Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction

Today’s world politics is passing through a major geopolitical transformation, and the world is witnessing an unprecedented level of transnational alliances and counter-alliances, which seem to be anchored in the temporality of the existing situation. 

Amid the US’s aggressive posturing under Trump and constant war-drumming against its adversaries, no nation, despite its economic or military strength, diplomatic stature or strategic depth, seems able to withstand fearlessly the politics of maximalist pressure or diplomatic coercion without creating its own bloc with a minimum common understanding of each other’s aspirations and limitations. The middle powers of the larger and extended Arab world have perhaps realised that the politics of intra-regional belligerency or ideological and political contestation has lost its relevance and should be jettisoned if they are to confront the wrath of the US–Israel duo and their politics of arm-twisting against those who choose to confront them or question  their long-term strategic or economic objectives. 

It is in these contexts that the recent visit of President Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye to Saudi Arabia and Egypt should be examined. President Erdogan first reached Saudi Arabia on 3 February 2026, and his second destination was Egypt, where he met President El-Sisi and had several other engagements on 4 February 2026. This was his second visit to Egypt after his visit in 2024[i], and similarly, it was his second visit to Saudi Arabia after 2023[ii], as well as his first foreign trip in 2026. 

One can interpret the present visit of Erdoğan to two important nations of the Arab region in multiple perspectives , but one cannot ignore the fact that the central  objective of the visit, among many others, was to establish a co-ordination framework among three major countries, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in the face of the Israeli political and military onslaught on Gaza; growing violence in the West Bank; constant encroachment on Lebanese and Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity; the deepening strategic and diplomatic divide over the situation in Sudan and Yemen; and the ongoing military strikes against Iran Since the Gaza ceasefire agreement signed in October 2025, one has seen how the Israeli war of attrition continues, and the chances of entering into the second phase of the agreement seem to be diminishing with each passing day. 

Erdoğan’s Visit to Saudi Arabia: A Sign of Consensus on Regional Issues

The latest visit of Erdoğan to Saudi Arabia and Egypt seems to have reinforced the axiom that there is no permanent enemy or permeant friend in politics. One can recall how both the countries boycotted each other diplomatically on global level following the murder of Saudi journalist Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 and Türkiye’s continued demonization Saudi Arabia while the latter launched a global campaign against the former for its alleged abetment of terrorism and providing shelters to the Islamist forces.

President Erdoğan landed in Riyadh on 4 February 2026 and held bilateral talk with the Crown Prince and de-facto rule of Saudi Arabia, Mohmmed bin Salman. At the end of the meeting, a joint statement was issued which was almost an expressive of consensus on several regional and issues of bilateral concerns. Both sides welcomed the formation of the Borad of Peace and UNSC resolution 2803, adopted on 17 November 2025, authorizing the Board of Peace (BoP) to function as an interim arrangement for the governance of Gaza and to establish a temporary International Establishing Force in Gaza.[iii] The statement also welcomed those countries which joined the BoP. [iv]The statement also reinforced the relevance of UNRWA in the war-torn Palestine and called for its continued functioning in the territories of whole of Palestine.

The joint statement expressed concerns over ongoing Israeli attacks Gaza, growing obstruction in reaching of humanitarian aids to the people of Gaza and deteriorating humanitarian situation. The statement further urged for supply of aid to Gaz without any interruption and stop violence. They also welcomed the commencement of Gaza Administrative Committee.

The two countries condemned the external intervention in Yemen and expressed disproval of any effort to divide the country on regional, ideological or ethnic basis. Similarly on Sudan, they called for respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the statement urged that no entity should be allowed to act outside the state framework. Both sides expressed their commitment for a strong Syria under interim president Ahmed al-Shara who, according to the statement, is working for stable and peaceful Syria.

The expression of a commonality and uniformity on Yemen could, no doubt, antagonize UAE which recently had a military showdown with the Saudi Arbia when Southern Transitional Council backed by UAE had recently attacked the norther part of Yemen, a bordering area with Saudi Arabia. Over the years, the southern Yemen emerged as contentious issue between the two wealthy Monarchies because the UAE has resorted to some strategies which appears to be aimed at separating the southern Yemen from the north.[v] It is worth recalling here that Erdoğan’s visit to Saudi Arabia came at a time when the political and diplomatic bitterness are quite explicit between two on several regional issue as both are supporting the warring faction in regional conflict which are in opposite camps.

