Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction 

The process of political and strategic transformation that began with the Arab Uprising in 2010 appears to have become a defining and ongoing feature of the West Asian region. Amid a series of momentous developments over the past decade and a half, the latest is the self-dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Türkiye, marking the end of its four-decade armed conflict with the Turkish state. Over these years, the PKK not only waged war in pursuit of political and cultural rights for the Kurds but also cultivated numerous affiliates and offshoots across Iraq, Iran and Syria. Yet, the news of its dissolution was no less unexpected than President Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria or his face-to-face meeting with Ahmed Al-Shaara, Syria’s de facto leader, in Riyadh. This was not for the first time that PKK leadership made such announcement but similar declaration was made in 1999 soon after the arrest of Öcalan and again in 2013 when both sides (PKK and the government) had almost reached a ceasefire. 

The decision to dissolve the PKK and lay down arms was initiated by none other than the group’s founding leader, Abdullah Öcalan (77) who has been serving a life sentence in Türkiye’s İmralı prison on Marmara Island since 1999. Although initially sentenced to death, his punishment was commuted to life imprisonment in 2002[i] following Türkiye’s abolition of capital punishment — a move driven largely by its aspirations for European Union membership. While the PKK has declared its intention to disband, what events will unfold remain uncertain. The process of disarmament and the dismantling of the group’s armed sanctuaries pose significant and complex challenges for the Turkish government. 

Moreover, the PKK is not only confined to Türkiye, but it also has its political and military wings across the region, and if the regional countries would extend their cooperation to the Turkish government in its mission of eliminating the PKK and its numerous terror outfits is yet to be seen. In the past, the issue of the PKK has been used as a bargaining chip and a strategic tool by regional countries to check the opponents or advance their own political agendas. A notable example is President Assad’s use of Syria’s Kurdish population against Türkiye during the height of the Syrian civil war. Over the past decade, Türkiye has engaged in multiple military confrontations with the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Northern Syria — presumably an offshoot of the PKK — with backing from both the Syrian regime and, at times, the United States. 

In light of the above, this paper aims to examine the broader context and prospects for the dissolution of the PKK. It will also explore the key challenges the Turkish government is likely to face in its efforts to dismantle PKK hideouts and sanctuaries, neutralise its armed capabilities and ultimately bring an end to its insurgency. 

How It All Happened 

Speculations were rife about the self-dissolution of the PKK soon after Öcalan, in a letter (27 February 2025), urged the party members to call a meeting and announce the disbanding of the PKK and end its decades-long rebellion against the government.[ii] The chief negotiator from the government’s side was Develt Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), one of the key allies of ruling Justice and Development Party ( AKP). Develt Bahçeli reportedly visited Öcalan several times before the current declaration made in the Kurdish Congress held from 7 May to 9 May 2025. Amidst his meeting with Öcalan, Develt Bahçeli held a series of meetings with the senior leaders of the Pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democratic Party (DEM) as well. 

It can be recalled here that the milestone was achieved as a result of MHP’s mission, “Terror Free Turkey”, launched in September 2024. It was the mission “Terror Free Turkey” which brought Develt Bahçeli and Öcalan face to face, where the former urged the latter to surrender arms and dissolve the PKK.[iii]

The PKK held its 12^th Party Congress in two cities of Northern Iraq from 5 May to 7 May 2025 and announced it would dissolve itself and abandon its armed struggle. The extraordinary session of the PKK was held at two places in Northern Iraq because of security concerns.[iv] It is also reported that Öcalan addressed the meeting virtually but the Turkish mainstream media was silent about it.

The resolution passed at the Congress read, “The four decades of PKK’s struggle has dismantled the edifice of politics of denial and annihilation and root of the annihilation could be traced to the philosophy of Ataturk’s Republic of Türkiye in 1924, which only believed in Turkic identity and its citizenry.”[v]

The statement also underlined that the movement had reached a point where the aspirations of Kurds could be achieved through a democratic process only [vi] and the era of people’s struggle has gone. The Congress also called for strengthening the Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood and sought support from all sides to initiate a new era of peace in Türkiye.[vii] The AKP welcomed the historic move of the PKK, and its official statement said that the current step is a milestone in Türkiye’s effort to make the Turkish soil free of terrorism.[viii]

Why is the PKK Surrendering Now

The PKK has been engaged in an armed struggle against the Turkish state since 1984, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives across Türkiye and the Qandil Mountains of Iraq, the latter having served as the group’s headquarters for decades^.9 Kurds in Türkiye number approximately 20 to 25 million out of a total population of 85 million, and they form the majority in around twenty of the country’s eighty-one provinces.¹⁰ Beyond Türkiye, the PKK has also been designated a terrorist organisation by both the United States and the European Union. It is worth recalling that during the early years of President Erdoğan’s rule, there were efforts to extend greater political and cultural rights to the Kurdish population. In 2013, direct peace negotiations were initiated between the two sides, but the process collapsed in 2015. 

