Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: China’s deepening involvement in Latin America, particularly in strategic sectors such as ports, space, and digital infrastructure, has heightened U.S. security concerns, given their potential dual-use nature and value as strategic assets amidst the U.S.-China contestation.

Introduction

For much of the 20th century, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) operated within the sphere of US hegemony, shaped by the Monroe Doctrine and reinforced through Washington’s dominance over the region’s economic, political, and security landscape. However, the 21^st century has witnessed the emergence of a multipolar global order, prompting many Latin American nations to recalibrate their relations beyond traditional Western partners.

At the centre of this shift is China’s expanding influence in the hemisphere, which has coincided with Washington’s strategic reorientation toward the Indo-Pacific. Over the past two decades, China has established itself as a key actor in the region by offering an appealing model of engagement, one characterised by accessible financing, large-scale infrastructure investment, resource-driven trade, market expansion, and a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which now includes 22 LAC countries,[i] China has invested billions in strategic sectors, including ports, railways, energy grids, telecommunications, and digital connectivity.

Economically, China has become the leading trading partner for several South American economies[ii], including Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and Argentina, driven by its demand for lithium, copper, soybeans, beef, and other key commodities. Beijing also engages with the region through multilateral platforms like APEC and the China–CELAC Forum, promoting collaboration on green energy, digital governance, critical minerals, and infrastructure finance.

In return, many Latin American countries have increasingly aligned with China’s political positions. Panama, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, leaving only a few (Paraguay, Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[iii]) continuing to recognise Taiwan. At the multilateral level, several LAC nations have supported or muted their expressions about China’s positions on contentious issues, such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan,[iv] within forums like the United Nations and the G77.

Meanwhile, China’s deepening involvement in Latin America, particularly in strategic sectors such as ports, space, and digital infrastructure, has heightened U.S. security concerns, given their potential dual-use nature and value as strategic assets amidst the U.S.-China contestation. Yet, by contrast, as Washington focuses its strategic attention on the Indo-Pacific, emphasising freedom of navigation and a rule-based international order, it risks ceding influence in the Western Hemisphere to China.

China’s Strategic Investments in Latin America: US Concerns and Countermeasures

Though China maintains that its investments in Latin American and Caribbean space, ports, and telecommunication sectors are purely civilian, the United States views them as potentially dual-use, serving both commercial and strategic objectives. Washington is particularly concerned that these projects could expand China’s regional influence, provide platforms for intelligence gathering, and enhance its ability to project power in the Western Hemisphere.

A.  Space

China has made significant inroads into LAC through its ‘Space Information Corridor’ initiative under the BRI. This involves providing space-related technologies and training, establishing ground stations, and collaborating on lunar and deep-space exploration.

China's space programme in LAC began with a significant collaboration with Brazil in the 1980s, particularly through the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) programme. Over the years, the two countries have enhanced space research through the exchange of expertise, scientific data, and the joint construction of satellites. Building on CBERS's success, China launched telecommunications and remote-sensing satellites and established strategic ground facilities[v] across LAC.

South America is the primary location of these ground station facilities, which encompass fully owned, co-built, and leased access structures. China’s co-built or leased access to ground‑station facilities are located in Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil,[vi] while its most significant presence is in Argentina’s Neuquén Deep Space Station, which is 100% built and operated by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC) under a 50-year lease. And, in recent years, China, through the China–CELAC Space Cooperation Forum, has expanded collaboration on satellite applications, Earth‑observation data sharing, BeiDou navigation adoption, and training programmes.

Some Latin American states also engage with China through the Asia–Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO), which promotes the peaceful use of outer space in space science, technology, and related applications. Peru is among APSCO’s eight full members, while other countries from the region participate as observers. The region also has seen participation in the China-led International Lunar Research Station, allegedly viewed as an alternative to the US-led Artemis programme, with Venezuela becoming its first Latin American member in July 2023.