At present, the trade volume between the two nations stands at around $8 billion annually,[vi] which is 14 per cent higher than  last year, and the leadership has promised to increase it to $10 billion next year and to $30 billion during the ensuing years.[vii] The significance of the economic ties between the two can be gauged from the fact that both are the influential members in G-20 and both constitute around 50 % of the regional GDP. In a press conference, Erdoğan added that at present Turkish companies are working on 400 joint or separate projects with the cost of $300 billion in Saudi Arabia.[viii] Both sides also agreed to explore investments opportunities under the Saudi Vison 2030 and “Türkiye’s Century” launched in 2022.[ix] The joint statement also stated the relevance of ongoing efforts for Free Trade Agreement between GCC countries and Türkiye.

One-day visit of Erdoğan was followed by signing of comprehensive maritime defense deal signed between two countries on 10 February 2026. The deal was signed during the World Defense Show held at Riyadh with participation from ninety-eight countries. The deal was signed between Turkish company Ulku Global and Saudi company SAMI to develop, manufacture and maintain unmanned maritime vehicles in Saudi Arbia.[x] This deal is said to be a major leap for advancing the indigenous production of defense equipment which is core to the Saudi Vison 2030.

There have been some unconfirmed reports that the visit was also aimed at exploring the possibility of a broader regional framework similar to mutual defense pact signed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last year. Raza Hayat Haraj, the Minister for defense production of Pakistan stated a few days ago that all three countries (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye) had agreed long ago for a collective defense pact and it could be signed soon.[xi] Mr. Raza  also stated that nature of Saudi- Türkiye deal would not be like Saudi-Pak defense pact because the historicity, nature and objective and contours of Pak-Saudi ties are completely different from Türkiye-Saudi ties.[xii] If the proposed pact translates into reality, it would be an explicit indication of collective endeavors to come out of the dependency syndrome and to develop their own military arsenal and expand their alliance to counter the adversaries and defeat the design of others to redraw the regional geopolitical and territorial map.

Further the US’ acquiescence to Israeli attack on Qatar in June 2025 inflicted a severe blow on its traditional Gulf allies, forcing them to recraft its security architecture and Saudi-Pak mutual security pact and Türkiye’s apparent interest in entering into a similar agreement should be seen in the same context. There are reports that Türkiye is building a corvette for Pakistani navy and is reportedly establishing a manufacturing plant for drones and F-16. There are reports suggesting that Pakistan has already signed an agreement with the Sovereignty Council of Sudan (transitional government in Sudan) to supply Karakarm-8 attack aircraft and 200 reconnaissance, attacks drone and air defense system and it is worth recalling here that both Saudi Arabia and Egypt are supporters of the transitional government in Sudan.[xiii]

The former Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim bin Jaber has also exhorted the Gulf monarchies to join the proposed military alliance to protect their economic and security interest and offset the looming danger over the arch of the region.[xiv]

No doubt any positive movement in the direction of Saudi-Türkiye defense pact would adversely affect the future prospect of Saudi Arabi’s joining the Abraham Accord as both (US and Israel) have been constantly resorting to the politics of maximalist pressure against Saudi Arabia to sign the agreement.

Türkiye-Egypt Ties Consolidates Further

Similar to Erdoğan’s visit to Saudi Arabia, his one-day visit ( 4 February  2026) to Egypt reflected an effort to recalibrate regional dynamics which does not appear to be in convergence with the geostrategic interests of the larger Arab region.

