Indian Council of World Affairs

Recently, the Gulf region has been undergoing a profound geopolitical transformation driven by conflicts, strategic competition and new alliances, leading to fragmentation of the regional order. Hamas ‘terrorist’ attacks of October 7 and Israel’ subsequent counter response accelerated these changes, making the Gulf deeply embedded in the regional arc of geopolitical instability spanning from the Levant region to the Indian Ocean. Amid this intensifying turbulence, the region is shifting from a relatively stable US-backed security arrangement to a more volatile and unpredictable order, undermining its political, energy and economic security.

To counter the emerging challenges, the Gulf States are increasingly diversifying their strategies through security cooperation with external actors. The UAE and Israel relations are deepening, reflecting new geopolitical alignments that have emerged following the Abraham Accords. The alignment has also expanded into the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia and Somaliland, which are considered as ‘threats’ by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Türkiye and Somalia to regional stability and security. The UAE and Israel axis is providing technological and security support to Ethiopia, Rapid Protection Force (RPF) in Sudan and Somaliland, thereby influencing the geo-economics and security environment in the broader Gulf and Horn of Africa regions. In contrast, the opposing alignment comprising states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Türkiye and Somalia, focuses on state-centric stability and territorial integrity through their engagement with Arab and adjacent regions, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. The Gulf States have also expanded these alignments into the South Asia region. The recent Defence pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has further altered the geopolitical landscape of both the Gulf and South Asia. These competing alignments have intensified intra-regional rivalries, challenging the stability of the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. One of the key aspects of this confrontation is the growing tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which first occurred in Yemen over the disagreement regarding the strategy to shape its future and later spread to the Horn of Africa and Sudan to consolidate their influence, indicating that the two countries have a competitive vision regarding the regional order and leadership.

The conflict deepened further in the region with the outbreak of the Iran War on 28 February 2026. It ruptured the traditional view of the Gulf States as stable economic hubs and pushed them to forefront of the conflict without proactive defence measures to counter the attacks. This has raised concerns about the Gulf States’ strategy to tackle future threats. The Iran War has regionalised the conflict to an unprecedented degree, drawing the Gulf region along with their civilian and maritime supply chain infrastructures directly into conflict.

The Iran War occurred at a time when the Gulf region was already witnessing competing regional outlooks, particularly amid Saudi-UAE tensions. The war has further fragmented Gulf geopolitics rather than bridging its divisions. As a result, cooperation remained fragile and deeply divided, indicating limited collective responses to crises. The war has also exposed that the Gulf is no longer a safe rear base, which was used as a military logistics hub to operate in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen; rather, these bases became part of the battlefield, exposing the states in the Gulf region directly to the conflict between Iran and the US. Against this backdrop, the paper aims to identify the drivers behind the recent geopolitical alignments and the key agreements shaping these emerging alignments in the Gulf region.

Causes Leading to the Geopolitical Alignments

For decades, Gulf States projected themselves as global financial and logistics hubs, stable investment destinations and centres of technology and service economies. This model was built on perceptions of stability and insulation from conflict, resting on the petrodollar system, in which Gulf-US relations were based on an exchange of energy security for military protection. This arrangement formed the bedrock of regional security. However, recent geopolitical developments have raised concerns about the durability of this framework, particularly as the US is alleged to prioritise Israel’s strategic objectives.

The shift became evident following Israel’s airstrike on Qatar on 9 September 2025, which hosts the largest American military forces base in the region. The strike occurred at a time when the Hamas and Israeli representatives were negotiating the peace talks in Doha to end the conflict in Gaza. Another significant flashpoint was the UAE-Saudi Arabia confrontation in Yemen on 30 December 2025, when the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) sought a military takeover of the Hadhramaut and Mahra governorates.[i] In response, Saudi Arabia launched a counter-military and diplomatic measure, striking what were described in the media as “Emirati weapons supply routes”, dismantling the STC, and forcing Abu Dhabi to announce its withdrawal from Yemen. This tension has since expanded from Yemen to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, restructuring regional alliances that threaten regional stability.

The region became further unstable with the US-Israel military operations-“Operation Epic Fury” and “Operation Roaring Lion” launched on 28 February 2026 against Iran. Iran countered the operations through a series of drone and missile attacks on American bases in Gulf States. It also reflected that the US-led security order in the region is collapsing, as the attacks occurred despite the presence of US military. The “oil for security system”, under which Gulf States provided oil and hosted US bases and the US became the security guarantor against internal and external threats, has been significantly weakened. These developments also shifted the Gulf countries’ focus from “geo-economics” to a “geo-security-dominated economy” in which the former uses economic tools for strategic advantage, while the latter subordinates’ economic activities to national security imperatives. The Gulf States have consequently recognised the need to reconsider their security dependence and explore alternative arrangements. They now seek regional security arrangements, grounded in self-reliance and the protection of critical infrastructure.