Timeline of China-LAC Space Cooperation

Source- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (think tank based in Washington, D.C.) and Chakra Dialogues Foundation

 China’s Space Ground Facilities in LAC

Source: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (think tank based in Washington, D.C) and Chakra Dialogues Foundation 

Satellite Image of China’s Ground Facilities in Chile and Argentina

Santiago Satellite Station, Chile
Source: Google Earth

Espacio Lejano Station, Argentina
Source: Google Earth 

From Beijing’s perspective, these ground facilities are justified as part of its commitment to the peaceful use of outer space and to promoting scientific cooperation with developing countries. In Venezuela, the El Sombrero and Luepa stations operate satellites, including VENESAT-1 and VRSS-2, for Earth observation and remote sensing. Bolivia’s Amachuma and La Guardia facilities manage communications with the Tupac Katari satellite. Argentina hosts several major assets: the Espacio Lejano Station in Neuquén, a deep-space antenna that supports China’s lunar and interplanetary missions; the San Juan Satellite Laser Ranging station, which contributes to global geodetic networks; and the under-construction China–Argentina Radio Telescope (CART), designed for astrophysics and geodesy. Chile complements this network with the China–Chile Astronomical Data Center in Santiago, which processes large volumes of data from the ALMA observatory. Collectively, these facilities enhance Latin America’s scientific and technological capacities while embedding China more deeply in the region’s space ecosystem. 

Concerns 

However, there is growing concern over the potential military component of China’s ground facilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. For instance, optical telescopes can track and gather intelligence on satellites in addition to monitoring near-Earth objects and space debris. 

Radio telescopes, such as those in Argentina’s San Juan and Neuquén provinces, can support both deep‑space communication and signal interception. These systems operate in the high-frequency X‑band and might have military applications. 

The data collected from active stations, such as those in Santiago (Chile) and San Juan (Argentina), can also be leveraged for anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems. Such information enables precise tracking and positional measurement of satellites, which is critical for targeting in ASAT operations. Satellite laser-ranging systems further enhance this accuracy by providing precise orbital data, which is useful for targeting and intercept operations. Moreover, China’s proposed antenna arrays in Río Gallegos would significantly boost its ability to track polar‑orbiting satellites in real time, enhancing its strategic position in the region. 

Another major concern is China’s lack of transparency in some space-related agreements, as it limits the host country’s oversight and influence over projects on its territory. For example, Argentina’s space deal with China under President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner for the Neuquén Deep Space Station raised questions about the intended uses of the technologies and the nature of the data collected. The agreement also includes a clause that bars Argentine authorities from accessing the 200-hectare compound, effectively placing it beyond the host nation’s direct control.[vii] Argentina agreed to the Neuquén Deep Space Station deal with China at a time of severe financial constraints and limited access to Western credit, viewing Beijing as a vital economic partner. The agreement, though controversial for limiting Argentine oversight, was justified by the government as a means to secure investment, access to advanced space technology, and deepen a strategic partnership with China at a moment when alternatives were scarce. 

U.S. Response to China’s Incursion into LAC’s Space Sector 

The United States is responding to China’s growing influence in the LAC space sector through diplomatic, strategic and multilateral engagements. For instance, ceding under U.S. pressure, Chile put the Ventarrones Astronomical Park, set to be built in the Atacama Desert, under review. The United States also successfully lobbied for an inspection of the Espacio Lejano station in Argentina. Furthermore, in Chile, the United States operates three major astronomical observatories: CTIO, Gemini South, and Rubin Observatory, maintaining a strategic scientific presence in the Southern Hemisphere. 

The US is also encouraging LAC countries to join the Artemis Accords, NASA’s framework for lunar exploration and space governance. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay are part of the accord. 

Furthermore, the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), the military command responsible for U.S. operations in outer space, is expanding partnerships in South America to enhance cooperation on satellite monitoring, space situational awareness, and joint research initiatives. For instance, in 2024, USSPACECOM strengthened its space partnerships by establishing a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) agreement with Uruguay[viii], arranging a liaison officer position with Brazil[ix], conducting high-level visits to Colombia and Argentina, and engaging in partnership dialogues with Chile[x], these initiatives aimed at reinforcing US influence and providing cooperative alternatives to China’s expanding space presence in Latin America. Along with this, in 2024, the US Space Conference of the Americas, organised for discussion on space threats, partnerships, and information sharing, helped the United States strengthen space sector engagement with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.

