Introduction
Amidst the ongoing Israel-Gaza war that broke out in the second week of October 2023, following the Hamas terror attack across the Gaza border in Israel, there seems to be no sign of an early end to the conflict and instead it seems poised towards a precipice of a regional war. Soon after the launch of Israel’s military operation in Gaza, the US moved its two aircraft carriers along with its special strike groups in the Mediterranean Sea.
Within a week after Israel’s air operation in Gaza, Hezbollah, an old adversary of Israel, started missiles and drones’ attacks in the northern parts of Israel. The killing of a commander of IRGC’s (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) Quds force, Razi Mausavi, in December 2023 and a senior member of Hamas, Saleh Al-Arouri, in January this year, in Damascus and Beirut respectively,[i] could be seen as a sign of expanding orbit of Israel-Gaza war beyond the confines of Israel-Palestine territories.
Among this chain of events, what has really added a new gambit to current Israel-Hamas conflict is the entry of Houthis through drone strikes including in the Red Sea. The Houthis who themselves were at war with the Saudi-led coalition for almost eight years and now control the political landscape in Yemen launched first drone attack on the port city of Eilat in northern Israel[ii] after a month of outbreak of Isarel-Hamas conflict which was an expression of solidarity with the Hamas. Soon Eilat attack was followed by missile attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea which later in mid-December led the US and its Western allies to form a new maritime combat force (Operation Prosperity Guardian) in mid-December to ensure the free navigation of global ships in and around the Red Sea. Any visible impact of Operation Prosperity Guardian is yet to be seen but the conflict in the Red Sea appears to have taken a sharp turn after the US-UK joint attack against Houthi military bases inside Yemen on January 12, 2024.[iii] The Houthis on their part declared that their missile and drone attacks would stop only after people of Gaza are provided food and medical facilities.[iv] In light of the above, this paper intends to examine the objective of the Houthis attack in the Red Sea and how the US and its allies are mobilising global support to confront this new threat. The paper will also explore if the new maritime operation would succeed in its mission and how the expansion of war would incur additional economic burden on vessel owners and operators and deprive the littoral countries of their traditional source of revenues.
Houthis, the Red Sea and the Ongoing Conflict
Soon after October 7 incident, the Houthi chief Abdulmalik Al-Houthi declared his support for Hamas and said that thousands of his men are ready to march to Gaza to fight along with the Hamas.[v] The situation escalated on October 19, 2023, when the US and Saudi forces intercepted a missile launched from Yemen and it was understood to have been directed towards Israel.[vi] A week later again, the cities of Taba and Nuweiba in Egypt suffered a drone attack while Israel claimed that the missiles were sent by Iran-backed Houthis to strike Israel.[vii]
Soon the Houthis began their operation in the Red Sea and started targeting merchant ships belonging to the Western countries for their diplomatic and military support to Israel in Gaza. After some time, they (Houthis) announced that every ship would be allowed to pass through the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Bab-el-Mandeb except those destined for Israeli ports. In recent weeks ships belonging to the UK and the US are also being targeted after both the countries began military operation inside the territories of Yemen on January 12, 2024.[viii]
In the first two months of October and November, Houthis carried out more than hundreds of missile and drone attacks at the ships traversing through Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea and believed to be carrying ammunitions and consumables for Israeli ports. A container ship (MSC United VIII) while enroute to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia was also targeted by the Houthi militias.[ix] There are fears that Houthis might also use unmanned boats and sea mines, as they had done during their eight-year war against Saudi-led coalition.[x]
Earlier most the drones and missies sent by the Houthis in the Red Sea were intercepted by the US and Israeli anti-missile destroyers. There are UK Royal Navy’s HMS Diamond and French Navy’s FS Languedoc and USS Carry among others are engaged in combatting the Houthis naval attacks. For the first time on November 19, 2023, Houthi militants used a helicopter to seize a merchant vessel (Galaxy Leaders) and took twenty-five crew members on board as hostages.[xi] It was later known that Galaxy Leaders was operated by a Japanese firm but owned by an Israeli businessman.[xii]
Multiple vessels sailing in large swath of water destined for different countries are finding themselves in the crosshairs of Houthi assault. On December 3, 2023, Houthis for the first time fired a ballistic missile targeting three US cargo vessels[xiii] and in retaliation US warship shot down three of Houthis boats in self-defence. Again, on December 12, Houthis carried out a missile attack hitting a Norwegian-owned tanker Strinda[xiv] in anticipation that it was headed for Israel. On December 14, a Danish containership A.P. Moler Maersk was hit in Bab-el-Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. In mid-December, two Liberia-flagged vessels caught fire in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb after being hit by a projectile from Yemen.
