Indian Council of World Affairs

The Myanmar military-aligned party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won the general elections, which were held in three phases from December 2025 to January 2026. Numerous international and regional organisations, including the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), have expressed divergent views towards the conduct of elections in Myanmar,. Myanmar is an important member country of ASEAN. Therefore, the viewpoint will look at the response of ASEAN member states towards Myanmar’s recently concluded general elections and possible future action by the Association. 

The Background 

The Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw took over the reins of government in 2021, after rejecting the November 2020 general election results, in which the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) won with an absolute majority. The military called the 2020 elections illegal, and citing irregularities, annulled them. Since then, Myanmar has witnessed intense fighting between pro-NLD groups and the Myanmar military, resulting in widespread destruction, killings and displacement. Some of the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) in the periphery have also opposed the military takeover of government. In collaboration with the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government supported by the NLD, the EAOs have been fighting the junta to assert control over areas dominated by minority ethnic groups. The spillover effect of the internal conflict on the economy and security are immense, especially for the states bordering Myanmar, such as Thailand, Laos etc. In response to the crisis, ASEAN proposed a Five-Point Consensus (FPC) in April 2021, during the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in Jakarta, under the chairmanship of Brunei.^[i]

The FPC called for an immediate end to violence and commencement of constructive dialogue among all parties. It agreed to the appointment of a special envoy to facilitate mediation and provide humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (the AHA Centre). Myanmar agreed to give careful consideration to constructive suggestions made by ASEAN leaders, but did not commit to implement the FPC, unless law and order is restored within Myanmar first.^[ii]

Since 2022, ASEAN has sent special envoys to visit Myanmar to meet with the concerned parties and stakeholders of peace. Despite ASEAN’s constant push, the military regime has not fully implemented the FPC so far. It did not allow special envoys to interact with all the concerned parties and stakeholders. For instance, Cambodia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prak Sokhonn, serving as ASEAN’s special envoy, visited Myanmar in 2022 but was not allowed to meet the NLD leader and former State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi. ^[iii] Instead, he was only given access to some members of the EAOs who signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and the junta officials. Since then, subsequent ASEAN’s special envoys faced similar barriers, with the junta insisting that the implementation process of the FPC must be Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned.^[iv] In a notable development, ASEAN’s special envoy to Myanmar, Othman Hashim from Malaysia, met some of the EAOs, such as the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Chin National Front and the NUG representatives outside Myanmar, in Thailand in February 2025.^[v] The move signalled ASEAN’s keen interest in pushing Myanmar towards a peace path by engaging with all stakeholders. Meanwhile, since 2021, ASEAN chose not to invite a junta representative to ASEAN Summits; instead, Myanmar was asked to send a non-political representative for the same, which was not agreed to by the junta.

As a result of the ongoing conflict in Myanmar, the economy is suffering. The World Bank has projected a 2.5 per cent contraction in GDP of Myanmar for the fiscal year 2025-26.^[vi] The March 2025 earthquake that hit parts of Myanmar amidst the internal political turmoil has put more burden on the economy. Despite the ongoing economic and political challenges, the junta went ahead with conducting elections with a promise to bring stability to the country.

Response to Myanmar’s Electoral Process

In preparation for the election, the junta in Myanmar invited the ASEAN to send observers to monitor the elections held in three phases from December 2025 to January 2026. Initially, ASEAN as a bloc did not respond positively to the request and took a position that it will not send observers or certify the elections^[vii]. Individual ASEAN member adapted divergent positions on the electoral process marked by concern and support. For example, Thailand’s Foreign Minister urged the Myanmar junta to peacefully transfer power following the elections, but warned that the military-led electoral process will not be “free or credible”, and therefore, Thailand will not recognise it. The Thai Minister, however, hoped that the poll could mark a key step in the broader peace process.^[viii] Indonesia resonated with a similar stand, stressing that ASEAN must take decisive actions to prevent further escalation of the effects of Myanmar’s crisis.^[ix] The Indonesian foreign minister has labelled the situation in Myanmar as ASEAN’s “backyard crisis” and emphasised the need for genuine and sustainable solutions to the crisis to secure regional stability and address humanitarian concerns.^[x] Malaysia, a member country of the bloc, is also facing vulnerabilities like refugee inflows and fears disruption to regional trade routes due to ongoing internal developments in Myanmar. Therefore, Malaysia did not send any observers to Myanmar’s elections,^[xi] while the Malaysian Prime Minister held direct talks with the junta and the NUG.^[xii]