B.  Ports

Another major area of Chinese strategic investment in LAC has been in ports. As part of its Maritime Silk Road initiative, China has significantly expanded its presence in key ports across the region through state-owned and state-linked enterprises, such as the China Ocean Shipping Company. Out of China’s approximately 40 port investment projects in Latin America, the major ones are located in countries, such as Jamaica (Kingston Freeport), Mexico (Manzanillo, Veracruz, and Lázaro Cárdenas), Peru (Chancay), Panama (Cristóbal and Balboa), Brazil (Paranaguá, Port of Açu VLCC Terminal), Venezuela (Port of Cabello), and Ecuador (DP World Posorja), where Chinese ownership exceeds 50 per cent.[xi] These ports, along with other investments, are situated near vital maritime chokepoints and trade routes, enhancing China’s logistical reach and access to regional markets and natural resources.

China's Port Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean

Source- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (think tank based in Washington, D.C.) and Chakra Dialogues Foundation

Project Details 

Source- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (think tank based in Washington, D.C.) and Chakra Dialogues Foundation

COUNTRY –WISE CHINESE INVESTEMENTS IN PORTS IN LAC

 

Source- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (think tank based in Washington, D.C.) and Chakra Dialogues Foundation

ZONE –WISE CHINESE INVESTEMENTS IN PORTS IN LAC

Source- Centre for Strategic and International Studies (think tank based in Washington, D.C.) and Chakra Dialogues Foundation

Concerns

Many of these ports are not fully controlled by China but involve substantial Chinese investment or construction contracts. For example, Kingston Freeport Terminal (Jamaica), Paranagua Port Terminal (Brazil), Port of Chancay (Peru), and San Antonio Pier Expansion Project (Chile) all have substantial Chinese involvement through financing, construction contracts, or port management partnerships. On the surface, these are commercial ventures intended to capture the dividends of booming LAC-Asia trade. Yet, they can also serve as logistics resupply points for People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels on rare goodwill tours, facilitate covert weapons movement (e.g., containerized missile systems), and act as nodes for intelligence-gathering on U.S. naval and economic movements.

At the same time, these ports’ proximity to critical interoceanic passage routes, such as the Panama Canal, the Strait of Magellan, and key Pacific and Atlantic routes, raises strategic concerns. For instance, China’s alleged interest in building a naval base on Argentina’s island of Rio Grande, close to Ushuaia, near the Strait of Magellan, which is an important gateway to Antarctica, has raised concerns about its true intentions. While the project is presented as commercial, there is also a growing scepticism about whether it could also be used for military purposes, allowing China to control a critical passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.[xii] And, in the event of a conflict, China could utilise its control over key ports in Latin America to monitor the movement of US naval vessels, delay their access to refuelling or resupply, or restrict their use of shipping lanes.

Beijing’s control over infrastructure could also allow it to shape customs procedures, restrict critical port facilities, or apply economic pressure on host countries. This is especially concerning in the case of Mexico, as China is involved in infrastructure projects in five ports (Manzanillo, Veracruz, Lazaro Cardenas, Tuxpan, and Ensenada), heightening apprehensions given the country’s importance in North American trade networks.

Moreover, controlling ports can give China more political power and hence control over resources, as countries that rely on Chinese money and trade may feel pressured to follow China’s interests, even if it affects their sovereignty. For instance, in Argentina, this influence is evident in the activities of China’s distant-water fishing fleet, the world’s largest, which has been repeatedly implicated in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing near Argentine waters. A 2024 agreement between the Santa Cruz provincial government and China’s Hongdong Fisheries Co. Ltd illustrates this growing entanglement. This arrangement grants Hongdong Fisheries assistance[xiii] at Santa Cruz’s ports in exchange for investments in port infrastructure.[xiv] Similar grievances have been voiced by Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, where Chinese fleets have been accused of depleting fish stocks.[xv]

U.S. Response to China’s Port Investments in LAC

In light of China’s expanding presence in Latin America’s maritime infrastructure, the United States has begun taking strategic countermeasures to protect its interests and maintain regional influence.

