Since 1960’s, mercenaries have been present in Africa, as most of the nascent post independent African states feared external and internal destabilization attempts, due to their weak governance and security conditions. Therefore, most of these states hired militias to secure control over their territories[i]. These mercenaries were widely accepted by the African states as they brought about some sort of stability and helped create conditions which were necessary for their economic development. These mercenaries mainly comprised ex- military servicemen from foreign armies. In the contemporary times, these mercenaries have become corporatised entities such as the American run Blackwater enterprise, UK’s Sandline International, Germany’s Asgard, South Africa’s Executive Outcomes and Russia’s Wagner Group. Russia’s Wagner Group enjoys state support. [ii] According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, “I want everyone to know that the financing of the entire Wagner Group was fully ensured by the state…. We fully financed this group from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget.” .”[iii]
This paper examines Wagner Group’s growing influence in Africa, its operations and its future in Africa after the demise of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Background
Russia perceives Africa as an increasingly significant partner particularly in the face of Russia’s isolation after the Ukraine Crisis and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on its economy. Russia has been expanding its influence across Africa through increased trade and investment, development assistance, educational and cultural exchanges[iv]. Besides, Russia’s private militia, the Wagner Group is also gaining foot hold in the African states. Wagner group is a network of businesses and mercenaries comprising former Russian soldiers, convicts and foreign nationals. Wagner group first emerged in 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea and since 2015 the group has been expanding its influence to several African states by providing direct military support and security services to these states. It is estimated to have stationed around 5000 soldiers, currently, across Africa, in Libya, Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mozambique[v].
Wagner’s Presence and Strategy of Engagement in Africa
Over the years, the Wagner Group has increased its presence in Africa. Its two major objectives in Africa are- first to enhance its economic interests by seeking access to valuable resources and explore business prospects; and second to strengthen Russian influence in the African States. Notably, since 2019, Wagner group has gained traction, majorly, in the resource rich fragile Western and Central African states where insecurity and conflict prevail. Most of these states have witnessed military coups, rebellions, inter-ethnic tensions and terrorism and these African states consider Russia’s Wagner Group as a partner that can provide security to their regimes.
Wagner group has been engaged in training their local militaries, protecting mining sites, guarding high-level government officials and giving advice to their national governments struggling from the crises. It is mostly compensated by the African countries in cash and access to natural and mineral resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold, diamonds, uranium and hydrocarbons. For instance, Central African Republic, the Wagner Group signed a deal with some rebels to secure diamond mines, which has been subsequently incorporated into Wagner’s mineral trafficking network, which links Sudan and Central African Republic to the East Africa Coast.[vi] Sudan and CAR have granted rights to Wagner Groups’ associated companies to survey and mine mineral resources, and in return the Wagner Group provides security to their regimes.
Besides keeping these regimes in power in the African states, the Wagner group have been involved in other activities.[vii] Wagner Group established ties with the locally registered companies in these countries, which were engaged in the extraction of natural resources, with the purpose of securing business access for Russian companies. In Central African Republic, Wagner’s local company Lobaye Invest conducts Wagner Groups’ mining operations while in Sudan, companies like M-Invest and Moroe Gold manages Wagner’s mining operations. According to Geneva based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, it was during this period (2017-2020) when Russia signed a couple of military agreements and was delivering weapons and other military equipment to these African states such as Sudan and Mali[viii]. According to SIPRI, between 2017-2021, African states received most of their weapons from Russia, accounting for 44% imports from Russia followed by the US (17%), China (10%) and France (6%).[ix] This has paved the way for increasing Wagner’s influence across Africa as Russia has been using Wagner to advance its foreign policy interests in Africa.[x]
According to some Western media reports, Russia has deployed Wagner Group in Africa instead of official military organizations, to provide training as it is cost effective. The deployment of Wagner forces reduces the economic burden of military engagement, as Wagner relies on different forms of self-financing, while not relying completely on the Russian military infrastructure[xi]. Besides, Russia can deny anytime any command issued to the Wagner group when faced with complex situations. In Libya for instance, when Wagner forces fought along Libya’s national army’s Tripoli Campaign in 2019, they were accused of extrajudicial killings. Moreover, there are reports which suggest that the group is supplying arms and ammunitions to Rapid Support Forces in its fight against Sudan National Army in Sudan. This also helps Russia to avoid any direct confrontation with other foreign militaries such as that of USA or France[xii].
Wagner Group’s Operation in Africa
The Wagner group’s operations in different countries of Africa, differ majorly with one another, given that each conflict provides a unique set of opportunities to the Wagner Group to make inroads in the African states. This is evident from its operations in Libya, Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan.
