Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: While the US has framed Maduro’s capture on 3 January 2026 primarily through the lens of narco-terrorism threats to its national security, Venezuela also emerged as a focal point where several broader US strategic concerns converged. For Venezuela’s central partners (China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba), the post-Maduro phase has opened a period of heightened uncertainty exemplified by the US issuance of general licenses for Venezuela’s energy sector on 13 February 2026. While, for Latin America the US operation put forwards pressing questions about the space available for strategic autonomy. 

Introduction 

On 3 January 2026, the United States launched a major military operation inside Venezuelan territory, named Operation Absolute Resolve, aimed at capturing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Both were subsequently transferred to the United States to face criminal charges, including narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, and weapon possession. The US government publicly framed its operation in Venezuela as a law enforcement mission aimed at executing longstanding criminal charges against Maduro, thereby stripping him of sovereign immunity. The intervention immediately triggered international concern, raising questions about the legality of extraterritorial enforcement against a sitting head of state, the absence of UN authorisation, and the precedent such an action sets for the rule-based order. Nonetheless, beyond these immediate legal implications, the Venezuelan case reveals a deeper shift in US policy towards the Western Hemisphere.

Venezuela’s Transformation from Ally to National Security Concern for the US

Throughout 20^th century, Venezuela was the United States reliable partner[i] in the Western Hemisphere. Between the 1920s and 1930s, under a concession-based legal framework, the US companies built much of the infrastructure for oil extraction in Venezuela and the US became the primary market for Venezuelan oil. However, these dynamics shifted with the rise of Hugo Chávez in 1998 and his Bolivarian ideology that championed “oil sovereignty” and hence greater state control over natural resources. In 2001, as part of his ideology, Chávez passed a law called the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, reinforcing constitutional provisions that hydrocarbon reserves belonged to the state, mandating that exploration and extraction activities be carried out by PDVSA or joint ventures in which the Venezuelan state held a majority stake, while allowing some private firms to participate in downstream activities (such as refining and sale). Between 2004 and 2007, operating agreements with foreign partners were converted into majority-state controlled with PDVSA holding at least 60 %–80 % ownership, while simultaneously raising royalty and tax rates, squeezing private interests[ii]. By 2007, major US firms such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused to accept the new terms and exited the Venezuelan oil sector, relinquishing extensive holdings in heavy-oil projects in the Orinoco Belt[iii].

Chávez also gradually adopted a more confrontational stance toward the United States, rooted in his Bolivarian worldview that emphasised national sovereignty and resistance to imperialism. Chavez publicly questioned U.S. militarised actions in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks[iv] and bilateral relations worsened between the two countries especially after the failed 2002 coup attempt, during which US was accused by the Chávez government of its involvement.

After Chávez’s death in March 2013, his chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro, assumed the Venezuelan presidency and continued the Bolivarian Revolution. However, Maduro’s early tenure coincided with a collapse in global oil prices, which fell from around $100 per barrel in 2014 to roughly $40 per barrel by the first quarter of that year[v]. This price decline hit the economy particularly hard because oil constituted nearly 98 % of export earnings and was the principal source of revenue used to fund social welfare programs. Along with that, the steady deterioration of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) caused due to decades of political appointments, corruption, underinvestment, and loss of technical expertise, drastically reduced oil output[vi]. Compounding this, there was economic mismanagement, the government set price caps on basic goods, and with higher demand and lower supply, businesses couldn’t make a profit and production fell, contributing to widespread shortages of essentials. Government also kept tight currency controls, which created a large gap between the official exchange rate and the black-market dollar rate, making imports more expensive and harder to buy. To cover large budget deficits, the government printed more money, which greatly weakened confidence in the Venezuelan currency Bolívar and helped push inflation to very high levels.

Beginning in February 2014, large-scale protests erupted nationwide[vii]. The Maduro administration responded with force, and accusations of human rights abuses proliferated. In December 2014, the U.S. Congress passed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, leading to targeted sanctions (including visa bans and asset freezes) on Venezuelan officials accused of human rights violations. Further, in February 2015, the U.S. Department of State issued visa restrictions, and in March 2015 President Obama issued Executive Order 13692, declaring Venezuela as a national security issue.

By late 2016, Venezuela had entered a sustained period of hyperinflation as shortages of food and medicine intensified, the economy collapsed, and millions of Venezuelans began to migrate abroad in search of basic necessities and better living conditions. And, beginning in August 2017 and expanded through 2019, the US imposed severe financial sanctions on Venezuela, effectively blocking Venezuelan government and state oil company, PDVSA, from US financial markets. These measures were aimed to restrict Nicolas Maduro's government from raising funds and accessing US capital. 

