China has become the first country to accredit Taliban-nominated official as Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Beijing. Reportedly, the newly appointed Taliban Ambassador Assadullah Bilal Karimi; who was earlier the Spokesperson of the regime, presented his credentials to Hong Lei, Director-General of the Protocol Department at China's Foreign Ministry, in Beijing on Dec. 1, 2023.[i] This development has raised questions as to whether this signals China’s readiness to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. So far, no country has officially recognized the Taliban administration although several countries have engaged with them. While Taliban hailed the appointment of its Ambassador as an “important chapter”[ii] in growing ties between the two neighboring countries, Beijing sought to play down the hopes for a formal recognition by stating that the regime will need to introduce political reforms, improve security and mend relations with its neighbours in order to be considered for full diplomatic recognition.[iii]
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated, “China has always believed that Afghanistan should not be excluded from the international community”, at the same time Afghanistan is expected to further respond to the expectations of the international community by building “an open and inclusive political structure (and) implement moderate and stable domestic and foreign policies.”[iv] China urged Kabul to “resolutely combat all types of terrorist forces, live in harmony with all countries around the world, especially neighbouring countries, and integrate with the international community at an early date”. Wang also said “As the concerns of all parties receive stronger responses, diplomatic recognition of the Afghan government will naturally follow.”[v]
Earlier in September 2023, China became the first country to send a new Ambassador to Afghanistan since the Taliban’s takeover. China's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zhao Sheng was welcomed in an elaborate ceremony that was attended by Acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund. While the Chinese Foreign Ministry deemed the appointment a 'normal rotation',[vi] the Taliban had sought to leverage the public nature of the ceremony to legitimise their rule, urging other countries to view it as a signal for expanding cooperation. The Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi thereby, called the nomination of Chinese Envoy “a significant step, carrying a significant message.”[vii]
China’s renewed interest in Afghanistan became apparent after the fall of the United States-backed Afghan government. It was among the first countries to welcome the Taliban’s return to power after the withdrawal of American troops two years ago. China was one of only a handful to host a Taliban Charge d’Affaires prior to the appointment of the Envoy.[viii] Even before the Taliban took over power in Afghanistan, China maintained communication with the Taliban and hosted high-profile meeting with a delegation of nine Taliban representatives in Tianjin, led by the head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission[ix]. In the course of the past couple of years, both sides had met on several occasions, bilaterally and internationally, underscoring China’s warming ties with the Taliban. In October, the Taliban expressed keen interest to be part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and contemplated sending a technical team to China to “better understand” the issues in the way of it joining the initiative.[x] The Taliban was in attendance for the BRI’s 10th anniversary forum in Beijing in October this year. While some speculated that the appearance of the group was a symbolic gesture of China’s growing engagements with the acting Afghan government; it was more likely reflective of the Chinese Government’s interests in Afghanistan being contingent on constructive if not cooperative relations with the authority that holds power in Kabul.[xi]
Chinese Interest in Afghanistan
In April 2023, China issued its 11-point position paper on Afghanistan, giving a clear indication of Beijing’s policy towards Afghanistan and the areas it will prioritize in its engagement with the Taliban moving forward. For Beijing, security remains a priority in its relationship with the Taliban, it would want to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for terrorist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) -- a Uyghur group that Beijing blames for unrest in its western Xinjiang Province. Chinese concerns also include Afghanistan being used by terrorist groups as a base for training and organizing or distributing propaganda, which could spill over into other countries in Central and South Asia where the Chinese presence is much more substantial in terms of investment and the number of Chinese nationals. Attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan only heighten such concerns.[xii]
China’s economic interests are diverse, ranging from infrastructure projects to mining and energy development. Afghanistan is a potential supplier of minerals to China, with resources such as gold, copper and lithium reportedly worth $1 trillion.[xiii] Independent Chinese investors were making inroads, albeit weak and flailing attempts, into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. With closer governmental engagement with the regime several deals could materialize; further cementing Chinese presence in the war-ravaged country. In January, the Taliban signed with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), a contract to extract oil from Amu Darya basin, which stretches between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. The deal will see an investment of $150m in the first year in Afghanistan and $540m over the next three years.[xiv] A Chinese company has recently expressed interest in investing $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium resources in the south, according to the Taliban-run Ministry of Mines and Petroleum.[xv] China is already involved in a fourteen-year deal to extract copper from the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar province, one of the world’s largest copper reserves.[xvi] On July 7 of this year, the China Afghan Mining Processing and Trading Company announced an investment of $350 million over the next few months in various sectors including power generation, construction of a cement factory, and public health.[xvii] Earlier in April 2022, the Taliban approved a $216 million Chinese investment project for an industrial park outside Kabul, which is expected to host 150 factories.[xviii] Close ties with the Taliban may benefit Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, projects of which are underway in neighboring Pakistan. Earlier this year, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, supported by Beijing, into Afghanistan.[xix]
Conclusion
Among Afghanistan’s neighbours, broadly, there has been a consensus that there is no alternative to some form of engagement with the Taliban (mostly, for reasons of ensuring regional stability and security). Yet, China is the only country to appoint an Envoy to Afghanistan; as well as host Taliban nominated Envoy in Beijing. China’s recent decision to accept the credentials of the Taliban Ambassador to Beijing, without having formally recognized Afghanistan’s new rulers as the legitimate government, therefore, is being viewed as both paradoxical and transactional by experts.[xx] The hosting of each other’s Ambassador undoubtedly signals both Beijing and Kabul’s willingness to forge closer ties with each other, however, it unlikely that warmer ties would lead to legitimization of Taliban regime by the Chinese, as there appears to be a consensus in the international community that the regime should address certain domestic issues and form an inclusive administration before formal recognition can be considered.
