Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: In recent years, warfare has been completely transformed with advances in low-cost innovation. Modern-day conflicts are not limited to expensive, sophisticated weapons systems, but also involve cost-effective systems with significant impact on short-term goals, expenditures and the duration of the conflict. In asymmetric warfare, the major powers have also shifted to inexpensive weapon systems, replicating the tactics and strategies of smaller powers.  

For decades, major powers, particularly the United States and Russia, have relied on advanced and highly sophisticated weapons systems, mainly expensive, to maintain a battlefield edge over their rivals. For instance, combat aircraft, helicopters, precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles, missile defence systems, aircraft carriers and submarines are often considered the backbone of modern warfare. Not only did such equipment enhance countries’ war-waging capabilities, but it also played a significant role in sustaining their economies through export.

However, conflicts over the past half-decade have revealed a major trend: powerful nations are adapting to low-cost innovations, such as drones, loitering munitions and electronic warfare systems, in contemporary international conflicts. Such equipment has been a part of their arsenal for years; however, its importance and utilisation have become evident in recent conflicts. There are two major reasons behind this trend, both rooted in economic and cost-benefit consideration. First, the use of traditional, costly missile defence systems against inexpensive weapons imposes an economic burden. Second, cheaper innovations are comparatively more feasible than expensive weapons systems for sustaining long-term warfare against an asymmetric power.

Such inexpensive systems have sometimes been widely used by smaller powers, often neutralising expensive, high-tech military systems and imposing a huge economic burden on their rivals. Therefore, perhaps the major powers have learned that sophisticated, highly advanced military equipment may not sustain prolonged warfare. Consequently, they have begun replicating the similar strategies and tactics of smaller powers, utilising low-cost weapon systems. Indeed, the major powers have effectively utilised this strategy by leveraging their skills and innovative capabilities.

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which started in 2022, could be considered the first major case study in recent years in which major powers have utilised cost-effective innovation. Russia, a relatively stronger power, closely studied and replicated Kyiv’s strategy on the battlefield. Since its inception, Ukraine has been quick to use small, cheaper drones. On the other hand, instead of relying solely on aircraft, cruise missiles, and expensive, sophisticated technologies, Russia also utilised small, unmanned aerial vehicles, decoys and dummies, and modified Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities costing only a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. While Moscow began using inexpensive drones against Ukraine in late 2022, the establishment of the elite Russian drone unit “Rubicon”, the Centre for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, provided Russian forces fresh impetus in 2024.[i] The unit was designed to combat Ukrainian forces by employing First-Person View (FPV) drones, reconnaissance and electronic warfare capabilities.

Russia has adapted similar capabilities, deploying Iranian-designed Shahed-136 drones and Geran-2 (kamikaze drones) and its local variants for suicide missions.[ii] Priced between $20,000 and $50,000 per drone they have inflicted economic burdens on Ukraine, which used the Patriot missile defence system (around $4 million each) for interception.[iii]  After initially importing large numbers of Shahed drones from Iran, Russia began mass producing them locally. Unlike Ukraine, Russia has focused on a limited number of drone models and designs, which helped them manage and scale up manufacturing to meet their requirements.[iv]

To counter Ukraine’s electronic warfare, Russia innovated and operationalised fibre optic-controlled drones (a first of their kind). These drones are directly connected to the operator via an optical cable rather than traditional radio signals, rendering them immune to jamming, difficult to intercept and allowing Russian forces to conduct precision strikes. Installed with a high-resolution camera, the fibre-optic drone proved highly effective against Ukrainian troops, military convoys and their logistic supply chain.[v]

Besides, Russia has extensively used decoy drones mimicking real drones. These decoy drones, made of plywood and foam and specifically named Gerbera and Parody, fly alongside the Shahed-136 drones to distract Ukrainian air defence systems,[vi] wasting their time and munitions. Similarly, Zala Lancet and Orlan-10 and its variants are multi-purpose drones used for both reconnaissance,[vii] by providing real-time intelligence to Russian artillery systems, and deception, by mimicking airborne threats. While operating at higher altitudes (around 5000–6000 metres) with accuracy, the Orlan-10, with a production cost of around $85,000 to $120,000, could be destroyed primarily by the expensive anti-aircraft systems, such as a Stinger missile system.[viii] On the other hand, the deployment of modern Orlan variants and Molniya drones, sometimes configured as a decoy, forces Ukrainian radars and air defence systems to activate, thereby revealing their positions and making them vulnerable to Russian artillery and air strikes.    

