Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction

Since early January 2025, the Islamist militant group Harkat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, also known as Al-Shabaab, has been increasingly recapturing territories in the Federal Republic of Somalia. Recently, it captured Mahas, a key strategic town in Central Somalia, on 27th July 2025. According to various news sources, the group has issued a statement claiming to have taken control of the town, which serves as a crucial hub for transport and logistics in the region. ^[i] This follows their capture of a series of strategic towns in July, including Tardo and Muqokori. These incidents have sparked debates about the group’s resurgence and increasing capabilities. 

There are also reports of collusion of the group with the Houthis and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the Red Sea and adjoining maritime waters to disrupt trade operations.^[ii] While Al-Shabaab is the wealthiest and most kinetic affiliate of Al-Qaeda, and both share broadly the same ideology of Salafi-Jihadism, the Houthis are a distinct armed, political, and religious group of Zaydi Shiites (a minority of Shiites).^[iii] They sprang up as a resistance movement in Yemen, controlling northwestern Yemen with Sana as its administrative capital. Their collusion not only aims to fulfil their individual agendas in the region and beyond but it also reflects a collective response to a larger and more pervasive perceived Western threat, highlighting a shared interest amidst the ongoing geopolitical churn. 

In this context, while giving a brief background about its origins, this special report analyses how and in what ways Al-Shabab has sustained itself for decades despite strong resistance from the Federal Transitional Government in Somalia, the Somalian National Army and African Union supporting forces. It also focuses on the group’s persistent threat and increasing collaboration with other groups such as the Houthis in the maritime waters of the wider Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Western Indian Ocean region. The report also assesses responses from major international actors, including India. 

Origins of Al-Shabaab: Tracing the Roots 

With its troubled colonial past and a history of political upheaval after independence in the 1960s with the unification of British and Italian Somaliland, Somalia faced a bloodless coup in 1969 led by General Mohammed Siad Barre. His regime was marked by extreme authoritarianism, which led to a rise in dissent, particularly due to escalating issues such as corruption, drought, famine, displacement, and clan rivalries, given the clan-based nature of the tribal society. This unrest also gave rise to separatist movements, notably Somaliland, which declared its independence in 1991, and Puntland^[iv], which proclaimed itself an autonomous region in 1998. 

His government was overthrown in January 1991, leading to chaos. As a consequence, there was an emergence of various local militias in the country. One such was the Salafi militant organisation Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI, or “Unity of Islam”) in Somalia, which was partly funded by Al Qaeda’s Chief Osama Bin Laden.^[v] The group was later disbanded, but young fighters from it joined the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – a loose coalition of Sharia Courts – as a youth militia in the early 2000s, governing areas of southern Somalia, including parts of the capital Mogadishu, after the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. 

The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was an alliance of various clan-based religious courts, which had been gaining credibility among the war-weary citizens of Mogadishu due to their efforts in establishing schools and hospitals, settling legal disputes, and upholding a strict code of law.^[vi] A military commander of the group, ‘Aden Hashi Ayro’, consolidated these fighters into a strong militia and is also known as the founder of Al-Shabaab. It has been said that the allegiance of the fighters was not to Ayro, but to the ICU because of its public services and nationalist agenda.^[vii] But later, Al-Shabaab split from ICU to form a distinct group due to the ICU’s moderate stance on joining the Transitional Federal Council, which was supported by Ethiopia, the United States, and the African Union after the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (which drove Al-Shabaab and ICU out of the capital, Mogadishu). 

