Indian Council of World Affairs

 

Unidentified Speaker: Good afternoon. Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, before I begin the program, I would like to request you to switch off your phone or put them in silent mode. On behalf of the Indian Council of World Affairs, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to this panel discussion on the theme, Recent Development in Syria and their Regional and Global Implications.

 

The panel discussion will be chaired by Ambassador Sanjay Singh and the discussion will be followed by a brief Q&A session moderated by the Chair. We will start this afternoon's program with Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA, delivering her welcome remarks. May I now request Ms. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar to deliver her opening remarks. Thank you.

 

Nutan Kapoor Mahawar: Distinguished experts, members of the diplomatic core, students and friends, welcome to the panel discussion on Recent Developments in Syria and their Regional and Global Implications. As you are aware, Syria has entered a new era of politics after almost five decades of the Assad family rule and 14 years of civil war. The forces of Hayat Tehrir al-Sham, led by their leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani that took power in December 2024, faced no resistance from Assad's fatigued forces or that of his allies.

 

The sudden exit of Assad exposed the limitations of foreign powers over Syria's internal dynamics. To us in South Asia, the situation in Syria also reminded of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021 and the ouster of Ashraf Ghani. What is the current situation in Syria? Julani, it seems, has consolidated his power since taking over and the security situation in the country seems to have improved.

 

Around 300,000 refugees have returned home in Syria since the fall of Assad, as reported by UNHCR. You would recall that some 4 million to 5 million Syrians had fled the country during the peak of the civil war, with most of them, 2.9 million, being in Turkey. For Syria, the question that now arises is whether the current regime would pursue a policy of accommodation or inclusion or would revert to the divisive politics of the past. The overthrow of the Assad regime offers an opportunity to reclaim the country by establishing a representative government and creating a multi-religious and multicultural society through a Syria-owned, Syria-led process.

 

The new transitional government has promised a pluralistic and representative political system and we have to see how this materializes. It has taken the step of declaring a new constitution which has however been criticized by religious and ethnic minority groups as discriminatory and non-representative. Syria's deep religious and sectarian divide is a serious challenge and steps will have to be taken to lift the country out of it. There are reports of sporadic violence against the Alawites who were close allies of Assad, the most recent one being the attack against pro-Assad Alawites in the coastal town of Latakia.

 

While both the minority groups, the Druze and the Kurds, have rejected the new constitution floated by the transitional government, the Kurds have reached an agreement with the transitional government to merge their military and civil institutions. Another challenge would be to erect a new security architecture within Syria to contain the rise of disruptive forces. Remnants of ISIS are still active in some parts of Syria.

 

How the new government would deal with this menace and other obscure terror outfits need to be seen. The role of external actors who were active in the civil war in Syria is undergoing shifts. Situation on Syria's border with Lebanon has improved with Assad's fall and the weakening of Hezbollah.

 

Israel's periodic targeting of Syria's military capability needs to be watched for avoiding any escalation. The retreat of Iran's proxies in the region, as also Iran's preoccupation with domestic issues and its relations with the US, indicate limited impact on the unfolding polity in Syria. Russia is continuing to keep its military bases in Hemimim and Tartus in Syria in coordination with the new transitional government in exchange for assistance in reconstruction.

 

US-backed SDF Kurd forces in the northeast of Syria have entered into agreement, as I said earlier, with the Central Authority regarding merger of civil and military institutions. US continues to have some 900 troops in Syria. And Turkey has repeatedly asserted its desire to be a major partner in Syrian reconstruction.

 

Countries in the region and beyond US, Europe, Turkey, Arab states are engaging with the transitional government and some of them like Turkey, Qatar and Azerbaijan have reopened their embassies. Many regional leaders, including Saudi FM, have visited Syria and Julani himself has visited both Turkey and Saudi. A ministerial multi-agency delegation from Russia also visited Syria in January.

 

The civil war in Syria post Arab Spring has taken a heavy toll on its people. In the span of 14 years of civil war, around 500,000 people were killed and millions were displaced both internally and externally, making it one of the world's worst humanitarian crisis in recent past. Additionally, the use of chemical weapons in 2013 created global hue and cry, following which Syria under Assad joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and undertook destruction of stockpiles.

 

More recently, the Director General of Organization of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW, and the Foreign Minister of the Transitional Government have exchanged visits and the latter has committed to the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons in Syria. Students of international relations recall that post 1979, the US had declared Syria a state sponsor of terrorism on account of its proximity to Iran. These sanctions strengthened with time and received a fresh impetus under President George Bush on account of Syria's alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction program and it being part of what he described as the Axis of Evil.

 

Arab Spring saw another wave of sanctions by US, EU and other countries. Of course, now evens have overtaken, demanding a fresh look at unilateral sanctions and a paradigm shift in how the country is viewed. Post Julani takeover, Saudi Arabia has taken the initiative to host a meeting on Syrian reconstruction in January 2025 at which 17 foreign ministers from European and Arab countries participated.

 

The meeting symbolized a shift in regional and global approaches towards Syria. The talks focused on accelerating aid to Syria's new government while ensuring that the transitional government meets its commitment to a more inclusive and representative administration. More work in this direction is needed.

 

At the time of the fall of Assad, India called for preserving the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. India has advocated a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led political process respecting the interests and aspirations of all sections of Syrian society. India should call for a political process that upholds pluralism and democracy. It should encourage the transitional government to commit itself to combating terrorism on Syrian soil. India should also examine how to contribute to Syria's reconstruction process including through its private sector. A working-level engagement with the transitional Syrian administration is key.

 

Main partners of Syria need to encourage the emergence of a Syria for the Syrians with increasing responsibility being assumed by the transitional government accompanied by credible demonstrations of moderation. Friends, developments in Syria are taking place amidst regional conflicts and global geopolitical shifts. How Syria's polity unfolds will have lessons for models of national governance and international relations that can creatively emerge in periods of chaos marked by high uncertainty, unpredictability, widespread devastation, turmoil and human displacement. It is for this that we have curated a panel of very distinguished experts today ably chaired by Ambassador Sanjay Singh, former Secretary to the Government of India.

 

I look forward to a thought-provoking discussion and I wish the panelists all the best.

 

Sanjay Singh: Thank you, DDG, for introducing this subject and I am so glad that the CIWA is holding this discussion on Syria. I see there is a considerable amount of interest in the topic and I welcome all of you. I hope that this is a constructive discussion as in keeping with ICWA traditions. We have a very eminent panel with us and we will try and see how we can explore various aspects of the developments in Syria and correlate them to the world around it and the larger world that we are living in very interesting times.

