Indian Council of World Affairs

Gurjit Singh[i]

During the UN General Assembly session in September 2024, discussions focusing on UN reform were frequent. The reform of the UN Security Council, particularly an expansion of seats in the permanent and non-permanent categories, is critical. Countries have consistently pursued this. A US statement, prior to the UNGA, said they would support India, Japan, Germany, and a representative of the GRULAC (Group of Latin American Countries) as permanent members of the UNSC. They would support two African permanent members, besides a rotational seat for the small island developing states.

On 21 October, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres speaking with AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki in Addis Ababa reiterated that the UN reform required inclusion of two African members as permanent on the UNSC. The Secretary General enunciated his New Agenda for Peace, under which he identified three important factors: trust, solidarity and universality. To ensure these and enhance the ability of the UN to maintain international peace and security, the contributions from Africa are important and become more essential. The UN Pact for the Future adopted by world leaders in September 2024 affords an opportunity to unitedly seek greater representation of an inclusive nature, which will make the UNSC more effective and accountable.

This has rekindled interest in UNSC reform. The Quad Summit’s Wilmington Declaration supported an ‘expansion of permanent seats(to) include representation for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean in a reformed Security Council.’

Africa is the focus of much of the attention of the UNSC but it has 3 rotational non-permanent members on the 15-member Council. This leaves decisions on Africa to be largely undertaken by others. There is a historical injustice of underrepresentation for Africa despite a growing agenda for Africa at the UN Security Council. Of the UNSC’s 203 meetings in 2023 on country or region-specific situations, 78 (38.24 percent) were on African matters. During 2023, Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique from Central, West and Southern Africa were on the UNSC. African countries under discussion included Sudan, Mali, DR Congo, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Central Africa region, Great Lakes, peace consolidation in West Africa, Western Sahara and Niger. Peace and security in Africa directly and protection of UN and humanitarian personnel indirectly covered Africa situations.

On 12 August 2024, the UNSC convened a high-level debate on ‘Addressing the historical injustice and enhancing Africa’s effective representation on the UN Security Council’ under the “Maintenance of international peace and security” agenda item.. This was a lead event under the rotating presidency of Sierra Leone.

Participation included the members of the UNSC, leaders of regional and interest groups and those of the General Assembly's Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) on the question of equitable representation and the increase of membership of the UNSC. All members of the AU Commission 10 were invited; a representative each from the OIC, the Benelux, the Nordic group, the CARICOM and the Arab group at the UN were invited. A representative each from the G4, the L 69 and the Coffee Club were also invited. Kuwait and Austria as co-chairs of the IGN process took part.

The Concept Note that Sierra Leone circulated before that meeting delineated the objective, which included, first, an acknowledgement of the historical under representation of Africa in the UN Security Council; secondly, its non- representation among the permanent members, and thirdly, it sought to highlight the Common African position.

Laying down the aspirations of its 54 countries and over 1 billion people, the President of Sierra Leone had said: “Africa demands two permanent seats in the UN Security Council and two additional non-permanent seats, bringing the total number of non-permanent seats to five.” The African Union will choose the continent’s permanent members, he said, stressing that “Africa wants the veto abolished; however, if UN Member States wish to retain the veto, it must extend it to all new permanent members as a matter of justice.” 

Sierra Leone intended to explore the impact of increased African representation on the UNSC on making it more legitimate and effective. The concept note sought to identify challenges to their activism and achievement and sought solutions for the reform process. The questions raised in the Sierra Leone Concept Note were: how can the currently structured UNSC be reformed to address the historical marginalization of Africa? Two, in what way has African under-representation in the UNSC restrained African ability for effective contribution to global governance? Three, how are the African underrepresentation on the UNSC and the ability of regional bodies like the AU to maintain regional peace and security been impacted? This emphasizes the widespread view that the UNSC composition is archaic and no longer manifests the geopolitical realities of the current era.

While reform negotiations, including relating to the UNSC and the importance of the veto, do take place at the Inter-Governmental Negotiations, UNSC members and the wider UNGA membership often emphasize UN reform at the UNSC, and this meeting was one such effort.

It is recalled that, in December 2022, during its Presidency of the UNSC, India had convened an open debate on New Orientation for Reformed Multilateralism, in which UNSC reform was widely discussed. Its concept note reminded the UNSC: The world is not the same as it was 77 years ago. The 193 States Members of the United Nations are more than triple the 55 Member States that it had in 1945. However, the composition of the Security Council, responsible for global peace and security, was last fixed in 1965 and is far from reflecting the true diversity of the wider membership of the United Nations.