In this scenario, the alternatives for Gulf States are likely to develop independent military capability, strengthen regional defence cooperation and balance the US, Russia and China.[ii] Notably, the current geopolitical transformations in the Gulf region are shaped by countries’ motivations to protect their national security and economic stability amid repeated security crises.

Emerging Regional Alignments

As the US role is becoming uncertain and non-responsive towards the security of the Gulf region despite the presence of its troops in military bases of the countries in the region, a new geopolitical environment is emerging, in which regional states are pursuing unilateral moves going beyond the region to expand partnerships with extended neighbourhood actors to strengthen their national security and protect their territorial integrity.

In this light, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Pact on 17 September 2025 to institutionalise their security partnership. The pact entailed that “any aggression against either nation is considered an attack on both.” It is a comprehensive defensive agreement encompassing “all military means”, alluding to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.[iii] Fundamentally, “the agreement stipulates that a foreign aggression on one is an attack on both”.[iv] Riyadh and Islamabad did not overtly highlight that the pact is linked to Israel’s attack on Qatar; rather, they projected it as a culmination of the years of discussions.[v] This pact includes mutual defence, military cooperation, deployment and operational assistance. One of the key outcomes of the pact came into the public domain when Pakistan deployed its F-16 fighter jets at the King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Sector (Dhahran).[vi] However, it does not entail any commitment on Saudi Arabia’s part in case of a war initiated by Pakistan, which partly explains Pakistan’s mediation efforts between the US and Iran to avoid being drawn into conflict. Türkiye is also seeking to join this emerging security arrangement, having gradually rebuilt military and security ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt after a decade of isolation following the Arab Spring.[vii] The role of the American President is crucial in positioning Pakistan as a mediator through the co-option of its Field Marshal Asif Munir, who has been visiting Tehran to facilitate the mediation, rather than the elected government’s representative, leaving an adverse impact on Pakistan’s fragile political system.

On 6 February 2026, another crucial alignment emerged when Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Somalia came together to secure strategic collaboration in the Red Sea following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on 26 December 2025.[viii] However, the recognition was claimed to be aligned with the Abraham Accords. One of the key motivations attributed to Israel is the establishment of its military base in the territory, a point reaffirmed by Somaliland’s leader, who stated that “his administration had not ruled out the possibility of granting an Israeli company a port” in the territory.[ix] The growing alignment between the UAE and Israel is not limited to the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region; it is also reflected in an alleged collaboration in southwestern Syria through the support of the Druze and their support for the Rapid Protection Force in Sudan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia view this alliance as a threat not only to the Khartoum government but also to the overall security and stability of the Red Sea. In addition, the UAE’s increasing political, economic and military ties with Ethiopia has further contributed to shifting geopolitical dynamics. Abu Dhabi has facilitated a ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland, including the Red Sea access for Addis Ababa. This has intensified tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over the GERD dam, heightening Cairo’s anxieties about water security.[x]

In response, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt rejected Somaliland’s recognition, citing concerns about destabilising fragile African and Arab states, while the UAE maintained a neutral stance.[xi] Qatar and Somalia signed a defence cooperation agreement on 20 January 2026. The agreement focused on expanding military and security cooperation, and further reinforced the strategic relationship between Mogadishu and Doha, reflecting both countries’ shared commitment to advancing defence and security, as well as long-term military cooperation.[xii]

Following Doha on 9 February 2026, the Saudi government took a significant step by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation with Somalia. The agreement aimed to deepen bilateral defence cooperation via enhanced technical support, training and force development.[xiii] Egypt, meanwhile, continues to view the presence of any new external security actor near the Bab el-Mandeb as a threat to its traditional role as guardian of Red Sea-Suez maritime security. Accordingly, the Egyptian government deployed more than 1,000 troops to Mogadishu under the African Union Mission on 11 February 2026, marking a significant shift in bilateral relations.[xiv]

In the wake of the Iran attack, Gulf unity remained largely tactical rather than structural, meaning the countries in the region did not transform their unity into integrated defence systems or a collective strategic doctrine. Instead, Gulf States remained highly dependent on the US, making them targets in the Washington-Tehran confrontation. They did not initiate military action against Iran; their role largely remained defensive, not offensive, adhering to internal security tightening, airspace closures and interceptions of drones and missiles.[xv]