On December 31, 2023, a containership, Maersk Hangzhou, registered in Singapore and operated by a Danish firm was hit when the ship had crossed half of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and was on its way to a Suez Canal port.[xv] In response, the US naval forces opened fire and as a result of which three Houthi boats sank.[xvi]
On January 2 2024, Houthis fired two anti-ballistic missiles into the southern Red Sea and its impact was felt by dozens of ships sailing in the Red Sea but no harm was reported. Soon on January 9, 2024, the US and British naval warship shot down twenty-one Houthi drones and missiles,[xvii] and in retaliation Houthis launched eighteen suicide drones and three anti-ship cruise missiles, considered to be the biggest attack in the Red Sea to date.[xviii] On January 11 2024, an international shipping lane in the Gulf of Aden was targeted by the Houthi militias but failed to inflict any harm. On January 12, 2024, the US and the UK launched a joint air operation against Houthi bases in Yemen killing five Yemeni citizens .[xix] The operation particularly targeted Al-Dailami air bases near Sanaa airport, Hodeida port, city of Taiz, Dhamar, Saada and Hajjah province and other arm depots of Houthis.[xx] After the UK-US joint operation, British Defence Secretary Grant Shapps in an article in Daily Telegraph wrote, “We are willing to take direct action and we would not hesitate to take further action to deter threats to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.”[xxi] Commenting on the joint US-UK operation in Yemen, the head of internationally-recognised Yemeni Presidential Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, said that these occasional targets are not the solution but the real solution only lies in complete elimination of the military capabilities of the Houthis.[xxii]
On January 27 again, the US naval forces launched military strikes against the Houthis inside Yemen after a British oil ship, Maryin Luanda, operated by Trafigura group, caught fire in the Gulf of Aden following a missile attack by the Houthis.[xxiii] It is also reported that there were twenty-two Indians and one Bangladeshi on board on Maryin Luanda ship.[xxiv]
Given the growing complexities and rising tension in the Reed Sea, Iran on December 31 2023, announced to deploy its warship (Alborz) in the Red Sea,[xxv] accompanied by the military ship “Bushehr,” equipped with long-range naval cruise missiles in an explicit sign of Iranian support to Houthis in the ongoing conflict. The deployment took place after Houthi Foreign Minister and chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council met in Tehran. Reacting to UK’s criticism of presence of Iranian warships in the Red Sea, Iran said that Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies are always part of positive regional developments and security.[xxvi]
Red Sea Conflict and Its Economic Cost
Historically, the Red Sea has been the most contested water space among past imperial powers and today it is known to be the most important trade link between Asia and Europe. Bab-el-Mandeb at the southern tip of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal at the northern tip of the Red Sea are the most important routes for global trade despite the emergence of several other routes in recent decades. The Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal are points of major strategic economic communication between Europe and Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The Red Sea is the entry point for ships using the Suez Canal, which controls around 12% of the global trade that passes through the waterway of the Red Sea and in total more than 19,000 ships pass annually through the Red Sea.[xxvii] Yemeni coast overlooks the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which is a narrow passage between Yemen and Djibouti and is considered one of the busiest sea passages in the world, as 7.1 million barrels of oil and 4.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas transit the Bab-el-Mandeb.
