Abstract: While witnessing the recent Afghanistan Pakistan conflict, hanging on a fledgling limited ceasefire, already violated by both the parties’ multiple times, the paper aims to analyse the recent fault-lines within Pakistan that have contributed to the current state of Af – Pak bilateral relations.
Introduction
Pakistan has been treating Afghanistan as a vassal state for long. Interfering in its domestic politics, moulding and re-moulding its foreign policy, instigating factionalism within tribes, as well as keeping some important clans under its stronghold, Pakistan has maintained such an Af-Pak policy for long. However, with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 15, 2021, things have not been smooth for the Pakistani establishment. In the initial days, the then Director of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed drinking tea in Kabul in September 2021 was seen as an influence Pakistan had on Afghanistan.
Though severe factional politics continues among the various tribal and ethnic entities in Afghanistan, there has been a general negative perception about Pakistani leadership and the establishment in the Taliban 2.0 regime.
As of October 2025, casualty figures from the Pakistan-Afghanistan clashes remain uncertain and highly contested, with both sides presenting contradictory accounts. Afghan authorities assert that they killed 58 Pakistani soldiers and destroyed several border outposts, while Pakistan’s military reports 23 of its personnel killed and claims to have eliminated more than 200 “Taliban and affiliated militants.” Islamabad has rejected Kabul’s claims as “outrageous and blatant lies.”[i]
The Refugee Issue
The Pakistani government has announced plans to expel both undocumented and certain documented Afghan refugees, including holders of Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC) and Proof of Registration (PoR) cards, under its “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Program” launched in October 2023. As part of this initiative, Islamabad intends to begin repatriating more than 1.3 million PoR cardholders in September 2025, a move that has already resulted in the arrest and deportation of millions of Afghans, both documented and undocumented. Despite strong objections by Afghan law makers as well as human rights activists, Pakistan government proceeded with the process of forceful deportation. On October 15, 2025, the federal government ordered the immediate de-notification of the remaining 28 Afghan refugee camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, effectively dismantling what had been over four decades of temporary refuge in the province. The decision marks an end to a 40-year period of displacement and uncertainty for Afghan refugees. This Pakistani decision has led to the forceful removal of more than 1.3 million Afghan nationals with PoR.[ii]
This sort of ‘insult to honour’ that has been brought forth on Afghanis by the Pakistani establishment has led to friction between the two countries. From all areas more than 1.9 million documented or undocumented Afghanis have been forcefully repatriated.[iii]
Role of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban or the Fitna al-Khawarij has been a major bone of contention for the Pakistani establishment. It has been working in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa targeting government installations, law enforcement officials, army establishment as well as civilians to promote and protect their interests demanding localised implementation of Islamic laws and the end of barbarity carried out by the Pakistani military establishment over the Pashtuns. To counter such barbarism. since the Taliban’s resurgence in 2021, violence in Pakistan has surged. In just the first nine months of 2025, over 2,400 people were killed—nearly matching and set to surpass last year’s total of around 2,500 deaths from attacks nationwide.[iv]
There were attempts of mediation between the TTP and Pakistani leadership by the Taliban leadership, but the talks collapsed. Pakistan now blames both the Afghan leadership as well as India (without any reason or evidence) in supporting the TTP carrying out unabated violence within Pakistan.
This is the reason why the Pakistani establishment took the decision of carrying out air-strikes on unverified locations killing women and children leading to direct conflict between Afghan and Pakistani security forces in October 2025.
