Indian Council of World Affairs

On 20 August 2025, the sixth China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral meeting in Kabul addressed security and economic cooperation. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi, Ishaq Dar, and Amir Khan Muttaqi discussed countering militancy and advancing trade, transit, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s extension into Afghanistan. By hosting these leaders, Kabul signals informal acceptance and participation in regional economic talks.

The sixth China-Afghanistan-Pakistan (CAP) trilateral at the Foreign Minister level was held in Kabul on 20 August 2025. It was the second such meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar and their Afghan counterpart Amir Khan Muttaqi in 12 weeks, after they came together in Beijing in May.[i] Reportedly, the recent meeting combined security coordination with economic goals: tackle cross-border militancy while promoting trade, transit, and infrastructure development, including renewed efforts to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and possibly Central Asia.[ii]

In its official statement, Beijing emphasised “strategic mutual trust”,  stronger law-enforcement ties, and joint action against transnational groups.[iii] Wang Yi stated, “China is ready to work with Afghanistan and Pakistan to deepen good-neighborliness and mutual trust, render mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other’s core interests, and firmly oppose interference by any external forces in the region”.[iv] Pakistan’s Foreign Office, in a brief statement[v] on X, said that the three sides “committed to strengthen joint efforts against terrorism”. The statement also noted, “They also reaffirmed their commitment to deepening collaboration in trade, transit, regional development, health, education, culture, and combating drug trafficking, as well as the extension of CPEC to Afghanistan”.[vi] Kabul, for its part, underlined that “the trilateral mechanism provides a platform for practical & result-oriented discussions to further expand cooperation”. Muttaqi added that, since the Taliban takeover in 2021, “Afghanistan has pursued an economy-centred foreign policy aimed at transforming the country from the narrative of security challenges into a crossroad of regional connectivity as the new ground realities also help the success of this policy”.[vii] The Taliban Interim administration’s statement also stated that the recently held meeting “reviewed the outcomes of previous sessions & focused on strengthening cooperation in political, economic, & transit sectors”.[viii]

The May Beijing meeting took place under the shadow of a four-day clash between Pakistan and India. It played a key role in re-establishing diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan after a period of heightened tensions. The meeting also opened discussions on extending the CPEC, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), into Afghanistan. The BRI is an extensive network of ports, railways, and highways aimed at connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe. India has strongly criticised the CPEC due to its route through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, leading New Delhi to oppose China’s broader BRI vision, which includes the CPEC. Notably, the Chinese Foreign Minister met with the Indian Prime Minister in New Delhi on 19 August before travelling directly to Kabul on the morning of August 20 for bilateral and trilateral discussions. He then proceeded to Islamabad for strategic talks with Pakistani leadership.[ix]

China’s Calculus

Beijing’s objectives remain steadfast: prevent militant activity from spilling into Xinjiang, safeguard Belt and Road assets, and leverage Afghanistan’s resources to forge lasting economic ties that stabilise China’s western frontier. In Kabul, Wang Yi emphasised “enhancing security cooperation, strengthening the trilateral security dialogue mechanism, and collaborating on counter-terrorism”.[x] Alongside this, he offered an economic package including trade, investment, and invitations for Afghanistan to align more closely with the BRI, potentially through mining projects. Afghan officials noted China’s interest in mineral exploration and expressed Kabul’s openness to deeper BRI integration.

China’s approach is shaped by two realities in Afghanistan. First, the Taliban prefer economic partners who don’t press them on human rights or inclusive politics. Second, although Afghanistan has rich mineral resources, it lacks cash, so even small projects in copper, lithium, or rare earths carry big political weight. Beijing sees that visible projects - like extending CPEC, building dry ports, or improving road and rail links to the Wakhan Corridor and Xinjiang - can give it influence to push Kabul on security issues, especially against ETIM. The key question is whether the promised “stronger law-enforcement ties” will actually result in intelligence sharing and real action against cross-border networks.[xi]

Pakistan’s Dilemma

For Islamabad, the trilateral framework represents an effort to reset relations. After years of tensions marked by border closures, cross-border skirmishes, and accusations over the TTP, Pakistan has sought to strengthen diplomatic ties, upgrading to an ambassador-level relationship to pragmatically manage, rather than endorse, the Taliban government. Announced earlier this year[xii], this move was positioned as essential for coordinating counter-terrorism efforts and facilitating trade. However, Pakistan’s core demand persists: Kabul must take decisive action against TTP sanctuaries and supporters. Public statements during the trilateral talks reiterated calls for the Taliban to curb groups threatening Pakistani and Chinese security while cautiously reopening discussions on economic incentives, including a tentative revival of CPEC-related initiatives.

