Abstract: The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is an important instrument of China’s Africa Policy. It facilitates China’s strategic expansion in Africa.
The ninth Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held from 4-6 September 2024 in Beijing. This year’s theme was “Joining Hands to Advance Modernisation and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Before the leaders’ Summit, the Foreign Minister and Economic Ministers’ meeting was held in Beijing on 3 September. The forum is one of the world’s largest diplomatic gatherings. At the Summit, 51 African states sent the Head of State, two states sent Presidential representatives, and the African Union Commission chair, Moussa Faki Mahamat, also attended the Summit. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also participated as a special guest at the Summit. Eswatini did not participate in the summit as it continues to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
The FOCAC 2024 took place in the backdrop of growing US-China rivalry, the deepening Ukraine crisis and other global conflicts. Tensions between China and the West have increased in the wake of the Ukraine war. China has neither condemned the war nor has it stopped its economic support to Russia. China has been supporting Russia’s war efforts in various ways. The paper will analyse the outcome of FOCAC 2024 and the major takeaways.
FOCAC 2024
The major outcome of the Summit was the grant of 360 billion yuan ($50.70 billion), elevating bilateral relations with African countries and bringing the element of the Global South to China-Africa relations. The 2024 Summit adopted two important documents: a Beijing Declaration on building “a shared future in the new era” [i] and “the Beijing Action Plan for 2025-2027”[ii].
Loan
In terms of loans, China committed 360 billion yuan ($50.70 billion) in financial assistance to Africa over three years. Around 210 billion would be through credit lines and 70 billion in new investments by Chinese companies. Some smaller amounts would be provided through military aid and other projects. It may be noted that this year the financial assistance is in Yuan. It is another step towards pushing the internationalisation of the Yuan. [iii] In addition, Ethiopia and Mauritius announced new currency swap lines with the China Central Bank.[iv] In his speech, Xi Jinping called the present state of China-Africa relations as going through the “best period in history.” [v]
Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/china-stops-short-africa-debt-relief-pledges-more-cash-2024-09-07/
This year, the financial assistance is higher than in previous years. On a comparative note, the funds promised this year exceed the amount announced in FOCAC 2021. However, it is less than the amount in 2015 and 2018, the peak of Chinese lending to Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative.[vi]
China also assured to create one million jobs on the continent and said the financing would be split between 30 clean energy infrastructure projects to boost connectivity. China promised one thousand smaller projects to start to improve livelihoods. They have described the smaller projects initiative as “small and beautiful.” It is believed that such a trend is more sustainable for African countries struggling to repay debts. It will be faster in terms of profitability for the Chinese as well.[vii] Notably, China is adjusting its lending strategy to ensure it engages with Africa in a “more resilient and sustainable manner.” [viii]
Bilateral Ties
At the FOCAC 2024, China attempted to change the character of the China-Africa relationship. Xi Jinping elevated ties with the African countries, raising them to a strategic level. The overall characterisation of China-Africa relations was elevated to an “all-weather community with a shared future for the new era.” [ix] Before the Summit, China established partnerships with more than 20 African countries. At the Summit, there were several bilateral meetings with Xi Jinping and different African Heads of State and Government on various issues, including major strategic issues. They also established strategic partnerships with 30 countries. [x] China waived tariffs for 33 African countries. At the Summit, it was announced that China would give least-developed countries having diplomatic relations with China, including 33 countries in Africa, zero-tariff treatment for 100 per cent tariff lines. This will help China expand market access to agricultural products.[xi] On the Summit’s sidelines, African leaders signed many agreements related to cooperation in infrastructure, agriculture, mining, energy, trade and other areas.