 

What I will do is the DGG has already drawn the outlines of what has happened there. I will just quickly go over certain aspects for our experts on the dais to just note and perhaps they would like to comment on these aspects as we go along. Thereafter, we will be happy to get comments from the audience, short comments, not long speeches and questions.

 

First of all, as has been pointed out, an enormous change took place in Syria. As the regime that was in place for about five decades was swept aside by an offensive, by the rebel offensive which reached Damascus on the 8th of December. The rebel offensive began in the end of November and on 27th of November and in 11 days it has reached Damascus and the government troops just went away. Now Syria is, as has been pointed out, has a Sunni majority but it has considerable minorities which are Christian, Druze, Kurds, etc. and it has various identities within itself.

 

It has also been rocked by 13 years of violence which started in Daraa in 2011 and has continued till now. As the DDG pointed out, the violence has affected hundreds of thousands and millions have fled Syria into Turkey and also to Europe. The Assad government in Syria had Iran, the backing of Iran, Russia and Hezbollah from Lebanon, all of which have been weakened recently by events affecting them and perhaps that is one of the reasons why their continued support to the Assad government weakened which led to this very fast transformation of the country.

 

One important thing that we all have to keep in mind are the various groups, armed groups in Syria. We have to listen to what they are saying and how their behavior is. You have the largest one which is now running the government which is HTS or led by the current President Ahmed Al-Sharaa also known as Abu Muhammad Al-Julani. It is a group which broke away from Al-Qaeda and established its own identity as Jabhat al-Nusra and then has now re-established its identity as HTS. The second group which is there is Assyrian Democratic Forces which are active in the Rojava that the Kurdish dominated northeast.

 

This is also a fairly large and powerful faction protecting Kurdish aspirations and Kurdish views. It also has a very close understanding with the United States which has spent enormous amount of money to train and arm them and they formed the basis on which the IS in northeast Syria was contained after the caliphate broke down. Then you have the Syrian National Army which consists of perhaps deserters from the old Syrian army supported by Turkey which has its own political aims in Syria.

 

Finally there are other rebels based on minority groups working out of the south from Daraa helped by or Al-Tanf near where the US is present. They are helped by Jordan and other such outside powers. And finally you have the Islamic State remnants still in Syria, 10,000 of them who are in prison, guarded by the Islamic Kurds.

 

Now the Kurds, if there is a pressure on the Kurds, they may withdraw their soldiers from guarding these remnants and then the Islamic State might re-select itself in Syria which may be another problem for the international community. But at the moment what HTS has done the right thing still now. For example, it has stopped its fighters from interfering with women's dresses and now it has a woman minister in the new government, interim government that they have announced.

 

The Christian Druze minorities have had their rights assured by the new government. The Alawites are a little more worried. In March there was recent violence in the coastal areas and number of them were killed. But the bureaucracy has been kept. The existing state structures are still being maintained. It is interesting that the foreign office retains all its former members including its embassies abroad.

 

So in short there is a continuity of state institutions. One problem that Syria faces is that its GDP has for all practical purposes been decimated. It had a GDP of around nearly $70 billion in 2011. Now it is estimated to be about $9 billion to $10 billion today. So there will be enormous cost for reconstruction in Syria. Now there are a number of outside powers which have interest in Syria.

 

The day President Assad left Syria, three foreign countries bombed various places in Syria. You had the Turkish Air Force bombing the north, especially targets associated with the SDF. You had the Israeli forces bombing all over the country, its naval assets, its rocket forces, its chemical assets, etc. And you had the US Air Force bombing the IS forces in the east. So on the day the government fell, you had all this.

 

Then on top of that you have Russia which is still present in Latakia and in Tartus, Tartus the naval base and Latakia the air base. US has 900 troops as the DDG mentioned and a base in Al-Tanf. Iran to all practical purposes has withdrawn from Syria and we will have Deepika speak more about it. So I won't anticipate what she says.

 

But without the connectivity for Iran through Syria which it had, its connection with Hezbollah and the support that it gives Hezbollah will be reduced. And these new developments in the region may make Iran rethink its role. Then you have internal developments in Iran and there are people in Iran itself who felt that the government had overextended itself in the region and maybe that may also come into play.

 

And finally we hear that perhaps US and Iran have started talking and they will continue indirect or direct talks. Russia would obviously like to retain its bases in Syria. It has already had talks with the new government. Turkey's main interest is to pacify its eastern Kurdish districts. Recently it had an agreement with Osalan and the PKK which has agreed to lay down its weapons. But the SDF in Syria has rejected it though the Kurds in northern Iraq have accepted that.

 

So it's a very complicated scenario given that the Kurds are the largest minority group without a country in the region, some 37 million of them. President Donald Trump said very clearly that this is not a fight, let it play out, do not get involved. But whether that is possible or not, we will have to wait and see.

 

And finally Israel has already entered the buffer zone, has created its own outpost at Jabal al Sheikh and its air force has pounded Syria repeatedly since the new government has taken over and what Israel wants to do further, we will have to wait and see. But yes, there is a new government and prior to the new government being announced as the DDG pointed out, the SDF and the HDS have come to an arrangement wherein the SDF will merge its structures with the national government led by HDS.

 

And we have in the new government with Mr. Al-Sharaa continue to lead the government, there'll be no prime minister but there is a representative from each of the Syrian minorities, Druze, Christian and Alawite and a lady who is also a minister. So there is in this mix very unsettled regional situation around Syria. There is in this mix the propensity of outside powers to play their own, project their own interests in Syria and finally we have in the country itself, we have a number of varied interests and identities playing out. And after 50 years of a certain structure, creating a new structure will be a difficult task and all we can do sitting in India perhaps is to wish the people of Syria well.

 

But before we do that, what I'll ask is, I'll ask all the eminent speakers on the panel, perhaps speak for 10 minutes each and we'll start with Deepika who will talk about Iran and its strategic aims and then Mudassir will come in with internal challenge Turkey and Saudi role and finally you will speculate on the future about the possibility for Syria in a multi-polar world.

 

But I'd also like each of our panelists to tell us the best case scenario and the worst case scenario in either case because put your foot out there and let's see what you think can happen and let's hope for the best.

 

So Deepika, the floor is yours.

 

Deepika Saraswat: Thank you, Ambassador. So as my mandate is already outlined, I'm going to be talking about...

 

Sanjay Singh: Not necessarily, but you can expand on that.