Ideology and Evolution 

The group adheres to an anti-Western ideology and its own strict interpretation of Islamic Shari’a Law. It rejects the goals of Somalia’s nationalists and aligns itself with Al-Qaeda’s global call for jihad.^[viii] It wants to establish an Islamic State in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region, including in the states of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.^[ix] The extremist group is responsible for gender-based and sexual violence, kidnappings, extortion, and mass killings, and with its latest resurgence has exacerbated an already precarious refugee crisis in the bordering states of Somalia, especially Kenya. The group has consistently opposed foreign intervention by portraying the Western-backed Transitional Federal Government as imposed, illegitimate, and antithetical to Somali interests and Islamic values, particularly in relation to the 2006 Ethiopian invasion backed by the United States, to garner both national and international support.^[x] Consequently, it has also been able to attract a large chunk of foreign fighters,^[xi] especially from neighbouring states like Kenya, Sudan,^[xii] Libya, and Egypt,^[xiii] as well as countries like Canada, the United States, Sweden, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Germany.^[xiv] 

Source: Infographic made by author using Napkin AI

Al-Shabaab further pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2012, aligning with its ideology of Salafi-Jihadism^[xv] and with the global call for Jihad. The group evolved from a local militia to a significant transnational threat thereafter, gaining territories in Somalia and staging various terrorist attacks in neighbouring nations, including the Kampala bombings in Uganda in 2010, the attacks on Westgate Mall in 2013, and Garissa University in 2015 in Kenya. After these attacks, there was a noticeable increase in the group’s capabilities as it intensified its attacks, especially using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), adapting itself to new technologies of warfare, including new-age drone warfare, according to recent reports. Today, Al-Shabaab, which translates to the ‘Youth’, is widely infamous for its brutal tactics and evolving strategies amidst an increasingly changing world. The Transitional Federal Government, along with the African Union (AU) Support Forces has, been fighting the extremist group for decades.^[xvi] However, the resilience of this terrorist group’s governing activities has made it a clandestine actor in the region, expanding its control over Somalian territories through violence and destruction. 

A Timeline of Al-Shabaab’s Evolution and Activities

Source: Infographic made by author using Napkin AI

Al-Shabaab’s Mechanisms of Survival and Sustenance

Since its independence, Somalia has faced a number of issues, including extreme corruption, lack of proper governance, clan rivalries, impoverishment, drought, famine, and a mistrust of foreign powers as a result of its colonial past. Al-Shabaab has tried to capitalise on these issues for its survival. Since its split from ICU and becoming a distinct entity, the group has sustained itself through various political, socio-economic, and ideological means, despite facing strong resistance from the Somali National Army and the African Union Support forces for years.

Provision of minimal basic public services

Al-Shabaab had governed various parts of southern and central Somalia before, during its peak in the 2000s and resurgences thereafter, and continues to do so today. This mechanism of governance has helped the group to maintain some kind of control in the region. The group has tried to implement and run its parallel system of governance, and one aspect of it is by offering some basic public services, mainly in parts of Central and Southern Somalia where it has established control. They try to leverage the lack of proper governance in these areas through these minimal services to gain public support by filling a gap which is largely because of economic restraints of the government.

For example, the group uses mobile courts to deliver legal services to captured areas and those remote areas that lack proper governance – a strategy that ICU also used in the early 2000s. Previously, they also took measures to manage the drought in 2006 as well as in 2017. In Mogadishu and other regions of the country, they also provided some level of education and managed hospitals at their peak between 2009 and 2010. Al-Shabaab also imposes taxes and operates a security and policing system. However, reports indicate that these services are ideologically motivated, with evidence of targeting ethnic minorities (primarily the Bantu, Tumaal, Reer Hamar/Benadiri, and Madhiban) and religious minorities (such as the Ashraf and the Sheikhal). These services have been noted to be limited in scope and encounter challenges during emergencies due to the group's lack of technical capacity.^[xvii]

Strong governance hierarchy and structure

According to experts, the group’s structure is well organised with a chain of command, because of which it has been able to provide basic public services and has been able to persist. There is a supreme central commander at the top, also known as the Emir. Since 2014, Abu Ubaidah, also known as Abu Umar, has been the Emir after the death of Ahmed Abdi Godane (the second Emir). Under him there is a deputy and a ten-member council, which is the Top Shura Majlis, or Body of the Cabinet, including a Consultative Council.^[xviii]