On the political front, the United States refused to recognize the outcome of the 2018 Venezuelan presidential election that declared Nicolás Maduro the winner, citing the absence of free and fair electoral conditions. In January 2019, Washington formally recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, thereby directly challenging Maduro’s legitimacy.

Six years later, the July 2024 presidential election was similarly criticised by the US as neither free nor fair, imposing additional sanctions on Maduro and his allies for their roles in electoral obstruction. Notably, this time, the United States also accused Nicolás Maduro of being the head of ‘Cartel de los Soles’ (Cartel of the Suns),[viii] which is responsible for trafficking drugs to the US. On July 25, 2025, the US Treasury Department designated the cartel as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, framing it as a national security threat.[ix]

By 3 January 2026, the US conducted a military operation in Venezuela, to extract Maduro, justified as a counter-narcoterrorism measure. Following the operation, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would ‘oversee a transitional framework’ in Venezuela as necessary to stabilise regional security while reasserting influence over Venezuela’s oil sector[x]. Subsequently, US entered talks with Venezuela’s interim President, Delcy Rodríguez, the former Vice President who assumed office after Maduro’s removal.

Operation Absolute Resolve is Culmination of a Phased Escalation Strategy

The 3 January US operation was not an isolated or reactive event but the culmination of a long-term, phased escalation strategy designed to dismantle the political, economic, and strategic foundations that had enabled the Maduro government to withstand pressure.

First, sanctions- In December 2014, the US Congress passed the Venezuela Defence of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, and in March 2015 President Barack Obama declared Venezuela an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’ to US national security.[xi] This designation enabled targeted sanctions against senior officials. After 2017, the Trump administration significantly expanded these measures by imposing financial restrictions on the Venezuelan state and sectoral sanctions on PDVSA,[xii] as means to increase pressure on Maduro regime.

Second, political delegitimization – in both the 2018 and 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, the United States, along with large segments of the international community, refused to recognise Nicolás Maduro’s victory. This sustained non-recognition deepened Venezuela’s diplomatic isolation and eroded the regime’s political legitimacy.

Third, naval deployments under counter-narcotics mandates – on 19 August 2025, the United States deployed naval assets, including nuclear-powered submarines, to the southern Caribbean[xiii]. These deployments justified under counternarcotics operations signalled a heightened US military presence in Venezuela’s immediate strategic environment.

Fourth, expansion of US legal instruments and targeted strikes on maritime assets – On 20 February 2025, US classified drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organisations,[xiv] effectively extending US jurisdictional claims beyond its borders. Subsequently, on 2 September 2025, the US military conducted a strike on a Venezuelan vessel in the Caribbean, resulting in the deaths of 11 individuals on board. The United States justified the operations by stating that the targeted vessels were allegedly involved in drug-smuggling activities. By 2 October 2025, President Donald Trump announced that the United States was engaged in ‘armed conflict’ with drug cartels.[xv]             

Lastly, seizure of oil tankers – starting mid-December, the US has intensified the seizure of Venezuelan oil tankers, the so-called ‘shadow fleet’ transporting sanctioned oil. These actions, aimed to tighten the enforcement of sanctions.

Strategic Rationale Behind Operation Absolute Resolve

Though the United States justifies Maduro’s capture behind narco-trafficking and narco-terrorism that challenged US national security, Venezuela also represented a convergence point of multiple other US concerns. Its targeting was therefore not incidental. It was selected precisely because success in Venezuela would serve as a demonstration effect and restore the credibility of US red lines.

A)  Larger Strategic Context

At a systemic level, the Venezuelan intervention served a broader signalling purpose for the United States. Amid narratives of declining US influence and accelerating talks on multipolarity, the US faced pressure to demonstrate its capacity to enforce red lines, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, historically treated as its strategic backyard. Venezuela offered a highly visible test case, allowing the United States to signal that alignment with rival powers or countries under US sanctions carries tangible costs.

In fact, the Western Hemisphere has re-emerged as a strategic theatre. Over the past decade, extra-regional powers, such as China, Russia, and Iran have expanded their engagement in Latin America, forming economic, diplomatic, and, in some cases, security partnerships with governments often considered anti-West, including Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. These relationships pose different challenges to US interests, highlighting the region’s growing significance in great power competition. At the same time, many left-leaning Latin American governments have given external actors access to strategic assets, such as ports, telecommunications, space infrastructure, minerals, and oil.

