Introduction
This year NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary at a time when the post-Cold War European Security architecture is completely shattered because of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The leaders of the NATO Member States met in Washington from 9th-11th July 2024 to signal a united Europe, to project a revitalised trans-Atlantic alliance in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, and to highlight the significance of investing in Europe’s collective future.
When the leaders met for the anniversary Summit in Washington, it was a cause for “celebration”. The NATO has found a new life in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis as the accession of Finland and Sweden has strengthened its Baltic flank, more than two third of its members have now crossed the 2 percent threshold of defence expenditure and the EU’s collective aid to Ukraine far outnumbers that of the United States indicating a shift in its European approach to the continent’s security. Yet, more needs to be done as far as the European Pillar of the trans-Atlantic alliance is concerned.
European Pillar of the Transatlantic Alliance: Renewed Impetus
The idea of a strong and robust European pillar, of course withing the framework of a NATO led transatlantic alliance, has recently gained immense popularity withing the strategic community of Europe in the backdrop of changing security landscape and the probability of a repeat of an American transactional foreign policy promoted and propagated by leaders like Trump. However, the concept is not new. Although the phrase “European Pillar” was first used by John F Kennedy in 1962, the idea that the primary responsibility for security and defence of Europe lies with the Europeans themselves is older than NATO itself.
The Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 which first established a mutual defence alliance for guaranteeing common security between France and Britain and the Brussels Treaty (1948) on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence which eventually transformed into the Western European Union in 1954 were the first expression of the European desire for mutual security arrangements.[i] It was the Brussels Treaty, signed between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK containing a mutual defence clause, that convinced a sceptical US Congress about the European capabilities as a reliable partner against the Soviets in an emerging Cold War that finally led to the establishment of the NATO in 1949.[ii]
Throughout the Cold War era, initiatives such as the European Defence Community, Western European Union, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), the European Political Group, the Eurogroup and armament procurements pointed out at serious European interests and efforts to establish a genuine defence and security identity of its own, although not autonomous or independent of the existing transatlantic arrangement. These initiatives were also welcomed by President Reagan in his West Point speech of 1988 when he said that “the credibility of Allied defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution…The Atlantic Alliance cannot be strong if Europe is weak”.[iii] However, it does not imply that the Americans have always been open to the idea of a strong European pillar.
In much of the post-Cold War history of the trans-Atlantic alliance, the United States has been reluctant to facilitate a larger European participation [iv] in the security management of the continent.[v] The end of the Cold War did give an opportunity for the European nations to play a more active role and they also responded to the opportunity by signing the Saint-Malo Declaration which could have raised a European Army. However, before the plan could materialise the Unted States balked at the plan and outlined a new US position which came to be known as “the three Ds”[vi] where the EU is not expected to outline any defence policy that could decouple European defence from the transatlantic alliance, duplicate NATO capability or discriminate against non-EU members of the alliance.[vii]
Challenges to a strong and self-dependent European Pillar
It was not just the American policies that weakened the European defence pillar. The Europeans let their guards down after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as evident in the lower financial commitments to their security needs before the war began in Ukraine. As the NATO took care of their defence needs, while the Russian Federation was not in a position to comprehensively challenge the post-Cold war security architecture of Europe, Europe decided to invest more in its social security needs. The average defence expenditure by the European countries had dwindled down to 1.6 % of the GDP compared to three percent during the Cold War period.