Wagner’s involvement in Libya began as a force multiplier for the Russian military- in its efforts to oust the Western backed government of Tripoli in Libya and to install Khalifa Haftar as the leader.[xiii] In Libya, the Wagner Group stationed around 2,000 personnel by 2019. By 2020, the ceasefire ended the conflict between the warring parties and since then Wagner Group has focussed more on gaining control over oil fields in eastern Cyrenaica bordering Egypt. However, Wagner Group is still providing training to Haftar troops. As of now, the Wagner troops are present in the Eastern province near al Khadim Airbase at al-Marj city and in the central region’s cities like Sirte and al- Jufrah. In order to conduct its operations in the Sahel region particularly in Niger and Chad, the Wagner Group has tried to use Libya as a strategic base as Libya provides strategic options for naval and aviation bases and provide support for the transportation of their equipment and personnel for their operations in other African states. The Wagner Group also seeks to make more investment and create new business prospects in Libya’s energy sector.
In Central African Republic, when the French military forces withdrew in 2017 due to the failure of Sangaris military mission to bring about stability, President Faustin-Archange Toudera turned towards the Wagner Group[xiv]. Around 670 Wagner personnel arrived in 2018 to support President Touadera in his fight against the rebels. According to Fidele Goundajika, the Special Advisor to Central African Republic’s President- Faustin Archange Touadera, “Wagner’s instructors came with Russia’s blessings …. Moscow has sub-contracted to Wagner and its military will stay there, with no major changes… Wagner’s soldiers will continue to operate on behalf of Russia.”[xv] Wagner Group had multiple functions such as training the grenadamires and local security forces, transporting the materials to and from Sudan and acting as personal bodyguards to the President. In return the Wagner Group attained the licence for the mining of diamond and gold. Besides, the Wagner Group was granted unrestricted access to CAR’s largest Ndassima Gold mines in the contract. In 2019, with an objective to restore order in CAR, the Wagner group was involved in bringing the government and the rebel groups to sign Khartoum Accord. Wagner pursued business ventures in CAR which it found fit. The CAR government granted the Wagner Group unrestricted logging rights of timber (about 1, 87,000 hectares), which generated massive revenue. Thus, in the past couple of years Wagner has established strong ties with the political leaders in CAR and acquire a strong hold over the country’s economy. Wagner’s engagement with CAR was perceived as a way to increase Russia’s diplomatic influence within the region.
In Mali, the Wagner Group’s increased presence in the last few months coincides with the withdrawal of the French and European military troops. By 2020, Malian transitional military government allowed more than 1000 Wagner personnel to conduct training and counter terrorism operations in Mali.[xvi] Wagner Group has attempted to capitalise on the anti-French sentiment rooted in discontentment that was further aggravated with the failure of operation Barkhane as, despite nine years of French military operations, nothing much has changed with regard to the management of security situation, governance, widespread inequality and marginalization of ethnic communities[xvii]. Malian Military Junta, therefore, turned towards the Wagner Group for regime security and to address the issue of rising insecurity in the face of rising terrorism. It is believed that President Assimi Goita’s government is aiming to retake the Kidal region in the North, which is the Tuareg stronghold, with the help of Wagner troops. The Wagner Group has been present in Mali near Bamako and has now moved towards Central Mali, which is a contested region and where the Al’ Qaeda affiliated militant group Jama’at Nasr al-Islamwal Muslimin exerts significant influence. Wagner forces have also occupied former Operation Barkhane bases near Timbuktu. According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, “Russia has delivered very large supplies of aviation equipment to Mali over the past few months, which has significantly increased the capabilities of the local forces to fight extremists.”[xviii]. However, in Mali, the Wagner Group investment in the mining sector proved out to be less profitable. This is due to the fact that the mineral resources are harder to exploit in Mali as compared to that in CAR and Sudan as the Government regulations in Mali are much stricter and some of the mines are controlled by the armed groups[xix].
The Wagner Group made inroads in Sudan in 2017, when the former President of Sudan Omar-al Bashir signed an agreement with Russia to provide protection to his regime. In a short span of time, M Invest, a mining company associated with Wagner Group came to Sudan. The Wagner Group, active in Sudan since 2019, has been involved in supporting the military ruler Omar-al Bashir and to secure gold mines.[xx] In 2019, when the protests against President Bashir began, Wagner Group morphed from a guardian army to a direct player in order to repress the protests. However, when Bashir was ousted, Wagner Group tried to align itself with Al Burhan but this alliance soon deteriorated, when Sudan’s National Army took charge and Wagner Group’s role was pushed backed to its role of guarding its mines. Presently Wagner Group is supporting Rapid Support Forces and its Commander Dagalo as it is primarily interested in guarding its interests in Sudan[xxi].
Future of Wagner Group’s Operation After Prigozhin’s Demise
The Wagner Group’s mutiny and the demise of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, 2023 raised concerns over the future of Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “Wagner members are working there as instructors. This work will, of course, continue.”[xxii] The sudden departure of Prigozhin and other senior leaders of the Wagner Group has led to the emergence of a leadership vacuum, but changes in the chain of command as far as its operations in Africa are concerned were implemented.