India has emphasised the following two issues: ‘How to inject new life into reformed multilateralism in order to ensure that the tools we have today are adequate to address the challenges of the future? What should be the key elements of this new orientation for a reformed multilateral system? What are the steps that are required to ensure that the Security Council reflects the contemporary global realities, which would make it more effective in discharging its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security?’

In July 2024, the current African members of the UNSC, Algeria, Mozambique and Sierra Leone spoke about the AU’s view on UNSC reform at a Ministerial debate on ‘Multilateral cooperation in the interest of a more just, democratic and sustainable world order’. They again referred to the ‘historical injustice to Africa’ and how the reform process must be responsive to the Common African Position (CAP). The debate provided an opportunity to highlight the importance of UN Security Council reform and support for greater African representation, based on an enlarged UN Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories.

More countries are speaking for a wider reform of the UNSC, coming closer to the G4 position. That seeks to have India, Brazil, Japan and Germany as permanent members, along with two African countries. The UK and France, have consistently supported India and others. In their statements at the UNGA, they supported the US and Quad position. Russia, which is tailing China, remains committed to a greater representation of countries of the Global South without specifying expansion of permanent seats. This is the Chinese position too. China does not mention any countries, and nor does it talk about including more permanent members.

China Friend or Foe?

Yet, China is the favourite of Africa, even though Africa does not benefit fully from the Chinese-Russian position. The role of Africa in this process remains tantalizingly devoted to achieving the Common African Position (CAP) as enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. This is pursued by the Committee of 10 (C10) African countries established in 2005.The C10 is charged with fulfilment of African ambitions.

In 2005, when the G4 was formally launched, an effort was made to rope in Nigeria and South Africa, the two largest African economies, as potential partners of the G4 to make a G6. That was stymied by some African countries who felt Nigeria and South Africa were moving ahead on their own without obtaining an AU consensus.

Two extraordinary AU Summits were held in 2005 in quick succession to decide whether the Ezulwini Consensus should be amended to back South Africa and Nigeria. Largely stoked by Chinese efforts, several African countries opposed any dilution, and castigated South Africa and Nigeria to the point that both those countries stopped pursuing themselves as African candidates.

In the 2005 extraordinary Summits of the African Union, objections were raised by then Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia, who, without being members of the Coffee Club, raised views which were widely seen as Chinese tutored. This prevented any bending of the Ezulwini Consensus. The formation of the C10 headed by Sierra Leone and including Zambia, ultimately bogged down the African position into remaining where it was 20 years ago. In 2005, the Uniting for Consensus (Coffee Club) countries introduced a proposal for UNSC Reform at the 59^th UNGA. They supported an enlargement of the non-permanent members from 10 to 20. These would be elected by the UNGA for a normal two-year term but would be eligible for re-election, subject to the decision of their geographical groups. This would prevent new permanent members but allow some countries to be elected to the UNSC more frequently. While Italy, Canada, Pakistan, South Korea and China were the main backers of the UFC it was mainly to prevent some of their rivals getting permanent seats rather than support CAP.

At the 12 August 2024 event led by Sierra Leone on the place for Africa in a reformed UNSC, the Chinese statement blamed the West for its colonial polices leading to historical injustice to Africa, it said nothing about itself doing nothing since becoming a P5 member in favour of Africa, its statement had no reference to a permanent seat for Africa. South Korea supported African aspirations but had reservations on a permanent seat expansion.

In the Beijing Declaration of China-Africa Summit of September 2024 on “Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era”, China supported ‘necessary reform and strengthening of the UN including its Security Council, redressing the historical injustices done to Africa, and increasing the representation of developing countries, African countries in particular, in the UN and its Security Council. China supports making special arrangements on the UN Security Council reform to meet Africa’s aspiration as a priority.’ What these special arrangements are is unclear but they are not permeant seats.

The Ezulwini Consensus

In 2005, the  African Union (AU) adopted two documents as the framework for its CAP on UN reforms; the first was the Ezulwini Consensus, adopted during the 22nd Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of the AU in March, and the other was the 2005 Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the UN.

This is now leading to some contradictions. Since Africa has 54 votes in the UNGA, nobody wants to particularly annoy them and tell them that their position is possibly becoming a hindrance. Everybody is perhaps paying lip service to the CAP and the Ezulwini Consensus to go along. Is the Ezulwini consensus getting Africa benefits for their version of UNSC reform?

Recently, this contradiction between African countries and  identified candidates for a permanent seat like India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) emerged during the Foreign Ministers meeting of BRICS . Now that Egypt and Ethiopia are members of the BRICS, they are vocal in preventing BRICS from openly promoting IBSA for permanent seats on the UNSC. This was a condition for their membership, agreed upon at the Johannesburg BRICS Summit when including Brazil, India and South Africa (IBSA) were specifically mentioned in paragraph 7 of the outcome document. Now that new BRICS members have joined; they bring their regional discord into BRICS.