As mentioned earlier, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Türkiye have long been the epicenter of Kurdish political and militant activity. However, the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq in 2005, in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, significantly reduced the threat posed by Iraqi Kurdish groups. In a sign of improving relations, Türkiye opened a consulate in the city of Erbil in 2010.[ix] However, it is also a fact that Türkiye had opposed the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017, fearing that it could embolden its own Kurdish populace for similar struggle. 

Meanwhile, Türkiye managed to subdue the remaining Iraqi Kurdish rebels with the cooperation of the KRG and continued its cross-border military operations for several years. Since 2022 in particular, the Turkish military has been conducting air-supported campaigns — namely Operation Claw-Lock and Operation Claw-Eagle — in northern Iraq. Sometimes the overstretched operation by Türkiye also drawn criticism from the KRG, and prominent Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr once described the Turkish military presence in the region as an "occupation."[x] In 2023, Türkiye’s Defence Minister stated that the sustained and comprehensive military operations had effectively crippled the PKK’s military capabilities.[xi]

Likewise, in Syria, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) — a Kurdish militia group supported by the PKK — significantly lost influence following the departure of President Assad from key areas of control. The anticipated withdrawal of US forces, which until recently provided substantial military assistance and strategic cover to the YPG in its fight against ISIS across several Kurdish-majority cities, along with the group’s potential integration into the Syrian national armed forces under a new government, may have compelled a shift away from the PKK’s traditional political strategy. Moreover, the rapidly evolving geopolitical realities in the region, by shifting priorities and changing alliances among major powers, could also have driven the PKK leadership to reorient its policy and pursue the path of pragmatism. 

Over the years, the PKK appears to have lost the support of several Western powers partly due to shifting internal dynamics within those countries and partly as a result of Türkiye’s persistent diplomatic campaign against nations, it believes, are offering political and financial backing to the group. In 2022, Türkiye notably blocked the commencement of NATO accession talks for Finland and Sweden, citing their alleged support for the PKK and their granting of asylum to individuals Türkiye considers affiliated with the organisation.[xii]

The recent initiative by the Turkish government to strike negotiations with the PKK despite decades of hostility is also widely interpreted as President Erdoğan’s attempt to secure the backing of the pro-Kurdish party, DEM, for a constitutional amendment aimed at removing the three-term limit on the presidency as Erdoğan sets his sights on the 2028 presidential election.[xiii]

The Challenges of Disarming the PKK

Although the PKK has announced its self-dissolution, there is a sense of euphoria among President Erdoğan’s supporters, who are celebrating it as yet another political victory for their leader. However, Erdoğan is likely to face a number of both major and minor challenges before the PKK can be fully disarmed, dismantled or meaningfully integrated into the country’s political process. Türkiye’s Defence Minister has said affirmed that military operations against the PKK might still be needed until the process of disarmament and surrender of arms is completed. He stated that Turkish forces will need to ensure that the PKK no longer poses a threat to the country. The modalities of surrender of arms and gradual mainstreaming of PKK members will have to be worked by the Turkish authorities in consultation with PKK.

It also remains unclear whether the estimated 50,000 PKK cadres who have fled the country over the decades will endorse the leadership’s decision to disband. Even if they choose to abandon the insurgency, could they possibly be permitted to return to Türkiye only under condition which are acceptable to the Turkish state. Türkiye will have to take the lead and reach out to the countries where PKK off-shoots are active or where PKK presence is significant. Türkiye will also have to enter into consultations with EU and US who have designated PKK as terrorist organisation to take into account recent developments. All stakeholders will have to cooperate to make the most out of these lates developments.

It would also be difficult to contain other Kurdish forces which are working for the rights of Kurds in the region, and there are groups, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Forces, which are pro-Türkiye, and how these nuances would be resolved would constitute another big challenge.

It remains uncertain whether Ocalan still holds significant influence over the PKK after being incommunicado for decades or whether he has any plans to negotiate the release of mid- and low-ranking members of the group who have been languishing in prison for years. Questions also remain about whether his leadership is strong enough to guide the process forward following the Congress’s declaration of the PKK’s self-dissolution at his behest. Following the dissolution, the PKK will likely lose its ability to control its cadres or to intervene in Kurdish affairs in Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Soon after the Kurdish Congress announced its decision to lay down arms, the Turkish government opened direct channels with Erbil, the Iraqi regional authority, to discuss mechanisms for surrender of weapons by the PKK and its affiliates operating across the region. In a statement, the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Nechirvan Barzani, expressed his government’s full support for Türkiye, adding that war and bloodshed could bring no lasting solution.[xiv] In a similar development, Türkiye’s Defence Minister, Yaşar Güler, announced that a coordination meeting would be held with regional countries — Syria, Iraq and Iran — focusing on strategies to dismantle the PKK’s weapons sanctuaries in cooperation with PKK members. It has been reported that Turkish intelligence  is in touch with  former PKK members to facilitate the process.   

