Indian Council of World Affairs

Nandini Khandelwal: Good afternoon. I welcome you all to the Indian Council of World Affairs for the Panel Discussion on Gen Z-led Digital Voices Reshaping Africa: Patterns and Implications. Before we proceed, may I request you all to kindly keep your phones on silent mode. Thank you. In today's discussion, we are honored to have with us the chair of the session, Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, former High Commissioner to South Africa and Kenya, who will be moderating the proceedings.

 

We are joined by five distinguished speakers, including two eminent discussants. Our first panelist is Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, followed by Dr. Samir Bhattacharya, Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. We also have a panelist joining us virtually, Dr. Godfred Bonnah Nkansah, Academic Faculty Member at Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Ghana. Joining the discussion as discussants are Dr. Ruchita Beri, Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, and Dr. Nivedita Ray, Director Research, Indian Council of World Affairs.

 

One more panelist was scheduled to join us online today, Professor Dr. Solomon winyi from Uganda. However, as today coincides with the Ugandan general elections, the internet services have unfortunately been disrupted throughout the country. Nevertheless, he has sent us a pre-recorded session of his, so we are looking forward to that. The session will conclude with a Q&A segment moderated by the Chair.

 

With this, I invite Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia to kindly deliver his opening remarks and guide us through today's proceedings.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much, Nandini. Nivedita, it is wonderful to be back with you and your team and I compliment ICWA for making sure that the conference room is full of people who have some expectations and I am sure that our panel will do its best to fulfill them. The topic chosen is very appropriate for the commencement of a new year, Gen Z protest movements in Africa, precisely digital voices reshaping Africa in a very neutral manner and the patterns and implications. But to be provocative, we really are in a fashion going to focus on what this generation in Africa is trying to do by doing all kinds of political activities which are being noticed across the continent.

 

As someone who probably is farthest away from Generation Z in terms of age, it is only proper that I make some initial remarks based on my recent research. But if I am uninformed, I think I will be looking to all the younger people in the hall to tell us exactly what's going on. Pew Research Centre defines Generation Z as those figuring in the age group of essentially 14 to 29. I presume that nobody is here below 20, but some may be just on the borderline. So certainly the house probably has about 50% or in fact more Generation Z here. They have been given all kinds of new phrases, some call them digital natives, others call them zoomers.

 

This is the group of people born between the millennials and alpha generation and they have grown up on internet, smart phone and social media. And mind you social media is not of the aunty uncle type Facebook. It is more recent TikTok and certainly X and Instagram. So clearly we have to be very clear as to what the characteristic of this generation is. And now we are seeing the results. What we are seeing is essentially a whole series of activities in various parts of Africa.

 

It was pointed out that while in a way it was started in other countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya earlier, but in the last two years, '25 to '26 period, the focus very much has been on other countries than these that I have listed. And they indicate countries such as Madagascar, Morocco, Togo as well. So is there something that is binding them together? Is this a peculiarly African phenomenon only? I would submit that it is not. It is in fact a global south phenomenon. It is happening as we know very well, closer home in South Asia. We saw it all opening as a slow film in Nepal.

 

In some ways, not exactly, but in some ways it has been also similarly seen in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as well. But Nepal was a particular example where the moment the access to social media was stopped, the generation rebelled and lo and behold in such fast action term, the government was brought down. So we have some idea. But there are other countries, Indonesia, Philippines, Peru, Paraguay, Timor-Leste. So that is the reason why I am saying it is a global south phenomenon. But we are today focused essentially on Africa.

 

I must compliment ICWA and its researchers for producing a very good concept note. I am a great fan of concept notes because if the concept note is right, then the discussion probably will proceed on the right lines. And of course we all know that nobody really reads concept notes before they come to the conference hall. So if you have read it, you already are miles ahead of the other participants. The central point of the concept note produced for this particular conference is that it names the countries and it names certain basic features and raises the right questions.

 

I think just as we all know, PhD scholars, when you raise your guiding questions, it is much easier to write your thesis. And here the fundamental question, and I am now actually addressing our panelists, is we have heard of struggles against colonialism and imperialism in Africa. So the first question very much is whether these protests have any resemblance to those classical struggles led by the titans of Africa such as Nkrumah and Nasser and Mandela.

 

The other question that is very important to note is that are we discussing just the protest movements or are we discussing the broader domain of the governance in Africa. Indeed, we are discussing the question of governance, because this governance is shaped and influenced by technology, by economy, by the trends towards urbanization and above all about the population dividend. Even this basic note says very clearly that 70% of the people in Africa today are below 30 years of age.

 

So it's a real young continent. We keep talking about similar figures for India and often we do not hear about others but this is an example where Africa, all 1.4 billion people today and all said to be 2.5 billion people in 2050 is truly very, very young and therefore, only those who have not followed Africa would be surprised that Generation Z movements are taking place here.

 

There is one more point I would like to mention is that just about 10 years back a major think tank in South Africa, Institute of Security Studies, they did a futuristic study of Africa and they basically concluded very clearly that there was a trend towards democracy in Africa and they claimed that come 2035, they were writing in 2015 and they said 20 years later, there would be more democracy and there would be more progress and there would be more stability in Africa. This was the 20 year.

 

But what we are seeing now 10 years later is that there is some regression. Democracy is there. I think even then ISS claimed that 38% people of Africa at that time were living in democracies and over 60% were in some kind of a semi-democracy. But now we have seen in the last two years, '24 and '25 that military coups are taking place, that there is a violation of the principles of democracy. So this also probably explains why we are now seeing more Generation Z reactions. And obviously, perhaps, we need to understand whether we are in a position to make some definitive judgments about them or we will have to wait and see as to where all this takes us.

 

My last point, I think it is very important for us in India to understand Africa better and we have a huge challenge. You spend a week reading top four English national dailies about South Asia, you can pass yourself off as a great South Asia expert. But for Africa you can't do because you cannot read anything in the Indian press about Africa. You really have to work hard, you have to go and dig information about Africa to be able to even write anything meaningfully. So this is the challenge which our Africanists face, but we have to find a way to make their lives a bit easier, because if frankly we don't understand Africa, we are going to pay a price for it.

 

So dear friends, I have presented some interconnected thoughts to you. I hope they have been sufficiently provocative for the panelists and I will now follow the schedule given to me and I will request Dr. Abhishek Mishra, a dear colleague, a very promising Africanist from IDSA now, you know your time limits, etc., we request you to present your views, Abhishek.

 

Abhishek Mishra: Let me first contextualize what's happening in Africa a little bit today, about the topic we are about to discuss. I think by late 1950s and early 1960s when African countries, when they started to gain independence from British and French rule, that resulted in a lot of optimism about the future of the nascent democracies on the African continent. There was a lot of hope that the newly elected, the newly democratic countries, they would be able to steer their own ships of state and regularly conduct free, fair, general elections, which essentially would be the true reflections of the ordinary Africans.