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*Dr. Anwesha Ghosh, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
Endnotes
[i] “Afghan Taliban Says China Becomes First Nation to Accept Its Ambassador.” VOA, Dec 1, 2023. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-taliban-says-china-becomes-first-nation-to-accept-its-ambassador/7380438.html#:~:text=In%20this%20photo%20provided%20by,on%20Dec.%201%2C%202023.( Accessed on 8.12. 23)
[ii] Ibid
[iii] “China says Afghan Taliban must reform before full diplomatic ties” DAWN, Dec 5 2023. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1795270 (Accessed on 8.12. 23)
[iv] Ibid
[v] Ibid
[vi] “China appoints ambassador to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.” Duetsche Welle, Sep 13, 2023. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/china-appoints-ambassador-to-taliban-ruled-afghanistan/a-66802533 (Accessed on 11.12.23_)
[vii] “Taliban gives a warm welcome to China’s new ambassador to Afghanistan.” Al Jazeera, Sep 13, 2023. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/13/taliban-gives-a-warm-welcome-to-chinas-new-ambassador-to-afghanistan. (Accessed on 11.12.23_)
[viii] “China continues Taliban balancing act after new ambassador arrives in Afghanistan.”South China Morning Post, Sep 16, 2023. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3234744/china-continues-taliban-balancing-act-after-new-ambassador-arrives-afghanistan (Accessed on 11.12.23_)
[ix] “China says Taliban expected to play 'important' Afghan peace role.” Reuters, 29 July, 2021. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taliban-delegation-visits-china-taliban-spokesperson-2021-07-28/
[x] “Taliban says plans to formally join China's Belt and Road Initiative.” Reuters, Oct 19, 2023. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-says-plans-formally-join-chinas-belt-road-initiative-2023-10-19/(Accessed on 11.12.23)
[xi] ‘Afghanistan: China’s critical jigsaw piece’, Australian Outlook, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 27 July 2021; and Mazhari, M., ‘China will fill power vacuum left by US in Afghanistan, Researcher’, 19 Oct. 2021 (Accessed on 11.12.23_)
[xii] Delaney, R., ‘China faces an increase in extremist threats in Central Asia, US panel is told’, South China Morning Post, 13 May 2022. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3177557/china-faces-increase-extremist-threats-central-asia-us-panel. (Accessed on 11.12.23)
[xiii] “The Taliban are sitting on $1 trillion worth of minerals the world desperately needs.”CNN, Aug 19, 2021. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/18/business/afghanistan-lithium-rare-earths-mining/index.html
[xiv] “Will China’s latest investment in Afghanistan actually work?” Al Jazeera, 27 Feb 2023. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/2/27/will-chinas-latest-investment-in-afghanistan-actually-work (Accessed on 11.12.23)
[xv] Saleem H. Ali and Thomas Hale, “ China, Afghanistan and the allure of ‘Green Mineral Development.”Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 18, 2023. Available at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/07/china-afghanistan-and-the-allure-of-green-mineral-development/ (Accessed on 13.12.23)
[xvi] Ibid
[xvii] Ibid
[xviii] ‘Chinese businesses make headway in Afghanistan despite Beijing’s cautious approach to Taliban’, South China Morning Post, 28 Aug. 2022. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3190469/chinese-businesses-make-headway-afghanistan-despite-beijings. (Accessed on 13.12.23_)
[xix] “China and Pakistan agree to extend Belt and Road Initiative to Afghanistan.”WION, May 7, 2023. Available at: https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/china-and-pakistan-agree-to-extend-belt-and-road-initiative-to-afghanistan-590042. (Accessed on 13.12.23_)
[xx] “What Will It Take for Taliban to Gain Recognition From China, Others?” VoA, Dec 10, 2023. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/what-will-it-take-for-taliban-to-gain-recognition-from-china-others-/7390814.html#:~:text=The%20Taliban%20foreign%20ministry%20announced,Taliban%20Ambassador%20Asadullah%20Bilal%20Karimi. (Accessed on 13.12.23)