Indian Council of World Affairs

Abstract: The fast-changing geopolitical landscape of the West Asia region and the growing anxiety and insecurity of the different religious and ethnic groups in Syria due to the HTS’ hardline Islamist outlook may create a situation in Syria that is akin to Libya. The interim president al-Sharaa may have to garner legitimacy from external actors to sustain his rule if he fails to resolve the structural challenges including the restoration of the secular and liberal credentials of the Syrian state. 

On 8th December 2024, Ba’ath Party-led President Bashar al-Assad’s 53 years old regime was toppled from power by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and supported mainly by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army under the auspices of Operation Deterrence of Aggression. Syria witnessed this historical turn in its politics after 14 years, which ignited with the outbreak of the Civil War following the domino effect of the Arab Spring in 2011. With the downfall of the Assad regime, there was a political vacuum at the higher echelons of its institutions and the subsequent lack of legitimacy in the Syrian state because the ancien regime was removed through a civil war, not with the representative processes linked to the democratic elections. The HTS was considered an Islamist militant group and was designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union and the United States. Therefore, the HTS requires building a legitimate rule in Syria through consensus and confidence-building measures with different stakeholders inside the country. 

In this context, since the HTS captured the power and became a de-facto governing party, its core leaders and commanders have claimed that they will establish a tolerant and inclusive form of government structure for all ethnic groups in Syria. The HTS had to reshape its hardline image as it was an offshoot of Al-Qaida. Notably, the HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who led the military operation that removed President Assad, looked for a new Syrian administration to garner the ‘legal and constitutional cover’ to lead a political transition. Al-Sharaa emerged as the most powerful political actor in Syrian politics after the removal of Assad. However, a significant degree of uncertainty is involved in the political transition because the country has gone through a civil war in which violence has been used to change the political leadership. The growing uncertainty in the political transition creates a sense of fear and insecurity among the new political elites, including al-Sharaa, of losing the nascent control over the state if they do not speed up the process of regime formation. As a result, al-Sharaa, coming from hardline Sunni ideology, required a new social contract with different ethnic groups and minorities inside the country to forge a new regime. Syria is a multi-ethnic country encompassing different ethnic groups and minorities, including Christians (Maronites), Alwaites, Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Druze, Yazidis, and Palestinians. It is important to see how al-Sharaa will include these minorities as stakeholders in the regime formation process, particularly the Alawaite sect, which has been ruling Syria for more than five decades. Thus, the paper focuses on the new political leadership’s measures to form the regime and identifies the challenges ahead for the Syrian Transitional government. 

Al-Sharaa’s Measures for Regime Formation 

Upon capturing power, HTS leader al-Sharaa had two options: experimenting with regime formation and fostering his legitimacy to rule Syria. The first measure was the implementation of one of the provisions of Assad’s 2012 constitution, which mandated that if the presidential post is vacant, the vice president will serve as interim president for 90 days until elections are held. However, appointing the previous regime’s vice president (Faisal Mekdad) was not accepted by the Syrian people, particularly the revolutionary forces who spent more than a decade resisting the pro-Assad ruling establishment. Therefore, al-Sharaa chose the second measure- ‘revolutionary legitimacy,’ which is a short-term arrangement embedded with populist support but expires with the end of the revolutionary stage or transitional period following the consolidation of the regime.[i]

The political leadership established the Transitional Ruling Council (TRC) on January 29, 2025, which unanimously chose al-Sharaa as the council’s president and effectively became Syria’s transitional president. The council's declaration dissolved the institutions and symbols of Assad's regime, including the National Assembly, Army, and network of security agencies and militias, and dissolved the Ba’ath Party, abolished the 2012 Constitution and all Assad era emergency decrees.[ii] Instead, the TRC established the new Interim Legislative Body which is responsible for the framing and promulgation of the interim constitutional declaration and laws, development of economic infrastructure, formation of independent commission to conduct elections and creation of the independent body for transitional justice. These measures are temporary as they are elements of the transitional regime in Syria and will be dissolved by adopting the new constitution. The current transitional regime in Syria emanated from an exceptional degree of popular unity. However, the question remains how the HTS and its leadership re-build institutions in a short period amidst the ongoing state of revolutionary legitimacy. 

After the formation of the TRC, al-Sharaa pledged to establish the Syrian National Dialogue Conference on January 31, 2025, aimed to bring representatives from different sections of Syrian society to create ‘representative legitimacy’ for the new regime through the roadmap of elections and a new constitutional order. However, al-Sharaa had to postpone the dialogue due to technical and logistical challenges, including the ambiguity surrounding the criteria for selecting invitees and the absence of international consensus. The National Dialogue is critical for al-Sharra to garner legitimacy inside and outside the country for the long term. Therefore, the National Dialogue held its first meeting on February 13, 2025, comprising seven members decided by the al-Sharaa-led TRC.[iii] The committee included members of the ruling coalition, civil society representatives, and two women, one of whom is Christian-responding to international and domestic demands for diversity and inclusivity. The dialogue remains controversial as it did not include the representation of Kurds and Alawite minority groups. 

Structural Challenges to the Transitional Regime

Economic Challenges: The war-torn Syria has faced profound economic challenges. Syria is currently witnessing a 90 percent poverty rate, and its GDP is only half of its pre-war period. The economy was contracted by 85 percent during 14 years of Civil War. The war has sparked hyperinflation and devalued the Syrian currency. The protracted conflict decimated the country’s primary infrastructure in the electricity, health, and transportation sectors. The lack of essential services and infrastructure further exacerbates the economic situation. Therefore, the transitional regime requires the economic infrastructure to generate employment and reduce poverty.