Global South
The concept of the Global South was added to the FOCAC Summit this year. Xi Jinping used the term several times to create and propagate a positive image of China’s engagement with Africa. He emphasised that China and Africa account for a third of the world’s population. In his speech, Xi Jinping raised the issue of modernisation and stated, “Modernisation is an inalienable right of all countries.” He added that the West has “inflicted immense suffering on developing countries.” Further, he projected China as a model of modernisation and the West as an exploitation of the Global South. Subsequently, creating one million jobs, boosting vocational training and providing military assistance fit into China’s ambition of building a political network across the Global South.[xii] Africa remains vital to China’s strategy of portraying itself as the champion of the “Global South” of non-Western nations.[xiii]
China tried to maintain a positive image of FOCAC within the country. Before the forum, Weibo shared a weekly bulletin stating that it banned users for harmful remarks about China-Africa relations. It also urged users to maintain a positive atmosphere in discussions about FOCAC. [xiv] It may be noted that the loans given by China to African countries were seen very critically in China. Chinese citizens called Xi Jinping the “Big Spender.” Big Spender is a term used for Xi Jinping’s investment to “throw money” in other countries.[xv]
China and the FOCAC
China’s increased appetite for energy and natural resources has increased its interest in Africa. In 2023 China-Africa trade stood at USD 282 billion. China is the largest trade partner of Africa but for China, Africa constitutes only 4.7 per cent of its global trade.[xvi] China-Africa trade is still in the donor-recipient model stage.
African leaders have expressed that they would prefer a more balanced and equitable relationship with China. Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African President, mentioned in his remarks “to narrow the trade deficit and address the structure of our trade.” He also asked for “more sustainable manufacturing and job-creating investments” in South Africa.[xvii]
China’s growing involvement in Africa can be attributed to its domestic compulsion to seek markets for its goods, creating an image of a global south-friendly country, seeking acceptance for its rise and its growth model and strategic competition with the US.
China’s diplomatic push in Africa is more urgent this year as they are facing slow economic growth at home. The country is searching for new buyers for its goods and dumping its excessive production.[xviii] Today China has very low consumer demand, its domestic investments are oversaturated with debts and falling investments, and its economic growth prospects have become heavily reliant on maintaining a positive trade balance. Consequently, China’s export credit agencies are under huge pressure to strike deals internationally by lending to anyone who will buy China’s exports. This vulnerability is compounded by the trade tariffs imposed on Chinese exports by several high-income countries. In many ways, China is more dependent on the markets it sells to than those markets are on China. [xix]
In the wake of the post-Ukraine war, the geopolitical environment has changed. Africa has become more attractive for international players. Some powers are interested in investing in Africa while others are receding. Africa has a lot more choices. Consequently, the competition for China has also increased in Africa. In December 2022, the US showed renewed interest in Africa by hosting US-Africa Leaders’ Summit.[xx] On the contrary, China has been holding the FOCAC Summit every three years. By consistently holding the FOCAC Summit, China is trying to showcase its commitment to Africa. China is using the FOCAC to counter-growing competition from any other power in the region.
The FOCAC 2024 failed to address many vital issues pertinent to China-Africa relations. The issue of ballooning debt distress in China-Africa relations was not addressed. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as of November 2023, 13 African countries which have taken loans from China are at high risk of debt distress with 7 already in debt distress. China did not announce any waivers or restructuring of the loan. At the Summit, China promised 360 billion yuan ($50.70 billion) to Africa, but it remains to be seen how the new financial disbursement will happen. China mentioned that the new loan would create 30 infrastructure projects to improve trade but did not provide the details.
Conclusion
The FOCAC as a Forum has come a long way. It started as a Ministerial-level event, and under Xi Jinping, it was elevated to a leaders’ Summit in 2015. Besides the Belt and Road Initiative, FOCAC has become an important instrument for increasing China’s foothold in Africa. The Summit provides an opportunity for China to defend its engagement in Africa and is an important tool of China’s Africa policy. Through FOCAC, China is trying to demonstrate its rising global clout despite rising tensions with the West. The forum gives space for China to showcase its economic might though the persistent issue of debt distress in African countries has not been addressed. Against this background, it remains to be seen, how far this year’s commitments will fructify.
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*Dr. Teshu Singh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 5 September 2024,
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485993.html (Accessed September 06, 2024).