A key example is in Panama, where the US moved to challenge Chinese control over vital port terminals near the Panama Canal. Although the United States built the canal itself, both its Pacific (Paloa) and Caribbean (Cristóbal) entrances were operated by CK Hutchison, a Hong Kong-based firm with close ties to Beijing.[xvi] In March 2025, a US-led investor group headed by BlackRock announced plans to buy a majority stake in the Hong Kong-based company that runs ports along either side of the Panama Canal.[xvii] However, China pushed back against the deal,[xviii] signalling growing geopolitical rivalry over infrastructure dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

Similarly, in Argentina, the US has expanded its defence cooperation[xix] and is in talks for the development of an ‘integrated naval base’ at the port of Ushuaia, which might help the country to monitor Chinese activities.[xx] In Ecuador, the US International DFC supported the expansion and modernisation of the Puerto Bolívar container port in Ecuador’s El Oro province[xxi] and announced that it signed a framework agreement with the government of Ecuador to refinance up to $3.5 billion of the country’s external debt to China.[xxii]

Further, as a direct strategic counterbalance to the Chinese-backed Chancay megaport in Peru, the United States, through its Development Finance Corporation (DFC), has expressed growing interest in supporting the modernisation of Chile’s Port of San Antonio.[xxiii]

C.  Telecommunication

As part of its broader Digital Silk Road initiative, China has been actively expanding its 5G technology footprint across Latin America. Chinese 5G infrastructure, primarily led by firms like Huawei and ZTE, is either being used or planned for deployment in several Latin American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.[xxiv] 

China’s 5G Infrastructure in LAC

Source- Council on Foreign Relations

Concerns

While China’s involvement in 3G and 4G development in the region drew limited pushback, the United States perceives 5G as a strategic threat due to its transformative nature. Unlike previous generations that enabled mobile communications, 5G underpins critical infrastructure, ranging from smart cities and autonomous vehicles to defence logistics and industrial automation. It supports more devices, transmits larger volumes of real-time data, and relies heavily on virtualised software systems, increasing its susceptibility to surveillance or covert control.

Washington fears that Chinese firms’ involvement in building these networks could grant Beijing access to sensitive data and influence over essential public and private systems, which can also be used for espionage. The concern also extends to China’s growing role in shaping global 5G standards, which could lock adopting countries into a Chinese-led digital ecosystem. For the United States, the proliferation of Chinese 5G is not just a matter of technology but a broader contest over geopolitical influence and digital sovereignty.

U.S. Response to China’s 5G Infrastructure in LAC

In response, the US Federal Communications Commission has designated multiple Chinese telecom companies, including Huawei, ZTE, China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom, as national security threats.[xxv] These designations aim to discourage the adoption of Chinese technology in critical communication systems, both within the U.S. and among its foreign partners.

On the ground, US carrot-and-stick diplomacy has influenced several regional decisions. In Costa Rica, under US pressure, President Rodrigo Chávez in August 2023 issued a decree regulating 5G deployment, effectively banning companies from countries not party to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, thereby excluding Chinese firms.[xxvi] This move also reflects a broader trend in which international legal instruments are repurposed to align digital infrastructure policy with geopolitical alliances, particularly those led by the United States.

In Panama, US concern intensified in 2024 after Huawei announced plans for Latin America’s first regional cybersecurity and transparency centre. The United States responded by pledging to replace Huawei equipment at 13 sites nationwide.[xxvii]

In Brazil, the rollout of Huawei’s 5G network faced delays due to tensions between Washington and Brasília[xxviii] (however, to date, Brazil has not banned it).

These cases, along with the US-led Clean Network Initiative, which seeks to build a global coalition of trusted partners to secure digital infrastructure from high-risk vendors, illustrate a broader strategy by the United States to limit China’s digital footprint.

US Initiatives to Counter Chinese Influence

Over the years, the United States has launched multiple initiatives to counter China’s growing investment footprint, including in Latin America, but their impact has been mixed.

