on building collective deterrence by promoting integrated and allied defence industrial capacity, furthering defence production through co-development and co-production among allies and ensuring resilient supply chains. Additionally, Trump’s current nationalist grand strategy has made the US’ security commitments to its allies appear bleak.[xvii]

Successive US administrations, including those of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, have been encouraging Japan to revise its export controls. For instance, Japan’s 2014 relaxation of export controls came three weeks before Barack Obama’s scheduled visit to Tokyo, who had a grand strategy called the Pivot to Asia.[xviii] At the time, US Secretary of State Chuck Hagel welcomed Japan’s decision as historic, calling on Tokyo to contribute to regional and global security.[xix] He further said that the export control decision is a constructive step toward a deeper bilateral alliance and technology cooperation.

Similarly, following PM Takaichi’s decision, George Glass, the US ambassador to Japan, praised the move as a historic step that enhanced the collective capability of the US-Japan alliance to maintain regional peace and safeguard freedom.[xx] These reforms are based on a collective defence approach, boosting regional deterrence and military handholding and helping share the alliance's burdens by supporting regional partners, in line with the US security and alliance commitments.

Conclusion

Japan has possessed advanced technologies in shipbuilding, aircraft, radars and sensors; however, these technologies were constrained by export restrictions. Following Takaichi’s decision, Tokyo is required to increase defence spending, host military bases, strengthen alliance partners through arms exports, build maritime capacity and improve interoperability. Moreover, the US’ alliance expectations, regional burden-sharing and its decades-long role as Japan's protector have also given impetus to the recent reforms. Japan and the US could further defence production through co-development and co-production among allies, building collective deterrence by promoting integrated and allied defence industrial capacity and ensuring resilient supply chains.

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*Dr. Mukesh Kumar is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “Breaking the Postwar Taboo: Japan Lifts Its Ban on Lethal Arms Exports.” Accessed June 4, 2026. https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/breaking-the-postwar-taboo-japan-lifts-its-ban-on-lethal-arms-exports/.

[ii] Koji, Murata. “Kishida’s ‘Realism’ Diplomacy: From the Yoshida Doctrine to Values-Based Diplomacy,” September 25, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/kishidas-realism-diplomacy-yoshida-doctrine-values-based-diplomacy.

[iii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports.” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/.

[iv] Ishimaru. “Japan loosens the reins on defence exports.” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 27, 2026. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/04/japan-loosens-the-reins-on-defence-exports/.

[v] “The Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.” Press release, n.d. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000083.html.

[vi] Brookings. “Japan’s New Security Policies: A Long Road to Full Implementation.” Accessed June 4, 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/japans-new-security-policies-a-long-road-to-full-implementation/.

[vii] Jie, Lim Hui. “Why a Pacifist Japan Seems to Be Doubling down on Arms Exports.” CNBC, June 17, 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/17/pacifist-japan-seems-to-be-doubling-down-on-arms-exports.html.

[viii] Petrie, Lucy. What Is the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)? UK Parliament Library, 2024. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10143/.

[ix] Gadhavi, Jaydeep. “Japan Overhauls Post-World War II Pacifist Military Approach, Lifts Restrictions on Defence Exports.” ThePrint, April 21, 2026. https://theprint.in/defence/japan-overhauls-post-world-war-ii-pacifist-military-approach-lifts-restrictions-on-defence-exports/2910246/.

[x] DD News. “Rattled by Trump, US allies eye Japan’s biggest arms opening since WW2,” April 16, 2026. https://ddnews.gov.in/en/rattled-by-trump-us-allies-eye-japans-biggest-arms-opening-since-ww2/.

[xi] Davidson, Helen. “Japan’s Cabinet Approves Record Defence Budget amid Escalating China Tensions.” World News. The Guardian, December 26, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/26/japan-defence-budget-china.

[xii] “The Proposed Hike in Japan’s Military Expenditure | SIPRI.” February 2, 2023. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2023/proposed-hike-japans-military-expenditure.

[xiii] Saxton, Adam Bartley, Tom. “Japan Is Pushing Hard on Autonomous Weapons.” The Strategist, April 7, 2026. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/japan-is-pushing-hard-on-autonomous-weapons/.

[xiv] ABC News. “Japan, Australia Sign Deal for Production of First Three Frigates.” April 18, 2026. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-18/japan-warship-deal-australia-with-mogami-frigate-richard-marles/106579734.

[xv] Bristow, Justin Bassi, Alex. “Good News: Japan Further Loosens Its Military Export Rules.” The Strategist, April 21, 2026. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/good-news-japan-further-loosens-its-military-export-rules/.

[xvi] George, Mathew, Jr., Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman. “TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2025,” March 2026.

[xvii] “America Revived: A Grand Strategy of Resolute Global Leadership | Council on Foreign Relations.” January 20, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/reports/america-revived.

[xviii] Comparative Connections. “The Sushi Summit.” May 15, 2014. https://cc.pacforum.org/2014/05/the-sushi-summit/.

[xix] The Times of India. “Japan’s Decision on Military Will Expand Its Global Role: US.” July 12, 2014. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/japans-decision-on-military-will-expand-its-global-role-us/articleshow/38243907.cms.

[xx] The Straits Times (Singapore). “Japan Opens Door to Global Arms Market with Overhaul of Defence Export Rules.” April 21, 2026. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-opens-door-to-global-arms-market-with-biggest-export-rule-change-in-decades.