Conditions on Lifting of Sanctions: The transitional administration emphasized the urgent need to withdraw EU and US sanctions, adding that these measures were put on the Syrian regime because of its repressive attitude toward rebels and revolutionaries. Therefore, the regime demanded that external actors must lift these sanctions. As the transitional regime started, the EU and the US announced they would lift the sanctions entirely conditioned upon the independent elections and establish the rule of law by creating a representative government in Syria.[iv]  This is critical for the holistic economic development of Syria, which will affect every Syrian in the country. The EU and the US emphasized the robust representation of the Syrian voices to shape the country’s future. 

Lack of Inclusive Government: Critics argued that five of the seven members of the National Dialogue are Islamists with ties to President al-Sharaa. The committee did not include members from the country’s Kurdish, Alawite, or Druze communities.[v] Therefore, it is crucial to see how the hardline HTS will reconcile with its Sunni ideology to govern a country that has secularists and several religious minorities.

Fear of Islamisation of the Syrian State and the need for interfaith and interethnic harmony: The new Syrian regime has announced to guarantee religious rights and freedom to all ethnic and religious minorities. However, it is yet to be seen if the new Syrian constitution will be based on Sharia and Islamic Jurisprudence. Many reports have suggested that the transitional regime has referred to Sharia law in the new school curriculum and the rebuilding of the police system. Syria has been a secular state, and the re-establishment of the state and its institutions on religious lines will increase the insecurity of the minorities and challenge the stability of new leadership.

Smuggling and Illicit Trade: The country’s overall dependence is on smuggling and illicit trade for revenue. Syria is the primary source of Captogan’s trade, which is an addictive amphetamine stimulant, with an annual value placed at 5.6 billion dollars by the World Bank.[vi] Syria’s transitional government is trying to change the country’s infamous status as a ‘narco-state’. The new leadership has performed several raids to demonstrate its anti-drug stance. However, the Syrian economy’s need for this narcotic to run the country will limit the HTS’s ability to dismantle its network. The remedy is to lift the sanctions tied to the complicated process of forming a representative government.

Threat of Revival of Sectarian Violence: The HTS government has controlled substantial territory in Syria, mainly which is inhabited by the Sunni population. However, it is still facing competition from other rebel groups, including Kurds, Druze, and Alawites, who vie for control over limited resources such as gas, oil, agricultural land, and water. Alawites are forming self-defense groups owing to the fear of reprisals from the HTS. There is a fear of large-scale revenge attacks, which will lead to a vicious cycle of sectarian violence, as has been witnessed in Libya and Yemen.

Issue of Internally Displaced People: The 14 years of the Civil War forced the Syrians to flee their homes inside the country. According to UNHCR, there are approximately 7.2 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Syria. In addition, around 6.2 million Syrian refugees are living in neighboring countries.[vii] The transitional government has taken measures, including the removal of the old regime’s oppressive security structures, the release of prisoners, rebuilding infrastructure, and providing basic services to provide safe passage for IDPs to return to their homes. However, the country is still going through turmoil face as many sections are not satisfied with the HTS’ national dialogue along with the prevailing economic hardship, which can result in the resumption of sectarian violence that can bleak the prospects of a durable solution to the IDPs.

Conclusion

The transitional regime in post-Assad Syria has promised to fulfill the aspirations and promises of the people. The HTS-ruled transitional government emphasized that it would be as representative of the Syrian people as possible and would earn their trust. It is important to note how interim president al-Sharaa will meet the challenges, including economic development, employment generation, poverty reduction, inclusive governance, and confidence-building measures. The fast-changing geopolitical landscape of the West Asia region and the growing anxiety and insecurity of the different religious and ethnic groups in Syria due to the HTS’ hardline Islamist outlook may create a situation in Syria that is akin to Libya. The interim president al-Sharaa may have to garner legitimacy from external actors to sustain his rule if he fails to resolve the structural challenges including the restoration of the secular and liberal credentials of the Syrian state. There is a possibility of the revival of violent chaos because, with the end of the transitional regime, if the constitution and the regime’s structures do not satisfy the people's aspirations, new actors might use violent measures to capture power.

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*Dr. Arshad, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

Endnotes 

[i] “Revolutionary legitimacy in Syria: Sharaa as President,” Arab Center Washington DC, February 4, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mr5mfwfr, February 7, 2025

[ii] “Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa named President for transitional period,” Al-Jazeera, January 29, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/3d393wv7, February 9, 2025

[iii] “Reactions regarding Syria’ National Dialogue Conference,” Levant 24, February 13, 2025, https://tinyurl.com/bdejz6jb, February 11, 2025

[iv] “Syria’s National Dialogue Committee: A façade of inclusivity,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 14, 2025, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2yarx3ey, February 15, 2025

[v] “Commitment to Inclusive Political Transition vital for Syria’s Success,” United Nations, February 12, 2025, accessed https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc15991.doc.htm, February 16, 2025

[vi] “What will happen to al-Assad’s Captagon empire now?” Al-Jazeera, December 18, 2024, accessed https://tinyurl.com/2edx3u9k, February 18, 2025

[vii] “Syria Situation,” UNHCR, 2025 Overview, accessed https://tinyurl.com/mrxjmv4a, February 15, 2025