 

Deepika Saraswat: That's a self-appointed mandate as well. So I'm going to talk about how Iran which had been a key backer of Bashar al-Assad, Iran seemingly abandoned Syria, is that the case? How is it that these developments unfolded and Iran found itself in a predicament? So I'll be talking about that. And then the kind of regional geopolitical landscape that has been reconfigured with the changes in Syria. So broadly these two issues I'll try and cover in the 10 minutes.

 

So when Bashar al-Assad, the government, fell in a very spectacular manner in end of November as Ambassador Singh described, many analysts compared it to Middle East having a 1989 moment. That the collapse of regime in Syria was like falling dominoes in Eastern Europe and it was in some ways comparable because the changes in Syria had followed a chain of events. Israeli success in degrading Hezbollah's military capabilities and leadership and then the direct exchange of fire between Iran and Israel which kind of exposed Iran's vulnerabilities and then the Israeli air superiority or rather dominance in Syria and Lebanon which kind of made it difficult for Iran, created operational constraints for Iran to support Bashar al-Assad.

 

So the result was this very quick development in a civil war which had been waging for almost 13 years and seemingly settled in favor of Assad. But this metaphor in my understanding has, it's kind of an overstretch that there is this 1989 moment where just like the Soviet Union has collapsed, there is a demise of the excess of resistance of Iran and the whole ideology of, or the really geopolitical credo of opposing US presence in the Middle East and anti-Israel resistance.

 

A more realistic take would be that the conditions that enabled the resistance axis to emerge which is basically a top-down regional order imposed through military action or military might by the United States or regional actors does not necessarily translate into a stable scenario for the region. And while Iran may feel operational constraints right now in supporting the Axis, but the conditions that enable, which is basically weak states, having strong external dependence for their survival, the persistent gap between state and society, state and the various societal actors and how they understand security and threats, and then the violent imposition of a one-state reality with no prospects for a Palestinian state, point to a situation where Iran or maybe some other player will exploit the situation and lead with the politics of resistance.

 

So those conditions have not necessarily changed. Having said that, the changes in Syria have reconfigured the regional geopolitical landscape. And with very visible setbacks for Iran. Syria was Iran's only state ally. Iran is one country that suffers from strategic loneliness. It's a Persian Shia nation in a largely Sunni Arab Turkic neighborhood. While Iran has this non-state allies, Syria stood out as the only state ally. And more than that, it was the linchpin of the resistance network. Syria was the logistics bridge through which Iran supplied its key ally in Lebanese Hezbollah.

 

It was Iran's route to the Mediterranean. And it had also been looked at as an additional front against Israel. After the initial domestic uprisings in Syria were captured by jihadists backed by an assortment of regional states, including Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Emiratis, and others, Iran had emerged as a primary backer of Assad to basically keep the regional network, the resistance axis, going. It could see that what the regional states were, I mean, it was for everyone to see what the regional states were interested in was not really democracy in Syria. It was an opportunity to take out an important Iranian ally.

 

So IRGC stepped in. IRGC framed its role in Syria as in terms of counterterrorism. But effectively, they were out there to ensure the survival of a key ally. IRGC mobilized local militias, Shia fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Iraqi militias also joined, at least along Syria-Iraq border in fighting against the ISIS. Hezbollah played a key role, especially in retaking homes and even fight for Aleppo in late 2016, which turned the tide of civil war in Bashar al-Assad's favor.

 

So taking of Aleppo had made it clear that Assad has survived. So just the way in November that the rebels advanced in Aleppo, it was more or less, once again, clear that the tide has turned to the other side. The rebels will advance along the strategic corridor connecting Aleppo and Damascus. I'll come to that in a while. But once the Assad regime had stabilized, Iran saw another opportunity, which was to seek a more permanent presence, IRGC strategic presence near Israel. So Iran's goal was to create a three-front dilemma for Israel, with Gaza in the south and Hezbollah and IRGC presence in Syria in the north.

 

So what Israel then started was a campaign between the wars. And the Israeli defense forces will routinely bomb IRGC military assets, launching precision strikes on high-value targets, Iranian weapon and rocket depots, command headquarters, intelligence, and logistic sites. But the idea was that there will be no public acknowledgment. They will be very high, based on very high intelligence, precision strikes. So Iran will not retaliate. There will not be a war.

 

And so it happened that Iran absorbed losses. Because for Iran, this whole presence, supporting Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and also this presence that it was trying to develop in Syria was about an indirect deterrence. The idea was to not fight Israel openly. So Iran absorbed losses. And that seemingly emboldened Israel. So when October 7 Hamas terrorist attack into Israel happened, Iran had no direct role. And same was established by Western intelligence agencies. But Israel's strategy was that while it tries to destroy Hamas, it also saw an opportunity to push back against the Iranian strategy of indirect deterrence by taking war to Iran.

 

So when April last year, Israel struck at Iranian consulate in Damascus. The idea was, what Israel signaled, that it is getting closer to a direct attack on Iran. And for Iran, then, the choice was whether it can just practice the strategic patience or do a recalibration. They did a recalibration, which was to establish a new, active deterrence posture by taking reciprocal action. And they struck, for the first time, that Iran launched missiles from Iranian soil directly into Israel. But that was a demonstrative measure. Idea was to signal resolve and capabilities, but it fell short in enforcing Iran's deterrent red lines.

 

So what Israel was effectively able to do, given the somewhat restraint, that Iran had shown, was that Israel imposed de facto land and air blockade in Syria, in Iraq, basically making it largely impossible for Iran to supply any weapons, transfer weapons, to Hezbollah or to bring weapons into Syria via Iraq. So this kind of development that happened in 2024 amid Israel-Gaza war, that also shaped the trajectory of what will happen in Syria, that Iran was largely constrained.

 

So this restraint did not really work in Iran's favor. There was a calibration, but not enough to change Israeli calculation. And we see similar thing playing out in Hezbollah's case also that while Hezbollah hoped that its stock of precision missiles and ability to engage in reciprocal action, but largely keeping the war contained to the border region, that will somehow work, that there will be a deterrence in place and Israel will not risk a broader war, given the threat that Hezbollah's missiles could pose, but that proved to be misfounded.

 

When Israel escalated its military, its air campaign in Lebanon in mid-September, and then we saw that carried out a very sustained bombing of Hezbollah's strongholds in southern Lebanon, Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah, being a resistance force, could not really sustain conventional tactics. So then what we see is that Hezbollah was also largely constrained. And then it was forced to reach a ceasefire, which basically meant that it accepted a de-linking of Gaza and Lebanese theater.