The past two years has witnessed a qualitative and profound shift in the bilateral ties between Türkiye and Egypt after it had run into a dep crisis following the ouster of President Morsi in 2013, an ideological ally of Türkiye. Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt too under Presider El-Sisi accused the government of Türkiye of harboring leadership of terrorist outfits (read Muslim Brotherhood) and creating instability in the region when the ties were at the worst during early years of El-Sisi’s rule. Once relationship had reached to such a low point when President El-Sisi had called Türkiye to refrain from intervening in Arab affairs being a non-Arab state. As stated earlier, this visit of Erdoğan can also be attributed to the growing urge among major Arab and non-Arab powers for a political and strategic unity to confront new political realities. A key highlight of the visit of Erdoğan was the meeting of High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. [xv] The first meeting of the Council was held in the last week of 2014. Along with this high-level meeting, both leaders attended the concluding session of Egyptian-Turkish Business Forum, which was attended by large numbers of prominent entrepreneurs, traders and businessmen from both countries.[xvi] President Erdoğan also emphasized that Türkiye and Egypt share the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean making maritime cooperation an important pillar of bilateral relations.[xvii]

The joint statement issued at the end of Erdoğan-El-Sisi meeting largely echoed the statement issued in Saudi Arabia as far as regional issues are concerned. Like in Riyadh, here too both sides welcomed the formation of the BoP and the establishment of temporary International Establishing Force in Gaza. [xviii] The statement also called upon all sides in Lebanon to respect UNSC resolution 1701 and favored a Sudan-led and Sudan-owned process in Sudan and called for the territorial integrity of Yemen. On Syria, the statement called both Syria and Israel to respect 1974 Disengagement Treaty. Both sides also discussed the relevance of implementing the Gaza ceasefire in totality and the Egyptian Presidency issued an official statement which stated that there were around forty points which were discussed by the two leaders including the joint condemnation of Israel’s constant violation of Lebanese and Syrian sovereignty by conducting military operations inside their territories.[xix]

On the economic front, both sides promised to enhance the current trade volume from $8.8 billion (2024) [xx] to $15 billion by 2028.[xxi] Egypt is the largest trading partner of Türkiye in the continent of Africa, and both sides signed a series of agreements with a particular focus on pharmaceutical and medical supplies. At present Turkish investment in Egypt has reached $4 billion.

The defence sector was one of the major focuses of the discussion between the two leaders. According to the Turkish Defence Ministry, a state-owned arm manufacturing company has decided to set up a factory for 155mm-long-range artillery ammunition in Egypt as well as cartridge production facilities. Türkiye has also decided to supply Egypt with its Tolga air defence system- purely an indigenous product.[xxii] On the occasion, Erdoğan gifted a Turkish-made electric car, TUG, to his Egyptian counterpart, President El-Sisi[xxiii] . He later stated that Palestine constituted the core agenda of their bilateral talks. On Iran, both leaders urged for diplomatic means to resolve the issue.

A Geopolitical Decoding of Erdogan’s Visit

The two-day visit of President Erdoğan to Saudi Arabia and Egypt cannot be seen in isolation from the broader transformations occurring across the larger Arab world. The visit was primarily aimed at mobilising the Arab leadership, creating a consensus on mechanism of conflict resolution and posing a unified front to end the wave of conflict, violence, occupation, encroachment and looming chaos across the region. It indicated a departure from diplomatic rigidity and pursuit of self-interest or self-centered regional politics towards accommodative and inclusive politics to create a flexible bloc with due regard for the aspiration and interest of each respective country.

Türkiye’s growing diplomatic and strategic clout, particularly amidst the collapse of Assad regime, diminishing influence of Iran in regional politics and its inclusion in last phase of Gaza ceasefire mediation and growing proximity to President Trump must have persuaded Egypt and Saudi Arabia to consolidate their ties with Türkiye even though not long ago both were arch rivals of Türkiye in the region. Türkiye is engaged in a hectic diplomacy along with other regional powers to mediate US-Iran-Israel nuclear stalemate. Though Israel is opposed to including Türkiye in the executive council of the BoP but one should not be surprised if Türkiye could prove catalyst in moving the Gaza ceasefire into second phase as it enjoys good ties with both the Hamas and the US. No doubt, an early end to the Gaza plight would bring political relief  to both countries as Saudi Arabia is constantly fearful about potential public  backlash[xxiv] and Egypt is anxious  about the possible mass transfer of Gazans into its territories  if the crisis continues for long. Türkiye appears to be filling  the diplomatic and strategic vacuum created in the wake of the Gaza war as it has not acted only as a mediator in the  Ukraine conflict but has also played s a similar role in Gaza crisis at various levels. Perhaps, Egypt needs a strong partner in form of Türkiye to help end the  Gaza war, facilitate the Rafah crossing and steer the agreement  into its second phase. This could be achieved through mediation between Türkiye and the US where both enjoy good rapport with each other.

