The world is in a state of flux, with upheavals and challenges on all sides. Japan, as a major power in the Indo-Pacific, is not immune to these factors. In recent years, the growing military power of an assertive China, the constant nuclear threat from North Korea, the global pandemic along with the war in Ukraine disrupting global supply chains, and the regional instability in the Middle East have all compelled Japan to reorient its strategic approach. Japan faced with a rapidly evolving and complex security environment has begun to recalibrate its strategic posture, with a focus on strengthening its ties with allies and partners, developing new capabilities, and increasing its defence spending.
Japan’s Strategic Reorientation
Historically, Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution since 1946 originally enunciated that Japan would “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”.[1] Article 9 had further stated that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained” and “the right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized”.[2] However, faced with challenges in an increasingly complex security environment, Japan’s National Diet enacted an official reinterpretation of Article 9 in September 2015, allowing the right to exercise collective self-defence and to deploy the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas for UN-authorised military operations.[3] This enactment was also considered essential for an effective US-Japan security treaty, as it would theoretically allow Japan to come to the aid of the US during operations aimed at protecting Japan.
With the passage of time, Japan has seemingly abandoned its pacifist nature for what it emphasises as a “defence-oriented” but “compelling form of deterrence”.[4] This strategic reorientation being advocated can be observed through their upgraded apex level strategic guidance and national security policy document, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2022, which was last formulated in 2013. Similarly, Japan’s strategic reorientation is also evident through their updated ‘National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG)’ of 2018 rebranded as the ‘National Defense Strategy (NDS)’ in 2022. The ‘Medium-Term Defense Program (MTDP)’ of 2018 was also revamped and became the ‘Defense Buildup Program (DBP)’ in 2022.
The NSS provides the overall framework for Japan's national security policy, the NDS outlines the specific capabilities and posture that Japan will need to achieve for its security objectives, and the DBP sets out a road map for developing and deploying those capabilities. The three upgraded documents together provide a comprehensive overview of Japan's national security policy framework and how it intends to implement that strategy especially in pursuit of a strategic reorientation.
In addition, Japan’s inclination towards a more proactive role in the regional and global affairs has been articulated through its Annual White Papers titled as the “Defense of Japan” (DOJ). The DOJ White Paper had its first publication in 1970, and ever since 1976 it has been issued regularly on an annual basis. In the 2022 Annual White Paper, a chapter was dedicated on the security repercussions of the war in Ukraine as well as the challenges stemming from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The “Defense of Japan 2023”, announced on 28 July 2023, was officially issued on 31 August 2023.[5] In describing the security environment surrounding Japan, the latest edition of the DOJ has for the first time stated that the “international community is facing the greatest Post-War trial yet”.[6] In fact, the DOJ 2023 exhibits a special feature on how there has been a significant strengthening of military capabilities of countries neighbouring Japan in the past ten years. Primarily focusing on the exponential growth of military infrastructure and intensified military activities leading to intrusion of sovereign territorial waters and airspace, the DOJ 2023 attributes China, Russia and North Korea as its premise for strengthening Japan’s defence capabilities.
To achieve its objectives of reinforcing defence capabilities, the Japanese government has stressed the importance of reaching 2 per cent of GDP for their spending on defence and other outlays from FY 2023 to 2027. This is what can be seen as a reflection of the dramatic shift in Japan’s strategic orientation, as it breaks away from decades of self-imposed 1 per cent limit. Based on the NSS 2022, the NDS 2022, the DBP 2022 and the other important security documents such as the DOJ 2022 and 2023, the Government of Japan has explained how it plans to utilise the required defence expenditures amounting to JPY43 trillion (USD310 billion)[7] from FY 2023 to 2027.[8] Apart from reaching the 2 per cent NATO benchmark, Japan believes that doing so will enable their country to take primary responsibility for its own defence within five years and assume a far more active role in Indo-Pacific security.
With the purpose of managing the challenges and focusing on the key areas, Japan has major programmes in the pipeline to build up its defence capabilities. Furthermore, as per the NDS 2022 in approximately ten years from 2023, Japan intends to make efforts to better attain their defence objectives and reinforce its defence capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield.[9] Japan will reinforce its integrated air and missile defence capabilities, materialise the style of warfare using unmanned assets controlled by AI, enhance space operation capabilities, establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities, reinforce transport capabilities and accelerate transport and replenishment through the improvement of supply bases.[10] Overall, Japan plans on improving resiliency of its defence facilities in the coming years.