 

So this unity of front, which Iran had hoped will ensure the survival of Hamas somehow, and also the rest of its resistance network, it failed. And then what we see is, one can say, a Turkish-Israeli tandem. That as soon as Hezbollah had signed a ceasefire, Turkish-backed rebels advanced from their stronghold in Idlib, captured Aleppo, and then they go along this strategic highway that connects Aleppo with Damascus. And then Israel started bombing different sites in Syria.

 

So this sort of led to a very rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad, this very strategic, this kind of a trifecta with Israel bombing, and then Turkey-backed rebels taking advantages, and Iran being sort of constrained. And then we saw what happened in Syria. But right now, Iran may have been pushed out of Syria, but then Turkey has replaced Iran as a key power broker. And from Iran's point of view right now, it's not Israel, it's Turkey, which is basically leading what it sees as geopolitical suffocation of Iran.

 

So just the way Iran had tried to develop a land corridor from Iraq to Syria, now Turkey has plans about Hejaz Railway, an auto-manera railway which never really came about, but was supposed to link Istanbul with Medina in Saudi Arabia, so now Turks are talking about Hejaz Railway, they're talking about Qatar, Syria, Turkey, gas pipeline. So Iran sees, and then there is Middle Corridor, of course, I mean, not related to the subject at hand, but Middle Corridor, again, links Central Asia and China as well with Europe via Turkey and bypassing Iran.

 

So Iran sees that Turkey is now going, is the dominant power in the Levant, is going to use its influence for geoeconomic aims and also to expand into Iraq and Lebanon. How Turkey has been doing that, and it's not anything new, that they will use a more sectarian strategy projecting Turkey as defender of Sunni interests, and while delegitimizing Iran as a largely Shia actor. So this Turkey-Iran geopolitical rivalry in the greater Middle East, I think that's the most immediate outcome of the changes in Syria.

 

But this Turkey-Israel tandem is actually now turning into an open rivalry, because Turkey obviously wants the government in Syria, the current rulers, to stabilize, to consolidate. But if Israel keeps bombing Syria continuously and finish off its military capabilities, it's hard to imagine how a state can really establish its control, especially in a historically fragmented country like Syria.

 

So I'll more or less end here. Just one final point, that Iran at this point may have taken the decision to basically step back, maybe. That may have to do with the fact that it is interested in keeping its rapprochement with the Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia, somehow alive, because these actors are also involved in Syria. And they would like to get Syria more stabilized. They're trying to shape the transition there. So I think Iran has a more wait-and-watch position.

 

But in terms of worst-case scenario, I mean, I don't want to envisage a best-case scenario, because it's already been spoken about that will be a Syrian process led by Syria, which I don't see happening. The worst-case scenario will be that Syria will fall back into the historical pattern of different regional actors and external actors using the fractured social landscape to fulfill their respective geopolitical aims. I end here.

 

Sanjay Singh: Thank you very much, Deepika. May I now invite Mudassir to let us know how other regional actors view the situation and what is happening internally in Syria.

 

Md. Mudassir Quamar: Thank you, Ambassador Sanjay Singh. Thanks a lot to ICWA, Srimati, Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Dr. Fazlur, co-panelists, ladies and gentlemen. It's a very interesting topic, very timely at that. Syria holds a number of significance. If you look at from the point of history, Syria has been at the center of the Arab politics, the Middle East politics, or West Asian politics, for a very long time. And what happens in Syria doesn't remain confined to Syria. It has always had echoes, ripple effects, all over the world. Obviously, in the region as well, but beyond it. I mean, look at the refugee crisis. It became a major problem for Europe in the last decade and a half. Obviously, geographically also, it is important.

 

So to mull about what will happen in Syria, we all know what has happened over the last decade and a half. So I will not really try and explain what has already happened. But what might happen, because one, there is a degree of, not degree of, there is a complete uncertainty as to what is going to happen. Because the broad understanding of the Hayat Tehrir al-Sham, the HTS, which has come to power, was that it is a terrorist group. It was almost, I mean, not almost, it was part of ISIS, actually. It started as a branch of ISIS, then joined al-Qaeda, then in 2017, pulled back and tried to confine itself to Syria.

 

But ideologically, to what extent it has been able to really change. Also, while it is certainly making all the correct announcements in terms of a new constitution, as was pointed out during the welcome remarks, in terms of a new government, interim government, which will be a transitional government for the next five years, with the Christian woman being a minister, an Al-Vaid representation. So there is some representation.

 

So in terms of outlook, it appears that it's giving a very positive, at this point, vibes of whether it is actually possible to sustain that. That will depend on a lot of factors. Many factors, in fact. What I'll try and do is I'll try and see what kind of scenarios we see from here, the worst-case scenario and perhaps the best-case scenarios. And then I'll try also bring some of the other regional actors. Dr. Deepika has already spoken about Iran. Other regional actors, and then how it might have implications on the broader regional geopolitics.

 

The best-case scenario is that we would see Syria continuing in the direction which it has in the last, let's say, three, four months, from 8th of December till today is actually 8th of April, so almost exactly four month and a day. So it has been very positive in the sense that Ahmed al-Sharaa has started to wear a tie and has met the European leaders. So he must be really good. He must be really progressive, because he's wearing ties. He's meeting all the good leaders. He's giving all the right remarks.

 

One doesn't know how much the PR agencies based in Istanbul are responsible for it, but he's actually making a lot of very good points, very good noise. And then he has also been able to sign an agreement with Mazlum al-Kobane, the SDF leader. Again, Turkey comes into the picture, because Turkey is now trying to have a peace, again, revive its peace deal with PKK. They have also, Abdullah Ocalan has said that PKK will disarm completely. And PKK has said that they will comply with that.

 

So that is the best-case scenario, that it will continue. Eventually, everyone will accept. The internal actors will accept. All the different factions, whether SNA or the ISIS or the SDF, many other factions, they will all accept our representative government. In the five years, Syria will start progressing, like other major regional actors. But it may not necessarily happen. I mean, in my understanding, this is too ideal, very difficult to actualize it, to make it happen. There are all the ingredients required for something like this to happen. The most fundamental is legitimacy and recognition. Legitimacy internally and recognition externally.

 

At this point, nobody internally is sure to be able to give that kind of legitimacy to Sharaa. And externally, nobody is really sure to completely recognize. It's like there is Taliban in Afghanistan, but nobody is really sure how things will pan out. Something similar, similar kind of a situation. And so the worst-case scenario would be, obviously, that the situation will unravel as fast as it has started, it will unravel, there would be infighting, there would be civil war, obviously countries like Israel, which are in a much, much stronger position, will be able to dominate, or at least come in, create a buffer zone, Turkey already has created a buffer zone in northern Syria, Iran too will perhaps come back, the other actors will also have to come back, but nobody is able to really create a stable Syria.