The visit has taken place at a very critical moment when the violence and killings continue in Gaza, Sudan is facing its worst humanitarian crisis, Libya is witnessing a political stalemate with no hope of any stability in the near future and there is a looming threat war over Iran’s uranium enrichment and ballistic missile programme. Iraq is facing its usual political instability and new fear of rise of terrorism after the transfer of thousands of imprisoned ISIS cadres in Syrian jails to Iraq and Yemen has emerged a new flashpoint between Saudi Arabia and UAE- a rare moment in their bilateral relationship in the region.

In such a volatile region, every major country is trying to reposition itself and carve out a role, and they now seem to have moved towards forging a collective approach because the past rivalry has not served their interest.

The choice of these two major countries in 2026 as first foreign destination[xxv] by Erdoğan is suggestive of the significance Türkiye accords to the whole region. Meanwhile, Türkiye is looking for a partnership with those countries that have been engaging with the regional issue for long with their own political weight and sway and both (Egypt and Saudi) fits in the design. Saudi Arabia also represents a pivotal actor to de-escalate the tension in the region, and the kingdom, along with Türkiye could play a pivotal role in easing the crisis in region.

The visit is also an indicative of the fact that no rebalancing can be done in the regional politics without the involvement of Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Likewise, no relationship in the larger Arab world could be governed by the logic of bilateral interest alone but collective approach has become a part of larger equation since the Israel-Gaza conflict began in October 2023[xxvi]

Here one could also see how the economic leverage enjoyed by Saudi Arabia is being viewed by power like Türkiye to deepen its economic ties and the visit is also about energy and defense where both sides need each other. Türkiye needs Saudi investment and energy while the kingdom is keen to upgrade its military hardware with Türkiye’s assistance. Over the years Türkiye has acquired a new clout in the global defence market particularly its Bayker Bayraktar TB2 drones which has emerged as an important component of its arms expert worldwide. Saudi Arabia seems less enthusiastic about its outreach to Russia or China for its defence requirement given the resent US’ backlash against those who imports arms from Russia or China.

What has added to Türkiye’s clout in regional politics is the role it was assigned by President Trump in BoP despite the displeasure of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Today, Türkiye is being seen by many as a counterbalance to Iran, which has lost its strategic clout after losing its allies in the form of Assad, the vanishing of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the total devastation of Hamas’ military infrastructure. Moreover, Trump does not seem to endorse each and every action of Israel, and the induction of Türkiye into the BoP is a case in point. In emerging political scenarios, Türkiye could act like a proxy of the US, which would, of course, excite regional powers to ally with it, as seen in the current moves of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Today Egypt finds itself completely isolated and marginalised in the regional politics and is constantly being haunted by fear of the influx of Gazans into its territories. In such a worrisome situation, Egypt needed an ally, which could come to its rescue and share some of its pressure and help it offset the public anger for its forced silence and submission to the dictates of Israel and the US. The joint military exercise conducted by both sides in September last year (the first in 13 years) [xxvii] cannot be seen in isolation from Gaza and other dangerous developments in the region, and both sides are looking for strategic alliances, and, in a way, one needs the other.

Further, similar stances of Türkiye and Egypt on most regional issues ranging from Somaliland to Sudan would have cemented ties further and growing support of the UAE to the Rapid Support Force (RSF) would have deepened their ties as Türkiye and Egypt are supporting Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, President of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia does not want to shoulder the burden of Israel-dominated region alone and it can rely on Türkiye only because it cannot trust the UAE and Egypt seems to be a weak link in the whole chain because of its strategic and diplomatic decline over the decades. Saudi Arabia is trying to expand the template of the regional politics and it can no longer confine the Arab affairs to the Arab leadership alone as was the case earlier. Soon after the fall of Assad, both countries (Türkiye and Saudi) expressed desire to play a constructive role in the region.[xxviii]