Singapore concerned about securing vital shipping lanes and regional security, upheld ASEAN’s rules-based framework and the full implementation of the FPC, criticising the conduct of the electoral process as the “bypass of democracy essentials”.^[xiii] Even ASEAN’s newest member, Timor-Leste, aligns itself firmly with ASEAN’s stance. Timor-Leste held talks with NUG members in Dili, a move criticised by the junta, as NUG, a shadow government, is labelled as terrorists by the military regime.^[xiv] Brunei, a maritime state and one of ASEAN’s smallest members, cannot risk regional instability, which can adversely affect its oil-rich economy^[xv] and national security; therefore, it also endorsed the bloc’s position on Myanmar’s electoral process.

Conversely, some ASEAN members showed willingness to engage with the post-election government in Myanmar, despite the concerns raised about the junta-led electoral process within the country and outside. For instance, the Philippines, which assumed the Chairmanship of ASEAN in January 2026, showed interest in engaging with the junta leadership in Myanmar.^[xvi] The Philippine Foreign Secretary, who is appointed as the special envoy of ASEAN to Myanmar, signalled towards the need to recognise the election outcome but emphasised that ASEAN as a bloc has not endorsed the three phases held.^[xvii] Cambodia and Vietnam are other ASEAN countries that sent delegations to monitor the elections in Myanmar.^[xviii] Cambodia’s position on elections in Myanmar can be seen as its willingness to play the role of a peace broker in the region. While Vietnam, a traditional ally of Myanmar, expects a domestic resolution through inclusive agreements between various stakeholders.^[xix] Adding to these divergences, Laos also showed interest in sending a team of election observers at the beginning of elections and supported the Myanmar election process.^[xx]

ASEAN’s Dilemma

The divergent views among the members of ASEAN regarding the conduct of general elections and the outcome may act as an impediment in engaging with the post-election government in Myanmar. The elections were held in areas firmly under the military’s control, where the junta-backed party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), won the elections, securing 72 per cent of seats.^[xxi] By conducting the general election, the junta aimed to secure domestic and international legitimacy. While Western powers and pro-democracy groups within Myanmar and a few EAOs have labelled the election as a sham, nonetheless ASEAN will have to deal with the government in place.^[xxii]

The ASEAN has maintained that “it will not recognise the outcome of the election, given the lack of consensus within ASEAN”.^[xxiii] Now that the elections have concluded in Myanmar, with the military-backed party USDP set to form the new government, it is yet to be seen how the ASEAN will persuade the new government in Myanmar to implement the FPC and engage with the new dispensation in Myanmar based on consensus decision making.

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*Ashutosh Rath, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes 

[i] Chairman’s statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, April 24, 2021, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf.  Accessed on January 16, 2026

[ii] Press Release on ASEAN Leader’s Meeting, April 27, 2021, https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi:eng/news/3253.  Accessed on January 16, 2026

[iii] “ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy welcomes Myanmar’s Year for Peace in 2022”, Khmer Times, July 7, 2022, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501108353/asean-chairs-special-envoy-welcomes-myanmars-year-for-peace-in-2022/.  Accessed on January 16, 2026

[iv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Union of Myanmar, March 22, 2022, https://www.mofa.gov.mm/en/press-release-20/.  Accessed on January 19, 2026

[v] “Myanmar Junta Gives New ASEAN Envoy Frosty Reception”, The Irrawaddy, February 13, 2025, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmars-crisis-the-world/myanmar-junta-gives-new-asean-envoy-frosty-reception.html. Accessed on February 14, 2026

[vi] Macro Poverty Outlook (Myanmar), World Bank, October 2025, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c6aceb75bed03729ef4ff9404dd7f125-0500012021/related/mpo-mmr.pdf.  Accessed on February 13, 2026

[vii] The Strait Times, “ASEAN will not certify Myanmar election or send observers, Malaysia says”, January 20, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-will-not-certify-myanmar-election-or-send-observers-malaysia-says. Accessed on January 22, 2026

