Indian Council of World Affairs

As the conflict in West Asia continued to intensify, President Trump released the much-awaited Cyber strategy, titled President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, on March 6, 2026. Even though States are increasingly adopting cyber strategies to secure their cybersphere, yet when a major power like the United States formulates it’s cyber strategy, it not only impacts its own domestic cyber concerns but actively shapes larger cyber discourse. This issue brief therefore aims to undertake an analysis of Trump’s Cyber Strategy to reflect on how it will catalyse cyberspace in a particular strategic direction and how it may transform the cyber discourse. 

A brief Introduction 

President Trump’s cyber strategy for America is deliberately concise and assertive. Very interestingly, President Trump has referred to it as his strategy for America, describing it as a national cyber strategy that outlines his priorities for ensuring the “unrivalled” status of the United States in cyberspace.[i] The strategy outlines six provisions which includes shaping adversarial behaviour, undertaking regulatory reforms, securing the federal network, protecting critical infrastructure, leading the emerging technologies, and development of workforce.[ii] Though the strategy’s brevity leaves many questions unanswered regarding its implementation, it nonetheless is pointing the world in a direction which compels a closer analysis. 

An Analytical Overview

Cyber as core National Security, not a Supporting Domain: Freedom and Security of America is the top priority of the strategy and cyber threats are seen as one of the existential threats to the American society and economy.[iii] These cyber threats are being enabled through cyber-attacks on US’ critical services such as banking, supply chains, health, communication, water treatment etc.[iv] Accordingly, the Cyber Strategy is called as the extension and continuation of National Security Strategy reflecting integration of cyber into core national security framework. As cyber becomes a core security issue, the strategy lays out a cyber threat landscape comprising cybercrime, financial fraud, intellectual property theft, disinformation, propaganda, influence operations along with the threats linked to adversaries selling “low-cost AI and digital technologies that carry embedded censorship, surveillance, and ideological bias”[v] as being detrimental to the American security. It does not name any country as threat actors, but the strategy strongly mentions adversaries, cybercriminals, big tech and espionage as actors which enable these new threats. To counter these cyber threats and threat actors, a range of state responses are mentioned which includes dismantling hostile networks, the pursuit of cyber actors engaged in espionage, and the imposition of sanctions on individuals and firms. It advances a pre-emptive approach, with the intent to “act swiftly, deliberately, and proactively”[vi] to neutralize risks before they materialize”.

Normalising Offensive Cyber Operations: Earlier, the cyber operations were part of US’ defensive strategy but the current U.S. posture reflects a more open and assertive strategic use of cyber to secure American national interests. The document very explicitly showcases that cyberspace is now fully integrated into the United States’ contemporary conflicts and geopolitical rivalries. The document leads by explicitly boasting successful use of cyber into broader military campaigns beginning with “destroying online scammers’ networks and seizing $15 billion of their stolen money, supporting a globe-spanning operation to obliterate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, or leaving US adversaries blind and uncomprehending during a flawless military operation to bring international narco-terrorist Nicolas Maduro to justice”.[vii] Further it says that “President Trump will continue to address threats in cyberspace directly”[viii] meaning that the US should be less concerned about the escalatory implications of applying and projecting power in and through cyberspace, and more willing to employ various instruments to disrupt and defeat cyber threats, especially via pre-emptive logics.[ix]

AI for Cybersecurity and Cybersecurity for AI: The Cyber strategy highlights how AI and cybersecurity are increasingly converging as a shared frontier. On one hand AI is transforming both defensive and offensive cybersecurity capabilities, on the other hand, cybersecurity risks, and threats are shaping how AI systems are designed, deployed, and governed. The strategy makes it apparent that future for ensuring cybersecurity is by means of AI and emphasising the necessity of deploying AI enabled cyber tools to effectively “detect, divert and deceive threat actors”.[x]  It states that Agentic AI[xi] will be adopted and used to protect large scale network not only to defend but disrupt adversary capabilities. At the same time, the AI technologies will be used as a strategic asset to ensure US’ leadership and also acknowledges that AI is itself a strategic asset which needs to be secured against cyber-attacks. Thus, the critical American AI stack such as compute infrastructure, data centres, AI models etc needs protection from cyber-attacks, manipulation, and espionage.