Allowing these trends to consolidate would, in US strategic terms, amount to tacit acceptance of a multipolar Western Hemisphere, an outcome widely regarded as incompatible with US national security. It is within this context that the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy 2025 articulates a renewed Western Hemisphere doctrine. Framed as a ‘Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine’, the strategy seeks to deny non-hemispheric actors the ability to control strategic assets or project influence in the region.

B)  Venezuela’s emergence as the most consequential site for this reassertion of order

Venezuela emerged as the most consequential site for Washington’s reassertion of order in the Western Hemisphere because it uniquely concentrated four structural challenges into a single strategic problem for US policymakers. 

First, Venezuela retained the world’s largest proven oil reserves, giving the country enduring geopolitical value despite a decline in production. For the United States, the concern was not only getting the reparations for US energy companies faced from exit due to nationalisation under Chavez and Maduro but about determining who could access Venezuelan crude, under what conditions, with broader implications for global energy pricing and market governance. 

Second, Maduro’s sustained political defiance (like Cuba’s Castro) distinguished it from other Latin American countries where US pressures eventually produced expected policy recalibration. Venezuela’s oil revenues, though sharply reduced, continued financing Maduro’s regime’s welfare programmes, thereby preserving internal cohesion and discontent. This was made possible due to continued support of Russia, China and Iran.

Third, Venezuela played a key role in weakening US sanctions beyond its own borders. Venezuela’s oil exports helped sustain the Cuban economy, thereby supporting another US-sanctioned country. Moreover, facing sanctions, Venezuela relied on a ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers that continued exporting oil, thereby undermining the effectiveness of US sanctions.

Fourth, the operation aimed to constrain the extra-hemispheric rivals influence in Venezuela. Under both Chávez and Maduro, whose governments adopted a pronounced anti-US posture, these actors (China, Russia, and Iran) expanded their engagement by leveraging Venezuela’s growing estrangement from US. Thus, removing Maduro aimed to disrupt the strategic ecosystem through which these countries expanded their influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Venezuela’s Relation with Its Central Partners: Implications for US and Post Maduro Concerns

Under Hugo Chávez and later Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela built especially close ties with Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran. These partnerships helped the government secure markets, money, technical assistance, and political backing at a time when US sanctions limited Venezuela’s access to Western markets.

• Cuba- Energy for services

The Cuba–Venezuela partnership received renewed momentum under Hugo Chávez with the signing of the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement on 30 October 2000. A central pillar of this agreement was an energy–services exchange, under which Venezuela supplied oil to Cuba below market rates, while Cuba provided medical professionals, educators, and technical expertise to Venezuela. This support continued under Nicolás Maduro, who reinforced the strategic alliance by signing 51 agreements in his first year as president, covering energy management and social programmes in areas such as healthcare, education, and recreation. Beyond economic and social cooperation, the alliance also developed a significant security dimension. Cuba played a key role in restructuring the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB). It is in this context that the recent 32 Cuban military personal was killed during US operation in Venezuela[xvi].

• Iran – Axis of Resistance

The Iran–Venezuela partnership dates back several decades, rooted in early diplomatic ties established when both countries became founding members of OPEC in the 1960s. However, the relationship deepened substantially in the early 2000s under Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, underpinned by a shared anti-American ideology. Further, for Iran, Venezuela provided an opening to expand its strategic presence in the Western Hemisphere. Hence this resulted in reciprocal state visits and cooperation agreements in energy, housing, and infrastructure. Chávez also openly supported Iran’s nuclear program, asserting Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes[xvii]. The partnership expanded further under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who developed a close personal bond with Hugo Chávez and oversaw a significant expansion in economic cooperation related to oil and gas refining and energy technology, mineral exploration, construction projects, automobile production, and banking programs.

Alongside the economic ties, defence relations also gradually increased from around 2006, Tehran began supplying Venezuela with Mohajer-series unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) produced by Iran’s Qods Aviation Industries (QAI). These platforms were subsequently re-branded and assembled in Venezuela as ANSU-series drones for use by the Venezuelan armed forces. In Fact, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) covering 2020–2024, Venezuela was the second-largest recipient of Iranian arms exports, accounting for 11% of Iran's total. The transfers largely consisted of Iranian-designed UAVs[xviii]. 