 

But sadly, what transpired was completely something which was not expected. Civil unrest and anarchy, it began to reign in the continent and the so-called founding fathers of many African countries, they tended to consider themselves above the law. And consequently, in a bid to retain their powers, they initiated a very complicated system of electoral manipulation and violence. Subsequently, it continued to pervade the entire continent.

 

So the system of electoral manipulation, it resulted in a system where old politicians were retained, which this culture, this tender to exclude African youth from active participation in politics. The current leadership also in Africa, this system is reflective of the current leadership in Africa, where mostly the current leadership is occupied by septuagenarians, basically, which are people aged between 70 to 79 years old, and also octogenarians aged between 80 to 89 years old. So essentially, what I'm saying is the leadership is old.

 

For old leaders, like various examples, Paul Biya of Cameroon, or Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, Alassane Ouattara of Cote d'Ivoire, and Emmerson Mnangagwa from Zimbabwe, Yoweri Museveni from Uganda, the list goes on. Obviously, there are young leaders as well. So despite the irony, the paradox is that despite the African continent having the largest youth population, it still, till date, continues predominantly to be run as a gerontocracy, basically. That essentially means a state or society which is governed by old people.

 

Now, through the Gen Z-led revolution, protest, call it, I mean, of course, there has been a lot of electoral mobilization, pro-democracy slogans, protest. Youths are becoming much more digitally active, etc. Various examples, obviously, from Sudan, Kenya, particularly hashtag, Ruto must go, or reject finance bill, even the protests against Adani Group as well. So youth activism is certainly evident in the continent. In North Africa, also the legacy of Arab Spring, it continues to inspire countries, people, youth in Tunisia and Egypt to also protest.

 

But what we are witnessing today is that there has been a substantial shift away from this, quote unquote, savior politics. By savior politics, I mean youth will seek a charismatic or political leader who will work to solve the deeper societal problems. This system is shifting towards a much more decentralized system, towards much more issue-based accountability. So elected leaders, they are increasingly viewed as failing to deliver tangible results, which is consequently forcing African youth to leverage digital tools through smartphones, through encrypted messaging apps, Discord servers, etc.

 

But we must remember that elections in Africa, they are not just fought only at the polling stations. Increasingly, the outcome of African elections is determined and it's shaped by the narratives which are emerging on the digital space, misinformation and disinformation that is on the rise. And that is only given a boost by the power and speed and reach of social media platforms. But misinformation, disinformation is not just simply African phenomena. Around the world, we have numerous examples of how disinformation has destabilized democratic institutions and widened, basically, the gap between government and citizens.

 

So essentially, what we are left out with is a breakdown in the state and citizen social contract. That is one of the reasons why even so many coups are also taking place in part of the continent. So the broader trust between stakeholders and the common people, that is completely missing, and which subsequently results in democratic processes declining. So essentially, for a democracy to function, trust in public institutions is imperative. It's mandatory for the proper functioning of a democracy.

 

But that in itself, trust in public institutions is declining. Afrobarometer, who does a lot of surveys, they recently surveyed 39 African countries with a sample of around 58,000 respondents from late 2021 to mid-2023 time period. And their survey results found that the Africans' trust in key institutions, it has declined. And it is declining compared to what the levels were a decade ago. Only the trust in religious leaders, or trust in army, or trust in traditional leaders, that has witnessed a rise. But political institutions, like president, or courts, or parliament, police, African populations' trust in all these public institutions, is alarmingly declining.

 

And geographically also, it is different. I mean, on Eastern and Western Africa, the trust is much more higher in countries like Tanzania on the East, or Niger, Burkina Faso on the West, compared to countries in Central, Southern, and Northern Africa, where the trust in all these public institutions is declining. So I think the situation, I mean, any sort of youth movement, of course, for any meaningful outcome to come out of the Gen Z-led digital movement, I think we, African nations, or African youth, or in whichever part of the world the protests are occurring, they have to focus on transforming only confrontation with authorities towards much more active youth participation, which is as we are witnessing.

 

But at the same time, I'll also mention that, I mean, under any authoritarian or military government, democracy does not function. Because under military, military governments are essentially, they are antithetical to any sort of democratic ethics, principles, or ethos. I'll stop there. Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much, Abhishek, for sticking to the time, and also making some very interesting and important points. I think you focused on the political aspects, and you brought it out that the trust in African institutions, except probably one or two such as church, is going down. And I think you also spoke very nicely about the shift from the severe politics. I think that's something very significant. Thank you very much for your intervention.

 

We shall now turn to Dr. Samir Bhattacharya, another promising Africanist. I have known him for several years and so I bring you in to express your views in about seven-eight minutes.

 

Samir Bhattacharya: Thank you, Chair. It is a very happy moment for me to be back here in ICWA. Thank you for the invite. I see a lot of known and very old friends, teachers. So I will start from where Chair introduced. I have actually read the concept notes. So I will talk based on the concept note. So my friend Abhishek has already spoke about the protest, the governance challenges. So in 2020, there were a lot of protests across the world.

 

As Chair said, it is a global south thing. So it started probably in 2022 in Sri Lanka. Then 2024, we witnessed in Bangladesh, we witnessed in Nepal. But in 2025, across Africa, it started in June in Togo. Then it happened in Kenya. Next month it happened in Kenya. Then it happened in Morocco. Then it happened in Madagascar. So if you can see the geographical range, the language, the culture, it's so different. What is the commonality? Commonality is all these protests were led by young people, Generation Z, as we call it. This Generation Z is also, some people call them Generation Anxiety.

 

So these are the people who have very less patience. They are not okay with the current status quo. They want change and they want it now. So these are the people who protested. But is this the first time the protests are happening? No, the protests have been, I mean, not just Arab Spring, last 10 years, the protest from Arab Spring, if you see, then these people have taken the help of technology. The protests have been held, I mean, Chair mentioned about Kwame Nkrumah. Chair mentioned about Julius Nyerere. These were the people who have also protested. But that time, they did not have the support of technology.

 

Today's protest, these young people, those who are protesting, this is the most important, you have to understand that this is the most technologically enabled generation. No generation before this generation had this privilege to be born with, at the age of five years, they are using mobile. We never had this opportunity. So these are the people who are already connected. Now, social media has helped a lot. In which way? Social media, first of all, it helped to share information. If something is happening to me, I mean, without technology, how can I share it? But when I share it, this becomes a collective voice. This is number one.

 

Number two, I can, I mean, technology is very helpful in cross-country experience sharing also. So people can learn. So for example, a Kenyan can see, oh, what is going on in Morocco? Okay, we should do this in that way. Otherwise, we'll get caught. So people are learning transboundary lessons is also there. Then, third important thing, of course, there are challenges like government is trying to crack down internet, as we have heard that in Uganda, there is no internet today. But then this Gen-Z are very smart. They use VPN. They can fool the government. So these are the advantages they have.