The group also has a military branch known as ‘Jabhaat’, which is regarded as the most important branch of the organisation. It has two sub-units, namely the ‘Jaysh al-usr’ – Army of the Hardship and Suffering – and the second is the ‘Jaysh al-hisbah’, the judicial, economic, and social branch.^[xix] Its job is to uphold law and morality in the society and to oversee the general welfare of the public. It also acts as a religious council, managing Sharia courts and enforcing laws through its Islamic Police Force, or Aysh al-hisbah.^[xx]

The group also has political and military representatives for each region it controls, including a well-established intelligence agency called – the ‘Amniyat’ which has been instrumental in weeding out the opposition in the group.^[xxi] Albeit, the group is not devoid of internal divisions which revolve around clan/tribal rivalries, foreign fighters, and nationalistic vs global agendas.^[xxii]

The group also indulges in forced recruitment and specifically exploits the clan conflicts, targeting oppressed clans. Instances of poor socio-economic conditions fuel lack of trust in the government and have also helped the group to coerce and force the civilian population to follow their fundamentalist rule. Although Hawiye clan members dominate the different levels of the organisational structure of the group, all major lineages are represented in the organisation. A large portion of Al-Shabaab fighters are also from oppressed clans of Marehan (sub-clans), Gaaljeel, Jajele, and Badi Ade. Foot soldiers of the group are mainly recruited from the Mrifle, Bantu, and Jareer clans.^[xxiii]

The financial glue

The financial strength of the group has also played a crucial role in the sustenance of its governance structures and its activities. During the initial years of the group, there were also reports of diaspora donations from abroad. Somalis abroad felt that Al-Shabaab could be an alternative option to improve the condition of Somalia, but once the group started aligning with a more radical approach, the funding dwindled considerably.

With time the group has adapted to new ways of earning money. It does so by collecting huge amounts of money, which is estimated at 150 million dollars every year. It generates revenue through various means, including taxation (zakat) on local businesses and roads, investments in charcoal, ivory, and sugar trade, as well as real estate; it also engages in illicit mining, extortion, kidnappings, domestic and international smuggling, theft of aid money,^[xxiv] and diversion of arms and assets.^[xxv] These payments also help in supporting the wider al-Qaeda nexus through several offshore businesses and hawala networks ^[xxvi] in the region.

The Role of Ideology

Al-Shabaab tries to legitimize its activities, particularly the collection of taxes, governance, and policing, by presenting itself as adhering to its strict Sunni Salafi Jihadism ideology and its own interpretation of Sharia Law. It does so by portraying itself not merely as a militia or insurgent force but as a provider of governance, social order, religious justice, and moral order.They try to portray the following of their orders and governance by terming it a ‘Religious duty’.^[xxvii]

The group also uses religious sermons and education, madrasas/Islamic institutes, and a bush university to inculcate ideology, produce clerics and jurists who reaffirm their world view, and try to build internal legitimacy among members and communities. Al-Shabaab’s use of ideology acts as another strong mechanism contributing to its sustenance.^[xxviii] 

Source: This infographic is made by the author using Napkin AI 

Counter-Mechanisms by National and International Forces

AU missions have been combating the group militarily, while UN missions, which have been political in nature, have helped strengthen the Transitional Federal Government. From 2007 till 2022, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) played a significant role in countering the group. AMISOM was replaced by the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in April 2022. In June 2024, the Somalian government, led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, had raised concerns and urged for a slow-paced withdrawal of the forces of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), as its mandate was ending by the end of 2024. The government worried about a potential security vacuum in the absence of a significant force in Somalia, expressing that the timeline be reviewed according to the capabilities of the Somalian national forces.^[xxix]