But after the eruption of the current crisis, more than sixty percent of commercial vessels were forced to change their route and go around Cape of Good Hope instead of Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden due to continuous attack on shipping passing through these waterways. The cost of maritime shipping to major Yemeni ports in Aden and Hodeida has doubled in comparison to the cost before the recent developments. While cost to the other ports in countries on the Red Sea has tripled in recent weeks.[xxviii]
Today around twelve major shipping companies including Italian-Swiss giant Mediterranean Shipping Company, Germany’s Hapag Lloyed, France’s CMA CGM, Denmark’s AP Moller-Maersk (world’s number two container line) and Hong Kong’s OOCL have suspended their operations in the Red Sea. The last one to announce the suspension of its operation was the UK oil giant British Petroleum.[xxix] Major shipping companies have decided to reroute, and now they are sailing through Cape of Good Hope imposing higher cost in the form of additional insurance fee and additional fuel consumption apart from causing delay in delivery of goods. For example, the total distance between the Gulf of Aden and Spain via the Suez Canal is around 6,600 kilometers, while passage through Cape of Good Hope would entail additional distance of around 17,000 kilometers[xxx]It is estimated that an increase of 60% in travel time and fuel cost between Asia and Europe in rerouting of ships will have its adverse impact on the consumers. Rerouting of ships through the Cape of Good Hope is likely to cost additional US $1 million for a round trip between Asia and northern Europe.There is already a hefty rise in war risk insurance rate and a ship carrying US$1 million worth of cargo is made to pay US$70,000 instead of US$40,000 before the crisis began.[xxxi] It is also worth mentioning here that rerouting of ships through Africa instead of the Suez Canal would delay the delivery of goods by 25% and incur the higher price on export and import items ranging from food to oil to other consumer goods.
Further the ports in African countries are not so well equipped in comparison to Bab-el-Mandeb or Suez Canal ports. African ports are much crowded with inadequate facilities and, according to the World Bank Port Index released in May 2022, main ports in South Africa, such as Durban, Cape Town and Ngqura, known to be the most advanced and the largest ports, are no where of the standard of the Suez Canal or Bab-el-Mandeb ports.[xxxii] The port of Mombasa in Kenya and port of Dar es Salaam in city of Dar es Salaam are too small to absorb the number of ships rerouting itself. More over these ports have limited docking or servicing facilities.
Though some shipping companies have started the operations in the Red Sea after the launch of Operation Prosperity Guardian, many are still hesitant to resume the operations and are still using the alternate route. According to a report, ships arrival in the Gulf of Aden had declined to around 40% in the month of December. Similarly in the Suez Canal, there was a decline of 45% in the arrival of ships in month of December.[xxxiii] Meanwhile some shipping ventures have announced their neutrality and are continuing the same old route and, according to a Bloomberg report, these ships are primarily Russian.[xxxiv]
The Suez Canal happens to be one of the major sources of revenue for Egyptian national economy, and a economy of Egypt is likely to suffer further because of the ongoing crisis. In last December, the Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA), Osma Rabea, informed that since the attack on Galaxy Leader in November, 55 vessels had opted to sail through Cape of Good Hope and since then the number of ships rerouting the passage is constantly rising.
Three years after the severe impact of COVID-19, Egyptian economy was going upward and between June 2022 and June 2023, the Suez Canal Authority was able to generate the revenue of worth US$4.9 billion, which is likely to go downward due to the ongoing crisis in the Red Sea. Although the Suez Canal Authority is making all efforts to persuade the ship owners against rerouting and trying to dispel the fears of shipping giants by telling them that current crisis is quite temporary and manageable. Similarly rise in cost of maritime shipping would impact Yemen adversely as Yemen depends on import to meet 90 % of its primary food items. A UN team of expert discovered that cost of maritime shipping alone represents 30-50% of the price of wheat flour in the local markets of Yemen.[xxxv]Yemen is already in trap of severe economic and humanitarian crisis because of a decade-long conflict and this crisis will further push the nation to the brink of economic disaster and intensify their hardship.