Under the Biden administration, the United States pushed for the Blue Dot Network, a mechanism to certify, support, and build infrastructure projects to international standards, assuring that the future of infrastructure investment does not fall victim to corruption and bureaucracy, particularly in the Global South. And the success of the programme led to Build Back Better World by G7 countries, later renamed as ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)’, to deliver high-quality, sustainable infrastructure. Further, under the Trump administration, the United States came up with the América Crece (Growth in the Americas) programme and the DFC (Development Finance Agency) to counter China’s growing influence. DFC with a $60 billion investment cap is tasked with mobilising private-sector investment in low- and middle-income countries. It serves as the financial backbone of América Crece, an economic framework aimed at promoting US private-sector investment in Latin America’s energy and infrastructure sectors.

Together, these tools were meant to provide a transparent, market-driven alternative to China’s state-led financing under the BRI. However, the impact of these policies has been modest due to the scale of engagement, lack of consistency, slow implementation, limited project visibility, and bureaucratic hurdles.[xxix] Furthermore, DFC’s uncertain reauthorisation beyond 6 October 2025[xxx] casts doubt on the long-term viability of these efforts. Without consistent political backing and faster execution, these US initiatives risk falling short, allowing China to deepen its economic footprint in the region through faster and less conditional investments.

Moreover, President Trump's unwillingness to continue previous administration initiatives and his transactional policies are now creating uncertainties. The administration has ended Biden’s Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP),[xxxi]  calling it ‘a series of endless dialogues without concrete measures’.[xxxii] Furthermore, the administration has frozen funding for USAID and effectively dismantled the agency, creating a significant vacuum in the US’ soft power and hence development-oriented engagement in Latin America. In addition, the imposition of tariffs on countries worldwide, including several in Latin America, as part of efforts to address the trade deficit or allegedly as a coercive tool, has heightened economic tensions in the region.

The relations have further deteriorated due to the designation of LAC cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organisations, the deportation of undocumented migrants, the controversial renaming of the Gulf of Mexico to the ‘Gulf of America’, and rising frictions surrounding the Panama Canal, altogether straining US–Latin America ties. All these measures might also push LAC closer towards China, which now champions the ‘Global South’, delivering what they need. 

Furthermore, Trump’s strategy remains largely Indo-Pacific-centric, focused on containing China within the region. This narrower geographical framing overlooks the growing geopolitical contest in Latin America, where China has made significant inroads through trade, infrastructure investment, and digital technology. If the United States fails to respond swiftly and address the needs of LAC countries, China may further consolidate its presence in the region, gradually limiting US influence in its neighbourhood.

Conclusion   

Strategic competition between the United States and China is reshaping their engagement across the globe, including in Latin America. Traditionally under U.S. influence, the region has, over the past two decades, witnessed significant Chinese inroads. Beijing has become a major trading partner for many Latin American countries and has further expanded its presence through strategic investments in space, ports, and telecommunications. These ventures have raised serious security concerns in Washington, prompting the U.S. to adopt countermeasures aimed at protecting its interests and maintaining regional influence, including pressuring Latin American countries to roll back Chinese projects and open up to alternative U.S.-backed initiatives.

For Latin American countries, this dynamic presents tough choices. While China offers attractive incentives, such as access to its vast markets, concessional loans, rapid project delivery, and a policy of political non-interference, countries must remain cautious of opaque contracts and avoid yielding to economic pressure that could compromise sovereignty in sensitive sectors. The absence of stringent safeguards in some agreements has left critical infrastructure entangled in great-power rivalry. Leadership transitions have further amplified this vulnerability, as policy swings between closer ties with Beijing and alignment with Washington have turned some countries into arenas of external competition.

Argentina illustrates this volatility: under former President Cristina Kirchner, Buenos Aires deepened cooperation with China in space and port projects due to economic needs, while under President Javier Milei, the country has pivoted toward Washington, partnering on the development of the Ushuaia naval base to monitor Chinese activities near the Strait of Magellan. These shifting foreign policy choices heighten concerns that possible foreign military involvement in critical local infrastructure could undermine national sovereignty or serve external interests.