Factors Driving Japan’s Strategic Reorientation
There are certain underlying factors that can be visibly attributed to why Japan is seemingly undergoing a shift in its strategic approach. The upgraded national security policy framework states that Japan's neighbouring countries, including China, North Korea, and Russia’s intensified military activities, are posing heightened threat. China, in particular, is stated to be engaging in unilateral changes to the status quo by use of force and amplifying its attempts to challenge the international order. The activities such as missile launches and coercive military actions by other neighbouring countries are also deemed as posing threats to Japan's security and the region.
China
It can be said that Japan has been overhauling its strategic approach since the past two decades. One of the prominent factors driving Japan’s strategic reorientation has been China's growing military capabilities and assertive behaviour in the East and South China Seas, which have raised concerns for Japan's security. China’s intrusion into the territorial waters and airspace of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea has been a significant security issue for Japan. The impending threat of China eventually invading Taiwan that is nearest to Japan’s Yonaguni islands generates another security challenge for Tokyo. It is also important to acknowledge the dependency of Japan’s industry on Taiwan’s manufacturing and supply of high-end semiconductor chips. Taiwan accounts for more than 60 per cent of Japan’s import of semiconductor chips, and this share has been on a climb.[11] Therefore, any disruption in imports from Taiwan would hinder the production downstream propagating through Japan’s supply chains.[12] . As such the situation only affirms what the former Prime Minister (Late) Shinzo Abe had mentioned in 2021, “Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency”.[13] In fact, on 12 September 2023, Japan appointed a serving defence ministry official as its de facto Defence Attaché in Taiwan, thereby revising its former policy of appointing retired Japan SDF officers for the role.[14] Therefore, Japan now sees China as the “greatest strategic challenge” and has underscored the importance of responding by strengthening its deterrence capabilities.[15] Japan has also continually raised concerns regarding China’s lack of interest in participating in international frameworks where other major creditor nations are involved. Additionally, China’s developmental finance assistance, which lacks transparency and exploits dependent countries, has also been consistently highlighted by Japan. The absence of accountability on defence expenditures by China is another major barrier for Japan in dealing with China’s assertive behaviour.
Russia
Another prime factor for Japan’s strategic reorientation can be ascribed to Russia. With regard to the military actions by Russia in Ukraine, they are considered by Japan as a clear infringement of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, a serious violation of international law, and a grave breach of the United Nations Charter.[16] This breach of Ukraine’s territorial integrity by Russia has further sown seeds of doubt in Tokyo for Japan and Russia have remained ‘technically at war’ since the end of the Second World War having not signed an official peace treaty. Furthermore, Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan, and the Habomai islands of the Kuril Island chain, which Japan claims as its “Northern Territories”, have complicated relations between the two nation-states for decades without a formal peace treaty. Japan has even claimed that Russia is increasing its military activities and strengthening armaments in the disputed “Northern Territories” amidst the Ukraine conflict.[17] There are also concerns raised by Japan regarding the possible Russian deployment of strategic nuclear submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk that surrounds the “Northern Territories”.[18] Such operational activities, in the disputed territories while the conflict in Ukraine rages on, have certainly raised much apprehension for Japan’s diplomacy and the need to conclude a peace treaty with Russia through the resolution of the territorial issue. Moreover, Russia’s joint statement issuing a “no-limits” friendship with China in February 2022, just prior to the special military operation in Ukraine, further added to Japan’s reservations.[19] Japan has become cautious of a military conflict similar to Ukraine erupting in the vicinity of its sovereign territories. Furthermore, in September 2023 Russia raised more uncertainties for Japan as it strengthened strategic and tactical cooperation with North Korea during Kim Jong-un’s first overseas trip since 2019.[20]
North Korea
North Korea has always been a significant security concern for Japan as the constant ballistic missile test provocations along with claims by Pyongyang of having advanced their nuclear capabilities have snowballed the crisis of regional stability and security. The test firing of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) by North Korea during the NATO Vilnius Summit in July 2023, along with North Korea’s close ties with Russia as Kim Jong-un made his first overseas trip since 2019 to Russia in September 2023, has fuelled apprehensions in Japan about their burgeoning tactical cooperation. North Korea also claimed to have launched its “first tactical nuclear attack submarine” in September 2023. Originally, the submarine was a Soviet-era Romeo-class diesel-electric attack submarine, which underwent an extensive conversion process.[21] North Korea has demonstrated its advancing capabilities to build attack submarines capable of carrying tactical nukes, while Kim Jong-un underscores his prospective plans to strengthen their naval forces. North Korea is also attempting to make headway in its space programme, and during Kim Jong-un’s recent visit to the Russian Vostochny Cosmodrome, President Putin offered to send the first North Korean to space.[22] What has also disappointed Japan regarding North Korea is how Russia and China being permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) have been tacitly aiding Pyongyang despite violations of relevant UNSC resolutions. Therefore, even though Japan has sought an early normalisation of relations with North Korea, in accordance to the Pyongyang Declaration signed in 2002,[23] North Korea’s continuous hard-posturing and sabre-rattling has only pushed back the process of achieving mutual trust for normalisation. Consequently, it has led to Japan reorienting its strategic approach towards North Korea as well, specifically relying upon the US-Japan extended deterrence mechanism, the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral security cooperation, and the NATO-Japan Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP).