 

Now let's talk about just Africa, whether this Gen Z-led protest that happened in 2025, how successful were they? So let's start with, I think, the biggest success that happened, it was in Madagascar, because they managed to change the government. But if you look, it was not Gen Z who replaced the government. It was finally the army has to step in, and it was army who changed the government. Look at Kenya, what happened in Kenya, the initial protest was against the finance bill. The government said that, okay, we are taking back the finance bill, but the finance bill is still they are revising it. And sooner or later, the finance bill will come, probably with some cosmetic changes. But it will come.

 

And what is happening, even today, like every other day, there is one protester who is getting disappeared from Kenya. So protesters are getting disappeared. It means how successful you can see. Then you come to Morocco. In Morocco, what happened? Why the protest happened? Because the initial protest started because six women died in the maternity yard. So the health is an issue. Education is an issue, because there is no employment. Even if the students with their graduation degree, PhD degree, they are not getting jobs. So they protested for education and health.

 

Now Morocco is a parliamentary monarchy. The king said, okay, we will look at education and health sector. But nothing really changed. So for me, the protests were successful. At least it gave the voice. The government heard what is happening in the ground. But if you really look at the ground results, I don't think it has achieved what it was meant to achieve. Now what were the pitfalls? Why it did not achieve what it was meant to achieve?

 

One reason should be because, as you said, Chair, about the leaders. So one advantage of these protests are that these are organic. That's a very good thing. But the problem of organic thing is that there is no leader. So protest is happening, but they don't know what is the end goal. Post-protest, what exactly we want? So these are the challenges. Now, I think you spoke about ISS report. So I was also reading that what is the future lies in Africa. So Bloomberg has come up with a publication which says that 2026 is going to be another year of protest. And they have predicted a few countries like Ethiopia, CAR, and DRC. These are the three countries which are on the verge of public student protests or Gen Z protests.

 

So we'll see what happens. But Abhishek has spoken about this disinformation campaign. The algorithm is also something which works against these Gen Z protesters. With algorithm, you can show different things. So how this 2026 is going to turn up, we'll see. But I think just protests on the road will not fetch the end goal, the result. Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much, Samir. Appreciate what you said. I think you're focusing attention on the geographic spread is very important. I'm glad you are seeing Africa as part of the larger global south story. You're quite right in pointing out that Gen Z has succeeded in putting across the dissatisfaction in front of the people. But these digital protests, and they're not just staying on computers. People have actually gone out on the streets and they have fought with the security forces. They have been killed and injured and arrested as well.

 

But when you come out and confront the traditional authority of the state, then you find life is more difficult than just pushing the buttons on your computer or using your mobile. There's a big difference in real life. And long before our own time for the freedom struggle of India, we know those who eventually became leaders, they took lathis on their backs from the British. It was not just by smartphone. So there is a big difference. Political protests is a good thing. But it will involve sacrifice. And it will involve long struggle. It will involve organization and management. And we'll have to see how. This may just be the beginning of a new phenomenon in Africa.

 

We are still a bit early watching it. But thank you so much for pointing out, in particular, that according to your research 2026 could be another year of turbulence in tension so that rings some bells because already we all know sitting here all the students of IR that the world is already bracing itself for a turbulent year in geopolitics. And so in that light what you just said about Africa wakes us all up a little bit more. Thank you very much now we have the possibility to go to Dr. Godfred Bonnah Nkansah and I think we are going to hear him digitally that is really wonderful and I particularly extend you a very warm welcome, you must forgive us, we argumentative Indians most of us probably have never been to African Continent, but holding forth as if we know Africa very well. So you are the first African voice that we will hear today and I look forward to listening to this and assure you that you will have our fullest attention. Over to you, sir.

 

Godfred Bonnah Nkansah: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and warm regards to the council. Thank you for the invitation. I would provide my reflections on the nexus between the demographic context of Africa and economic drivers and how they are influencing Gen Z's political attitudes or shaping Gen Z's political attitudes. So I personally think that the demographic context of Africa is the foundation, which gives us insights into all the political protests we are seeing on the continent.

 

So, yes, so 70% of Africans below the age of 30 and that has been repeatedly emphasized in our discussion this morning, but I like to look at it from the point of median age. When we look at Africa's median age, it's below 19 years. So half of Africans are below 19 years and that presents significant challenges socio-economically. So the demographic structure of the continent has made it very challenging for African governments to be able to achieve economic goals, because the overwhelming majority of Africans are not within the age of productivity, they are below 19 years implying they are in school, they are consumers, they are not adding to the economy.

 

And we know from political demography that for any country to realize demographic dividend based on the age structure, the median age of that country has to be between 25.6 years and then 42 years, between 25.6 years and 42 years. That gives the country the opportunity to harness maximum dividends from its working class. So we have the context of Africa, where the median age is below 19 years. So the economic challenges of Africa for me is likely to continue for significant decades to come until the population age structure is fundamentally altered to have the most of Africans within the median age, which permits productivity.

 

And that has affected the economic opportunities for young Africans growing up, especially the Gen Z generation. I think it's important to note that while the World Bank statistics estimate high youth unemployment rates on the continent, it is so for the former sector. Most young Africans are within the informal economy. So they are doing something, but not within the formal context, implying that the biggest challenge is not so much youth idleness or youth unemployment but livelihood precarity or the lack of sustainable livelihoods for most Africans.

 

So they have something doing, young Africans, they have something doing, but it's not sustainable. And that has created a lot of pressure on governments to expand the formal sector to absorb the teeming, better educated generation of Africans we currently have. That has fed into the political or digital activism of many young Africans. But interesting parts of what is happening across the continent is that the grievances of the Gen Zs are not only economic, they are not only towards addressing their economic precarity.

 

Interestingly, the issues we have seen on the continent being protested, cut across multiple sectors. For instance, when you take Ghana, in recent months, the demonstrations by the Gen Zs have focused on environmental sustainability. It's been against illegal mining. Even though the economic challenges are there, environmental concerns have come up strongly among many young Africans as issues for the future, issues for the present, which need to be addressed. So you find those nuances.

 

When you take the case of Nigeria, the End Sars protest was not fundamentally economically motivated. It was a question of police brutality and security breakdown within the country. So the context of security also features prominently in the protests of Gen Zs, both digitally and also offline. And then when you take the Sahel, countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, the focus of digital activism by Gen Zs there has majorly been on the inability of their governments to address French imperialist influence.

 

So those ones mirror the pro-liberation era politics of Africa. So across different countries, the interest seem to differ. And then when you take the case of Togo, that was political and it was against what experts typically call constitutional manipulation by the government. So Gen Zs are being very tactical in their political engagements, both online and offline. Yes, the economic issues are present, like we saw in the case of Kenya, the financial bill, but also they are interested in environmental issues. They're also interested in security issues. They're also interested in political issues. And that has opened up the space for digital activism on the continent or across multiple frontiers based on the interest and the passion of young people on the continent.