At the same time, some countries have managed to strike a balance by pursuing strategic autonomy. Brazil, for example, has maintained robust trade relations with China while declining to formally join the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby preserving room for cooperation with the U.S. and resisting Washington’s pressure to exclude Chinese telecom firms. However, it can be said that, for Latin America as a whole, US-China strategic competition is reducing their room for manoeuvre and making them opt for choices such as south-south cooperation and stronger intra-regional cooperation.

To avoid becoming a mere playground for great-power rivalry, Latin America must anchor its approach in strong leadership, institutional consolidation and oversight, and transparent contracts. Safeguards such as national security clauses, diversified partnerships, and regional coordination can strengthen bargaining power while reducing vulnerabilities. Ultimately, skilled leadership, accompanied by informed public opinion, can serve as a bulwark against external pressures. It is essential to withstand coercion, manage debt responsibility and create space for growth by ensuring that foreign investments deliver tangible local benefits, such as job creation, technology transfer, and capacity-building, while avoiding asymmetric dependencies and promoting self-reliance. Robust governance can turn U.S.–China competition into a source of resilience, but without it, sovereignty may be eroded and countries will be left more vulnerable to external control and drawn into great-power camps.

***** 

*Dr. Girisanker S.B. & Keshav Verma are Research Associates at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Wang, Christoph Nedopil. Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – Green Finance & Development Center. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/.

[ii]Marc Jütten. “China's increasing presence in Latin America: Implications for the European Union.” (2025). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769504/EPRS_BRI(2025)769504_EN.pdf

[iii] Roy, Diana. “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America | Council on Foreign Relations.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.

[iv] “Will Latin America Turn Against China Over Human Rights?”.  Inter-American Dialogue. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://thedialogue.org/analysis/will-latin-america-turn-against-china-over-human-rights.

[v] Note- A ground facility is any land-based installation, such as antennas, telescopes, or control centres, that communicates with, monitors, or supports satellites and space missions.

[vi] Jr, Matthew P. Funaiole, Dana Kim, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez. “Eyes on the Skies: China’s Growing Space Footprint in South America.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space.

[vii] “China’s Military-Run Space Station in Argentina Is a ‘Black Box”. Taipei Times”. February 3, 2019. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/02/03/2003709158.

[viii] US Southern Command. “USSPACECOM and Uruguayan Air Force Sign Space Situational Awareness Information Sharing Agreement.” US Southern Command News, April 9, 2024. Accessed August 6, 2025. https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3739659/usspacecom-and-uruguayan-air-force-sign-space-situational- awareness-information/

[ix] US Southern Command. “USSPACECOM, Brazilian Air Force Sign Liaison Officer Agreement.” US Southern Command News, April 11, 2024. Accessed August 6, 2025.  https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3739656/usspacecom-brazilian-air-force-sign-liaison-officer-agreement/

[x] US Space Command. “USSPACECOM Commander, CSEL Reinforce Partnerships in SOUTHCOM AOR.” U.S. Space Command News, August 6, 2024. Accessed August 6, 2025 https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/3863453/usspacecom-commander-csel-reinforce-partnerships-in-southcom-aor/

[xi] Lab, iDeas, and José Romero. “Evaluating the Risk of China’s Port Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean | CSIS Americas Program.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://chinaportslac.csis.org/.

[xii] Kubny, Heiner. “China’s Port Plan in Ushuaia and Satellite Station in Antarctica | Polar Journal.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://polarjournal.net/china-plans-a-gateway-to-antarctica-in-argentina/.

[xiii] Bello, Fundación Andrés. “Agreement with Chinese Fishing Company Hongdong Generates Criticism in Santa Cruz.” Fundación Andrés Bello | China Latinoamerica, November 5, 2024. https://fundacionandresbello.org/en/news/argentina-????????-news/agreement-with-chinese-fishing-company-hongdong-generates-criticism-in-santa-cruz/

[xiv] Seafood Media Group. “IN BRIEF – Governor Vidal Opens the Ports of Santa Cruz to a Chinese Company Operating in Mile 201.” FIS Worldnews, October 24, 2024. Accessed August 6, 2025.https://www.seafood.media/fis/worldnews/search_brief.asp?l=e&id=132356&ndb=1

[xv] Ford, Alessandro. “Chinese Fishing Fleet Leaves Ecuador, Chile, Peru Scrambling to Respond.” InSight Crime, November 5, 2020. https://insightcrime.org/news/china-fishing-fleet-response/.