Challenges for Japan’s Strategic Reorientation
Externally, there are countries such as China and Russia that have raised concerns over the apparent abandonment of the pacifist policy by Japan. Soon after the three documents (NSS, NDS, DBP) were issued by Japan in 2022, the spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry stated that drastic changes could lead Japan back to its “history of militarism and committing acts of aggression”.[24] Russian Foreign Ministry also issued a statement mentioning how Japan is “returning to unlimited militarisation, which will inevitably provoke new security challenges and exacerbate tensions in the Asia-Pacific region”.[25] Hence, there arises large scale potential for a backlash from China, Russia and even North Korea who are at the moment looking at Japan’s increase in defence spending as a sign of attempts at reviving its military potential as witnessed prior to the Second World War.
Domestically, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also faces certain hurdles with popular support for his Cabinet seeing a fall in recent approval ratings to 32.3 per cent, the lowest since 2021.[26] The concerns of the public largely remain with the administration’s ability to address the country’s social and economic issues weighed down by price hikes. Even though the Government of Japan approved a fresh economic stimulus package of JPY 17 trillion (USD 113 billion) for families hit by inflation and falling purchasing power,[27] there are concerns over the eventual hike in taxes to cover the proposals for increase in defence spending and socio-economic benefits.
In the aftermath of the tragedies from the Second World War, traditionally there has been certain significant domestic opposition to Japan's increased militarisation. Nevertheless, there is a public mandate now growing in Japan for a more robust defence posture. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict a poll conducted during May 2022 by the Mainichi Shimbun,[28] a newspaper known for criticising expansionary defence policies found that 76 per cent of their respondents supported an increase in defence spending.[29] More recently, between March to April 2023, Kyodo News conducted polls via mail, which showed a 61 per cent public support for acquiring counterstrike capabilities to enhance deterrence.[30]
The outcome of both polls suggests that the increasingly severe security environment driven by China’s military rise and potential military action against Taiwan, North Korea’s increasing ballistic missile tests, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict has spurred the majority in Japan to approve developing of new capabilities to strengthen their defence posturing.[31] At the current juncture there is support for strengthening defence capabilities in Japan but the public is against its financing through tax increases.
Conclusion
Due to the increasing severity and complexity of the security environment surrounding Japan, their strategic reorientation is expected to proceed with adequate support. The only hurdle that Japan may face is if the economic situation in Japan deteriorates significantly, it may then result in Japan continuing to increase the spending but at a slower pace. Overall, the general consensus even amongst parties from the opposition has been recognition of the need to strengthen Japan’s defences in the face of growing threats from China and other regional powers. Increased defence spending and focus on Indo-Pacific security also require a further introspection into how they impact the regional balance of power, as well as Japan-China, Japan-Russia and Japan-North Korea relations. In pursuit of coordinating with traditional allies such as the US, and recalibration of its ties with South Korea for ensuring security in the region, Japan needs to anticipate the risks involved and prepare itself for the outcome of an emboldened trilateral partnership between China, Russia and North Korea.