Wagner Group’s operations in Africa are unlikely to be abandoned as it serves Russia’s interests to expand its outreach across Africa. What is equally significant is the fact that it will be difficult to completely dismantle the Wagner Group as it has set the foundation, developed the infrastructure and has facilitated political and economic connections. Its economic engagement in the African state is diversified as, apart from the traditional investments in gold and diamond extraction, it is also involved in ventures such as forest industry, oil fields, alcohol and coffee production. Most of the African states rely on the Wagner Group for security assistance and exit of Wagner from these states would certainly lead to political and security crises in these African states. In Mali, for instance, the withdrawal of Wagner forces may accelerate the pace at which terrorist organizations are gaining control. In the face of withdrawal of the French forces and UN peacekeeping force MINUSIMA, Wagner’s withdrawal will only heighten the security challenges. Moreover, the ongoing construction of a base by the Wagner Group near Bamako’s Airport is a clear sign that Wagner is fortifying its position in Africa.[xxiii]
Given the Wagner’s deep involvement with the national governments of these African states since the last six years, it will be difficult for Russia to replace Wagner Group’s activities in Africa. Thus, it is unlikely that Wagner Group will leave Africa anytime soon.
*****
*Dr. Gauri Narain Mathur, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] Peter Fabricus. ‘Wagner is being used in Africa as a Proxy to Target Civilians’. Institute for Security Studies. 16 September 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/wagner-is-being-used-in-africa-as-a-proxy-to-target-civilians
[ii] ‘ Wagner Group Operations in Africa’. ACLED. 30 August 2022. https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/
[iii] ‘ Putin Says Wagner Group fully Funded by the State’. TASS. Russian News Agency. 27 June 2023. https://tass.com/defense/1639345?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com
[iv] Joseph Siegle. “Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability”. Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment. George C. Marshell Centre for European Studies. 28 April 2021.
[v] ‘ Wagner Group Operations in Africa’. ACLED. 30 August 2022. https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/
[vi] Joseph Siegel. Russia’s Use of Private Military Contractors. Africa Centre For Strategic Studies. 15 September 2022. https://africacenter.org/experts/russia-private-military-contractors/
[vii] IBID
[viii] Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is an autonomous civil society group based in Geneva, and it collects data on organized crime and illicit trafficking.
[ix] IBID
[x] Juliya Stanyard, Thierry Vircoulon and Julian Rademeyer. ‘ Russia’s Military, Mercenary Engagement in Africa’. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 16 February 2023. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-in-africa/
[xi] Federica Saini Fasanotti. ‘Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, Commercial Concessions, Rights Violations and Counter Insurgency Failure’. Brooking Institution. 8 February 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/
[xii] Theo Neethling.’ Russian Paramilitary Operations in Africa: The Wagner Group as the De Facto Foreign Policy Instrument’. Scientia Militaria. 2023. Vol (51). No.(1). http://scientiamilitraia.journalsac.za
[xiii] Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, Marcel Plithcha.’ After Prigozhin: The Future of Wagner Model in Africa.’ Combating Terrorism Centre. 2023. Vol (16). No.(9). https://ctc.westpoint.edu/after-prigozhin-the-future-of-the-wagner-model-in-africa/
[xiv] Operation Sangaris was a military operation conducted by the French Military in Central African Republic from late 2013 to 2017 as the fighting broke out between Seleka and Anti Belaka rebels and the state lost its ability to maintain order. Around 2500 French troops were deployed as a part of the operation Sangaris.
[xv] Fedeica Saini Fasanotti. ‘ The Wagner Group’s Future in Africa. GIS. 27 July 2023. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/wagner-group-africa/
[xvi] Jared Thompson, Catrina Doxsee and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. ‘Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali’. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 2 February 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali
[xvii] Munira Mustafa,’ Shadows of the State: How Wagner Group extends Russian Reach in Africa’. The Interpreter. 8 August 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/shadows-state-how-wagner-group-extends-russian-reach-africa
[xviii] ‘ Lavrov Pledges Russian Military Support on Visit to Mali Amid Concerns over Abuses’. France 24. 7 February 2023. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230207-lavrov-says-russia-to-help-mali-improve-military-capabilities
[xix] Rapheal Parens. ‘The Wagner Group’s Playbook in Africa: Mali’. Foreign Policy Research Institute 18 March 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali
[xx] ‘ Russian Mercenaries in Sudan: What is the Wagner Group’s Role.’ Aljazeera. 17 April 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/17/what-is-the-wagner-groups-role-in-sudan
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] ‘ Wagner will continue Mali, Central African Operation’. The Moscow Times. 26 June 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/26/wagner-will-continue-mali-c-africa-operations-lavrov-a81648
[xxiii] Christopher Faulkner, Raphael Parens, Marcel Plithcha.’ After Prigozhin: The Future of Wagner Model in Africa.’ Combating Terrorism Centre. 2023. Vol (16). No.(9). https://ctc.westpoint.edu/after-prigozhin-the-future-of-the-wagner-model-in-africa/