 

So I thought that would be important to establish that the economic drivers are not the only drivers. There are also equally important issues Gen Zs are attempting to influence. And I'm also supposed to provide my reflections on what models currently exist for constructive state youth engagement that rebuilds trust and potentially prevent escalation of digital activism into conflict. I think that in the post-liberation era or beyond the liberation era narratives, what African governments must come to terms with is the fact that like our distinguished Chair rightly mentioned, this generation is a generation of digitally savvy young people. They live online, they socialize online.

 

I think African governments are still quite rigid and majorly focused on traditional systems of engagement with young people. But you will not find the young people in the parliaments engaging governments. You will not find them in the political parties actively engaging. They are online and it implies that the forms of engagements between the states and young people should transition from the traditional spaces of engagements into online spaces where the young people are. However, what we see is that across many African countries, the engagement of young people online is seen as a threat to national security.

 

And we've seen that today in Uganda. Elections are happening and the internet is down. Why? Because the government has securitized the engagement of young people online. And it's important we shift from that mindset and embrace digital activism as an alternative space for public engagement by young people. Governments having really bought into that idea of seeing the digital space and digital deliberation as complimentary spaces of engagement to the former democratic process. And I think that mindset is critical.

 

Currently, they are seen as antagonistic to the interest of the government. So that is very important. And then lastly, because of time, I think it was Dr. Abhishek talked about meaningful youth engagement. That is very important. It's important because what we see is tokenistic youth representation in governance. And we are not seeing meaningful representation of young people within the spaces of power. So young people still feel marginalized and tend to see the digital space as where they can push their interest. But like we heard from our immediate past speaker, the returns on the engagement online have been really meaningful.

 

If your protest overthrow a civilian government and is replaced by a military government, that cannot be described as successful. So it's important that drive also focuses on meaningful youth representation or participation within governance. I think I'll pause here for now. And then when further opportunities come, we can reflect further. Thank you very much.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you, Dr. Godfred Nkansah. Thank you for making some very telling points. And we expected nothing less from you because you are sitting right there and you're brought in not merely the Ghanian perspective, but typically and importantly, the African perspective. I think your basic thesis that only economic factors are not responsible behind this digital activism that has to be factored in. And you also referred to a completely new phrase to us digital optimism, which is very characteristic of an African approach to life. So I've understood that as well.

 

I was hoping that you will also comment on some regional variations, how is this protest movement different in East Africa and in the island state Madagascar or North African state Morocco, but we'll come to that. I'm not putting the question to you yet. We will now try to take in the recorded intervention of a scholar from Uganda as explained by Nandini earlier Professor Dr. Solomon Winyi. Can we try to get his pre-recorded intervention over to you?

 

Solomon Winyi: Esteemed panel, viewers and participants, good afternoon. My name is Dr. Solomon Winyi, I am a lecturer in Makerere University. I will start to speak about political landscape and the rise of Gen Z-led digital protest in Africa. As you speak, there is no internet in Uganda, so that's why I'm having this pre-recorded video, somehow I managed to have a pre-recorded video.

 

The small background, Africa's median age is around 19 and this shows that politics is increasingly youth-driven and these Gen Z are dictated, native, networked and of course centralized. What we see is the protest politics shifting from party-led, they are no longer traditional political parties, but they are more platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok and of course X, which is formerly Twitter. The claim, of course, is the intersection of the shrinking states or civil states in Uganda, but what we see is more of economic precarity and the networked digital culture.

 

In Uganda, of course, this is part of the continental pattern of digitally driven youth mobilization, but shaped by Uganda's election-centric and security-heavy political order, which we see during the election period like what we are seeing currently. What matters is these movements are not episodic unrest, they signal more of a structural reconfiguration of the political participation in Africa. So what is the political landscape of Uganda and what is the enabling context?

 

We see a tightly managed political system, which needs a digitally connected generation. Of course, we see a long incumbency and centralized executive authority, we see centralized elections and narrowing of civic media space, but there are challenges like persistent use of unemployment, inequality and corruption perceptions that tend to force these youths to engage in protests. But the formal political channels are of course seen by the Gen Z as unresponsive, so that's what has been causing these issues.

 

But the result, we see politics shifting from institutions to platforms, but also the dissent is migrating political rallies, now we see it on social media feeds, hashtags and encrypted groups like Telegram. But what we can see is the distinct narrative of the Ugandans versus the rest in Africa. For us, we have more of lead, light, network mobilization, and of course, this is harder to recapitulate. But we see a reliance on big dog fast tactics, which are due to protest policing. And we see, like right now, the youth have tried to switch from different measures to VPN, and of course there is the diaspora amplification.

 

All this is trying to have this rapid escalation from issue-based grievances to systematic critique. But we see a strong election framing where we see protests quickly reading the situation as a routine challenge. But what we can see is more big dog protests are less as a civic expression and more of a preemptive security risk. What about on the African scene? And I want us to look at Uganda within this continental Gen Z protest wave, because we have seen it in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, but all of them have things in common, like economic triggers, taxes, cost of living and employment. Hashtag the street. Pathways we have seen decentralized, youth-led, and distrustful of parties.

 

We have seen these protests more of a moral accountability and not ideology. We have seen it as evidence politics where you have videos, livestreams, citizen journalism, all these have created a generational challenge to enlight legitimacy and not specific policies. So what is new versus of course the Arab Spring? Definitely the similarities is the continuity because we see these are still news-led, technology-enabled platforms, of course triggered by economic and dignity grievances. But the new space, what we see is more of a digital ecosystem that are now relying on algorithms and of course, they are surveilled and also fragmented.

 

But also we see states have learnt repression. How do you deal with this? Before, we switch off the internet in Uganda, but now there are specific areas where we have targeted shutdowns. Of course, there is digital intimidation. So the states have evolved in terms of how they deal with these issues. Of course, there is no illusion of rapid regime collapse. We also see the protests is often subsonic, but persistent and not revolutionary. So what is the bottom line of this debate?

 

This is not an Arab Spring. It is more of a long-term network of tension. What is the implication of democracy and the political trust? What we see is of course the Gen Z and digital political, but very distrustful of institutions. Voting alone is seen as insufficient, that's why we have voter apathy. And protests have become a parallel accountability mechanism. But also, of course, repression deepens alienation and reinforces digital resistance.

 

So what is the risk? To me, I feel the risk is if I'm not addressed this gap, we may see protest fatigue. But also radicalization of the military and what you hear now, what is called authoritarian order narratives. That's what is likely to be the outcome. But we need also to know what works and what doesn't work. What doesn't work is internet shutdowns. They don't work. Criminalization of protests, co-optation without reform, treating Gen Z as a security problem. This is actually creating a bigger gap between regimes and the young people that constitute the majority of the population. What works?

 

To me, what works is credible economic inclusion pathways, maybe we could think of digital civic dialogue spaces, we could also have what we call youth responsive governance reforms, and also lastly, let's look at regional norms, protecting digital spaces or civic spaces through regional economic communities like the South African Community, SADCC, ECAS, and (Inaudible), or African Union at that level.