After Chavez death, Iran–Venezuela relations initially lost momentum as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, did not prioritise Latin America in his early foreign policy. However, bilateral ties regained strategic significance after the U.S. reimposed sanctions on Iran in 2018, and on Venezuela’s PDVSA in 2019, prompting closer coordination to mitigate economic and energy constraints. From 2019 energy collaboration deepened as Iran supplied fuel, refinery components, and technical assistance to revive Venezuela’s crippled oil sector. Both sides also allegedly relied on shadow shipping networks to bypass US sanctions[xix]. Relations further intensified after Ebrahim Raisi assumed office in 2021, culminating in Maduro’s 2022 visit to Tehran and the signing of a 20-year strategic cooperation agreement encompassing the energy, financial sectors, as well as an agreement to “work together on defence projects[xx]”. The momentum in relations continued under President Masoud Pezeshkian, with Iran reaffirming its support for Nicolás Maduro, while Venezuela condemned Israeli actions against Iran in June 2025.

• Russia- Power Projection

Over more than two decades, Russia has embedded itself in Venezuela's military and energy sector, supporting Hugo Chavez and his successor, Nicolas Maduro, and establishing a firm foothold in the Western Hemisphere On energy, after Hugo Chávez’s nationalisation of Venezuela’s oil industry, the country required massive capital and technical support to sustain production. As a result, Venezuela turned to Moscow for cooperation in redeveloping its oil sector. In 2009, Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA and a consortium of major Russian producers (TNK‑BP, Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, and Surgutneftegaz) signed a memorandum of understanding to develop the Junín‑6 block in the Orinoco Oil Belt, with PDVSA holding a controlling 60 % stake and the Russian consortium 40 %[xxi]. However, over the 2010s, most of these Russian partners scaled back or exited due to low production results, operational difficulties, and uncertain economic prospects in Venezuela’s highly challenging oil environment. This left Rosneft as the principal Russian energy actor in Venezuelan upstream projects. By the mid‑2010s, Venezuela’s economy was in severe decline, and PDVSA struggled with cash shortages, falling oil output, and limited capacity to pay for imports or maintain operations, compounded by U.S. and Western sanctions that cut off access to international financing.  To keep oil flowing, Rosneft provided prepayments and loans to PDVSA between 2014 and 2017, with repayment structured in oil deliveries[xxii]. Rosneft also acquired stakes in additional Orinoco Belt ventures during this period.  As U.S. sanctions intensified, targeting not only Venezuelan oil but also foreign intermediaries that helped Venezuela, Rosneft faced increased legal and financial risks for its trading activities. In response, Rosneft transferred its Venezuelan assets in 2020 to Roszarubezhneft, a Russian state‑owned energy company, to protect them from sanctions and it continues to operate them[xxiii]. From 2018 onward, Russia has not publicly announced new loans to Venezuela, and its ability to finance or expand foreign investments became more constrained after the onset of the Ukraine war and pressure from Western sanctions. Despite these limitations, energy cooperation has endured. In May 2025, Russia and Venezuela signed a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Treaty that included commitments to collaborate on oil and gas exploration, joint ventures, and energy market cooperation[xxiv]. Later, on November 20, 2025, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a 15‑year extension of long‑term joint ventures between PDVSA and Russia’s Roszarubezhneft[xxv].

Subsequently, relations progressed in the defence sector as Venezuela was looking forward to diversify after years of reliance on U.S. equipment and training. Around 2005–2006, Venezuela under Chávez placed large orders for Russian weaponry, including Kalashnikov rifles, helicopters, and Sukhoi Su‑30MK2 fighter jets. In May 2011, the two governments signed an intergovernmental military-technical cooperation agreement in Moscow, formalizing defence relations and establishing Russia as Venezuela’s principal arms supplier[xxvi]. Under this framework, Russia delivered a wide range of military hardware, including multi-role fighter jets, helicopters (Mi‑17, Mi‑35, Mi‑26), tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and air defence systems, and also transferred licensed production technology[xxvii].

Meanwhile for Russia, Venezuela served as leverage against US support for Ukraine and Georgia. As part of power projections, Russia deployed Tu-160 strategic bombers to Venezuela on three occasions. The first deployment occurred in September 2008, shortly after the Russia–Georgia war. A second visit took place in October 2013, when Tu-160 bombers stopped in Venezuela as part of long-range training flights in Latin America. Last, deployment occurred in December 2018, amid Venezuela’s internal political crisis. In March 2019, Russia also sent a small contingent of military personnel to Venezuela. Though Russia stated that the personnel were deployed under existing military-technical cooperation agreements to conduct maintenance, training, and consultations. Since, the arrival took place amid Venezuela’s deepening political crisis, the move can be interpreted as symbolic support for President Maduro.