US Maritime Coalition
Soon after the Houthis carried out its first missile attack on a ship destined for Israeli port on November 19, 2023, the US accused Iran and its strategic allies in the region for being complicit in these attacks and warned of stern retaliation. The US President Joe Biden said that the US wants to avoid direct military confrontation with Houthis.[xxxvi] But warnings and threat failed to deter Houthis from targeting numerous ships in and around Bab-el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. Amidst increasing incidents of attacks and emergence of the Red Sea as a theatre of conflict after Gaza, the US Défense Secretary Lloyed Austin on December 19 2023, announced the formation of multinational maritime security forces, “Operation Prosperity Guardian”. It was also announced that it would operate under preexisting mechanism known as Combined Maritime Forces, a counter-piracy and counter-terrorism naval coalition. The US Défense Secretary Lloyed Austin, on the eve of announcing the coalition in Bahrain, had also told that more than twenty countries had agreed to participate in the group. Apart from the US, other countries include the UK, France, Italy, Canada, Bahrain, Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Spain, and Seychelles. While the US and the UK decided to send their ships under the obligation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, Netherlands, Norway, Canada, and Australia announced that they would send only their naval officers, while Seychelles would engage in information exchange.[xxxvii] Germany declined to participate possibly because of its preoccupation with Russia-Ukraine conflict. Canada did not send its ship saying that its navy is needed more to protect the Western hemisphere than to join a far-flung war. France said that its ships would operate under the French command only, while Italy said that it would send its own Virginio Fasan frigate to protect its ships.[xxxviii] While Spain prefers to work under NATO or European command and not under the US command.[xxxix] China, a strategic foe of the US, too refused to join the coalition saying that it will protect only those ships that have its own (Chinese) flags.[xl] It is also worth recalling here that a Combined Task Force 153 (CTF153) formed by the US has been present in the Red Sea since June 2022.[xli]
In addition to Operation Prosperity Guardian, the US in January designated the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, which many, including internationally-recognised government of Yemen were seeking for long. In the last week of January, both the US and the UK announced to impose individual sanctions against prominent Houthis. They include Houthi chief Abdel Malik, Houthi Defence Minister, Commander of Houthi Naval Forces and Head of its Coastal Force.[xlii]
Recently Houthi chief Abdel Malik also announced to add 165,000 new militants to his 600,000 militia forces and termed the US’ decision to put the Houthis on terror list an act of cowardice.[xliii] He claimed that his group had already launched more than 200 drones and more than 50 ballistic missiles in the last two months,[xliv] while according to US Central Command report, since November 19, 2023, when Houthis captured an Israeli ship for the first time, they have carried out 32 missile and drone attacks only.
No sooner had US Secretary of Défense Lloyd Austin announced the formation of Guardian of Prosperity than the Israeli tanker “Chem Pluto” was attacked by a drone 200 kilometres south west of Veraval port in India.[xlv] Even before the idea for formation of the current naval alliance was mulled, Iran’s Défense Minister had said that the Red Sea was part of its region and has no room for extra-regional force.[xlvi]
If the Houthis continue with the current pace of attacks in the Red Sea and the supply of drones and missiles continue for them, which is the likely scenario, the cost of anti-Houthi naval operation would be very hefty and its sustenance for long would be difficult. The cost of one single drone attack does not exceed US$100,000 and the deployment of missile interceptors is a costly affair as these are very advanced and sophisticated devices. One single anti-missile operation costs around US$2 million. Further the volume and traffic of commercial ships and the large swath of the Red Sea is likely to make any operation not an easy exercise. Further there are constraints on respective coalition partners in the ongoing operation under Operation Prosperity Guardian because of different policy of different states in terms of quantum and nature of the retaliation vis-à-vis attacks from the Houthis. Amidst US-led efforts to form a new naval coalition force and its eventual formation (Operation Prosperity Guardian) what came as a surprise was the absence of major Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and even non-Arab country like Türkiye despite being an important member of NATO from the coalition. Every non-participating county in the region is having its own diplomatic and strategic reason to act in its own individual way.
Red Sea Conflict and India
As far as India is concerned, India had deployed its sophisticated maritime assets. It has also deployed dozens of warships east of the Red Sea to provide security against pirates and have conducted investigation of more than two hundred fifty vessels since January this year.[xlvii]
India is known for having very large number of its citizens as sea-farer on international commercial vessels. Since the launch of US-led naval operation, India has sent two warships in the Gulf of Aden but independent of the Operation Prosperity Guardian. In this regard, India’s External Affairs Minister had said, “We will not be considered responsible country when bad things are happening in surrounding country”.[xlviii]
Though India was invited by the US to be part of its naval coalition but India refrained from joining it. A top navy official said that there is no reason to involve ourselves in the ongoing operation as India’s interest is being protected.[xlix] While the MEA official spokesperson said,” We have personal stake and have been supportive of the free movement of commercial ships. That is something we are interested in”.[l] India’s response is reflective of its careful assessment of the unfolding situation in the region.
Conclusion
On the basis of the above narratives, it can be construed that the ongoing Isarel-Gaza war might expand into the region if no early solution is sought to the current humanitarian crisis. The war of attrition is being witnessed on different fronts in and around Isarel. The US military bases in Iraq and Syria are conducting sporadic military operations in Syria and Iraq in retaliation to militia’s attack against the US marines. Talks are on about the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq.