On 27th December 2024, the UN Security Council authorised African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM) replacing ATMIS and allowed the deployment of up to 12,626 personnel, including military, police, and civilian components drawn from Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, and Egypt, to support the Somali government’s nearly two-decades-long fight against al-Shabaab.^[xxx] There are doubts about whether the neighbouring Ethiopia would join these countries. The presence of troops remains but is lesser than before, as ATMIS had 14,000 troops under it.^[xxxi]

Moreover, the withdrawal of 700 US troops from Somalia’s elite unit, the ‘Danab Special Forces’, under the current Trump administration and funding cuts have significantly hindered the operations of the African Union and peacekeeping forces.^[xxxii] These decisions can adversely impact the government’s efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab and have consequently contributed to their latest resurgence. In February-March 2025, Al-Shabaab launched a major offensive, named Operation Ramadan, seizing over 15 towns across the Middle Shabelle, Hirshabelle, and Lower Shabelle regions of Somalia, retaking territories not held since 2019.^[xxxiii] The group is also trying to maintain its operations by forming new partnerships, such as with the Houthis in the region.

The Al-Shabaab and Houthi Collusion: Reinforcing Wider Maritime Insecurity

In 2022, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Houthis had already signed a non-aggression pact, resulting in cooperation in security and intelligence, including the exchange of weapons and coordination in attacks against the Yemeni Transitional Government supported by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US. Since late 2024, Al-Shabaab and the Houthis have been reported to be working together more closely. According to a UN report of 2024, this relationship had existed before but was limited to being transactional or opportunistic in nature. In recent times, it has been deepening and posing an increasing threat to the region.^[xxxiv]

In March 2025, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2776, extending the sanction regime for the group until 13 January 2026. By adopting this resolution, the Security Council and member states aim to disrupt the group’s arms flow, finances, and capabilities.^[xxxv] The UNSC reports that Al-Shabaab fighters trained in Houthi camps in drone warfare have surfaced, including the Houthis’ supply of high-technology advanced weapons in key Al-Shabaab areas. These weapons were reportedly used to target the AUSSOM forces in Somalia in September and November 2024.^[xxxvi] Earlier, Al-Shabaab used assault rifles, mortars, and improvised explosive devices, but the Houthis provide access to more advanced systems, including weaponised drones and surface-to-air missiles,^[xxxvii] increasing their arms and technological capacities, reflecting a shift towards advanced and new-age drone warfare. This is likely one of the major reasons that the extremist group has been able to recapture various territories swiftly since early 2025, which it lost in the offensive in 2022 against the Somali army and African Union Mission forces. Through this partnership, Al-Shabaab also wants to maintain its regional standing as a global terrorist group,^[xxxviii] apart from achieving its interests in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region.

On the other hand, after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, the Houthis are trying to reposition themselves as a regional force by deepening ties with Al-Shabaab. They aim to expand their international network of resistance and maintain a consistent supply chain, which includes securing funding.^[xxxix] Since Al-Shabaab is al-Qaeda’s wealthiest affiliate, this alliance is beneficial for the Houthis. The Houthis benefit from Al Shabaab’s support of disruptive piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. Through Al-Shabaab, they get access to the wider Western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. This strengthens the Houthis’ ability to threaten maritime traffic in the region while deepening their leverage vis-à-vis the United Nations-backed government in Yemen.^[xl] The Houthis also earn in millions through these attacks on unarmed ships. There are also speculations about the involvement of the Iranian regime in supplying and funding Al-Shabaab and Somali pirates with the support of the Houthis.^[xli] After the recent escalation with Israel, it has been said that the regime wants to increase its strategic depth in the Red Sea as well as the Mediterranean, trying to gain a foothold at key international chokepoints and seeking to benefit from the cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab to control Bab al-Mandeb from both sides.

The Houthis and Al-Shabaab have become stronger in disrupting trade and security in the maritime waters of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Western Indian Ocean. Their increasing collaboration could potentially result in further fatalities for the wider region.