[viii] “Thailand urges Myanmar junta to allow transition after vote”, The Straits Times, December 08, 2025, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-urges-myanmar-junta-to-allow-transition-after-vote. Accessed on January 22, 2026

[ix] “Southeast Asian MPs to ASEAN: Denounce Myanmar Junta Sham Elections and Put Rohingya Humanitarian Crises at the top of Summit Agenda”, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, October 23, 2023, https://aseanmp.org/publications/post/southeast-asian-mps-to-asean-denounce-myanmar-junta-sham-elections-and-put-rohingya-humanitarian-crises-at-the-top-of-summit-agenda. Accessed on January 23, 2026

[x]Jayanti Nada Shofa, “Indonesia Seeks ‘Beyond Business As Usual’ Approach on Myanmar Election”, Jakarta Globe, January 14, 2026, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-seeks-beyond-business-as-usual-approach-on-myanmar-election.  Accessed on January 24, 2026

[xi] “ASEAN will not certify Myanmar election or send observers, Malaysia says”, The Straits Times, January 20, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/asean-will-not-certify-myanmar-election-or-send-observers-malaysia-says. Accessed on January 23, 2026

[xii] Haris Azman, “ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy on Myanmar: Between Symbolism and Substantive Diplomacy?”, MEIG, June 13, 2025, https://www.meig.ch/highlight-29-2025-asean-chairs-special-envoy-on-myanmar-between-symbolism-and-substantive-diplomacy/. Accessed on January 24, 2026

[xiii] “SM Lee Hsien Loong at the Regional Outlook Forum 2026 Dialogue”, Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, January 08, 2026, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/sm-lee-hsien-loong-at-the-regional-outlook-forum-2026-dialogue/. Accessed on January 27, 2026

[xiv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Union of Myanmar, January 19, 2026, https://www.mofa.gov.mm/en/myanmar-protests-and-condemns-timor-lestes-conduct-contravening-the-asean-charter/. Accessed on January 27, 2026

[xv] Moez Hayat, “Understanding Brunei’s Approach to Diplomacy in Myanmar”, International Affairs Forum, https://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternal_Document.cfm?contenttype_id=5&ContentID=9209#comments. Accessed on January 28, 2026 

[xvi] Maria Siow, “Asean urged to rethink stance as Myanmar election risks normalising junta rule”, South China Morning Post, January 15, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3340024/asean-urged-rethink-stance-myanmar-election-risks-normalising-junta-rule?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article. Accessed on January 28, 2026

[xvii]Jim Gomez and Joeal Calupitan, “ASEAN does not recognize Myanmar’s elections”, Associated Press, January 30, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/asean-philippines-international-law-conflict-c1651405c9fbe7883970ec26f02cd388. Accessed on February 2, 2026

[xviii] Refer to footnote no. 13.

[xix] Anna Velikaya, “A Fragmented Response: ASEAN Policy on the Myanmar Crisis”, Valdai, December 26, 2025, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/a-fragmented-response-asean-policy-on-the-myanmar/ . Accessed on February 2, 2026

[xx] Myat Sandar Zaw, “Myanmar’s election is a litmus test for ASEAN centrality”, East Asia Forum, January 08, 2026, https://eastasiaforum.org/2026/01/08/myanmars-election-is-a-litmus-test-for-asean-centrality/#:~:text=ASEAN's%20response%20to%20the%20junta,than%20questioning%20the%20electoral%20process.  Accessed on January 23, 2026

[xxi]Myo Pyae, “Myanmar Military-Backed USDP Wins Over 72% of Seats in Junta’s Election: UEC”, The Irrawaddy, February 04, 2026, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/myanmar-military-backed-usdp-wins-over-72-of-seats-in-juntas-election-uec.html. Accessed on February 5, 2026

[xxii] Shwe Yi Myint Myat, “Myanmar’s planned elections are a sham”, East Asia Forum, November 16, 2025, https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/11/16/myanmars-planned-elections-are-a-sham/. Accessed on February 5, 2026

[xxiii] Mara Cepeda, “No consensus for now’ within ASEAN to recognise Myanmar election, says grouping’s chair”, The Straits Times, January 29, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/no-consensus-for-now-within-asean-to-recognise-myanmar-elections-says-groups-chair. Accessed February 6, 2026