As far as other actors in the region are concerned such as Houthis or Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias in Iraq like Al-Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada would like to avoid the spread of war but in case of perpetuation of the conflict, these forces would be left with limited choice as not to be seen as weak and diffused entities. In case of continuance of the conflict for long, these extraterritorial forces might be induced to be more mor belligerent as already evident in the Red Sea and on Israel-Lebanon borders.
The ongoing escalation across the Red Sea might reignite another phase of civil war inside Yemen which has witnessed a spell of relative peace following the truce with Saudi Arabia. Further Houthis can also exploit their current ascendency in Red Sea to strengthen their bargaining power in evolving Yemeni domestic politics. The overwhelming display of power by Houthis is likely to further weaken the voice of internationally-recognised government of Yemen and enhance the sway of Houthis in current regional political dynamics and help it emerge as a major actor in the Axis of Resistance under umbrella of Iran. As far as the economic impact of the conflict in the Red Sea is concerned, it might have drastic effect on the global economy. If the current stalemate continues and merchant vessels and commercial ships continue to opt longer route, it could again trigger a disruption in global supply chain and subsequent inflation, witnessed amidst the COVID-19. Moreover, the economy of a country like Egypt whose Suez Canal ports are significant means of national revenue could be badly hit.
*****
*Dr. Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui, Senior Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
The views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Iran Confirms Death of IRGC Commander in Syria, International Iran, December 25, 2023, Accessed https://rb.gy/1q71id January 23, 2024
[ii] Houthis say they carried out drone attacks on Israeli port of Eilat, Aljazeera English, December 26, 2023, Accessed https://rb.gy/avf90w January 2, 2024
[iii] Nargesh Bajoghli & Vali Nasr, How the War in Gaza Revived the Axis of Renitence, Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2024
[iv] Israel-Gaza War: Will the Red Sea Cries Lead to Wider Middle East Conflict, The Guardian, January 02, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/QSFTn January 10, 2024
[v] Israel-Gaza War: Will the Red Sea Cries Lead to Wider Middle East Conflict, https://acesse.dev/QSFTn
[vi] As the Tragedy Continues in Gaza: Red Sea Pushes the Region to a New Threat, Al-Hurrah (Arabic), November 21, 2023, Accessed https://encr.pw/2EFVi December 31, 2023
[vii] Ahmed Mohammad Hase and Dan William, Drones blast hit two Egyptian Red Sea towns, Isarel Points to Houthis, Reuters, October 28, 2023 Accessed https://rb.gy/sry399 February 13, 2024
[viii] After Burning of Commercial Ship in Red Sea, US and Britain Strike Yemen, Rail Youm (Arabic), January 27, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/HnQag January 29, 2024
[ix] Half of Red Sea Container-Ship Fleet Avoids Routs on Threat of Attacks, Insurance Journal, December 28, 2023, Accessed https://acesse.dev/x8GzF January 26, 2024
[x] Re-Establishing Maritime Deterrence Requirs Bold Action, Al-Majallah (Arabic), January 12, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/sAfTk January 13, 2024
[xi] Israel-Gaza War: Will the Red Sea Cries Lead to Wider Middle East Conflict, https://acesse.dev/QSFTn
[xiii] Houthis claim hit on Cargo ship in Red Sea but US officials say drone ship missed, Times of Isarel, January 4, 2023, Accessed https://encr.pw/oWT3B January 23, 2024
[xv] US Amry: Sinking of Three of Four Houthi Boats that Attacked Container Ship Off Yemen, Asharq Al Awsat (Arabic), December 31, 2023, Accessed https://encr.pw/2N8kX January 2, 2024
[xvi]US Sinks Houthi Boats in Red Sea: How did the Fight Unfold , Aljazeera, January 1, 2024,Accessed https://rb.gy/cyrbaq February 12, 2024
[xvii] Western Strikes on Houthis: Numbers and Analysis, Al-Majallah (Arabic), January 15, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/rNBjw January 16, 2024