Today, there remains a fundamental disparity between the American and the European pillars of the NATO in the form of asymmetrical interdependence where Europe needs the United States for its security needs, not the vice-versa.[viii] The Europeans benefitted from the American security guarantee and sought common prosperity through extensive trade, commercial and investments bonding under the EU umbrella. But there has been growing realisation in Brussels that the American commitment has its own limitations given Washington’s shifting attention to Beijing and the Indo-Pacific. Recently, the United States has upgraded its joint military alliance with Japan after the two sides warned about China’s growing economic, political and military coercions and labelled Beijing as “the greatest strategic challenge” in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.[ix] As pressure mounts on the Taiwan strait and North Korea continues with its weapons programme, the US is bound to divert its attention to the region. In such a scenario a strong and self-dependent Europe capable of its own defence will give a breathing space to the United States which could than focus on the present and emerging challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the security and defence shortcomings in Europe and has exposed the lack of a common strategic culture in the continent when it comes to the question of addressing the security of Europe.[x] Besides there has been different ideas among the political class on the security aspects of Europe. With the rise of the Eurosceptics Far-right parties in Europe this debate on European defence has particularly intensified. However, regardless of differing perceptions among the EU members on the question of European security what is imperative is the need for a strong European pillar in the NATO- a conclusion time and again highlighted by the successive American administration, not just Trump. The idea that Europe cannot take American security umbrella for granted and remain oblivious of its own defence and security needs has been rightly emphasised in the recent speeches and interviews of President Macron who has been quite vocal on the Europe’s vulnerabilities as a civilisation that in its entirety represents certain values and norms. [xi]
War in Ukraine and Strengthening European Defence
Russia’s decision to breach Ukrainian border came as a moment of strategic awakening for the EU which has emerged as the largest supplier of aid to Kyiv and even, for the first time in its history, agreed to supply lethal weapon to a non-EU and non-NATO member.[xii] In its Strategic Compass, released in 2022, the European Union acknowledged the fact that their remains critical gap in its defence and security capability and what is needed is “a quantum leap forward to develop a strong and more capable EU that acts as a security provider”.[xiii] Clearly there is a growing realisation that more needs to be done on developing capabilities, filling strategic gaps, and jointly resisting aggressive and revisionist actions.[xiv]
The European pillar depends upon the EU Member States whose actions define the course the transatlantic alliance takes in the near future. Within the EU, there has been a growing consensus, except disrupters like Orban’s Hungary, that the member states have their own independent contribution to make and this has been evident in the efforts of countries like Germany to shoot up its defence spendings. Poland, similarly, has taken a lead in increasing its own defence commitment as a NATO member and has targeted 5 percent of its GDP on defence related expenditure. Today, at least two-third of the European members have crossed the 2 percent threshold on defence expenditure and some of them are eagerly looking forward for a revision and a new spending target of at least 2.5 % of the GDP.[xv] From adopting a softer approach towards Russia to advocating for EU enlargement and sending troops on ground, there has been a remarkable change in the attitude of President Macron on the question of European security. The three Baltic countries, members of the NATO since 2004, have been already spending more than 2 % and are now poised to spend at least 3 % of their respective GDP on defence.
The war in Ukraine and the ensuing nuclear threats from the Russian side have brought a new wave of militarisation on the continent. Although the efforts have mainly focussed on boosting conventional deterrence, but arguments are also being put forward in favour of extending nuclear deterrence. Poland, for example, indicated its willingness to host US nuclear weapons on its territory and join the NATO’s ‘nuclear sharing arrangement’.[xvi] The debates on nuclear deterrence have particularly become important after Russian decision to move tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and conducing nuclear drills. Thus, there have been calls for strengthening the French and British nuclear deterrence through more frequent demonstration of the nuclear capabilities.[xvii] However the credibility of the joint French and British nuclear deterrence is limited by the number of their warheads. The French and the British with their respective possession of 290 and 225 warheads cannot compete with Russia which 5,580 nuclear warheads, largest after the United States.[xviii]
European Defence in the NATO’s Washington Summit of 2024
At the anniversary summit in Washington the Alliance was focussed on the most enduring challenge that it has faced after the end of the Cold war-the rise of Russia as a resurgent power that wants to restructure the post-Cold war security architecture of Europe. The Washington Declaration issues after the Summit categorised the Russian federation as the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and held it solely responsible for the war in Ukraine.[xix]
As expected, the war in Ukraine and the broader European security dominated the Summit agendas and was evident in the Washington Declaration’s categorical reference to not just Russia but also to its partners and allies particularly the People’s Republic of China which was referred to as “ a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” owing to its no-limit partnership with Russia.[xx] Iran and North Korea, too, were accused of “fuelling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine by providing direct military support to Russia”. Besides, the Alliance also recognised Beijing as a systematic challenger to Euro-Atlantic security proclaiming China also as an independent threat to the interests of the allies owing to its irresponsible space, cyber and nuclear behaviour.