[xvi] South China Morning Post. “Li Ka-Shing’s Hutchison Steps Back from Global Ports amid Trade War.” March 5, 2025. https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3301104/ck-hutchisons-surprise-sale-global-ports-sends-stock-surging-amid-unfolding-trade-war.

[xvii] The Economic Times. “BlackRock Strikes $23 Billion Deal for Ports on Both Sides of Panama Canal amid US-China Tensions.” March 5, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/blackrock-strikes-23-billion-deal-for-ports-on-both-sides-of-panama-canal-amid-us-china-tensions/articleshow/118717234.cms?from=mdr.

[xviii] Phillips, Morgan. “China May Gain Greater Control of Panama Canal after BlackRock Deal Misses Deadline.” Fox News, July 28, 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-may-gain-greater-control-panama-canal-after-blackrock-deal-misses-deadline.

[xix] David Vergun. “Argentina Increases Military Ties to the United States.” DOD News. July 2, 2025. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4233677/argentina-increases-military-ties-to-the-united-states/

[xx] Williams, Lachlan. “South Atlantic Stakes: U.S. Counters China at Argentina’s Ushuaia Naval Hub.” The Rio Times, May 1, 2025. https://www.riotimesonline.com/south-atlantic-stakes-u-s-counters-china-at-argentinas-ushuaia-naval-hub/.

[xxi] “Strengthening Global Supply Chains and Countering China’s Influence with a Modernized Port in Ecuador.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://www.dfc.gov/investment-story/strengthening-global-supply-chains-and-countering-chinas-influence-modernized-port.

[xxii] Landers, Clemence, Nancy Lee, and Scott Morris. “Why Does DFC Want to Pay Off Ecuador’s Chinese Creditors?” Center for Global Development Blog, January 19, 2021. Accessed August 6, 2025. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/why-does-dfc-want-pay-ecuadors-chinese-creditors

[xxiii] Latam. “A Major Port Investment in Chile Is the United States’ Response to China.” Latam FDI, December 4, 2024. https://latamfdi.com/major-port-investment-in-chile/.

[xxiv] Roy, Diana. “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America | Council on Foreign Relations.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri.

[xxv] Federal Communications Services. List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act. https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist

[xxvi] Costa Rican Court Suspends Exclusion of Huawei as a 5G Provider. February 14, 2024. https://www.rcrwireless.com/20240214/featured/costa-rican-court-suspends-exclusion-huawei-5g-provider.

[xxvii] The China-Global South Project. “Huawei Out, Washington in: Panama’s 5G Reset.” July 9, 2025. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/panama-huawei-5g-us-china-central-america/.

[xxviii] Oliver Stuenkel. “Huawei or Not? Brazil Faces a Key Geopolitical Choice.” Americas Quarterly, n.d. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/huawei-or-not-brazil-faces-a-key-geopolitical-choice/.

[xxix] Berg, Ryan C., Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Juliana Rubio, Henry Ziemer, and Jessie Hu. An Americas First Case for Reauthorizing the Development Finance Corporation. July 22, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-first-case-reauthorizing-development-finance-corporation.

[xxx] Henagan, William. “Reauthorizing DFC: A Primer for Policymakers | Council on Foreign Relations.” Accessed August 4, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/article/reauthorizing-dfc-primer-policymakers.

[xxxi]Note- APEP is launched by the Biden administration along with twelve[xxxi] members of the LA region to deepen economic integration, tackle economic inequality, and restore faith in democracy by delivering for working people across the region.

[xxxii] “APEP Trade Track ‘Suspended,’ but Some Technical Work Will Continue”. InsideTrade.Com. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/apep-trade-track-suspended-some-technical-work-will-continue.