• China- Financing through oil-backed loans

China’s growing influence in Venezuela began with the signing of a “Strategic Development Partnership” in 2001 under President Hugo Chávez. The move was in response to diversify its economic relations away from the United States, which had long been Venezuela’s principal trading partner and primary source of foreign direct investment. The relations were later elevated under Maduro, with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2014 and to an all-weather strategic partnership in 2023 indicating very deep, resilient, and long-term cooperation. On September 14, 2018, Venezuela also joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[xxviii].

Today, China is Venezuela’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. Over two-thirds of China’s official imports from Venezuela are oil and oil-related products. The relationship deepened significantly in the energy sector, following Chávez’s visit to Beijing in December 2004, where he proposed expanded cooperation in the oil sector. Major Chinese state-owned energy firms (CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC) became involved in crude purchases, upstream investments, petrochemical ventures, and structured financing arrangements. Later, these investments culminated in the establishment of the China–Venezuela Joint Fund (CVJF) in 2007[xxix]. Accordingly, China extended tens of billions of dollars in oil-backed development loans to Venezuela which the country used to finance infrastructure projects such as railways and power plants. Repayment was structured through long-term crude shipments.

During the oil boom years prior to 2014, Venezuela borrowed heavily from China, estimated at approximately US$60 billion, under this model[xxx]. However, the collapse of oil prices in 2014 fundamentally altered the equation. As export revenues plummeted, PDVSA was required to ship greater volumes of oil to service the same debt commitments, intensifying fiscal strain. By the mid-2010s, repayment stress became evident, with shipment delays and renegotiations emerging as recurring features. Although Beijing continued limited financial support between 2016 and 2018, large-scale new lending slowed considerably as Venezuela’s economic crisis deepened. The imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA in 2019 further forced Chinese state oil companies such as CNPC to formally paused direct crude lifting due to sanctions[xxxi]. Nevertheless, Venezuelan oil continued to reach Chinese markets through intermediaries and other opaque trading arrangements.

Beyond, energy, defence relations also solidified with Venezuela becoming a major buyer of Chinese arms in Latin America since 2005.  Acquisitions have included light tanks, armored personnel carriers, rocket launch systems, radar systems, and transportation and training aircraft. China also supported Venezuela’s space and satellite ambitions, which includes the construction of El Sombrero Satellite Ground Station and its backup facility, the Luepa Satellite Control Ground Station[xxxii].

A)  Strategic Implications for the US

For the United States, each relationship that Venezuela maintained with its central partners posed a distinct level and type of challenge to US interests in the Western Hemisphere. And hence the removal of Nicolás Maduro was about dismantling a set of differentiated strategic threats emanating from this partnership.

In case of Cuba, Venezuela undermined US sanctions on Cuba by serving as a principal economic lifeline, particularly through subsidised oil supplies. From US perspective, pressure on Venezuela offered an indirect means of weakening Cuba without direct intervention, thereby encouraging change in Cuba that might lead to greater alignment with US interests. Trump in fact mentioned Cuba will fall of its own, and no need for intervention^[xxxiii], the gravity of this statement might be after understanding the role played by Venezuela in Cuban economy.

At the systemic level, Venezuela functioned as a platform for great power competitors (China and Russia) to expand their political, economic, and security footprints close to US borders. China’s expanding presence in Venezuela was viewed by US as a long-term strategic challenge rather than an immediate threat. The US concerns also centred on Chinese-operated ground stations and dual-use infrastructure in Venezuela^[xxxiv], which reportedly allow Beijing remote access and potential intelligence-gathering of US activities in the hemisphere.

Meanwhile, Russia’s role in Venezuela is perceived as more overtly confrontational by the US. Even though Russia’s economic capacity has been constrained by US sanctions and the Ukraine war, its actions such as deployment of TU-160 strategic bombers to Venezuela in 2008, 2013 and 2019 are viewed as deliberate power projection intended to challenge US influence.

At the asymmetric threat level, Iran’s relationship with Venezuela raised a different set of concerns. The US have repeatedly alleged that Iranian-backed Hezbollah networks use Venezuela as a logistical, financial, and operational hub in the Western Hemisphere, challenging its national security^[xxxv].