Saudi Arabia, for years, is trying to reposition its image in the regional politics and shift its image of a US’ proxy to be an independent actor or in the regional politics. Hence, it is in search of several regional options and front without being beholden to single power or axis. The region is witnessing a renewed phase of regional activisms and all parties are looking for a reliable partner and Türkiye seems to be a long term and genuine player that is why both the countries (Saudi and Egypt) appear keen to forge a new level of tie. In such a situation, Türkiye seems to be a stable partner instead of the UAE, which has been flexing its muscle in the region which was more explicit in Yemen, particularly after it became the part of the Abraham Accord. 

The scale of Gaza’s complexities and the US’ unilateral move seem to have forced these nations to assess their past position and revisit their previous stance to resolve the short-term and long-term crisis. For Türkiye, Gaza acts like an entry point to emerge as a bigger player in the region, and it knows that it cannot do it alone and particularly in opposition to Israel, which does not want to see it in any role. It is important for Türkiye to regain its regional role and use Palestine as leverage to transcend its regional alliance or traditional role.

All these three countries know that a prolonged conflict is not in favor of the region, and further, any full-fledged war against Iran can have a devastating impact, and the memory of Iraq’s invasion is still fresh for the whole region. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a litmus test for Turkish diplomacy and his new government under Erdoğan, who was somehow able to say “no” to the use of its airbase by the US-led forces.

A Politics of Compulsion or Long-Term Strategy

An observer of the Arab politics knows it well that the regional leaders in the Arab world for decades have invariably failed to evolve a consensus on regional conflict and it is well reflected in the dysfunctionality of organizations such as Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab League (AL) or Origination of Islamic Conference (OIC). However, the current turmoil in the region seems to have persuaded the regional leaders to revisit the past policy of self-interest and evolve a collective mechanism in response to present realities. They must have realized that the military onslaught is not only confined to Gaza or Lebanon or Syria or Yemen but it could engulf the whole region as Iran, a relatively powerful country, has already borne the brunt of joint US-Israel military strikes. The current efforts for creating a regional unified bloc manifested in this shuttle diplomacy should not be seen as tactical move alone but it has been driven by an existential defensive necessity.[xxix] It is not merely a chance that the visit of Erdoğan coincided with the visit of Egyptian Foreign Ministers to Saudi Arabia and UAE, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister’s visit to Qatar and Turkish Foreign Minister’s visit to Egypt.

The Israeli media has described Erdoğan’s two-nation tours as endeavors to create a new regional axis, that collapsed in the face of Israeli military operations when Israel was seen to be fighting on multiple fronts across the region. This visit cannot be regarded as a fleeting diplomatic event but rather as a new effort to project a regional alliance in the wake of Israel’s rise and the openly belligerent policy of the US, resulting in the dawn of a new era in regional politics.

The shared threat perception emanating from Israel seems to be pushing towards a comprehensive geopolitical transformation of the region. Three past adversaries have moved towards a policy of integration because politics based on isolation or unilateral assertion failed to serve their respective interests. Arab leaders now appear to have realised that isolationism tends to render them more vulnerable and that alliance-building is the only viable path to survival in a troubled region.

Recent modernization and advancement of Turkish defense industry and technology proved to be factor in attracting power like Saudi Arabia and Egypt towards it as both are keen to diversify the source of defense equipment and are gradually moving away from US-led security umbrella. The idea of forming a new defense alliance between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia should also be seen in the light of geological transformation, where politics of coercion instead of hitherto politics of negotiation or accommodation seems to be shaping the diplomatic landscape of the region. The shuttle diplomacy cannot be seen as a political luxury but an existential necessity to reshape a balance of power to contain Israel and other pro-Israeli forces.

Conclusion

President Erdoğan's tour to two important countries of the region reveals the region’s search  ongoing search for new balance of power after the collapse of regional order existed before the eruption of Israel-Gaza war.

The constant expansion of the confines of conflict and violence seems to have forced a reorientation or recasting of foreign policy by many countries, and this was evident in Erdoğan’s visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The visit was more of a pre-emptive exercise to rearrange diplomatic equations before the situation takes a much harsher turn and the region becomes more chaotic.