It shows that, despite decades of arms procurement, Gulf States still need to build autonomous defence capacity against external threats. This became evident at the Summit of Islamic Countries, where the foreign ministers of Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan met in Riyadh on 21 March 2026 to discuss ways to combine their strengths amid the Iran War.[xvi] Also, the 12 participants[xvii] at the Summit, which earlier were sympathetic to Iran, asserted “the right of states to defend themselves”, citing Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on defensive action, following Tehran’s launch of drones and ballistic missiles attacks on their non-military infrastructures.[xviii] However, Gulf countries’ strategy remained limited to diplomatic manoeuvring through the co-option of other regional actors, revealing that Gulf actors are intermediaries rather than independent strategic agents.

Conclusion

The Gulf has transitioned from a US-backed security order into an uncertain, fragmented political system which is no longer insulated from conflict and external threats. The region is now deeply connected to the broader zones of instability in the Levant, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This transformation is happening at a time when the traditional security bargain based on “oil for security” has collapsed, as the US presence no longer guarantees protection, and the Gulf countries are increasingly exposed to the frontline of regional conflicts. From the Horn of Africa to the Strait of Hormuz, the Arabian Peninsula is being drawn into multiple geopolitical confrontations.

In addition, the Gulf region’s vulnerabilities were further exposed during the Iran War, which targeted not only the military bases of the US in the region but also the critical civilian infrastructure. The Gulf countries’ vast economic and military capacities have not been translated into strategic autonomy, leaving it structurally a contested geographical arena rather than a stable anchor of regional order.

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*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

End Notes

[i] The Yemen Review Quarterly: October-December 2025, Center for Strategic Studies: SANA’A, February 2, 2026, accessed https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/oct-dec-2025, April 9, 2026.

[ii] Khalid Al-Khanji, How the War in Iran is shaping Gulf collective consciousness, Middle East Council on Global Affairs, March 10, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/4s8zu2am, March 18, 2026.

[iii] Ragib Soylu, Turkey hunts for new security alliances as regional tensions rise, Middle East Eye, January 13, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3r4ym6ds, March 12, 2026.

[iv] Riad Kahwaji, Saudi-Pakistan defence pact brings new nuclear player to region, Breaking Defence, September 22, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/ms8rvdje, March 18, 2026.

[v] Saudi Arabia signs mutual defence pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan, Al Jazeera, September 17, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/ydp3zd3p, March 19, 2026.

[vi] Saudi defense ministry says military force from Pakistan reached King Abdulaziz Air Base, Arab News, Aprill 11, 2026, accessed https://www.arabnews.com/node/2639535/amp, March 22, 2026.

[vii] Turkey in the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact: A new regional order?, The New Arab, January 21, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/46zs562m, March 18, 2026.

[viii] Saudi Arabia moving towards military coalition with Somalia and Egypt, Middle East Eye, January 16, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/47877enk, April 9, 2026.

[ix]Somalia’s Mohamud slams Israel’s ‘interference’, rejects base on Somaliland, Al-Jazeera, February 8, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2hw9dy5d, April 6, 2026.

[x] Giorgio Cafiero, Saudi Arabia confronts the Israel-UAE alignment in Somalia, Arab Center Washing DC, February 26, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/6ezh5d36, April 4, 2026.

[xi] Gregory Aftandilian, Egypt: Partnering with Saudi Arabia on security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Arab Center Washing DC, January 27, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/4tkab8r6, April 5, 2026.

[xii] Somalia, Qatar sign defence cooperation agreement in Doha, Somalia National News Agency, January 19, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mva4te7k, April 7, 2026.

[xiii] Somalia, Saudi Arabia sign agreement on military cooperation, Al-Jazeera, February 10, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3e46sh7w, April 16, 2026.

[xiv] Somali president witnesses Egyptian forces deploying to AU mission in Somalia, Egypt Today, February 11, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2ehcx67k, April 2, 2026.

[xv] Gulf Situation Assessment: Iran’s Attacks on Arab States will backfire, Middle East Forum, March 8, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3b8ntxfe, April 10, 2026.

[xvi] Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan meet as Ankara pushes for a security pack, Middle East Eye, March 21, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/4pubst3r, April 15, 2026.

[xvii] Qatar, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkiye and the United Arab Emirates.

[xviii] What did Arab and Muslim ministers discuss in Riyadh meeting on Iran, Al-Jazeera, March 19, 2026, accessed https://tinyurl.com/yjnht242, April 13, 2026.