 

So the final takeaway from my discussion, Uganda's youth protests are not a threat to democracy, they are a stress test for its adaptability, and that is what I feel about this discussion. Thank you for listening to me, and I'm sorry this is a recorded video because as you are aware, there is no internet in Uganda. Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much. I'm happy that the perspective from the other side, eastern side, was brought in by this young lecturer from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration from a very famous university, Makarere University in Kampala. I think we have to take note of the fact that this digital activism, digital voices, Uganda was one of the earliest countries where it all began, and in fact it seemed to succeed up to a point because many concessions were made by the government at that time to the various demands made, and now I don't know what exactly is the connection between that and the elections now and what would happen, but we have got a good serious perspective from that country as well.

 

So thank you ICWA for covering the east and the west, but this is a massive continent, 54 or 55 countries, and obviously we can only get a broader picture because there are so many variations in the center, in the south, in the north, in the horn of Africa, that we can only get a little bit of flavor of what is on offer. But I'm very happy that we have two senior scholars on Africa of long standing who have made their own contribution to Africa studies in India, and they have agreed to now serve as discussions. So I will first invite Dr. Ruchita Beri to take the floor for about five minutes and comment on the topic, and this will be followed naturally by the host, Dr. Nivedita. Yes, over to you.

 

Ruchita Beri: Thank you, Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, and thank you, ICWA, for inviting me for this very important and topical area of discussion on Africa. This has been missing in the discussions among the think tanks within New Delhi for a while, so thank you for organizing this. I am really happy to say that we have covered a lot of ground already on this issue. We have had four speakers discussing various aspects of the Gen Z-led digital voices, which are indeed reshaping the pattern of protests within Africa from what it used to happen earlier.

 

I would like to make a few points. First, as Ambassador Bhatia, you pointed out that this is not something which is limited to Africa. This is common in the Global South, Asia, Africa. I haven't seen any in Latin America in the last couple of years, but definitely Asia and Africa have been several of these protests. One thing that is very common among all geographies within Africa is that the trigger is same, and that is stagnant prospects for the youth, widening inequality. There have been a lot of discussions within the social media about how the elites are manipulating or amassing wealth, and the commoners are left behind.

 

The rising unemployment and the aging political leadership, the generational divide between the administrators and the youth, this is something which is very common as a factor, and also that all of them use various social media handles for conveying their distress or amassing political support among the youth. These were the triggers which are common, whether you take the case of Kenya, you take the case of Morocco, or Madagascar, Uganda, all these places, these were the common factors.

 

And as has been rightly pointed out, the fact that in Africa, the demographics say that 70% of the population is under 30. So that makes the median age of about 19 years. So how do you deal with a generational gap where 70% of the population is less than 30, but the people who are leading these countries are above 60? So the mindsets are different, the fact that they are losing out a lot in terms of getting what they want, whether it's jobs or better prospects of living. If you look at the protests which took place in some of these countries, like in Kenya, it was basically the taxation which would lead to even costlier living conditions for people which led to the protests.

 

In Madagascar, it was something like, I think it was the issue of poor government delivery or water and electricity. In case of Morocco, it was health and education that were the causes. But one thing that is common is that all these protests were suppressed by the government. They did suppress all these protests. And most of the time, it was a violent suppression. The numbers may vary. In some cases, there were 40, which were injured or arrested, or the others, there were 60 or more, or there were hundreds in Kenya. But they were violent suppression of these protests.

 

That means that the current leaders, the current elites, political elites within Africa are not ready to pass on the mantle to the youth. They are not ready to acknowledge the fact that the youth are a subsection of the society with whom they need to have a dialogue. Until they have a dialogue with the youth, I mean, the writing is on the wall that 70% of the population is below 30, so you need to have a dialogue if you want to have a sustainable, stable government in future. But this is something which the political elites are ignoring.

 

Secondly, I would like to point out the fact that these protests, there are some challenges which are quite visible. The protesters say that, okay, we don't have any leadership. And this is a positive point of the protest. Because they say if there is no leadership, that means the government cannot co-opt any of our leaders and then scuttle the protests. That's their argument. But the flip side is that if you do not have a leader, then there's no direction amongst the Gen Z protesters. They don't have a long-term vision that what next? What next if these fail, then what will happen?

 

It is true that in some cases, like in case of Madagascar, has been touted as a success story in case of the Gen Z protest, that it led to a change in the government. But the change in government, as has been pointed out by the speakers, was again, the military took over the government. And the person and the prime minister was a very unpopular businessman. So the protesters from Madagascar have ruled and said that the government has hijacked our revolution. And we do not want our revolution to be hijacked by corrupt officials or corrupt politicians. That's their basic disgruntlement against this whole process.

 

So, therefore, they say that this protest will continue in future, maybe at a subterranean level. But it will continue. So until and unless the governments and the protesters from the Gen Z come to some kind of a dialogue in future, this protest will not end. And I've read some of the remarks which have been made by these protesters in Kenya, in Morocco, in Madagascar. And they say that we are not really interested in being part of the government. But at least the government should reflect the concerns that we have really fought for, that those solutions that we are seeking for should come about.

 

So lastly, I think the point which was raised by the professor from Ghana, that it's not just the economic or social issues which are bothering the Gen Z. It's also the security and environmental concerns, which have led to these protests. And as has been said by the last speaker, that the governments have securitized the Gen Z protests and made it into a security issue rather than looking at it as a political issue, which is very important to note. And that may not augur well for the future stability and the future of democracy in Africa. So I'll stop here. Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much. Very clear comments. I don't really have to elaborate and comment on them. I'll immediately request Dr. Nivedita Ray to offer her expert comments. Thank you.

 

Nivedita Ray: Thank you, Chair. And very good afternoon to everyone. I think all the speakers and panelists have given very insightful remarks. And as a last speaker, it becomes very challenging to consolidate. So what I'll do is more of consolidating what others have spoken and maybe throw up some questions for larger discussion. And I will touch upon five points here. And my, basically, observation will be more comparative and a little more conceptual.

 

I start with what the chair raised at the outset. Whether protests in Africa, now what we're seeing, is something very new. Anybody who has been studying African studies throughout, and when we are conceptualizing this particular talk, we thought we have been discussing a lot about India-Africa. But what is happening now in Africa, can we reflect on that, the Gen  Z protest? Because I'm someone who worked a lot on protest literature, right from, the Chair mentioned about anti-colonial movements.

 

My first point that I'd like to raise, question that I want to raise is, is the Gen Z protest really new in Africa? When you say Gen Z protest, it's a youth-led protest. So youth-led protest, is it new? My argument is not new. And why it is not new, if you reflect back, whether you talk of anti-colonial movements, whether you talk of anti-apartheid movements, whether you talk of pro-democracy movements in the 1990s, youth were very substantially participated in most of these uprisings. And sir has served in South Africa. If any African scholar will be knowing about the Soweto uprising in 1976. And it was taken forward by high school students against the Bantu education system, where the African language, Afrikaan, not the Dutch language, was being imposed. And how that Soweto uprising led to such a widespread protest in South Africa.