The visit was not only meant for Türkiye to reconnect with old allies and reposition regional geopolitics with a specific role for itself, but it was also equally important for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which have lost significantly in their diplomatic and strategic domains in the face of US–Israel coercive diplomacy and politics of intimidation.

Apart from the many tangible and intangible messages of the visit, the most significant seems to be the realisation on their part that the growing threat of further chaos and anarchy cannot be confronted individually. A collective effort and diplomatic convergence are urgently needed to address the volatile situation and chart a new course of action, as the region is trapped in a vortex of crisis at an unprecedented level.

This two-nation tour of Erdoğan cannot be regarded as a routine visit. It has the potential to evolve into a meaningful and concrete action plan and could serve as a prelude to the establishment of a regional strategic partnership between Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, even though the latter two were once at loggerheads during the peak of the Syrian civil war and amid Egypt’s crackdown on Islamist forces. The evolving partnership appears aimed at confronting current regional challenges while serving the layered interests of all three.

However, there are certain limitations and constraints that could deter the achievement of the core objectives of the visit or what has been outlined in the joint statements. Each country has its own exclusive and divergent interests, which could, if not derail, at least delay the process of forging a closer partnership, as speculated by many observers. For example, it remains uncertain how far Egypt or Saudi Arabia can go in deepening ties with Türkiye and whether they can overlook or disregard the concerns of powers such as Israel or the US. According to a report published in Arabic Daily, Al-Quds-Al-Arabi, the US has asked Sudi Arabia to stop financing the Turkish fighter jets or partner in its production. Israel too has expressed its concern over growing involvement of Turkiye in the region and some local media reports in Israel has interpreted the visits an effort to build a Sunni ring around Isarel.  

Similarly, despite the emergence of consensus on a series of regional issues, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may not pursue identical policies on the unfolding situation in Iran.

Further, this visit by Erdoğan reflects a strategic shift in Turkish foreign policy and an attempt to restore Türkiye’s role as a pivotal player in the region, in line with the objectives of the “Century of Türkiye” project launched in 2022, which aims to enhance the country’s regional and global stature. However, one may still harbour doubts as to whether Saudi Arabia and Egypt would allow Türkiye to shape the region in accordance with its own preferences. Any narrow approach or exclusivity is likely to undermine the broader objective behind Erdoğan’s visit by bringing latent conflicts of interest to the fore before any positive outcome can be achieved.

*****

*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Erdogan in Egypt in first ever visit in a decade; to hold summit with Sisi, Ahram online, February 24, 2024, Accessed https://shorter.me/5gKop February 12, 2026.

[ii] Joint Statement Issued at Conclusion of Turkish President’s Visit to Saudi Arbia, Saudi Press Agency, February 4, 2026, Accessed https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2504609 February 12, 2026

[iii] United Nations Digital Library, November 17, 2025, Accessed. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf#files February 23, 2026.

[iv] Erdogan Improves Relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt: An Alliance of Interests against Israel, Hazarat for Political and Strategic Studies (Arabic), February 5, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/cKhQX February 14, 2026.

[v] Mohammad Ayoob, Saudi Arabia vs. the UAE: The Other Gulf Crisis, The National Interest National Interest, February 14, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/gYqRF February 20, 2026.

[vi] Sheema Abdul Hameed, An Analysis of Turkish President’s Visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Shaaf (Arabic), February 5, 2026, Accessed, https://shorter.me/jxy7J February 22, 2026.

[vii] Sheema Abdul Hameed, An Analysis of Turkish President’s Visit to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Shaaf ( Arabic ), February 5, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/jxy7J February 22, 2026.

[viii] Yusuf Hamood, Erdogan’s Visit to Saudi Arabia: The Gulf at the Heart of Reshaping the Regional Balance, Khaleej online (Arabic), February 6, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/p8LAl February 24, 2026.

[ix] Joint Statement Issued at Conclusion of Turkish President’s Visit to Saudi Arbia, Saudi Press Agency, February 4, 2026. Accessed https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2504609 February 12, 2026.