As a result, “Operation Absolute Resolve” was named to signal US willingness to decisively neutralise perceived threats emanating from Venezuela absolutely. In the immediate aftermath of the operation, the United States has sought to leverage sanctions relief and oil-sector access to pressure the interim Venezuelan government to significantly scale back economic and strategic ties with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba.

B)  Post-Maduro: Concerns of Venezuela’s Central Partners 

1.  Honouring Existing Political Commitments and Commercial Contracts

The post-Maduro phase has generated widespread uncertainty among Venezuela’s central partners, primarily over whether the interim leadership under Delcy Rodríguez will withstand US pressure and continue to honour existing political commitments and commercial contracts. 

The ongoing US-Venezuela discussions reportedly link future oil cooperation and the retention of existing contracts to conditions imposed by the United States. Accordingly, on 13 February 2026, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), issued two general licenses, General License No 49 and 50, that together open limited, conditional pathways for foreign oil companies’ engagement in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector. General License No. 49 allows foreign companies to enter contracts with PDVSA for new investments in Venezuelan oil and gas with separate permits from OFAC. The authorization also does not allow transactions with companies in Russia, Iran, or China or entities owned or controlled by joint ventures with people in those countries[xxxvi]. On the other hand, General License No. 50 permits limited operational activity in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector, only for five international energy companies such as BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell. While these firms are allowed to engage in specified transactions with the Venezuelan government and PDVSA, the license requires that most monetary payments, such as royalties, taxes, or fees, be deposited into US-supervised Foreign Government Deposit Funds[xxxvii]. In response to the licenses issued, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, during his visit to Venezuela in February 2026, emphasized that a central aim of US energy policy is to expand American investment in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector while limiting the influence of external powers such as China, Russia, and Iran in the country’s energy industry[xxxviii]. Subsequently, this has raised concerns among Venezuela’s central partners. 

In case of Cuba, Venezuela was not simply an ally of convenience for Cuba, but an ally with which it formed a “Bolivarian brotherhood” and was key to Cuba’s external survival strategy. Though the interim Venezuelan government has confirmed that the bilateral ties will continue to be guided by principles of self-determination, national sovereignty, brotherhood, solidarity, cooperation, and reciprocity, Cuban officials remain uncertain whether leadership will be able to resist sustained US pressure aimed at weakening this long-standing alliance. At present, Cuba is facing a severe energy and economic crisis exacerbated by the decline in oil shipments from Venezuela[xxxix] due to US sanctions. Further, dilution of Venezuelan support could only exacerbate Cuba’s economic and energy vulnerabilities. 

Iran’s concerns are more structural. A post-Maduro realignment possibly with US would significantly constrain Iran’s ability to operate, transit and project influence in Latin America. Venezuela has functioned as Iran’s principal logistical and diplomatic foothold in the Western Hemisphere, a shift in Venezuela’s political orientation thus would narrow Iran’s regional operating space and undermine its sanction evasion networks.

China and Russia face the most consequential strategic and economic uncertainties. In response to the license issued by the US on 13 February 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the restrictions as discriminatory[xl], highlighting Moscow’s long-term projects and claiming investment ownership in Venezuelan oil assets. While for China, especially, this has become a major concern, as the country is entitled to an estimated 4.4 billion barrels[xli] of Venezuelan reserves under the oil-for-loan debt repayment framework, placing this model under strain. Beijing also fears that the interim government in Venezuela under US pressure may shut down China’s space tracking and ground station in Venezuela, one of China’s most strategically sensitive overseas installations.

In the post-Maduro phase, both China and Russia are primarily focused on safeguarding and preserving their existing economic and strategic investments in Venezuela.

2.  Larger Concerns for China and Russia

Both actors view US actions against Maduro as setting a troubling precedent and signals a readiness to cross previously respected red lines by the US, accelerating a shift away from a rules-based international order towards overt power projection. They are concerned whether this in the future can repeat in other theatres, where they have invested heavily.

Moreover, sustained US pressure on LA governments to exclude (primarily China and, to a more limited extent, Russia) from strategic sectors such as energy, ports, logistics, telecommunications, and defence in the western hemisphere has become a concern. Like the Venezuelan oil sector, the US diplomatic and strategic pressure has previously influenced Latin American governments to reassess, restrict, or recalibrate engagement with extra-regional actors. For instance, in Panama, US pressure contributed to the review and cancellation of Chinese-linked port concessions[xlii], while in Costa Rica, regulatory and security frameworks were recalibrated to restrict China’s participation in critical telecommunications infrastructure[xliii].