Electronic equipment, combined with propaganda and information warfare mechanisms, is yet another low-cost system the Russians have developed and utilised effectively. They have deployed man-portable and vehicle-mounted EW systems that are effective at jamming small drones. Similarly, drones combined with EW capabilities provide visual reconnaissance while also jamming communication and transmitting false information to the rival’s electronic devices, using the Leer-3 system.[ix] Such electronic capabilities have strengthened older EW technologies, thereby providing a low-cost, multi-layered defensive shield.      

Following its fourth anniversary, the scale of drone warfare in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that low-cost innovations can sometimes be more mobile and decisive than expensive technological weapon systems. With assistance from Iran and China, in terms of components and drone designs, the conflict now appears to be tilting in Russia’s favour.[x] To date, both sides have heavily deployed thousands of inexpensive drones built from reverse engineering and commercial components.

The Israel-Iran Conflict

Earlier, the US and Israel had been using traditional missile defence systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) and Patriot missile systems, to intercept incoming aerial threats, at a cost of millions of dollars per unit.[xi] These traditional defence systems cost significantly more than the drones they intercept, resulting in severe economic losses. The US and Israel have also witnessed the efficiency and impact of the small and suicidal drones in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Addressing these gaps and closely examining the developments, the US has adopted similar tactics by investing in and producing low-cost unmanned systems. The US has been developing similar weapons with improved short-term battle efficacy, known as the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS). LUCAS is a one-way kamikaze drone (suicide drone) that operates on a fire-and-forget strategy.[xii] Developed with reverse engineering, adapting the Iranian strategy and design, the drone has recently been utilised against Iran in its operations. Developed by SpektreWorks, a US-based firm, the LUCAS drone costs around $35,000 per unit.[xiii] Most importantly, the LUCAS system is inspired by the Iranian Shahed-136 loitering munition, which has been widely used in several conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war.

Israel had also developed the Iron Beam laser air defence system to destroy the incoming aerial threats operating mainly at lower altitudes, including drones, rockets, loitering munitions and missiles. Unlike the traditional rocket-propelled system that costs thousands of dollars per unit, the Iron Beam is a ground-based direct-energy weapon that uses a laser beam as a soft-kill mechanism to destroy incoming threats, with each laser shot costing around $3.50, as stated by Naftali Bennett in 2022, then Prime Minister of Israel.[xiv] The laser weapon system is manufactured by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, which also serves as Israel’s High-Energy Laser National Centre of Excellence and National Lethality Lab. According to The Conversation report, the Iron Beam system was successfully tested in 2022 and first used against a drone launched by Hezbollah in 2025.[xv] Reportedly using 100-kilowatt solid-state laser energy, the weapon system could effectively neutralise low-range threats,[xvi] complemented by the higher-range Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow air defence systems. However, its official deployment and application against Iran are not confirmed.

The development of LUCAS and Iron Beam becomes more important, given swarm tactics, in which a large number of drones, including decoys, are released to overwhelm sophisticated defence systems that cannot shoot down drones with accuracy.   

A Glimpse of China’s Role

When it comes to low-cost military technologies, it is impossible to overlook China and its capabilities, as well as its role in cheaper innovations, mainly drones. China has perhaps been aware of the contemporary trends and patterns in global conflicts. Consequently, it began massive production of these small unmanned systems, preparing an inventory of a balanced mix of sophisticated and low-cost military systems for years. Rather than relying solely on expensive and sophisticated platforms, China has demonstrated large-scale drone manufacturing for various purposes, including commerce and agriculture, which could increasingly be integrated into its warfare doctrine.

China has also demonstrated swarming tactics, often during light shows and functions. The drone swarms could be used in warfare for multiple purposes, including offensive and defensive operations, signal disruption, reconnaissance, flight obstruction, and data theft. It could potentially be used to intercept and destroy high-velocity incoming missiles and aircraft. China’s manufacturing capability in micro- and very small-sized drones makes swarming more complex and destructive. These trends suggest that China may use a strategy of engaging its rivals with low-cost innovations if it enters a future conflict.