As far as the support to Ukraine is concerned the allies “passed the test of seriousness” said Daniel Fried, former US ambassador to Poland. Although Ukraine failed to receive an invitation to join the Alliance, it did receive significant assurance of continued NATO support in the form of a “Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine” which included provisions like a minimum baseline funding of 40 billion euros by next year, providing sustainable security assistance to help Ukraine prevail in the war and other provisions such as equipment and training. Other key arms transfers such as the Danish and Dutch F-16, air defence systems, including long-range Patriot systems, were also announced at the Summit.[xxi] However, disagreements withing the Alliance on Ukraine, the upcoming Presidential election of the United States and continued American resistance to the use of its weapons by Ukraine to strike deep inside the Russian territories will test the vigour and durability of the western commitment to Ukrainian security.
In paragraph 29 of the Declaration, the Alliance “recognised the value of a stronger and more capable European defence” and the status of the EU as “a unique and essential partner of the NATO” along with acknowledging the need for strengthening defence industry across Europe and North America and better defence industrial cooperation.[xxii] NATO was right in acknowledging the consequential position of the European Union in the context of Ukraine and the need to deepen practical cooperation with the EU, as well as the non-EU members, to address its core mandate of credible deterrence and defence. The need for a strong and capable defence industry in Europe along with greater defence industrial cooperation was also acknowledged in the last year’s Vilnius Summit.
The war in Ukraine has brought a sense of urgency on the question of defence spending by the European allies and there has been a realisation that the previously agreed threshold-2 % of GDP expenditure-would not be enough to fill the existing strategic gaps. The Washington Declaration also recognised this concern and acknowledged the need for expenditure beyond 2 % of the GDP to address existing shortfalls.
Since 2014 when a democratically elected government was deposed in Ukraine and Russia responded with annexing Crimea, the Eastern Flank of NATO has gained strategic significance for the Alliance, although it has been a sensitive theatre since the beginning of the Cold War and after the NATO enlargements post-Cold War. In the Washington Summit, the allies also dwelt on strengthening the eastern flank as part of the support for Ukraine. On the sidelines of the Summit, US and Germany agreed for deployment of non-nuclear long-range US missiles, that could hit targets in Russia with a range of 2500 kms, in Germany from 2026. The “episodic deployment” will include missiles such as the Tomahawk cruise missiles, the SM-6 ballistic missiles and hypersonic systems currently in development.[xxiii]
Conclusion
As NATO completes 75 years of its existence as a successful military alliance that has stood the test of time, it is the right time to focus on strengthening the European pillar of this transatlantic alliance. It is important to understand that a strong and robust European pillar with status parity with the American pillar will only complement the role of the NATO arrangement as an effective deterrence. The United States, too, needs to shed its historical hesitancy against a strong and self-dependent Europe and must facilitate the European defence autonomy, which is not to be misunderstood as a step towards NATO dismantling.
However, before Europe becomes capable of defending itself and end its more than a century of dependency on the United States for its security it needs to address some of the fundamental and structural constraints it faces such as lack of credible combat force, low defence spending and lack of cooperation among the allies. Additionally, the huge military assistance to Ukraine has heavily stressed Europe’s own stockpile and thus they must fill their own stock in order to continue Europe’s support to Ukraine for as long as it takes. These constraints get further highlighted when compared to Russian defence industrial production that has ramped up despite the unprecedented level of sanctions.