At present, however, there is little indication that Beijing or Moscow intends to escalate directly. Instead, both appear inclined to adopt a wait-and-see approach, while potentially using the Venezuelan case as a blueprint for similar actions in other theatres, including Ukraine, Taiwan or elsewhere.

Implications of the US Operation for Latin America’s Strategic Autonomy

The US military operation in Venezuela has exposed deep fault lines across Latin America. Regional responses have been sharply divided: left-leaning governments of Cuba, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil condemned the move as a violation of sovereignty and a dangerous precedent for regional stability, while several conservative governments of Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, Chile and Ecuador welcomed or framed the action as a necessary blow to Venezuela’s authoritarianism and to transnational criminal networks[xliv]. This polarization highlights the persistent ideological fragmentation that limits collective responses to external intervention in the LAC region.

The operation also puts forward questions regarding space available for LAC’s strategic autonomy. On one hand, the US operation in Venezuela signals that overt ideological confrontation, particularly when coupled with strong alignment toward US strategic rivals in sensitive sectors, carries tangible costs. However, engagement with US rival powers is not impossible. What is shrinking is not the ability to diversify relations, but the space for openly defiant geopolitical positioning. Latin American governments can still engage extra regional actors, but such engagement must be carefully calibrated. For example, Brazil under left aligned Lula demonstrate that strategic autonomy can still be pursued through calibrated balancing under “"active non-alignment" rather than outright confrontation. Brazil, has maintained robust trade relations with China while declining to formally join the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby preserving room for cooperation with the US and resisting US pressure to exclude Chinese telecom firms[xlv]. This kind of pragmatic hedging underscores that autonomy remains viable when engagement with external powers is managed carefully, without provoking.

More fundamentally, the US operation in Venezuela leaves Latin America with few choices. One path is states adjust to US pressures through bilateral engagement. Second path involves deeper political, economic, and security coordination at the regional level to enhance collective bargaining power and expand autonomy. However, this option requires overcoming ideological divisions, institutional weaknesses, and resource constraints that have historically undermined Latin American integration. In parallel, governments could also deepen South–South partnerships, with actors such as India, ASEAN, Africa, to reduce overdependence on any single power centre and widen their room for manoeuvre.

Conclusion

The US operation in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 marks a decisive inflection point in the US approach towards the Western Hemisphere. While US has framed Maduro’s capture primarily through the lens of narco-terrorism threats to US national security, Venezuela also emerged as a focal point where several broader US strategic concerns converged. These included the country’s sustained political defiance, the geopolitical and economic significance of its vast oil reserves, its role as a hub for sanctions circumvention, and the deepening influence of extra-hemispheric rivals within its economic, security and political structures. The operation thus served as a signal to US adversaries that it is prepared to use force to prevent them from gaining or retaining influence in key economic sectors of a sanctioned country, underscoring a willingness to cross red lines that had previously been respected in the Western Hemisphere.

For Venezuela’s central partners (Cuba, Iran, China and Russia), the Maduro regime provided a critical foothold to challenge US influence in the Western Hemisphere and to sustain their economy. However, the post-Maduro phase has introduced deep uncertainty over whether US pressure will constrain the interim government’s capacity to sustain political alignments and protect long-standing commercial and strategic commitments, exposing them to heightened risks across diplomatic, economic, and security domains. These concerns have already been exacerbated by the US issuance of general licenses for Venezuela’s energy sector on 13 February 2026, creating uncertainty about the future of their investments and influence in Venezuela’s oil industry. Further, they are concerned whether this in the future can repeat in other theatres, where they have invested heavily.

Regarding the implications of US operation in Venezuela for Latin America’s strategic autonomy, the intervention underscores that Latin America’s strategic autonomy is increasingly shaped by how states calibrate their foreign policy choices. Venezuela under Maduro shows that overt geopolitical defiance carries higher risks, while calibrated engagement and pragmatic hedging as seen in Lula’s Brazil remain viable strategies. Ultimately, the future of Latin America’s autonomy will depend on the region’s ability to strengthen regional integration overcoming ideological divisions.

*****

*Dr. Girisanker SB, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] Michael Crowley, “How Venezuela Went From U.S. Ally to Trump Target,” New York Times, December 19, 2025, updated December 20, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/19/us/politics/venezuela-united-states-history.html

[ii] Igor Hernández and José La Rosa Reyes, Reforming Venezuela’s Oil and Gas Sector: 02 The Context in Venezuela (Chatham House, May 20, 2021), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/reforming-venezuelas-oil-and-gas-sector/02-context-venezuela

[iii] NBC News. “Exxon, Conoco Refuse to Sign Venezuela Deal.” June 26, 2007. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19431319.