 

So the best and the worst case scenario are these, I think we would be looking at an unstable, but not a completely failed Syria for pretty some time, it will continue in the direction where it will be somewhere in between, and not completely fail, because there are actors in the region who do not want Syria to fail, be it Turkey, be it even Israel, be it Saudi Arabia, be it Iraq, be it even Iran, or Qatar or UAE, they do not want Syria to fail at this point. The same situation can be said about countries like US, Russia, the European Union countries, EU and other external powers who have some interest in Syria, for a variety of reasons, not for the same reasons, but for similar reasons, they don't want Syria to fail.

 

So they will not allow Syria to fail completely, at least that is what the scenario looks like, but then the question is can they actually help Syria become stable, become politically acceptable, gain legitimacy, gain recognition, and then also have the ability to create a inclusive, plural, more reflective of the Syrian reality, Syria is not a homogenous country, there are multiple ethnic groups, there are multiple religious groups, there are multiple sectarian groups, and then for a country to remain as part of the larger regional geopolitics.

 

So if Syria continues in this direction, what would be the regional situation? I think, obviously, I mean, there is no doubt that Iran is at a very, very disadvantaged position as far as regional politics is concerned, but Iran will remain in denial, it has remained in denial for the last so many decades, so many years, it will remain in denial, it will not accept the regional situation, it will not accept that it is at a disadvantaged position. That means that we are up for a trouble. We would be in a situation where Iran will continue to try and re-enter Syria through its proxies.

 

There are enough groups in Syria who would be ready to work with Iran, so that will continue. Turkey has really gained a very advantageous position because of its strategic relations with HTS and many other groups in Syria, but I think Turkey is also vulnerable. And that vulnerability is emerging more because of Turkey's, it's like your assessment of yourself is more than what you are. The ability really to control the region to make the region a mirror of itself is something which Turkey has been trying since 2011. Even before that it was saying that Turkey is going to be the model.

 

So that is something which I think it's an overstretch. That creates a vulnerability for Turkey. It's a military power, it's a big country, it's a G20 economy, it has population. So that doesn't mean that Turkey doesn't have the ability to be a regional power. It is, but if it overestimates itself as a power, I think that will be a problem. Which means that if Turkey really has to stabilize Syria and not allow the Syrian problem to become a Turkish problem, then it will have to work with other regional powers. And those other regional powers are most importantly Saudi Arabia, and many would not like what I'm saying, and the second is Israel.

 

Without working with countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel, Turkey will not be able to create a stable Syria, period. You can no longer exclude Israel from regional geopolitics. Israel is here to stay. It has the military power. It has the backing of the most important superpower in the world. Obviously China is competing with the US, but not in the Middle East so in West Asia it remains an economic power. It has not yet become a political power. It has started, obviously, enhancing and increasing its engagement, undoubtedly it's not at all a military power. There's hardly any Chinese military presence in the region.

 

On the other hand, US is a military power. It's a political power. It's an economic power. And Israel is an ally of the US, which no other ally of the US can actually claim in the region, maybe even outside the region. So any regional process cannot be exclusive of the Israeli interests. So what are Israeli interests? Israeli interest is mainly security. It wants that no terrorist group, and I'm very specifically using the word terrorist group, but also other groups, other non-state actors. They should not be allowed to launch any attacks inside Israel. Sounds familiar, but that is the reality.

 

Then, I mean, obviously, there are other interests. Other interests in the sense Israel wants to do business with the regional countries, do business with the Gulf countries, do business with any country which is interested in doing business with it. Which means that Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, comes into the picture, which before October 7, 2023, was on the verge of recognizing Israel. The crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, is on record just before the October 7 attacks that they are in the process of getting closer every day.

 

Obviously, the current ongoing conflict has pushed that aside, the likelihood of Saudi Arabia publicly recognizing, normalizing relations with Israel is zero at this point. But it cannot be completely ruled out, in the sense that means the precondition of some kind of solution to the Palestinian statelessness and the Palestinian issue needs to be arrived at, even if it is not exactly the two-state solution based on 1967 line. And more important for Saudi Arabia, the prerequisite for working with Turkey is to have the ability to invest in Syria, to have the economic presence in Syria, and not allow the Islamist groups, especially in Syria or otherwise as well, to challenge or to threaten Saudi and other GCC monarchies' security. I think that is the bottom line for Saudi Arabia.

 

If they become a threat for their security, that is the red line for Saudi Arabia, organizations like Muslim Brotherhood, which are not necessarily an armed organization, but because of their ideology, they feel threatened. They feel insecure. And they have banned them, and have taken actions against them. There are other, obviously, countries like Qatar which are important, they are working with Turkey, countries like UAE is also very important, especially in terms of economy. There are many armed non-state actors in the region that will see Syria as a model, and might try something similar in other countries.

 

So that is, again, a serious threat for the regional politics. But I think, and I'll stop here, just one point about what is there for India. I mean, I don't want to completely ignore the Indian interest. India has been working with Syria pretty long time. It's got good relations. India did not close its embassy in Damascus at all, never, throughout the 15 years. It also was working with the Assad government. There were visits. The Syrian Grand Mufti had come to India to attend the Sufi conclave a few years back, and then other ministers also were coming. Which means that, from an Indian point of view, it can be seen as a disadvantage.

 

A regime with which India had good relations, even though, in terms of business, there was not much happening because of the war. But if Syria has to stabilize, I think somewhere the regional powers like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have to work together, and they also have to work with countries like India, which can help in the stability, not directly, in the sense that you can't have Indian presence there, in terms of military or political scenarios, but if there is a larger geoeconomic process that they can start, and middle powers, regional powers in the region, they can become part of it, and countries like India can, through their regional engagements, can become part of it. I think that would be perhaps the best case scenario. Thank you.

 

Sanjay Singh: Thank you, Mudassir, for your words, and I will now invite Atul to address the audience. But before you do that, let me just give you one or two pointers that both Deepika and Mudassir think that Turkey will have a dominant role there, and yes, and Israel will have a role there, and Syria could have been seen as a kind of a buffer state between two major powers in the Middle East.

 

Now if there is a vacuum there, what will happen there? The second aspect is, which I would like you to speculate about, is I think Mr. Ahmed Al-Sharaa, President Mr. Ahmed Al-Sharaa has had considerable experience in governing and running the Syria Salvation Government in Idlib, and that is the experiment he is now replicating in all of Syria. So will he be able to do that? Mudassir has his views on it, and I would like you to also talk about that.