Quick Reflections

As Donald Trump elevates cyberspace to core national security issue and normalises the use of offensive cyber while integrating artificial intelligence into cybersecurity, this development is likely to have implications for global cyber discourse.

Accelerated Militarisation of Cyberspace: For some time now, cyber issues have been moving horizontally, evolving from being primarily a concern of the United States and a few technologically advanced nations into one of the top security threats of almost every other country with the central focus on the strategic-military aspect of it.[xii] Many countries are investing in military cyber capabilities, and the evidence suggests that nearly 50 states have developed or possess offensive cyber capabilities.[xiii] Following Trump’s cybersecurity strategy this trend is likely to gain further momentum as other states especially Russia and China may perceive the growing offensive capabilities of the United States and its open use of cyber in conflict as a significant threat. There are strong grounds to expect this trend will intensify as states are already using AI enabled cyber capabilities in military operations. AI’ advantage of speedy threat detection and prediction is enabling a gradual shift in the role of cyber capabilities from a supporting function into being directly embedded in “targeting, escalation, and coercion” in warfare thereby influencing the outcomes of conflict.[xiv]

This is backed by evidentiary support from conflict sites which shows that during Ukraine-Russia conflict, cyber was mainly used as supporting the main conflict i.e. to disrupt communications, degrade systems, or deploy destructive malware where kinetic military operation remained at the forefront.[xv] But this is changing, as reports suggest that in the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, Israeli operations leveraged Iran’s camera infrastructure to support targeting and post-strike assessment reflecting a deeper integration of cyber into military operations, the military operation now starting to depend directly on cyber access.[xvi]

Cyber Diplomacy will take a beating: Cyber diplomacy was already marked by intense geopolitical competition before the new US Cyber Strategy came out. UN cyber negotiations have long been divided between a Western vision of an open, rules-based cyberspace and a Russia-China led model based on “information sovereignty” and greater state control over cyberspace.[xvii] These competing geopolitical visions have politicised even procedural discussions within mechanisms such as the UN GGE (United Nations Group of Governmental Experts) and OEWG (Open Ended Working Group), slowing consensus on cyber norms, international law, and capacity building.[xviii] The new US Cyber Strategy, combined with US’ withdrawal from several international organisations in January 2026, risks deepening these existing divisions. Rather than strengthening cooperation, it can deepen liberal vs authoritarian cyber politics, weaken trust among states, and undermine the implementation of the UN framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. And this fragmentation is particularly damaging for the Global South. Although the newly established UN Global Mechanism on ICT Security includes a dedicated capacity-building pillar, geopolitical rivalry may reduce the diplomatic space for developing countries to independently shape cyber priorities and demand equitable cyber assistance. Instead, cyber capacity-building risks becoming increasingly tied to geopolitical alignment, where major powers use technological assistance and digital infrastructure partnerships to expand influence.[xix] As a result, developing countries may be forced to navigate competing cyber groups rather than benefit from inclusive multilateral cyber diplomacy.

Undermining of Human Rights in AI enabled Cyber Warfare: As strategy promotes AI to “detect, divert, and deceive” threats and even disrupt adversaries,[xx] this means use of cyber before and during conflicts will become faster, automated and less dependent on human decision-making. It can lead to less space for human in loop in the automated warfare, raising serious concerns regarding violations of fundamental human rights i.e., the right to life, security, privacy and due process. As AI becomes central to decision-making, many functions that previously required human judgment, ethical evaluation, and legal accountability are now increasingly delegated to automated systems that rely on algorithms and large data bases, which may be inherently biased.[xxi] The decisions are becoming high-speed, high-volume approvals rather than case-by-case assessments, increasing the likelihood of automated errors without meaningful human accountability.[xxii] Consequently, there is an increased risk of misidentification and more civilian harm, particularly when AI systems are used in targeting or operational decision-making,[xxiii] as has been observed in Israel-Gaza conflict.