 

And again, even 1990s, the Sabah-Sabah movement, if anybody remembers about Kenya, it was a huge movement that brought down the single-party rule against the Daniel arap Moi. He was talking about governance issues. It moved from a single-party rule to a multi-party rule. Now, very recently, in 2011, again, Yenne Mare movement in Senegal, which is, in English, we say, we are fed up, quote, unquote. In 2011, again, it was a mobilized youth movement, which again, it was again about power cut, rising corruption issues, which led to the downfall of, in 2012, the elections, where we saw that there was a regime change.

 

And similarly, fees must fall, if you know about this in South Africa. Fees must fall. That originated in 2015. And this student-led protest, again, that swept across entire South Africa, where they were demanding about decolonization of education, higher education and the tuition fees, the rising tuition fee increase. So, similarly, in India or parts of Asia, we have seen youth-led movement. And we cover India also, the JP movement, or Hong Kong, Sri Lanka. They were all youth-led movement.

 

But then, what I argue is that it is not new in Africa. But what is new is the form and the tempo of mobilization. That makes it new. And everybody touched upon this. And in their comments, it came out. Two things that we saw. One, the old protest, the student-led protest that we saw, or organization-led protest, they were more organization-centric, and where you have a hierarchical model from the top down. Vis-a-vis, what we see now is a network-centric action, that which everybody talked about. So organization-centric to a network-centric.

 

So difference is not in the spirit of the protest. But difference is, basically, there is no intermediation. The past youth leaders, they followed a charismatic leader in their fighting. But Zenzi has killed the leader. They are leaderless. So that is why somebody said, it is very harder for the state to decapitate. Because there is no single neck. That comes to the second point that I want to stress. And again, second choice, both. Youth-led protest earlier and now. Ideology versus lived experiences.

 

So, from a theoretical angle it very much aligns to the relative deprivation theory if anybody is aware of. Because what unites the Gen Z today, which we all talked about, is the rising aspiration versus the stagnant opportunities. So, this generation is more educated, more mobile connected, more connected, more globally aware. But this generation is growing up amidst jobless growth, limited vulnerabilities, shrinking welfare state, and perceived elite insulation from crisis. So, this is what differences between ideology versus.

 

Now, if you look at all these protests that we talked about, whether it's Kenya or Nigeria, or the coming very nearer to Sri Lanka in 2023, all that lead to economic collapse. So, relative deprivation. But what is more important here to highlight is that deprivation here is not material. Deprivation here is very digitally visible. And social media makes it, exposes these inequalities more prominently. That is, the rulers and the ruled. Africa and the world. The world is moving. Africa is rich in resources, but still is being plundered. So, emotionally it is very immediate for the peoples. Nothing abstract that when we talked about other protests, let's say pan-African as an ideology, which is more abstract, but this is more immediate.

 

So, this comes to the third point that I want to stress, which Samir and others have already stressed about, digital spaces. I don't think digital spaces are just tools. They are the new political infrastructure. And where we see, and when we talk of… anybody, when you discuss about protests, it is about how do you do a protest. You need some mobilizing element, there should be some ideology or something that connects you. But same thing, mobilizing forces. So, I talked of the relative deprivation, the factors, but that itself does not mobilize. Somebody that has to mobilize is a digital space. And here, the digital space, so you are not having the traditional sources, but your non-traditional sources like social media, crowdfunding, influencer networks, digital narratives, these are all used in this kind of movement.

 

I read a book, somebody has written about the way today, we are talking about the digital protest and all. Something called connective action versus collective action. The collective action earlier had an ideology, which has we. We as an ideology saved. But today, it is connective action. There is no we. There is I. I'm participating in this protest because I can't pay the rent. So reject finance bill. So the I factor here, the personal expression here, becomes very important when we look at these kind of the collection. So collective versus the connective element, where the I becomes very important.

 

And third, then coming back to the concept again, the network movement concept, which everybody touched upon somewhere or another, the strength and limitations. So what are the strengths? Very true. It is rapidly adaptive. It is scalable quickly. It's very resilient. All that is discussed. But again, the limitations. So here, you have a high mobilization capacity versus weak institutionalization. So these protests, you'll find very highly coordinated and rapidly scale up and adaptability. And you have a very low entry for participation.

 

But same time, if you look at the weekly, it's a weekly institutionalized. And why weekly institutionalized, which already others have said, because it is leaderless. And when you are leaderless, you don't have a negotiating agent. So it is difficult to translate a protest energy into any policy reform. So the point to stress here is that movements can disrupt effectively. But the struggle to negotiate or translate a momentum into a long-term reform is a challenge.

 

So if you look from a social movement perspective, this raises a very key question. And that question is, can leaderless movements convert disruption into durable political outcomes? That's the question that we need to ask. So the general insight is a movement that cannot negotiate can only disrupt. So Gen Z protests do not transition from a street to any structure or any institution. So that is why they risk have a wait and see approach of the state. So the state has more time than the street.

 

So that's where the problem is, when somebody talked about why it is not success. So however, having said this, when it comes to these outcomes of these protests, I would like to emphasize that Gen Z protests may not always topple governments, may not always lead to immediate policy shifts. But what they certainly do is they redefine political discourse. And they delegitimize entrenched elites. And they reshape what is considered as politically possible. And so their impact, I would say, will be more normative rather than institutional.

 

So in conclusion, let me say the Gen Z protests in Africa should be understood not as an isolated eruption, but as a part of a global generational pattern shaped by relative deprivation that I talked about, the difference that the inequities that we see, enabled definitely by new forms of resource mobilization, that is the digital space, and expressed through network movements, which is leaderless, which is horizontal, not hierarchical the way it used to be earlier. So they function less as a revolutionary force. But they're certainly indicative and are also, I would say, a diagnostic tool to understand that where it reveals where states are basically failing to respond to the generational expectations.

 

So be it the Kenyan, be it the Nigerian, be it the Moroccan experience. So what I observe is that the Gen Z is more afraid of poverty than the police. So the real question that I'll end here is for African and not also African, the Asian states, is not whether Gen Z will continue to mobilize, but whether political systems can adapt fast enough to convert these disruptions into any democratic idea, or leave it rather than a recurrent instability. I'll leave it at that, thanks.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much. That was an excellent summation. And I thank you for reducing my burden. You looked into the future, and you have come to the conclusion, and rightly so, that digital protest is a new form of political movement that we are seeing in the Global South, particularly in Africa. It is just beginning to raise its head. What change it will bring, that is still in the womb of the future. But obviously, it has its strengths, and it has its weaknesses.

 

At this stage, dear friend, I know we have overshot our time, but the subject was fascinating. And in my democratic tradition, I would very much like to give a chance for a few questions, because they may be stirring your mind. We still have a few minutes. We can really handle that. So I will give first a chance to the one who probably conceptualized this idea. Nandini, you go ahead.