It is not only the government that has opened multiple diplomatic fronts to turn the PKK’s announcement into reality; the pro-Kurdish party, DEM — the third largest party in Parliament — has also sprung into action. On 18 May 2025, a DEM delegation visited Abdullah Öcalan for the first time since the PKK’s dissolution announcement and the fifth time since December 2024 to discuss the future course of action.[xv]

There has already been considerable uproar among opposition parties over the PKK’s reference in its resolution to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which they claim was a driving force behind the marginalisation and oppression of Kurds by successive Turkish governments. Meanwhile, the leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, has urge the government to invite Abdullah Öcalan to the Parliament to formally announce the surrender of arms.[xvi] Leaders of both the Good Party and the Victory Party have opposed the government’s current move. The Good Party described the entire exercise as an act of treason against the nation, accusing it of being a strategy to secure Erdoğan’s position as a lifetime president. Meanwhile, the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, issued an official statement seeking that all solutions concerning the Kurds should be debated and decided within Parliament, warning against using the matter as part of daily electoral calculations or political manoeuvring, as has happened in the past. Additionally, there are reports that other senior PKK leaders have met Öcalan, who himself may be placed under house arrest rather than remaining in his current incarceration.[xvii] The self-dissolution of the PKK has sparked a new discourse in Türkiye, fuelling widespread speculation — most notably over the socio-political acceptance of previously banned members of the organisation in Türkiye. Meanwhile, Develt Bahçeli has called on the government to undertake humanitarian and confidence-building measures to help lay the groundwork for lasting peace in the country.[xviii]

Conclusion

It is not for the first time that Öcalan has asked its members to put down their arms. A similar announcement was made in 1999 when Öcalan was captured and again in 2013, when both sides (PKK and government) were on the verge of reaching a deal. But this time, its chances of success are more given that Europe and West Asia are occupied with pressing conflict amidst immense geopolitical churn. The matter has a better chance of success if it remains a bilateral issue between Türkiye and PKK with Türkiye taking the lead in consultations with other relevant countries to see a lasting solution to the issue.

Of course, decades-old hostility which has created an environment of distrust and a psychological barrier, would have to be overcome by all sides which will be challenging.

*****

*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui is a Senior Research Fellow with ICWA.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Turkiye Commutes Ecolan’s Death Sentence into Life Imprisonment, Euroactive, October 4, 2002, Accessed https://shorter.me/5-zIh May 20, 2025.

[ii]Jailed PKK leader tells cadres to lay down arms, Aljazeera (English) Feb 27, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/_60B1 May 12, 2025.

[iii] Imrali delegation pays first visit to Ocalan after the dissolution of PKK, Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic) May 18 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/geWIz May 19, 2025.

[iv] Full Text: PKK’s Statement on Disbanding Decision, Bianet (English) May 13, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/jf8Jn May 18, 2025.

[v] PKK: The End of Long Historical Era, Al-Quds-Al-Arabi (Arabic Daily) May 14, 2025, Accessed, https://shorter.me/lAjQy May 19, 2025.

[vi] Full Text: PKK’s Statement on Disbanding Decision, Bianet (English) May 13, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/jf8Jn May 18, 2025.

[vii]Kurdish Media: PKK Announces its official disarmament and dissolution, Eelaf (Arabic Daily) May 12, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/wEQiF May 17, 2025.

[viii]Kurdish Media: PKK Announces its official disarmament and dissolution, Eelaf (Arabic Daily) May 12, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/wEQiF May 17, 2025.

[ix] https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/future-of-kurdish-question.

[x] Mehmat Alaca, PKK Disarmament: What does it mean for Baghdad and Erbil, The Middle East Eye, May 10, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/q90LT May 14, 2025.

[xi] Imrali delegation pays first visit to Ocalan after the dissolution of PKK, Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic) May 18, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/geWIz May 19, 2025.

[xii] Erdogan: Turkiye asks Sweden and Finland to end support to terror group, Middle East Eye, May 21, 2022, Accessed https://shorter.me/lh4u2 May 13, 2025.

[xiii] Andrew Wilks, Hopes still exist for PKK- Turkiye détente, despite deadly attacks, Aljazeera (English) November 1, 2024, Accessed https://shorter.me/CWmLo May 12, 2025.

[xiv]Imrali delegation pays first visit to Ocalan after the dissolution of PKK, Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic) May 18, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/geWIz May 19, 2025.

[xv] Imrali delegation pays first visit to Ocalan after the dissolution of PKK, Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic) May 18, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/geWIz May 19, 2025.

[xvi] Abdul Basit Sayyed, The Dissolution of PKK and the possibility of Turkish government Opening to Kurds, Al-Quds-Al-Arabia (Arabic Daily) May 17, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/o6JXp May 17, 2025.

[xvii] PKK: The End of Long Historical Era, Al-Quds-Al-Arabi (Arabic Daily) May 14 2025, Accessed, https://shorter.me/lAjQy May 19, 2025.

[xviii] Saeed Abdul Razaq, The decision of the dissolution of Turkiye sparks new row in Turkiye, Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic) May 16, 2025, Accessed https://shorter.me/DjpgI.