The strategic positioning of Bab-al-Mandeb strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Source: This map has been made by the author using Google Earth.

In response to the Israel-Hamas war, which started in October 2023, there has been an increase in piracy and attacks on ships in the region. Although there is no evidence of a combined attack from the Houthis and Al-Shabaab in the maritime waters of the region, there have been significant increases in individual instances. Recently, in July 2025, two bulk carriers, namely ‘Eternity C’ and ‘Magic Seas’, sank in the Red Sea as a result of Houthi attacks,  causing an oil spill.^[xlii] The attacks have had a considerable impact on global trade, evidenced by a 50–60 per cent reduction in Suez Canal traffic, while the rerouting of commercial vessels around the Cape of Good Hope has surged by 420 per cent.^[xliii]

The wider region of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa, and the Western Indian Ocean is affected by trade disruptions, attacks, and piracy by Al-Shabaab and the Houthis, as of May 2025.

Source: ACAPS, ACLED, Africa Confidential, Hiraal Institute, JMIC, MSC-IO, UN since November 2023 and Africa Centre for Strategic Studies.

Even the rerouting of ships through the Cape of Good Hope has increased opportunities for pirates. International navies of the US, the UK, and India are thwarting piracy incidents in the region. Various operations by the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom have been underway to protect the commercial ships against these attacks, especially the increased Houthi attacks in the Red Sea after 7 October 2023. Last year in March and April, the Indian Navy successfully rescued sailors from Somali pirates through two operations. This success has led to experts from the international community expressing faith in the Indian Navy’s capabilities to ensure safety in the region. Amidst India’s rising political power, experts suggest New Delhi could pave the way for Red Sea traffic to function smoothly by deploying naval escorts to protect merchant shipping in the Red Sea, along with Operation Aspides of the EU.^[xliv]

In this regard, the European Union operation also proposed expanding cooperation with the Indian Navy in the fight against piracy earlier this year, after which a joint naval exercise was conducted from 1st to 3rd June 2025 between both navies. This exercise focused on advanced counter-piracy techniques, interoperability, tactical manoeuvres, and communication protocols.^[xlv] On 13-18 April 2025, India launched its biggest ever joint naval exercise with African nations, co-hosted by Tanzania with participation from Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, and South Africa. The Indian Navy also deployed the ‘Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) Sagar mission’, carried out by INS Sunayna, which also took part in the joint naval exercise along with other Indian Navy ships as a part of efforts to strengthen maritime bonds with nations in the region.^[xlvi]

Experts say it is part of New Delhi’s broader ambitions in playing a more assertive role in maritime operations, including anti-piracy efforts and deepening ties with the continent.^[xlvii] India has established much of its naval infrastructure in the Western Indian Ocean and has undertaken recent initiatives in the region in response to increasing challenges and opportunities. These include the heightened presence of Chinese vessels and the growing importance of India-Africa maritime cooperation. As a result, India could assume a larger role as a ‘security provider’ for these vital maritime trade routes,^[xlviii]while remaining mindful of its own security interests.

Conclusion

Somalia and the adjacent maritime waters have been plagued by Al-Shabaab’s terror, which has impacted the region in the worst manner. The extremist group has sustained itself for decades and continues to pose a threat to the stability of the region. The growing capabilities and alliance of the group with the Houthis also increasingly pose a threat to the wider maritime waters of the region. This can potentially lead to the militarisation of the region, disrupt the supply chain (which just revived from constant threats from the global pandemic and the Ukraine conflict), increase organised crime and worsen the internal crisis in Somalia. Apart from other countries, India can play a significant role in maintaining peace and stability in the wider maritime waters, with the broader aim of being the security provider in the region. Confronting this rising threat demands not only fortified security at sea and on land but also a spirit of international cooperation in safeguarding global peace and stability.