 

Nandini Khandelwal: Thank you, panelists, for the insightful observations. Since our talk shifted from the Gen Z-led protest to the broader governance issues that Africa is dealing with, I have an observation and a follow-up question. For example, in Madagascar, we saw weak governance and elite fragmentation, which led to a military takeover. But on the other hand, there is a state called Tanzania, where we saw that there were protests, but there was also this government-military nexus, which helped suppressing the protest, and it's suppressing the protest to this day.

 

So this might suggest that Gen Z have the ability to expose and amplify the issues at large, but they don't determine whether the regimes fall or they stay. Who decides that the political outcomes are decided actually by these elites? The elite cohesion, in fact. So if the elite cohesion ultimately determines these outcomes, then how do we move forward beyond these elite capture to make the Gen Z protest sustainable and bring out the actual on-ground results? Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Good question. Abhishek, you're sitting as a neighbor. Why don't you answer it? No, let's just finish it. No, no, you are the two panelists. You want to answer? Otherwise, I'll go to Sameer. Yeah, Samir, go ahead and answer it.

 

Samir Bhattacharya: I think we should not call it just elite capture. I think one difference is also institutions. So, for example, Madagascar is a very poor country. Its institutions are failing. Compared to that, Tanzania, the institutions are more stable. So I'm not saying that what government did is correct, but the government has some institution to fall back to. So, for example, in Kenya, when students protest, for the finance bill students protested and young people protested. There were some institutions. The people still have the respect for some institutions. For example, police. For example, military.

 

In Madagascar, I would say it's a coup wrapped in revolution. But then if you ask these local people, they will say, no, no, we are happy because we trust more in the military than in the government. Which means the military institution was a trust factor. There was a trust factor towards the military institution. So I think if institutions are strong, those countries sometimes it's more difficult to bring changes. But then what ma'am said also that this protest, even though we have to take them for the normative values, even though there was no change immediately, there was no immediate transformation, at least there was some disruption, at least the voice was heard.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: You see, this takes us to the heart of the challenge of democracy in Africa. In my view, what we have studied and seen, it reflects backsliding of democracy. There is a paradox. The young people are dissatisfied and unhappy, they have found a new channel for expressing their views. But within the actual real world, probably the political parties are weak, NGO system is weak, media is weak, economic problems are overwhelming and as a result, that unhappiness which is there, voiced publicly, does not get translated into political reform. This is how I look at it. But again, I would stress, these are tentative judgments. You are not in a position to make a final judgment because you don't still have the full picture. Anybody else like to raise another question? I think I will give it to the lady here and I think if you address it to our friend from Ghana, that would be very good. All right, we will take two or three questions. You go ahead and after that we will come to you.

 

Sugandhi J.: Good evening everyone. I am Sugandhi, Research Analyst at the Council. My question is to Dr Bhattacharya. As we have witnessed in many African countries that there has been continuous state repression of digital activism. Do you think that this move could push the African youth towards violent forms of resistance like we saw in the Madagascar protest? Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: I think you wait. I would prefer to go to Ghana. So yes, go ahead.

 

Unidentified Participant: Good evening everyone and greetings to the panel. Thank you for giving me a chance. So, my question is to Dr. Godfred, sir. Sir that, given that African continent is young in a sense that there are lot of people under 30 age and the median age as you said is 19. And sir, what we have recently seen is the boom of AI. So sir, how is the African Union and African governments are tackling the rising radicalization amongst Africaners because what we have seen is terrorist organizations like Islamic State of West African province and then Sahel province, they are increasingly using AI to disseminate their ideologies and propaganda. Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Okay, I think you've brought in a totally new dimension, but I'll go to Dr. Godfred. He might like to cover both questions to the extent you wish to. Okay, over to you.

 

Godfred Bonnah Nkansah: Thank you very much for the question. I would say that the African Union is significantly behind in terms of the deployment of AI to support governance. It's a very bureaucratic institution, and it's not only the African Union. It's regional organizations like ECOWAS, SADC. They are very bureaucratic, and because of that, it takes a long time for them to be in sync with current trends.

 

On the other hand, these terrorist groups are fast on the move and are evolving with the digital evolution we are seeing. So the current response of the African Union towards terrorism or violent extremism, particularly in the Sahel and other places, hasn't been that edge-cutting because technologically the Union hasn't made that significant jump or significant progress in terms of its guidelines and its position on the use of AI. That is a challenge within the security space, and because of that, it is rather individual countries which are attempting to institute solutions against violent extremism, leveraging AI and drones and other equipment which can be used to address the challenge. That seems to be the current context within the African space.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much. We will take the final round of questions now. Go ahead. I'll come to you after that, and one more question, maybe on this side. Go ahead.

 

Tahina Rasamoelina: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am Tahina from the Embassy of Madagascar. Thank you, ICWA, for organizing this panel discussion, which is very enriching for us who have lived the movement happening in Madagascar. I wanted to know what India thinks about what is happening in my country, so I am happy to be here. What I would like to contribute to bring more understanding in this discussion is the role of the diaspora for Madagascar. I cannot say for the other countries, but for Madagascar we have 200,000 Malagasy abroad, which weigh USD 380 million in remittance. And in this movement, the diaspora played a very important role. Starting from 2015, we in Madagascar started to give a platform for the diaspora. We at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, established a direction who is in charge of the diaspora, and little by little it has led to a visible commitment, visible action toward Madagascar. And in this movement, the diaspora played a huge role. It has facilitated the international exposure. You may have seen on the news that from one day we were on the New York Times, in French magazines. So the diaspora for Madagascar especially plays a very big role. The diaspora has started to be part of the government since 2019 with the former president, and now slowly the diaspora is taking an important role. Thank you.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much. Thank you for your comment. Yes, go ahead.

 

Deepak: Good evening, everyone. My name is Deepak, and my question is to Dr. Ruchita Beri, ma'am. Ma'am, you touched upon the topic of the securitization rather than politicization of the movements. So do you see the role of protecting the digital borders from external influences that may be from external states or non-state actors in these Gen Z movements? Do we need to protect the digital borders from the influence of external actors?

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you. One last question from this side. Yes, you can go ahead.

 

Priya: Good evening, everyone. I'm Priya. My question is that can the Gen Z-led protest bring back the pan-African identity moving away from the separate ethnic conflicts that have been happening such as the Rwandan genocide?

 

Rajiv Bhatia: So the best way to handle the comments and questions is I will be happy to give one minute each to the panelists and we will start in the reverse direction. So you are part of the panel, you want to say something for a minute in addition to your profound observation, you can do it now.