[xviii] Western Strikes on Houthis: Numbers and Analysis, Al-Majallah (Arabic), https://l1nq.com/rNBjw
[xix] War on Gaza: Anger and Defiance in Yemen Following US-UK Airstrike on Houthis, Middle East Eye, January 12, 2024, https://l1nq.com/udp0f January 23, 2024
[xx] The Red Sea and Risk of Regional War, Al-Majallah (Arabic), January 16, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/Nq8i0 January 27, 2024
[xxi] Is A Western-Iranian Clash in Red Sea Imminent after US Strike against Houthis? Asharq Al Al-Awsat (English), January 2, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/7wW6E January 27, 2024
[xxii] After Burning of Commercial Ship in Red Sea, US and Britain Strike Yemen, Rail Youm, https://acesse.dev/HnQag
[xxiii] After Burning of Commercial Ship in Red Sea, US and Britain Strike Yemen, Rail Youm, https://acesse.dev/HnQag
[xxiv] After Burning of Commercial Ship in Red Sea, US and Britain Strike Yemen, Rail Youm, https://acesse.dev/HnQag
[xxv] Is A Western-Iranian Clash in Red Sea Imminent after US Strike against Houthis, Asharq Al Al-Awsat (English), https://acesse.dev/7wW6E
[xxvi] Iran Sends Flotilla to Red Sea amid rising tension with West, Amwaj, January 3, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/709Tc January10, 2024
[xxvii] Red Sea Attack a Source of Concern for Egyptian Economy, Asharq Al Awsat, January 5, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/53eGj January 8, 2024
[xxviii] The Impact of Red Sea Escalation on Yemeni Economy and Humanitarian Situation, Yemeni Studies Group, February 15 2024, Accessed https://rb.gy/2qf2r2 February 16, 2024
[xxix] US announces 10-nation force to counter Houthi attack in Red Sea, Aljazeera, December 19, 2023, Accessed https://encr.pw/IIY7E January 30, 2024
[xxx]Red Sea an American Platform for Crisis Management, Al-Majallah (Arabic) https://acesse.dev/HMmrQ
[xxxii]https://acesse.dev/HMmrQ
[xxxiii] Half of Red Sea Container-Ship Fleet Avoids Routs on Threat of Attacks, Insurance Journal, https://acesse.dev/x8GzF
[xxxiv] Half of Red Sea Container-Ship Fleet Avoids Routs on Threat of Attacks, Insurance Journal, https://acesse.dev/x8GzF
[xxxv] https://rb.gy/k4ctrq
[xxxvi] Israel-Gaza War: Will the Red Sea Cries Lead to Wider Middle East Conflict, The Guardian, https://acesse.dev/QSFTn
[xxxvii] Re-Establishing Maritime Deterrence Requires Bold Action, Al-Majallah (Arabic), https://acesse.dev/sAfTk
[xxxviii] Red Sea between capabilities and cost, Al-Majallah (Arabic), January 8, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/aOevW January 20, 2024
[xxxix] Re-Establishing Maritime Deterrence Requirs Bold Action, Al-Majallah (Arabic) https://acesse.dev/sAfTk
[xl]Re-Establishing Maritime Deterrence Requires Bold Action, Al-Majallah (Arabic), https://acesse.dev/sAfTk
[xli] Red Sea between Capabilities and Cost, Al-Majallah, https://acesse.dev/aOevW
[xlii] US-UK Sanction on Houthi Leaders, Asharq Al Awsat (Arabic), January 26, 2024, Accessed https://encr.pw/H4R0d February 2, 2024
[xliii] Houthis attacks are becoming mor ferocious, Asharq Al Awsat, February 1, 2024, Accessed https://acesse.dev/NhqRn February 3, 2024
[xliv] US-UK Sanction on Houthi Leaders, Asharq Al Awsat (Arabic), https://encr.pw/H4R0d
[xlv] Red Sea an American Platform for Crisis Management, Al-Majallah (Arabic), December 25, 2023, Accessed https://encr.pw/HMmrQ January 7, 2024
[xlvi] Iran Sends Flotilla to Red Sea amid rising tension with West, Amwaj, January 3, 2024, https://acesse.dev/709Tc
[xlvii] Krishn Kaushik, India deploys unprecedented naval might near Red Sea to reign in piracy, Reuters, January 31, 2024, Accessed https://l1nq.com/PFvmK February 14, 2024
[xlviii] Krishn Kaushik, India deploys unprecedented naval might https://l1nq.com/PFvmK
[xlix] Rushali Saha, Making Sense of India’s Muted Response to the Red Sea Crisi, The Diplomat, January 22, 2024, Accessed, https://l1nq.com/08gr4 February 15, 2024
[l] Shashank Mattoo, US Invites India to Naval Coalition in Red Sea, Mint, January 4, 2024,Acccessed https://acesse.dev/GeUUO February 16, 2024