*****

*Sugandhi, Research Analyst, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i]“Is Al-Shabaab Back? Key Somalia Town of Maxaas Falls - the Africa Report.com.” 2025. The Africa Report.com.

2025. https://www.theafricareport.com/388762/is-al-shabaab-back-key-somalia-town-of-maxaas-falls/.

[ii] 2025. “Expanding al Shabaab–Houthi Ties Escalate Security Threats to Red Sea Region – Africa Center.” Africa Center. May 30, 2025. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/al-shabaab-houthi-security-red-sea/.

[iii]Riedel, Bruce. 2017. “Who Are the Houthis, and Why Are We at War with Them?” Brookings. December 18, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/.

[iv] Klobucista, Claire, and Mariel Ferragamo. 2025. “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State.” Council on Foreign Relations. January 21, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state.

[v]Klobucista, Claire, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2022. “Al-Shabaab.” Council on Foreign Relations. December 6, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab.

[vi] admin. 2008. “Somalia’s Al-Shabab Reconstitutes Fighting Force.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 15, 2008. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-al-shabab-reconstitutes-fighting-force.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii]“Al-Shabaab’s Leadership, Hierarchy and Ideology.” 2022. East & Central Africa Terrorism Database. September 1, 2022. https://eactdatabase.org/ct/al-shabaab-s-leadership-hierarchy-and-ideology_8.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Macharia Munene. 2012. “The Challenge of Al-Shabaab.” E-International Relations. February 17, 2012. https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/17/the-challenge-of-al-shabaab.

[xi]Ibid.

[xii]“- from AL-SHABAAB to AL-NUSRA: HOW WESTERNERS JOINING TERROR GROUPS OVERSEAS AFFECT THE HOMELAND.” n.d. Www.govinfo.gov. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg87183/html/CHRG-113hhrg87183.htm.

[xiii] “Al-Shabaab – Eurafrica Press & News.” 2024. Eurafrica.info. 2024. https://www.eurafrica.info/2024/07/18/al-shabaab.

[xiv]Hummel, Kristina. 2018. “‘Deutsche Schabab:’ the Story of German Foreign Fighters in Somalia, 2010-2016.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. May 24, 2018. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/deutsche-schabab-story-german-foreign-fighters-somalia-2010-2016.

[xv] “Ideological movement that holds that it is a religious obligation for individual Muslims to use armed force to cause the establishment of true Muslim state governed under a Salafi interpretation of shari’a.” “Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update.” n.d. Critical Threats. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update.

[xvi]Ibid.

[xvii]Hummel, Kristina. 2020. “The Limits of ‘Shabaab-CARE’: Militant Governance amid COVID-19.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. June 29, 2020. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-limits-of-shabaab-care-militant-governance-amid-covid-19.

[xviii]Op.cit (7)

[xix]Ibid.

[xx]Ibid.

[xxi]Harrington, Jake, and Jared Thompson. 2021. “Examining Extremism: Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (al Shabaab).” Www.csis.org. September 23, 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-shabaab.

[xxii]Center, Combating Terrorism. 2014. “An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 24, 2014. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/an-in-depth-look-at-al-shababs-internal-divisions/.

[xxiii] EUAA, '2.2.1. Persons fearing forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab' in Country Guidance: Somalia, May 2022.

[xxiv] CNN, Sam Kiley. n.d. “Funding Al-Shabaab: How Aid Money Ends up in Terrorists’ Hands.” CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/12/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-foreign-aid-intl/index.html.

[xxv]“Somalia: Battle for Al-Shabaab’s $150m - the Africa Report.com.” 2019. The Africa Report.com. 2019. https://www.theafricareport.com/333417/somalia-battle-for-al-shabaabs-150m/.

[xxvi]“Treasury Designates Transnational Al-Shabaab Money Laundering Network.” 2024. U.S. Department of the Treasury. March 19, 2024. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2168.

[xxvii] 2012b. “State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia.” Politics, Religion & Ideology 13 (4): 513–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.725659.