 

Nivedita Ray: There was no direct, well I don't have any direct questions but the question that she raised, Nandini, we didn't touch upon the variations in the protest. When I look at Madagascar and the protest in Tanzania, I personally see when I look at the protest in particularly Eastern and Southern Africa, that is more about governance issues and when I look at Francophone Africa, Madagascar, so there I feel there is some kind of an external influence where the military taking over is a significant thing, which doesn't happen in other places and there is a question of again external influence, external party plus the sovereignty issue that comes into play in most of the Francophone Africa.

 

So that's where you see where there could be a good military and a political establishment, very solid, they come together to protest, to kind of respond to the protest in a united way but you don't see that happening in Madagascar, which is a Francophone Africa. I may be wrong, but this is my way of looking at how a Francophone African country and an Anglophone African country is different.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you.

 

Ruchita Beri: Thank you. I think there is one question to me which is a direct question which is on the digital borders that given the fact that we are now, that a number of countries are securitizing this whole Gen Z protest. I think this is something which the political leadership will have to look into. There is definitely more constraint on the digital field, definitely there is a rise and rethinking about the digital borders, the digital curbs are on in terms of controlling the various protesters. Earlier it was only related to terrorists and other anti-social elements but because of the rise of Gen Z factor, the Gen Z protests, I think the governments are looking at controlling digital borders very carefully.

 

Specifically because a number of these protesters have looked at the examples of the protests in other countries. In Madagascar, particularly, I've come across reports, which suggest that several of these protesters looked at the case in Nepal as an example, as a playbook of how they went about their protests in Madagascar. And also, the question of diaspora playing an important role, which is pointed out by the representative from the Madagascar embassy here. But I think that is also a factor which is coming up in multiple countries, that the diaspora is increasingly becoming a tool for engendering political change in various countries, whether it is through supporting the Gen Z movement or through the traditional role of supporting alternate political parties. That is something that remains to be seen.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you. Thank you very much. Samir?

 

Samir Bhattacharya:  I'll answer you. So basically, whether it will get violent or not, see, already some of these protests already got violent. Many people died in some places. Six people died. Some are injured. Some are in jail. So whether it will get violent or not, the question does not arise, because it was already violent. But why these governments, they are very intelligent. So I was reading an article. We were good that we were talking about Uganda, the person is missing. Uganda's average age of Uganda is 30 years. And the president of Uganda is president for last 40 years. So most of the people who are voting today, they were not born when Uganda president was there.

 

So I was reading an article how this president is winning every year. So one good thing these people do is that they know the psyche of the people. So they can always, at the last moment, bring some cosmetic change, bring something, some lollipop, and then calm the popular. But then the Gen Z, their challenges are real, real-time challenges. So unless these challenges are fulfilled, they will protest. And this protest, if the voices are not heard, then it will get violent. So I think about the solution, I'll just mention that all the governments in Africa, they should try to bring some mechanism where these youth voices can be heard. That doesn't mean that the youth has to become the president or minister, which happened, actually. In Senegal, the president is very young, it's like 44 years old. But at least some mechanism where they can voice, raise their voice.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you.

 

Abhishek Mishra: To answer the question on can the Gen Z protests, can they bring about any pan-African identity, I believe it will be very difficult to bring about any pan-African identity. Although we are sure that digital tools are becoming much more fashionable as tools for protest. But there we have to be mindful of the various regional variations when it comes to protest as well. For example, like small island developing nations, they will have different issues. Countries on Eastern and Southern Africa, they tend to focus mostly on the protest, I mean. Mostly on the governance and societal issues.

 

Whereas on the western side or on the Sahelian side, it's more of a question on, I think Ambassador Bhatia asked at the beginning, are the protests, do they have any resemblance to the colonial era protests? I think on the western side of the continent, their historical grievances are much more related towards their colonial experiences. Their external influence is much more involved as well. So overall, having a pan-African identity will be difficult. But using digital tools to protest, that is, of course, fashionable and a new normal.

 

Rajiv Bhatia: Thank you very much, panelists. You've done a commendable job. I wanted to highlight some points before people leave the conference room for a cup of tea. Looking at Africa at the macro level and looking at what is happening in the world, particularly in India, I would make the submission that the Z generation's work in Africa is fundamentally a good news from Africa because it is meant to strengthen democracy. It is meant to enrich the governance. And it is meant to ensure that the youth and their voices are heard by the society, by the state.

 

This is happening mainly because of the weaknesses in the governance system in some of the countries in Africa. Political parties are weak. Media does not often have full freedom. NGOs work unsatisfactorily. Think tanks may not be so strong. And therefore, the young, particularly who have perhaps completed their education and looking for a job, find that the future is dark. So what do they do? They start expressing their frustration and then taking that from their bedroom to the public streets.

 

And I wanted to illustrate to say this, why this is not happening in India. Because the contrast is very strong and I am very happy that at least one African scholar is listening to me. And this is that here is a country where political system works. The authorities are answerable. Political parties are there. Media is completely free. It may be on one side or the other, but it is completely free to say what it wants to say. Think tanks are becoming stronger. NGOs are strong as well. And so above all, our Z generation, the medium age, as you said, 19 is busy finishing the class 12 examination and looking for a seat in a university. They are not out to reform the political system because others are doing it.

 

So I think while it is for India to study and research what is happening in Africa, and I am very happy that for once we are not discussing India-Africa relations or China role in Africa or what US has done or not done in Africa. We are discussing Africa per se. This is a remarkable situation. But we should also highlight for the benefit of the African audience as to why this is happening on the African continent and why it is not happening in India. So there is some convergence, some mutual need to understand each other.

 

And therefore, in the end, I think I would like to make one suggestion to ICWA. Don't stop here. Do more of it. Africa was your special mandate until others came and started taking it away from you. And when you do next time a conference like this, make sure that there are more African voices. You simply cannot discuss Gen Z-led digital voices and not use technology to the maximum. You have terrific network of experts in Africa. Bring them on. And at least they should be equal in number, say, four Indian experts and four African experts. That is where we will have even more genuine dialogue. So thank you very much, dear friend. You have stayed till the end. We happily overshot it by about an hour. Thank you very much.

 

Nandini Khandelwal: On behalf of ICWA, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Distinguished Chair and speakers for sharing their valuable views on this timely theme. My special thanks to Dr. Nivedita Ray, Director Research at the Council for her constant support and guidance. I would also like to thank all of my colleagues and audience for their constant engagement. To know more about ICWA's research work, events, outreach programs and publications, do visit our website and social media handles on the X, LinkedIn, YouTube and Facebook. Thank you and please join us for the high tea at the foyer.

*****

List of Participants

1. Amb. Rajiv Bhatia, Former High Commissioner to South Africa and Kenya ( Chair)
2. Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA
3. Dr. Samir Bhattacharya, Associate Fellow, ORF
4. Prof. (Dr.) Godfred Bonnah Nkansah, Academic Faculty Member at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana (online)
5. Prof. (Dr.) Solomon Winyi, Political scientist & lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University, Uganda (online)
6. Dr. Ruchita Beri, Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF)
7. Dr. Nivedita Ray, Director (Research), ICWA