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*Dr Tunchinmang Langel, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA)
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal
Endnotes
[1] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1946, “The Constitution of Japan”, November 3, 1946, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Accessed 19 October 2023)
[2] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1946, “The Constitution of Japan”, November 3, 1946, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Accessed 19 October 2023)
[3] Reiji Yoshida and Mizuho Aoki, 2015, “Diet enacts security laws, marking Japan's departure from pacifism”, The Japan Times, September 19, 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/19/national/politics-diplomacy/diet-enacts-security-laws-marking-japans-departure-from-pacifism-2/ (Accessed 19 October 2023)
[4] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan”, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed 26 October 2023)
[5] Japan Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces, 2023, “Defense of Japan 2023”, Twitter, August 31, 2023, https://twitter.com/ModJapan_en/status/1697175244954632702 (Accessed 25 October 2023)
[6] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023, Defense of Japan 2023, August 31, 2023, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023_EN_Full.pdf (Accessed 18 October 2023)
[7] Yuki Tatsumi, 2023, “Making defence spending sustainable for Japan”, East Asia Forum, June 24, 2023, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/24/making-defence-spending-sustainable-for-japan/ (Accessed 26 October 2023)
[8] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2023, Defense of Japan 2023, August 31, 2023, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2023/DOJ2023_EN_Full.pdf (Accessed 18 October 2023)
[9] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Defense Strategy”, December 16, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf (Accessed 27 October 2023)
[10] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, “National Defense Strategy”, December 16, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf (Accessed 27 October 2023)
[11] Todo Yasuyuki, 2023, “Japan’s Supply Chains at Risk: Preparing for a Taiwan Contingency”, Nippon.com, June 12, 2023, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00907/ (Accessed 27 October 2023)
[12] Todo Yasuyuki, 2023, “Japan’s Supply Chains at Risk: Preparing for a Taiwan Contingency”, Nippon.com, June 12, 2023, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d00907/ (Accessed 27 October 2023)
[13] Ben Blanchard, 2021, “Former PM Abe says Japan, U.S. could not stand by if China attacked Taiwan”, Reuters, December 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/former-pm-abe-says-japan-us-could-not-stand-by-if-china-attacked-taiwan-2021-12-01/ (Accessed 19 October 2023)
[14] Kaori Kaneko, Yukiko Toyoda, Tim Kelly and Sakura Murakami, 2023, “Exclusive: Japan elevates Taiwan security ties in move likely to rile China”, Reuters, September 13, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-elevates-taiwan-security-ties-move-likely-rile-china-2023-09-12/ (Accessed 19 October 2023)
[15] Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed 18 October 2023)
[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2022, “The launch of military actions by Russia in Ukraine (Statement by Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa),” February 24, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003086.html (Accessed 18 October 2023)
[17] Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed 18 October 2023)
[18] Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, 2022, “National Security Strategy of Japan”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed 18 October 2023)
[19] President of Russia, 2022, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, February 4, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (Accessed 23 October 2023)
[20] KCNA.kp, 2023, “Respected Comrade Kim Jong-un Has Talks with Russian President”, September 14, 2023, http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/12825c828f2c19519cdc394bec9a51d9.kcmsf (Accessed 23 October 2023)
[21] Navy Recognition, 2023, “North Korea unveils new submarine Hero Kim Kun Ok”, September 8, 2023, https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/september/13552-north-korea-unveils-new-submarine-hero-kim-kun-ok.html (Accessed 23 October 2023)
[22] Times of Israel, 2023, “North Korea’s leader wraps up Russia trip with drones gift”, September 17, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/north-koreas-leader-wraps-up-russia-trip-with-drones-gift/ (Accessed 23 October 2023)
[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2002, “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration”, September 17, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html (Accessed 23 October 2023)
[24] Global Times, 2022, “Japan's passage of defense documents brings country away from track of post-war peaceful development: Chinese embassy”, December 16, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202212/1282035.shtml
[25] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2022, “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on Japan's newly revised security and defence doctrines”, December 22, 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1844902/ (Accessed 26 October 2023)
[26] Gabriele Ninivaggi, 2023, “Kishida’s popularity in free fall ahead of key political events”, The Japan Times, October 16, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/10/16/japan/politics/kishida-approval-ratings/ (Accessed 26 October 2023)
[27] Kyodo News, 2023, “Japan OKs over 17 tril. yen economic package to ease inflation shock”, November 2, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/11/25c8195fdf24-japan-govt-to-approve-economic-package-worth-over-17-tril-yen.html (Accessed 3 November 2023)
[28] Mainichi Shimbun, 2022, “Just under 80% think defense spending should be increased, Mainichi Shimbun poll”, May 21, 2022, https://mainichi.jp/articles/20220521/k00/00m/010/168000c (Accessed 27 October 2023)
[29] Yuki Tatsumi, 2023, “Making defence spending sustainable for Japan”, East Asia Forum, June 24, 2023, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/06/24/making-defence-spending-sustainable-for-japan/ (Accessed 26 October 2023)
[30] Kyodo News, 2023, “80% in Japan oppose tax hike plan to cover defense outlay: poll”, May 7, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/05/4179bee70ea6-80-in-japan-oppose-tax-hike-plan-to-cover-defense-outlay-poll.html
[31] Kyodo News, 2023, “80% in Japan oppose tax hike plan to cover defense outlay: poll”, May 7, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/05/4179bee70ea6-80-in-japan-oppose-tax-hike-plan-to-cover-defense-outlay-poll.html