This shift towards engagement is also driven by economic pressures. Pakistan’s economy relies on smooth trade corridors, with energy and food import costs highly sensitive to transit disruptions. A stable border with Afghanistan helps mitigate risks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, while the trilateral framework spreads responsibility for security incidents that could otherwise jeopardise cooperation. Islamabad’s strategy hinges on leveraging a China-supported platform to secure gradual progress against the TTP, without pushing the Taliban to publicly break ties with allied militant groups - a challenging balance with limited historical success.

Kabul’s Objective

For the Taliban, the meeting itself sends a strong message. By hosting China’s Foreign Minister and Pakistan’s deputy prime minister/foreign minister, Kabul shows it’s gaining informal acceptance, even if official recognition is still out of reach, and that Afghanistan is joining regional economic talks. The Taliban will highlight discussions on investment, extending the CPEC, and improved diplomatic ties as proof their government is legitimate, while ignoring ongoing issues like women’s rights, inclusive politics, and the presence of foreign militants. This focus was clear in Kabul’s official statements emphasising trade, mining, and connectivity.[xiii]

However, chasing this image of legitimacy has risks. The more the Taliban try to profit from their strategic location, the more Pakistan and China will demand solid security commitments. If those commitments mean arresting, expelling, or restricting groups historically linked to parts of the Taliban, it could create internal divisions. On the other hand, if the Taliban’s promises are just talk, Pakistan will lose patience, and China’s support will depend on avoiding attacks on its people or projects.

In conclusion, it can be said that the trilateral meeting primarily revolved primarily around security concerns. China highlighted threats posed by the ETIM, Pakistan emphasised its challenges with the TTP and the BLA, while Kabul offered only broad assurances to prevent attacks originating from Afghan territory. The critical question is whether the Taliban can satisfy the expectations of both China and Pakistan.

Overall, this meeting carries significance for three key reasons. First, it underscores China’s willingness to engage directly with the Taliban, prioritising security and resource access over international criticism. Second, this indicates Pakistan is shifting from exerting pressure on Kabul to pursuing cooperation, although it still demands concrete action against groups targeting its territory. Third, it provides the Taliban with an opportunity to project legitimacy and economic engagement without undertaking meaningful governance reforms.

For India, the development warrants careful scrutiny. The strengthening of China-Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation, particularly through potential CPEC expansion - could undermine India’s regional influence and pose security challenges, especially given its opposition to projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

*****

*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] “Pakistan, Afghanistan move towards ‘restoring ties’ in talks with China.” Al Jazeera, May 23, 2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/23/pakistan-afghanistan-move-towards-restoring-ties-in-talks-with-china. (Accessed on 22.8.25)

[ii] “Wang Yi holds trilateral talks with Taliban, Pakistan FMs”. The Hindu, August 20, 2025. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/wang-yi-holds-trilateral-talks-with-taliban-pakistan-fms/article69957169.ece (Accessed on 22.8.25)

[iii] “Foreign Ministers of China, Afghanistan and Pakistan Hold the Sixth Dialogue”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, August 21, 2025. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202508/t20250822_11694221.html (Accessed on 22.8.25)

[iv] Ibid

[v] “The 6^th Foreign Minister’s Dialog was held on 20 August in Kabul”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, X- Handle @ForeignOfficePk, August 20, 2025. Available at: https://x.com/ForeignOfficePk/status/1958152836174520470 (Accessed on 22.8.25)

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] “Sixth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue between Afghanistan, China & Pakistan Held in Kabul.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, August 21, 2025. Available at: https://mfa.gov.af/en/45359(Accessed on 22.8.25)

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] “Wang Yi holds trilateral talks with Taliban, Pakistan FMs”. The Hindu, August 20, 2025. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/wang-yi-holds-trilateral-talks-with-taliban-pakistan-fms/article69957169.ece(Accessed on 23.8.25)

[x] Foreign Ministers of China, Afghanistan and Pakistan Hold the Sixth Dialogue”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, August 21, 2025. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202508/t20250822_11694221.html

[xi] “China, Afghanistan hold talks on mining, Belt and Road participation.” Reuters, August 20, 2025. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-afghanistan-hold-talks-mining-belt-road-participation-2025-08-20/(Accessed on 23.8.25)

[xii] “Pakistan announces to upgrade ties with Afghanistan, appoint Ambassador to Kabul.” The Hindu, May 30, 2025. Available: https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-announces-to-upgrade-ties-with-afghanistan-appoint-ambassador-to-kabul/article69638369.ece (Accessed on 23.8.25)

[xiii] Sixth Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue between Afghanistan, China & Pakistan Held in Kabul.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, August 21, 2025. Available at: https://mfa.gov.af/en/45359. (Accessed on 23.8.25)