 

And finally, was the Astana process led to an understanding between the people involved in the Astana process was Russia, Turkey, and Iran. And two active members of the Astana process moved out of Syria and left to the third. Was there an understanding there? The floor is yours.

 

Atul Aneja: Thank you so much, Ambassador Singh. Many provocative thoughts, but let me first try and give context to what happened in Syria. And I think once we have the context clear, then we can move on to the possibilities and options. I think you've got to link what happened in Syria to way back, to my mind, to the collapse of the Soviet Union, because that really starts the process of consolidation of the unipolar world. And it leads, in one way, to consolidate the unipolar world was, among other ways, was regime change processes, color revolutions, use of organizations like National Endowment of Democracy, USAID, etc., to topple, in many cases, legitimate governments.

 

And the experiment really starts with Eastern Europe, the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the breakup of Yugoslavia is the first experiment of successful regime change done during the Clinton administration. And then the wave of regime changes, because the idea was to what Francis Fukuyama had said, that this is the end of history and this is going to be the unipolar era throughout. And that wave from the 90s actually moves into West Asia and North Africa. So you cannot disconnect what happened in Eastern Europe, the experience gained by the sole superpower at that time, which is the United States, and how that was sort of replicated then in the Middle East, West Asia, North Africa.

 

How I came about it was as a reporter in Cairo, when I was in Tahrir Square in 2011, and on Tahrir Square I saw a big canvas on one side, and that canvas had a charcoal fist on that. And I thought to myself, this doesn't look very Arab, this looks a little more European, something like Che Guevara style stuff. Then that got me to investigating as to what the symbol was, and that remained for three, four days. I took a picture of that, it disappeared after a while. That was a symbol of the Otpor movement of Yugoslavia, which brought down Milosevic.

 

So then what was the connection with the Arab Spring and Otpor movement? And that got me into investigation, that there was something called the April 6th Youth Movement in Egypt, which was at the forefront of, along with the Muslim Brotherhood, which eventually brought down Hosni Mubarak. And Ahmed Mahar, the leader of the April 6th Youth Movement, actually had visited Serbia, and he and another colleague of his were actually trained in how to go about regime change protests, in the sense, how do you carry out peaceful protests, what happens when rubber bullets are fired at you? One simple technique was to put your plastic bottles inside your jacket to do that. What happens when tear gas is fired at you? Videos were shown with them, and this was facilitated by Freedom House and National Demon for Democracy.

 

So to me, the whole imagination that this was democratic movements, this was something which was Arab Spring, something demonstrating the aspirations of the ordinary people, I mean, the entire mythology of that was broken, because I realized this is regime change, and this is hard geopolitics, and not grassroot movement taking over the state. And that's really what happens, because regime change from Egypt, then you go into Libya, and I think Libya is a turning point which brings us to the Syrian connection, because around 2011, March, in Libya, when the protests started, around the same time when they started in Syria, and Libya was a classic case of regime change, where Gaddafi was brought down in October 2011.

 

But what is significant with Syria is the way two major powers of now a mutating unipolar world to a multipolar world take a stand. And these two powers are both Russia and China. Around the time when a no-fly zone was created, which was used by NATO to bring down Gaddafi, China and Russia were abstaining in UN Security Council's resolutions on these countries. But with the killing of Gaddafi, that pattern changes. And that pattern changes when they start vetoing any kind of no-fly zones. And in this case, it was Syria, because there was a resolution posted. Nobody abstained. These two countries actually block it. And that, to me, was a turning point, because they had figured it out that this is a process regime change. And to me, it was very clear that now the Russians and the Chinese had identified their first defense line, which was Syria, that no more regime changes from here.

 

And the second defense line was Iran, because if there is regime change in Syria followed by Iran, then Eurasia gets exposed. And the ultimate prize of this unipolar world regime changes in two countries, which is Russia and China. So this is the partial reversal of regime change process in the Middle East, which these two countries resist. But coming fast forward from there, what could not be achieved in 2011-12 led to a consolidation, in a way, of Bashar al-Assad. That finally changes after the October 7 attacks by Hamas from Gaza in Israel, because that process unleashes a new set of forces entirely, and which actually means that during this period, when you had the axis of resistance developing, post-Qaddafi especially, which is Iran at the center, and then you have Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon, and then you have Houthis who came in a little later in the Suez area in Yemen, and of course, the Syrian state.

 

So this phalanx, which had been created, starts getting dismantled. And I don't want to repeat. All of you are aware of what really happened. I think the killing of Hassan Nasrallah was a very, very important and pivotal moment, because the moment Hezbollah gets killed, the Redouane Brigade, which was guarding Syria, Bashar al-Assad, is incapacitated in a way. And Bashar read the tea leaves a little late in life, but what happened to Qaddafi did not happen to him. The Russians bailed him out and took it out then. But the morale had completely collapsed with the killing of Hassan Nasrallah.

 

And what was not accomplished in 2011, which is regime change in Syria, gets finally accomplished in December 2024. So that's the entire… I mean, I just want to sort of paint the big picture that the full cycle of regime changes. And that's the time when the moment we are at this time. What happens from here? I think I completely agree with Mudassir and Ambassador what you had mentioned. Israel, the most important player here. I'm a little disturbed here because this Israel is not the Israel of the 1967 war or the Yom Kippur War. This is a different Israel. It is not Ben-Gurion's deterrence capability. This is an ideologically different Israel.

 

And you have the Ashkenazi Jews who are mainly socialist-oriented, which came from Europe, who were actually the ruling class since inception of Israel, has been almost replaced on the cusp of it by the Mizrahi Jews, who come from a different geography completely and are far more radical in their thinking. And their imagination goes to messianic levels because Mizrahi groups and the messianics, which have sort of coalesced in Israel with Netanyahu, are really looking at a greater Israel picture with the central ideological basis that whatever they do has to bring in the redemption of Jews where that's the ultimate grand objective.

 

And that is why the plans like the Yenon plan, which is earlier by a minister of Netanyahu earlier, which is essentially of a greater Israel, which means that you don't stop at Gaza. You go further, and then Syria comes into the picture. Then you go move, go beyond. Iraq comes into the picture. And this is the vision of a greater Israel. Why? Because this is linked to your basic bigger messianic objective. I think these are the kind of people which have taken over Israel. There is resistance to it. It is not that it's just taken over. But my fear is that the cycle of transformation or change, which we are witnessing in the region, has not ended. We are in the middle of it, and Israel is going to be a problem here.