Other Causes
Few other causes can be cited as major irritants that has come to the fore. After decades, the first bilateral visit of Acting Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to New Delhi on a six-day visit from October 10 has been an issue of contention for the Pakistani leadership. The manner in which Muttaqi was received and the meetings were held cannot be to the liking of the Pakistani establishment. It should be noted that Pakistan carried out its first attacks on Kabul, after Muttaqi arrived in New Delhi. Even the Pakistani Foreign Office summoned the Afghan Ambassador, objecting to references to Jammu and Kashmir in the joint statement and how it was mentioned that terrorism is an internal matter of Pakistan.[v]
Another issue is the Bagram Air Base, which President Trump wants the US to reclaim as an air force base, which was vacated in haste before. President Trump had made his interest known to re-acquire/return the Afghan Bagram Air Base to Field Marshall Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. President Trump also threatened the Taliban leadership to comply to the US demand of handing over the air-base.[vi] The Taliban leadership responded by stating that “Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are paramount,” urging the United States to honour previous commitments not to use military force, which Trump threatened to use stating that the base was only miles away from China.[vii]
One more issue requiring attention is the law-and-order situation in Pakistan. It is rightly mentioned by international media that “ISI is facing an unprecedented crisis of control across multiple fronts”. This could lead to a major re-shuffle in the ranks of the Pakistani establishment. The violent road protests carried out by Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)[viii] throughout Pakistan and the manner in which the establishment and law enforcement agencies violently suppressed the protests by directly shooting at the protestors had to be hidden from the mainstream and international media. Though there was a blanket ban on domestic social media, the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, did divert attention of the international media, from the domestic violence on streets that was taking place in Pakistan.[ix] More than 15 protestors died in police shooting, hundreds being injured in Lahore and Islamabad.[x]
Assessment
There is no doubt that Pakistan survives on false narratives and fiction but even in the maze of falsehoods and tales, it is falling short to hide the fault-lines of Pakistan and its relations with its neighbours. The present Afghan Pakistan conflict remains a challenge to the peace and security of the region and reflects the quagmire that Af-Pak region is in.
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*Dr. Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharjee, Sr. Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Updates: Afghanistan’s Taliban, Pakistan say border clashes killed dozens, Al Jazeera, October 12, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/10/12/live-afghanistans-taliban-pakistan-claim-inflicting-losses-in-fighting#:~:text=Tensions%20between%20Pakistan%20and%20the,in%20the%20cross%2Dborder%20clashes. Accessed on October 16, 2025
[ii] Curtains for Afghan refugee camps in KP as Centre de-notifies last 28, Dawn, October 16, 2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1949157/curtains-for-refugee-camps-in-kp-as-centre-de-notifies-last-28 accessed on October 16, 2025
[iii] Afghanistan: Returns of Afghans creating multi-layered human rights crisis, Office of High Commissioner, UNHRC, July 18, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/07/afghanistan-returns-afghans-creating-multi-layered-human-rights-crisis#:~:text=In%20just%20over%20seven%20months,including%20500%2C000%20since%2013%20June. Accessed on October 16, 2025
[iv] Analysis: Why Pakistan and the Taliban won’t find it easy to patch up, Al Jazeera, October 16, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/16/analysis-why-pakistan-and-the-taliban-wont-find-it-easy-to-patch-up accessed on October 16, 2025
[v] Pakistan Summons Afghan Envoy Over Joint Statement During India Visit, NDTV World, October 12, 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-summons-afghanistan-envoy-over-joint-statement-during-india-visit-9439722 accessed on October 16, 2025
[vi] Trump warns Afghanistan to return Bagram: What is so special about the air base? Hindustan Times, September 21, 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/trump-warns-afghanistan-to-return-bagram-what-is-so-special-about-the-air-base-101758430646332.html accessed on October 16, 2025
[vii] Afghan Taliban rejects Trump threats over taking back Bagram airbase, Al Jazeera, September 21, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/21/afghan-taliban-rejects-trump-threats-over-taking-back-bagram-airbase accessed on October 16, 2025
[viii] Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan is a far-right Islamist populist political party in Pakistan. The party was founded by Khadim Hussain Rizvi in August 2015, who also became its first ameer. TLP is currently led by Saad Hussain Rizvi.
[ix] Pakistan moves to ban TLP, launches crackdown after deadly clashes in Muridke, Money Control, October 16, 2025, https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/pakistan-moves-to-ban-tlp-launches-crackdown-after-deadly-clashes-in-muridke-article-13620049.html accessed on October 16, 2025
[x] Pak plunges into chaos as 15 die in police firing during Islamist party rally, India Today, October 13, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-tlp-protests-in-muridke-lahore-islamabad-violence-pro-gaza-march-police-firing-injured-killed-2802094-2025-10-13 accessed on October 16, 2025