The need to accelerate European efforts becomes imperative in the backdrop of increased American involvement in the Indo-Pacific and its security commitments in the middle east. The United States must become a partner in Europe’s quest to revitalise its defence and should offer unprecedented support to the efforts for strengthening the European pillar.
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*Aman Kumar, Research Associate, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Helmut Sonnenfeldt. “The European Pillar: The American view”, The Adelphi Papers, Palgrave, 1989, https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tadl19/29/235?nav=tocList (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[ii] Mathieu Droin, Sean Monaghan and Jim Townsend. “NATO’s missing pillar”, Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/natos-missing-pillar (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[iii] Ibid
[iv] Ibid
[v]Max Bergmann. “A More European NATO”, Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/more-european nato#:~:text=A%20stronger%2C%20less%20dependent%20Europe,team%20led%20by%20just%20one. (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[vi] Madeleine K Albright, “The Right balance will secure NATO’s future”, Financial Times, December 7, 1998, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06989.8?seq=1 (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[vii]Max Bergmann. “A More European NATO”, Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/europe/more-european nato#:~:text=A%20stronger%2C%20less%20dependent%20Europe,team%20led%20by%20just%20one. (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[viii] Eckhard Lubkemeier. “Standing on our own feet? Opportunities and risks of European self-defence”, SWP Research Paper, February 2021, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/72161/ssoar-2021-lubkemeier-Standing_on_our_own_feet.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2021-lubkemeier-Standing_on_our_own_feet.pdf (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[ix] Leo Lewis and Kana Inagaki. “US and Japan warn of China threat as they upgrade military alliance”, Financial Times, July 28, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/1dd7034c-67a8-4a9c-bc98-ff9509d49154 (Accessed July 29, 2024)
[x] Judy Dempsey. “Making European defence an imperative”, Carnegie Endowment, May 2, 2024 https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/05/making-european-defense-an-imperative?lang=en (Accessed July 25, 2024)
[xi] Judy Dempsey. “Is Europe ready for a new Transatlantic alliance?” Carnegie Endowment, July 23, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/07/is-europe-ready-for-a-new-transatlantic-era?lang=en¢er=europe (Accessed July 29, 2024)
[xii] Tara Verma. “European Strategic Autonomy: The Path to a Geopolitical Europe”, The Washington Quarterly, 47:1, 65-83, April 15, 2024 https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2024.2327820 (Accessed July 29, 2024)
[xiii] EU. “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence”, The European Union (Accessed July 29, 2024)
[xiv] Ibid
[xv] Noah Keate. “UK wants NATO defence target upped to 2.5 percent”, Politico, April 24, 2024 https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-wants-nato-defense-target-2-5-percent-shapps-sunak/ (Accessed July 27, 2024)
[xvi] Julian Borger. “ Poland suggests hosting US nuclear weapons amid growing fears of Putin’s threats”, The Guardian, 5 October, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/05/poland-us-nuclear-wars-russia-putin-ukraine (Accessed 06 August, 2024)
[xvii] Artur Kcprzyk. “Debating perspectives of European Nuclear Deterrence”, The Polish Institue of International Affairs, https://pism.pl/publications/debating-perspectives-of-european-nuclear-deterrence (Accessed 06 August)
[xviii] Kelsey Davenport. “2024 estimated global nuclear warhead inventory”, Arms Control Association, July 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance (Accessed 06 August 2024)
[xix] NATO. “Washington Summit Declaration”, Issued after the NATO Atlantic Council meeting of the NATO heads of the States and Government in Washington on 10 July 2024, July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm (Accessed July 26, 2024)
[xx] Ibid
[xxi] William Courtney. “NATO bolsters its Eastern Flank”, RAND, August 01, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/08/nato-bolsters-its-eastern-flank.html (Accessed 06 August, 2024)
[xxii] Ibid
[xxiii] Reuters. “US to start deploying long-range weapons in Germany in 2026”, Reuters, July 10, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-start-deploying-long-range-weapons-germany-2026-2024-07-10/ (Accessed 26 July, 2024)