 

Now, who is going to resist Israel? And frankly, none other equally messianic kind of imagination, people with messianic imagination, which is Iran. Because Iran believes that the 12th school of Shia Islam means that you have to have the return of the Mahdi. And if you want to have the return of the Mahdi, then you have to create certain conditions for the Mahdi to arrive, because that will lead to the final utopia of peace, justice, and equality for all, not only their country, but beyond. So you are two messianic kind of powers in competition with each other.

 

And I fear that this is not going to end anytime soon. Iran may be down at this time. But Iran, a very, very important development, which I think a lot of people are missing out, is the Treaty of Peace, which Iran has signed with the Russians. Extremely important, because there are hidden elements within this treaty. Russians have virtually given a nuclear umbrella to Iran. So this particular moment, from an Israeli perspective, you have finished Hezbollah. You have finished Syria. Houthis, you can manage. They're a smaller problem.

 

The only bigger player, from an Israeli perspective, is Iran. But if Iran is attacked, then we are looking at World War III scenario. Because if the Russians are giving the Iranians a nuclear umbrella, if you see Lavrov's statements, even when it comes to dialogue with Trump, that this is your red line. Iran, the second defense line, cannot fall. First has fallen, which is Syria. But the second defense line, Iran has to stay. So I think that is going to be an equation, Iran and Israel.

 

Now you come to other players. Turkey, perhaps exaggerated. I agree with Mudassir here, that you do have a strong Turkey. It will be involved in the reconstruction process. But Turkey has created just too many enemies for itself now. If you see, I went to Qatar about a year ago. And you could see Iranian tourists around. You could see on the windscreen of cars, Erdogan's pictures. But after what they have done, that is the Turks, the betrayal of Iran, I do not see the Iranians coming and Turks coming any time closer.

 

The Russians have been miffed at Turkey very, very strongly. That equation is in six. Internally, too, Turkey is having major problems. Right now, we are having major demonstrations inside Turkey. And if the next elections take place, don't know whether Erdogan is going to win. So in a scenario where Turkey, too, maybe has to look inward, will it have the kind of capacity to intervene massively into Syria? Inside Syria you see a possibility of a kind of vacuum development and that does not call for too much stability.

 

But having said that, I think the Turks are looking also at the oil and gas game and that is important because there had been this proposal of Qatari gas being taken to Syria and from northern Syria to Turkey to feed into the Nabucco pipeline, which was a pipeline for Europe. I was just reading the Turkish media, that whole idea after HTS has come into power, they are looking at this oil and gas as a major factor perhaps in what is really happening.

 

Interestingly the Americans are not too keen with the Europeans getting an independent channel of oil and gas with what happened between the EU and Russia with the blockage of the pipeline, Nord Stream etc. to Germany. Europe has virtually come on its knees, it is facing a recession and Trump's America is not too displeased with that. So whether the Americans would like to give the European Union a lifeline through Syrian territory by taking out Qatari gas and then transiting it further into Europe, we will have to wait and watch. But there is an oil and gas factor which we need to see in Syria.

 

Ambassador, your point of Syria being possibly a buffer, in an optimistic scenario it can be what Afghanistan used to be as a buffer between the Russian and the British at one time. Can you have Syria between Israel and Iraq? Is it possible? It is something which can be looked at, which is a theoretical possibility. What needs now to be done in the best-case scenario is an inclusive dialogue. One is internal reconsideration, but as we had when the Taliban were out in Afghanistan, we had the Bonn Conference which actually created, at least on paper, an inclusive government in the 90s.

 

We would need that kind of a conference, Astana process, will that pay, or Astana plus, because if you want to have an inclusive process then you got to have Israel into it, you got to have Iranians into it, you got to have the Russians into it, and I think you have got to have the Indians into it as well, because if this region destabilizes, it has massive implications for India, our whole energy security, etc. The IMEC corridor, we have huge stakes in this region. A destabilized West Asia is not great for India. So I think we need that kind of a diplomatic process at some point to come for a lasting peace in Syria.

 

I think we also have to look at the Chinese factor because that unipolar moment of 1991 of collapse of Soviet Union, it has got completely mutated into these multiple poles. While India is one of the poles remains, China has emerged probably the strongest civilizational pole. Russia, after Ukraine war, perhaps is going to become another important pole and the Americans. So you have power diffusion of this kind. You need to have an imagination about Syria within this multiple of framework and not a Eurocentric or a Western oriented. This is new Sykes-Picot. It's that big what's happened right now.

 

So it has to have a completely different imagination for a lasting solution to emerge. I'll stop here. Thank you very much.

 

Sanjay Singh: Thank you very much. And I thank the three panelists for throwing up a lot of ideas that I think a 15 minute discussion will not do justice to it. But we have in the program a 15 minutes discussion. And I will do that. But the recent developments in Syria is not confined to the region itself. It has implication for the wider region. It has implications globally. How this will all pan out remains to be seen. But I think the discussion would have whetted your appetite to think in different directions and to follow various strands which have been thrown up today.

 

So now I invite anyone from the audience to make a comment or put a question. But please be very brief. May I first invite Dr. Rahman, Fazlur Rahman, to make his comment, who has put together this very interesting debate.

 

Fazlur Rahman: Thank you. My question to Dr. Mudassir, Dr. Mudassir if I understood you correctly, I think you spoke about Israel doesn't want Syria to fail. To the best of my understanding, I think Israel wants each and every country in the region to fail. This is political chaos, instability that suits Israel. And what Israel has been telling for the last two and half years since the Gaza happened, that we have to change the map of Middle East. What do they mean by changing the map of the Middle East? To weaken the state of Israel, let's see if a country bombardment in Syria, in what way they want to get the state stable, they are doing in Lebanon, they want the same in Iran, they want to have the same in Turkey. So I think that's the only thing that suits Israel in today's unfolding situation, that is a weak, unstable, fragile region where they could have an opportunity to strengthen themselves militarily, politically, strategically, and I think diplomatically as well. Just your comment, I think.

*****

 

And second question, sir, to you, I think, do you see any possibility of going clash between Israel and Turkey? Because both countries are very much involved in Syria, and there have been constant warning from Israel to Turkey, and the last, I think yesterday, Erdogan himself said the people of Gaza are fighting to save Turkey. He was trying to hint that any time, it's also an attempt to basically distract attention from the domestic crisis. Do you see this could happen in coming months and years, I think? Thank you.

 

Sanjay Singh: The floor is yours Mudassir. But I think let us not get our imagination to run completely wild. Thank you.