For instance, Israel’s undisclosed AI-powered database at one stage identified 37,000 potential targets based on their apparent links to Hamas, in addition their AI system called Lavender which was used by military to permit large numbers of Palestinian civilians to be killed, particularly during the early weeks and months of the conflict.[xxiv]  AI enables large-scale data driven generation of targets (e.g., 37,000 individuals identified)[xxv] normalizing high civilian casualties as “collateral damage” in pursuit of operational efficiency.

At the End

As States started recognising cyber as a new threat area, cyberspace has been witnessing a fragmented and gradual evolution, shaped by clandestine cyber competition during and before war, piecemeal norms and incremental capability-building across states. However, Trump’s cyber strategy represents a larger shift that seeks to consolidate, formalise and give definite direction to this fragmented cyberspace. It signals a more explicit move towards the militarization of cyberspace, with offensive cyber capabilities increasingly embedded within main conflicts thereby limiting space for cyber diplomacy and having implications for human rights. This strategy thus can impact cyber in a profound manner.

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*Anubha Gupta is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] The White House, President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, March 6, 2026. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf

[ii] Digital Watch Observatory. 2026. “US National Cyber Strategy Prioritising Offense and AI.” March 10, 2026. Available at https://dig.watch/updates/us-national-cyber-strategy-prioritising-offense-and-ai

[iii] The White House, President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, March 6, 2026. v  https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Louise Marie Hurel et al., “Brief, Bold and Beautiful? Reactions on the US National Cyber Strategy,” Royal United Services Institute, March 16, 2026. Available at https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/brief-bold-and-beautiful-reactions-us-national-cyber-strategy

[x] The White House, President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, March 6, 2026. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf

[xi] According to IBM, traditional AI models operate within predefined constraints and require human intervention, agentic AI exhibits autonomy, goal-driven behavior and adaptability. The term “agentic” refers to these models’ agency, or, their capacity to act independently and purposefully.

[xii] Dunn Cavelty, Myriam. “The Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why Less May Be Better.” In 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CYCON 2012) – Proceedings, 1–13. Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2012. Available at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2012/01/2_6_Dunn-Cavelty_TheMilitarisationOfCyberspace.pdf

[xiii] DW Observatory. Cyberconflict and Warfare in 2025. DiploFoundation, accessed May 21, 2026. Available at Cyberconflict and warfare in 2025 | DW Observatory

[xiv] Sayegh, Emil. “U.S.-Israel-Iran Conflict Is One War Across Two Fronts: Cyber And Kinetic.” Forbes. April 3, 2026. Available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilsayegh/2026/04/03/cyber-and-kinetic-warfare-are-now-one-battlefield-what-the-us-israel-iran-conflict-reveals/

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Sayegh, Emil. “U.S.-Israel-Iran Conflict Is One War Across Two Fronts: Cyber And Kinetic.” Forbes. April 3, 2026. Available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilsayegh/2026/04/03/cyber-and-kinetic-warfare-are-now-one-battlefield-what-the-us-israel-iran-conflict-reveals/

[xvii] Sukumar, Arun, and Arindrajit Basu. 2024. “Back to the Territorial State: China and Russia’s Use of UN Cybercrime Negotiations to Challenge the Liberal Cyber Order.” Journal of Cyber Policy 9 (2): 256–87. doi:10.1080/23738871.2024.2436591.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Carver, Julia. 2025. “Developing Digital “peripheries" for Strategic Advantage: Capacity Building Assistance and Strategic Competition in Africa.” Contemporary Security Policy 46 (3): 455–96. doi:10.1080/13523260.2024.2430021.

[xx] The White House, President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America, March 6, 2026. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf

[xxi] Schwarz, Elke. 2025. The Ethical Implications of AI in Warfare. Queen Mary University of London. Accessed June 5, 2026. Available at https://www.qmul.ac.uk/research/featured-research/the-ethical-implications-of-ai-in-warfare/

[xxii] McKernan, Bethan, and Harry Davies. “‘The Machine Did It Coldly’: Israel Used AI to Identify 37,000 Hamas Targets.” The Guardian, April 3, 2024. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] McKernan, Bethan, and Harry Davies. “‘The Machine Did It Coldly’: Israel Used AI to Identify 37,000 Hamas Targets.” The Guardian, April 3, 2024. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes

[xxv] Ibid.