[x] Saudi-Turkiye Defence Agreement in Fields of Naval Vehicle, Khaleej online (Arabic), February 11, 2-26. Accessed https://shorter.me/c1tvp February 24, 2026.

[xi] Ismail Basha, An Analysis of Prospect of Turkiye-Pak-Saudi Alliance, Arabic 21, January 28, 2026. Accessed   https://shorter.me/u5WUN February 5, 2026.

[xii] Ismail Basha, An Analysis of Prospect of Turkiye-Pak-Saudi Alliance, Arabic 21, January 28, 2026. Accessed   https://shorter.me/u5WUN February 5, 2026.

[xiii]Yusuf Hamood, Erdogan’s Visit to Saudi Arabia: The Gulf at the Heart of Reshaping the Regional Balance, Khaleej online (Arabic), February 6, 2026.  Accessed https://shorter.me/p8LAl February 24, 2026.

[xiv] Ismail Basha, An Analysis of Prospect of Turkiye-Pak-Saudi Alliance, Arabic 21, January 28, 2026. Accessed   https://shorter.me/u5WUN February 5, 2026.

[xv] Shadee Luis, Regional Restructuring, Al-Modon (Arabic), Feb 11 2026, Accessed  https://shorter.me/g4BUR  February 28 2026.

[xvi] Erdogan Improves Relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt: An Alliance of Interests against Israel, Hazarat for Political and Strategic Studies (Arabic), February 5, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/cKhQX February 14, 2026.

[xvii] Military and Trade Agreement between Egypt and Turkiye and a Gift from Erdogan to Sisi, Arabic 21, (Arabic), February 4 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/KlazR February 23, 2026.

[xviii] Digital Library United Nations Digital Library, November 17, 2025. Accessed  https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf#files February 23, 2026.

[xix] Erdogan Improves Relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt: An Alliance of Interests against Israel, Hazarat for Political and Strategic Studies (Arabic), February 5, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/cKhQX February 14, 2026.

[xx] After Saudi Arabia, Erdogan Arrives in Egypt and holds close door meeting with Siss, Arabic 21 (Arabic), February 4, 2026, Accessed, https://shorter.me/DX2vc February 10, 2026.

[xxi] Lizzie Porter & Hamza Handavi, Egypt, and Turkey deepens newly forged alliance with arm deals and manufacturing ties, The National, February 22, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/gTuFf February 23, 2026.  

[xxii] Lizzie Porter & Hamza Handavi, Egypt, and Turkey deepens newly forged alliance with arm deals and manufacturing ties, The National, February 22, 2026, Accessed https://shorter.me/gTuFf February 23, 2026

[xxiii]Military and Trade Agreement between Egypt and Turkiye and a Gift from Erdogan to Sisi, Arabic 21, (Arabic), February 4, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/KlazR February 23, 2026.

[xxiv]https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/where-does-turkey-fit-saudi-arabias-new-regional-policy. 

[xxv] Umru Al-Misri, Erdogan Visits Saudi Arabia, and Egypt at the Time of Regional Flux: What does Nakra wants from its Arab outreach, 180 Tahqeeqat (Arabic), February 3 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/1ySCA February 14, 2026.

[xxvi] Umru Al-Misri, Erdogan Visits Saudi Arabia, and Egypt at the Time of Regional Flux: What does Nakra wants from its Arab outreach, 180 Tahqeeqat (Arabic), February 3, 2026, Accessed https://shorter.me/1ySCA February 14, 2026.

[xxvii] Erdogan Improves Relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt: An Alliance of Interests against Israel, Hazarat for Political and Strategic Studies (Arabic), February 5, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/cKhQX February 14, 2026.

[xxviii] Betul Dogan Akkas, Saudi Arabia’s New Regional Policy has strong potential, Middle East Eye, February 8, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/wZeQ_ February 10, 2026.

[xxix] Mutazz Mansour, Saudi Rabia, Turkey and Egypt: A Rapprochement of Compulsion, Hizb al-Edarah-al-Shabiyah (Arabic), February 8, 2026. Accessed https://shorter.me/ByYYb February 10, 2026.