 

Md. Mudassir Quamar: To the best of my understanding, I don't think Israel wants… it's in the interest of Israel to have a completely failed Syria. For a very simple reason, that Israel, I mean, we can get into the ideology and the messianism and the greater Israel, and we can have a very long debate on what Israel wants and all that. I'm not getting into that, maybe some other time, when we'll have a discussion on Israel, maybe. But for a very simple reason, that a failed Syria would be a fertile ground for all kind of non-state actors who would be anti-Israel and who would be maybe more lethal than Hamas.

 

And for that reason, Israel would not want a failed Syria, even if a very stable, very strong Syria may not also be in the interest of Israel. But remember, between 1970 till 2024, with all the problems, not having a peace treaty between Israel and Syria, they were living side by side in some kind of cold peace. So I think a stable Syria would be in the interest of Israel. I'll stop there.

 

Atul Aneja: Very quickly, Israel versus Turkey in Syria. I think, look, Iran, sorry, Israel has achieved its first strategic objective, which is getting Iran out. Now comes the question of Turkey. I think it will be okay for Israel to have a HTS-led government, so long as it is not armed with missiles, let's say, or anything else or weaponry which can cause a security problem for Israel. Similar to what happens in the Ukraine situation. Russia, Ukraine shouldn't get missiles on its soil, should not become a NATO member. I'm okay with Ukraine. Something similar over here. Turkey, fine, but now they're detaining onto it. Don't cross the red line.

 

Second thing, I don't think the Israelis are worried about Turkey's so-called support for Hamas or for the Gazans. It hasn't happened during this period. Turkey has been found out. So that's something of absolutely no concern to the Israelis. I think that will be how the Israelis probably look at it.

 

Sanjay Singh: Anyone from the floor? Yes, please.

 

Sugandhi J.: Thank you, panelists.

 

Sanjay Singh: Introduce yourself.

 

Sugandhi J.: Yes, I'm Sugandhi. I'm a Research Intern at the Council. And thank you for that enriching discussion. My question is to Dr. Mudassir. Ambassador talked about the remnants of ISIS in the Kurdish camps. Do you think they would have a role to play in the formation of the army or in the new Syrian landscape? What role would they have to play? Or what would happen to them now they have been in the camps for a very long time now? Thank you.

 

Md. Mudassir Quamar: Thank you for that question. Actually, if you look at the ISIS, obviously many are under the SDFs in detention camps. But there are others who are free, who are still fighting. They have not given up arms. They're fighting left, right, center, everyone. They're fighting HDS. They're fighting with the SDF. They're fighting with other groups. But I don't see ISIS having any role because of a very simple reason. HDS, other Syrian groups, the Kurds, and the external actors, none of them want ISIS to have a role. And they all see ISIS as a threat, as a threat in terms of security, as a threat in terms of ideological threat. Because they do not recognize anybody as a legitimate actor, not just the minorities, but also the Islamists who do not have similar ideology as ISIS.

 

So I think, again, the best case and the worst-case scenario. If the best-case scenario, the positive scenario, ISIS remnants will eventually either be completely eliminated or they will gradually be maybe sent back or will remain in detention for years to come and will be exhausted. But I don't think them being integrated, don't see a scenario of them being integrated into the mainstream at this point.

 

Sanjay Singh: Thank you. We have already crossed the time limit for this discussion and before we end, may I request all the three panelists for make their last interventions, a minute each, and then we'll close the discussion.

 

Deepika Saraswat: Well, I don't think I have much to add at this point, but I'll just reiterate the point I made earlier that the region actually remains, the whole idea that we hear from some quarters about a new Middle East, I think we should take that with a pinch of salt. The region is actually very fragile and what we really need is a little more cooperative approach, which is just missing. This zero-sum approach to regional order has not worked at all. So the idea to keep Iran out, to keep that country out, I think that's a recipe for instability.

 

So here I think China has an opportunity. China has been experimenting with creating political dialogue especially in the Persian Gulf region. So it would be interesting if there can be alternatives. The US-Israeli approach to regional order unfortunately remains very zero-sum and it hasn't really stabilized the region. So what we need is alternative and I think that India also has a role to play a constructive role going forward. Thank you.

 

Md. Mudassir Quamar: Very quickly, I think two points. One, Syria is at a crossroads and if the current trend of positive outlook continues, it's a good thing. It will have, you know, if it strengthens, it needs to have some kind of collective approach. I would agree with what Atul was saying that some kind of regional process for Syria needs to be brought in.

 

And on India, I would, again, reiterate the point, how I ended my presentation, there are far too many interests for India in the West Asia region for the region to become too unstable. And I think we need to have an approach whereby India can become part of the regional processes that are in India's interest. Thank you.

 

Atul Aneja: I think, every crisis has a big opportunity. And I think there is an opportunity in this for countries of the emerging economies in the Global South. For too long has diplomacy for reconciliation or non-reconciliation in the Middle East has been with the Europeans or with the Americans. I think the time has come to change it in commensuration with the changing shift in global power. And I think here where countries, civilizational states like India, like China, Russia, we need to play a far more greater balancing role. That is not to say that the European Union will not have a say or the Americans will not have a say, but we need to create a balance. And that opportunity seems to be arising with the developments right now in the Middle East. Thank you.

 

Sanjay Singh: Thank you very much. All that remains for me to say is to thank the panelists for contributing to this very rich discussion. For me, the takeaway has been that the hope is that stability, the way the new government has started, we can hope that it creates the condition for continuous stability and prosperity in Syria.

 

And secondly, the countries around the region and the great powers have to contribute to allow this process to continue and to support it. And for which process on Syria, we already had a process on Syria based in Geneva. Maybe it could be resurrected. Maybe we could have a new process set up on the border lines as was for Afghanistan. And India would need to play its role because it's in nobody's interest for there to be ungoverned spaces in that region. I thank you all for attending today's seminar and thanks to ICWA for inviting us to be members of this very important discussion. Thank you very much.

 

Unidentified Speaker: So I think we will all agree that we had a very fascinating, interesting discussion. I take this opportunity to thank the chairs and members of the panels and members of the audience. With this, we come to the end of the program. Now, all of you are invited for high tea in foyer. Thank you very much.

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List of Participants 

1. Nutan Kapoor Mahawar, Additional Secretary, ICWA 
2. Ambassador Sanjay Singh, Former Ambassador to Iran and Secertary (East), Ministry of External Affairs. 
3. Deepika Saraswat, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis 
4. Md. Mudassir Quamar, Associate Professor, Centre for West Asina Studies, SIS, JNU 
5. Atul Aneja, Strategic Analyst Research Fellow, Former strategic affair editor, The Hindu