[xxviii] Ibid.

[xxix]Jazeera, Al. 2024. “Somalia Asks Peacekeepers to Slow Withdrawal, Fears Armed Group Resurgence.” Al Jazeera. June 20, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/20/somalia-asks-peacekeepers-to-slow-withdrawal-fears-armed-group-resurgence.

[xxx]Ali, Faisal. 2024. “UN Authorises New Mission against Al-Shabaab in Somalia.” The Guardian. December 28, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/28/un-authorises-new-mission-against-al-shabaab-in-somalia.

[xxxi]Ibid.

[xxxii]Board, Editorial. 2025. “Abandoning Somalia Again Will Empower Terrorists.” The Washington Post. June 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/06/01/somalia-mogadishu-al-shabab-africa-africom.

[xxxiii]Ibid.

[xxxiv]Africa Defense Forum. 2025. “Al-Shabaab Alliance with Houthis Continues to Grow.” Eurasia Review. June 25, 2025. https://www.eurasiareview.com/25062025-al-shabaab-alliance-with-houthis-continues-to-grow/.

[xxxv] Pike, John. 2025. “Security Council Extends Al-Shabaab Sanctions Regime, Renews Panel of Experts in Resolution 2776 (2025).” Globalsecurity.org. 2025. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2025/03/mil-250303-unsc01.htm.

[xxxvi]“Expanding al Shabaab–Houthi Ties Escalate Security Threats to Red Sea Region – Africa Center.” 2025. Africa Center. August 21, 2025. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/al-shabaab-houthi-security-red-sea.

[xxxvii]Ibid.

[xxxviii]“The Role and Evolution of Al-Shabaab in Somalia | Polis Analysis.” 2025. Polis Analysis. 2025. https://www.polisanalysis.com/news/the-role-and-evolution-of-al-shabaab-in-somalia.

[xxxix]Ardemagni, Eleonora. 2024. “Beyond the Axis: Yemen’s Houthis Are Building Their ‘Network of Resistance.’” Rusi.org. 2024. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/beyond-axis-yemens-houthis-are-building-their-network-resistance.

[xl] Op Cit (32)

[xli]Bakr, Faisal Abu. 2024. “Houthis Arm Al-Shabaab in Somalia with Apparent Iranian Coordination.” Al-Fassel. June 26, 2024. https://alfasselnews.com/en_GB/articles/gc1/features/2024/06/26/feature-01.

[xlii]Jon Gambrell. 2025. “Search for Missing Ends after Yemen Rebels Sink Ship.” AP News. July 14, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/eternity-c-yemen-houthis-red-sea-attack-shipping-849f64d2646d566af51ca0f78e34448f.

[xliii]Blaine, Francois Vreÿ and Mark. 2024. “Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. April 9, 2024. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/red-sea-indian-ocean-attacks-africa-maritime-vulnerability/.

[xliv]The. 2025. “‘Indian Navy Is the Only Hope’: Analyst Thinks India Needs to Step up to Save Red Sea Shipping.” The Week. July 23, 2025. https://www.theweek.in/news/middle-east/2025/07/23/only-india-can-stop-houthis-as-west-fails-analyst-explains-how-only-indian-navy-can-make-the-red-sea-safer.html.

[xlv]“EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and INDIAN NAVY CONDUCT a NAVAL EXERCISE in the INDIAN OCEAN | EUNAVFOR.” 2025. Eunavfor.eu. 2025. https://eunavfor.eu/news/eunavfor-atalanta-and-indian-navy-conduct-naval-exercise-indian-ocean.

[xlvi]India, Times Of. 2025. “INS Sunayna Returns to Kochi Naval Base after Deployment in Indian Ocean.” The Times of India. Times of India. May 8, 2025. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kochi/ins-sunayna-returns-to-kochi-naval-base-after-deployment-in-indian-ocean/articleshow/121004481.cms.

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