Besides its own preparedness for the future, China has played a significant role in revolutionising and managing contemporary global drone warfare. Although Beijing has avoided direct involvement in recent conflicts, it plays an indirect role in conflicts in which it is not a party. For instance, China’s critical components and technologies, a key component in global drone manufacturing, have been significantly used by Ukraine[xvii], Russia and Iran.[xviii] On the other hand, the US drone manufacturing companies are also relying on Chinese critical components and batteries.

These capabilities of China stem from its dominance of the global supply chain and reprocessing facilities for rare-earth and other critical minerals. These minerals are key components of semiconductors, batteries and chips used in drones, missiles, laser systems and other military equipment, both expensive and inexpensive. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China currently accounts for over 60 per cent of global rare-earth production and over 90 per cent of their processing and refining.[xix] Moreover, the US Geological Survey report suggests that between 2020 and 2023, the US relied on China for over 70 per cent of its overall imports of rare earths and other minerals.[xx]

Such capability makes China a dominant player in managing and sustaining low-cost technologies. Additionally, these capabilities have created a massive global dependency on China, complementing its economy and security preparedness. Under such circumstances, China's export controls and restrictions on rare earths and other critical minerals could significantly disrupt global supply chains. In April 2025, China imposed tight export controls on seven heavy rare earths and associated technologies, followed by restrictions on a further five elements, associated products, equipment and technology in October, which primarily affected the US and the EU.[xxi] However, the second wave of restrictions has been suspended until November 2026.  

Implications and Conclusion

Cost has become a major variable in modern-day conflicts. If not a complete victory, these inexpensive systems have at least played a major role in affecting battlefield decision-making, battle expenditures, the duration of the conflict, and the short-term goals and objectives of the nations. In asymmetric warfare, smaller nations with limited resources have often used inexpensive weapon systems, giving them a limited yet certain advantage. However, the adoption of such capability by powerful countries with a technological and innovative edge has truly transformed them from mere inexpensive pieces of equipment into low-cost innovations. In the past five years, major powers have increasingly focused on developing low-cost innovations. Perhaps the strategy of utilising simple, affordable weapon systems has forced advanced militaries to rethink their traditional strategies.

Countries such as Russia, China, Israel and the US are leading the race to develop and deploy low-cost innovations and capabilities, complementing their sophisticated and innovative arsenals and technology-based warfare doctrine. The US has maintained the largest defence budget and has incomparable technological and innovative capabilities compared to almost all other countries. However, the emergence and application of the LUCAS drone system in the US inventory indicate that even the world’s most advanced militaries can learn and adapt strategies from smaller nations. Additionally, Israel’s development of Iron Beam and Russia’s establishment of the Rubicon unit suggest similar strategies of transforming inventory with low-cost systems.  

By expanding the cost spectrum, modern warfare has entered a phase where adaptability and cost-effectiveness matter as much as advanced technologies. Today, lessons from less powerful countries are also playing a major role in reshaping the strategies and doctrines of the strongest states. The emphasis on technological superiority has been challenged by small and cost-effective systems in recent conflicts. The fundamental shift in military strategies and outcomes driven by low-cost platforms could incentivise nations to develop inexpensive unmanned systems and interceptor drones for both offensive and defensive purposes. It will reduce the economic burden of prolonged wars and the number of casualties.

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*Dr. Mukesh Kumar is a Research Associate at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Kirichenko, David. “Russia’s growing Rubicon drone force is a major threat to Ukraine.” Forbes, September 4, 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkirichenko/2025/09/03/russias-growing-rubicon-drone-force-is-a-major-threat-to-ukraine/.

[ii] IISS. “Russia Doubles Down on the Shahed,” n.d. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/04/russia-doubles-down-on-the-shahed/.

[iii] Butts, Dylan. “Iran’s Shahed Drone: How 'the Poor Man’s Cruise Missile’ Is Shaping Tehran’s Retaliation.” CNBC, March 5, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/05/iran-shahed-136-drone-cost-air-defense-gulf-war-us-israel-gulf-scorpion-strike-centcom.html.