[iv]Democracy Now! “Chavez Slams Bush Administration; Predicts End of U.S. Empire.” Accessed February 16, 2026. https://www.democracynow.org/2006/9/21/headlines/chavez_slams_bush_administration_predicts_end_of_us_empire . 

[v] “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate | Council on Foreign Relations.” November 30, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/venezuela-crisis.

[vi] The Policy Circle. “Socialism: A Case Study on Venezuela.” Accessed February 16, 2026. https://www.thepolicycircle.org/minibrief/socialism-a-case-study-on-venezuela/.

[vii] BBC News. “What Lies behind the Protests in Venezuela?” Latin America & Caribbean. February 25, 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-26335287.

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[xxv] Mayela Armas, “Venezuela Approves 15‑Year Extension of Russia‑Linked Oil Joint Ventures,” Reuters, November 20, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/venezuela-approves-15-year-extension-russia-linked-oil-joint-ventures-2025-11-20/.

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[xxvii] CNA, “Trends in International Maritime Geography and Maritime Power Projection,” CNA Report IOP‑2019‑U‑020309, June 2019, https://www.cna.org/reports/2019/06/IOP-2019-U-020309-Final.pdf.

[xxviii] affairs, Zhao Yusha Global Times reporter covering international, politics, and society Zhao Yusha. “China, Venezuela Elevate Bilateral Ties during Maduro’s Visit - Global Times.” Accessed February 16, 2026. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202309/1298154.shtml.

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[xxxii] “China-Venezuela Fact Sheet.” Accessed February 16, 2026. https://www.uscc.gov/research/china-venezuela-fact-sheet-short-primer-relationship.

[xxxiii] The New York Times, “After Venezuela, Trump Says Cuba Is ‘Ready to Fall,’” New York Times, January 5, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/05/world/americas/trump-venezuela-cuba.html

[xxxiv] See xiv

[xxxv] “-Hezbollah in Latin America: implications for U.S. homeland security.” Accessed January 19, 2026. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72255/html/CHRG-112hhrg72255.htm.

[xxxvi] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela Sanctions Program: General License 44 and Related Authorizations,” accessed February 16, 2026, PDF file, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935011/download?inline.

[xxxvii] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Venezuela Sanctions Program: General Licenses, Authorizations, and Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed February 16, 2026, PDF file, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935016/download?inline.

[xxxviii] “- YouTube.” Accessed February 16, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQp7JHp9U5A.

[xxxix] Ramani, Devyanshi Bihani &. Srinivasan. “How Venezuela’s Oil Collapse Is Plunging Cuba into Energy and Food Crisis.” Data. The Hindu, January 27, 2026. https://www.thehindu.com/data/how-venezuelas-oil-collapse-is-plunging-cuba-into-energy-and-food-crisis/article70547120.ece.

[xl] Dmitry Antonov and Anastasia Teterevleva (reporting), “Lavrov Says U.S. Restrictions on Russia’s Role in Venezuela Oil Business Are Discrimination,” Reuters, February 11, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/lavrov-says-us-restrictions-russias-role-venezuela-oil-business-are-2026-02-11/.

[xli] Tang, Didi, and BERNARD CONDON 5. min read. “Trump Has a China Problem in Venezuela: What to Do with Beijing’s Debt and Oil Stakes.” Yahoo Finance, January 9, 2026. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/trump-china-problem-venezuela-beijings-010046180.html.

[xlii] Press, Associated. “Panama Supreme Court Cancels Hong Kong Company’s Canal Contracts.” World News. The Guardian, January 30, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/30/court-ends-hong-kong-china-panama-canal-contracts.

[xliii] ET. “Chinese Embassy Criticizes Costa Rica for 5G Company Restrictions.” ETTelecom.Com. Accessed February 16, 2026. https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry /chinese-embassy-criticizes-costa-rica-for-5g-company-restrictions/104459634.

[xliv] Ioris, Rafael R. “Latin America’s Mixed Reactions to Trump’s Venezuela Intervention.” New Lines Magazine, January 15, 2026. https://newlinesmag.com/argument/latin-americas-mixed-reactions-to-trumps-venezuela-intervention/.

[xlv] “China’s Influence Over Space, Ports, and the Telecommunication Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean Emerges as a Security Concern for the US - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India).” Accessed February 16, 2026. /show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=13594&lid=8286.