[ii] Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 5 September 2024,
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485719.html (Accessed September 06, 2024).
[iii] Laurie Chen and Joe Cash, China offers Africa $51 billion in fresh funding, promises a million jobs, Reuters, September 05, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-deepen-industrial-agricultural-trade-investment-ties-with-africa-2024-09-05/ (Accessed September 06, 2024).
[iv] Duncan Miriri and Laurie Chen, China stops short of Africa debt relief as it pledges more cash. Reuters, September 07, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-stops-short-africa-debt-relief-pledges-more-cash-2024-09-07/ (Accessed September 8, 2024).
[v] Huaxia, (FOCAC) Full text: Keynote address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the opening ceremony of 2024 FOCAC summit, Xinhua, September 05, 2024, https://english.news.cn/20240905/e898a78004754f229763ad2bb5be7aa3/c.html (Accessed September 6, 2024).
[vi] Duncan Miriri and Laurie Chen, China stops short of Africa debt relief as it pledges more cash. Reuters, September 07, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-stops-short-africa-debt-relief-pledges-more-cash-2024-09-07/ (Accessed September 8, 2024).
[vii] Jalelah Abu Baker, The potential impact of China’s latest US$50 billion pledge to Africa, Channel News Asia, September 06, 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-africa-50-billion-pledge-bilateral-trade-military-aid-jobs-4591056 (Accessed September 9, 2024).
[viii] China pushes smaller, smarter loans to Africa to shield from risks, the Economic Times, September 06, 2024, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-pushes-smaller-smarter-loans-to-africa-to-shield-from-risks/articleshow/1131 (Accessed September 10, 2024).
[ix] Foreign Ministers of the Co-Chairs of FOCAC Jointly Meet the Press, September 06, 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202409/t20240906_11486618.html (Accessed September 7, 2024).
[x] He Yin, To rally more than 2.8 billion Chinese, African people into powerful force that drives the two sides' modernization, People's Daily, September 10, 2024, http://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0910/c90000-20217455.html (Accessed September 15, 2024).
[xi] Yin Yeping, China to give LDCs including 33 African countries zero-tariff treatment, move to boost trade prosperity, Global Times, September 05, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202409/1319333.shtml (Accessed September 6, 2024).
[xii] Cobus van Staden, FOCAC and China’s Global Messaging, China Global South Project, September 6, 2024, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/focac-and-chinas-global-messaging/
(Accessed September 10, 2024).
[xiii] Tom Porter, China is hosting African leaders in a lavish display of its global ambition, Business Insider, September 04, https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/world/news/china-is-hosting-african-leaders-in-a-lavish-display-of-its-global-ambition/articleshow/113070596.cms (Accessed September 6, 2024).
[xiv] Big Spender, China Digital Space, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/09/chinese-investment-in-africa-under-scrutiny-during-focac-2024/ (Accessed September 15, 2024).
[xv] ibid.
[xvi] Zainab Usman and Tang Xiaoyang, How Is China’s Economic Transition Affecting Its Relations With Africa?, 30 May 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/how-is-chinas-economic-transition-affecting-its-relations-with-africa?lang=en (Accessed September 25, 2024).
[xvii] Opening remarks by President Cyril Ramaphosa at the official talks with President Xi Jinping on the occasion of the South Africa state visit to the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, China,
https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/opening-remarks-president-cyril-ramaphosa-official-talks-president-xi-jinping-occasion-south-africa (Accessed September 15, 2024).
[xviii] Mara Hvistendahl and Joy Dong, China Woos Africa, Casting Itself as Global South’s Defender, The New York Times, September 4, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/04/world/asia/china-africa-summit.html (Accessed September 6, 2024).
[xix] Henry Tugendhat, The U.S. Has a Better Offer for Africa Than Debt, Foreign Policy, 25 September 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/25/china-africa-lending-us-agoa-gsp-dfc-economic-engagement/ (Accessed on 27 September 2024) .
[xx] 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit Overview, https://www.state.gov/africasummit/ (Accessed on 27 September 2024)