[iv] Dickinson, Peter. “Russia Has Learned from Ukraine and Is Now Winning the Drone War.” Atlantic Council, December 4, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-has-learned-from-ukraine-and-is-now-winning-the-drone-war/.

[v] Dickinson, Peter. “Russia Has Learned from Ukraine and Is Now Winning the Drone War.” Atlantic Council, December 4, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-has-learned-from-ukraine-and-is-now-winning-the-drone-war/.

[vi] “Russian Decoy Drones That Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses | ISIS Reports | Institute for Science and International Security,” December 18, 2024. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/russian-decoy-drones-that-depend-on-western-parts-pose-a-great-challenge/.

[vii] Balestrieri, Steve. “Russia’s Military Is a Drone ‘Superpower.’” National Security Journal, June 5, 2025. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/russias-military-is-a-drone-superpower/.

[viii] Business Insider. “Russia Has Been Able to Keep Its Most Effective Drone Flying over Ukraine Thanks to Western-Made Parts.” Accessed April 1, 2026. https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-keeps-orlan10-drone-flying-over-ukraine-with-western-parts-2023-2.

[ix] “The Fall and Rise of Russian Electronic Warfare | Hudson Institute.” February 17, 2026. https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/the-fall-and-rise-of-russian-electronic-warfare.

[x] “​Russia Replaces Orlan and Zala with ‘Single-Use’ Molniya Reconnaissance Drones — a Shift Impossible Without China | Defense Express.” Accessed April 1, 2026. https://en.defence-ua.com/news/russia_replaces_orlan_and_zala_with_single_use_molniya_reconnaissance_drones_a_shift_impossible_without_china-17721.html.

[xi] Arranz, Adolfo, Ally J. Levine, Arathy J. Aluckal, et al. “Cheap Drones Are Reshaping the War in the Sky.” Reuters, March 17, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkyamxqpm/.

[xii] Arranz, Adolfo, Ally J. Levine, Arathy J. Aluckal, et al. “Cheap Drones Are Reshaping the War in the Sky.” Reuters, March 17, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkyamxqpm/.

[xiii] The Times of India. “‘One-Way Attack Drone’ Used by US for First Time in Iran Strikes: What LUCAS Is and How It Works.” March 1, 2026. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/international/one-way-attack-drone-used-by-us-for-first-time-in-iran-strikes-what-lucas-is-and-how-it-works/articleshow/128904438.cms.

[xiv] Newdick, Thomas. “Israel’s Iron Beam Laser Air Defense System Has Downed Enemy Drones.” The War Zone, May 29, 2025. https://www.twz.com/news-features/israels-iron-beam-laser-air-defense-system-has-downed-enemy-drones.

[xv] Dwyer, James. “Israel’s ‘Iron Beam’: Why Laser Weapons Are No Longer Science Fiction.” The Conversation, March 4, 2026. https://doi.org/10.64628/AA.saqp54frc.

[xvi] Iron Beam, accessed March 30, 2026. https://www.rafael.co.il/system/iron-beam/.

[xvii] Pusztaszeri, Aosheng. Why China’s UAV Supply Chain Restrictions Weaken Ukraine’s Negotiating Power. December 16, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-chinas-uav-supply-chain-restrictions-weaken-ukraines-negotiating-power.

[xviii] Jcookson. “From Drones to Rocket Fuel, China and Russia Are Helping Iran through Supply Chains.” Atlantic Council, March 25, 2026. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/from-drones-to-rocket-fuel-china-and-russia-are-helping-iran-through-supply-chains/.[xix] “Why China Curbing Rare Earth Exports Is a Huge Blow to the US.” October 16, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1drqeev36qo.

[xx] Mumladze, Mariam. “Why Rare Earths Are Central to US-China Relations.” The Loop, November 19, 2025. https://theloop.ecpr.eu/rare-earths-are-central-to-us-china-relations/.

[xxi] IEA (2025), with new export controls on critical minerals, supply concentration risks become reality, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/commentaries/with-new-export-controls-on-critical-minerals-supply-concentration-risks-become-reality.