In paragraph 8 of the BRICS Kazan Declaration of 2024, they ‘ recognise the legitimate aspirations of African countries, reflected in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration’. BRICS also supports ‘the legitimate aspirations of emerging and developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America, including BRICS countries, to play a greater role’ globally, including in the UNSC. The specific reference to IBSA countries is now dropped after BRICS expansion.

Once they have joined, they seek to queer the pitch, not so much to keep India and Brazil out, but to refrain from identifying South Africa as the African candidate, because they say that Africans will decide who the African candidates are, and, therefore, BRICS cannot decide on supporting South Africa.

This is the same quagmire that has bogged the CAP down from being an effective measure to achieve UN reform.

The C 10

The C10 group, has two from every region of Africa: Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea from Central Africa, Kenya and Uganda from East Africa, Namibia and Zambia from Southern Africa, Libya and Algeria from North Africa, and Senegal and Sierra Leone, which is the Chairman, from West Africa. None of these are serious permanent membership contenders. They are the countries who much rather see an expansion of the non-permanent seats, as then their turn on the UNSC may come faster.

Egypt and Algeria are aligned to the Coffee Club. Egypt is unique case. It would oppose expansion of permanent membership, but if it is considered as a candidate for a permanent seat on behalf of Africa or the Arab League or the OIC, then it would alter its loyalty from the Coffee Club. At the UNGA, in September 2024, Egyptian FM called for an Africa/Arab representation on a permanent basis which is contrary to the Coffee Club position on no expansion of permanent seats.

Egypt and South Africa worked together to get Egypt and Ethiopia rather than Nigeria into BRICS in 2023. Now the same African countries hold South African ambitions in check!

The CAP is clearly bogged down. It is not getting Africa ahead and it’s preventing the L69 lead into IGN and text-based negotiations. India’s former PR to the UN told the author that the African members would mostly attend L 69 and IGN meetings but with no clear effort to push the process forward. Competing rivalries among them and the inability of the international order to achieve the global development goals makes all of them wonder how they can get into and profit from high tables.

The Indian effort at the G 20 obtained a seat for the AU.  South Africa was the only African country on G 20. That the EU was already a member helped in this, but the EU is not in the UN and, hence, that prevents Africa from trying for an ‘AU seat’, which would be permanent, but which could have a rotating country, possibly its chairman occupying it. That kind of arrangement will not work when the Charter is ultimately amended. Africa is not a rule to itself that it can dictate to the UNGA how it will be represented in the UNSC.

The AU believes that it can decide its own candidates for permanent membership once 2 seats are allotted to it. The reality is that even when AU endorses countries for non-permanent seats, others jump into the fray despite the AU consensus. In one case the AU chair DRC itself broke ranks to contest in 2021. This has happened in 2011 and 2020 as well.

The AU perhaps requires greater clarity and activity. There have been periodic Summits of the C 10 countries to gauge the support that they have obtained for the CAP. The statement by the AU Commission chairperson at the last C 10 summit in 2023 concedes that over two decades, the CAP has not made headway and requires adjustment of its tactics, if not its position.

The AU Commissioner for political affairs held a consultation with civil society, academics and others in May 2024 to determine how the CAP can be better pursued. They stuck to the C 10 approach. Their main emphasis is African unity which is not easy to reconcile with various ambitions and Big Power machinations.

The Possible Way Forward?

The natural corollary would be for the African Union to align itself with other Global South members, like India and Brazil. But it is influenced by its staunch partners, China, Turkey and South Korea, with whom it also has close relations and which are not in favour of an expansion of permanent seats. Therefore, between Africa's ambition of two fully empowered permanent seats on the UNSC and two additional seats on a non-permanent basis to redress its historical injustice lies an epochal error of negotiating judgment.

They have got stuck in a rut. The C 10, and 3 African countries on the UNSC, are bound by the CAP; they have no leeway to negotiate except to repeat their position. The Coffee Club rejected the CAP; the G4 supports it. Yet the C10 spends time persuading the UFC and, presumably, the UFC persuades the C10 that there should not be any expansion of permanent seats! It is time for the African delegates to come forth and discuss how they can adjust with other positions to better obtain results.

What holds the AU up from deciding its own candidates for two African permanent seats on the UNSC? It is their own approach which does so. If they were to announce two countries and start engaging in text-based negotiations with those two countries in the lead there may be progress. For this, they need to act before, not after the UNGA does. That way they could pursue the CAP with more vigour and have the privilege to decide its candidates itself.

Everybody now is generally ready to address the historical injustice against Africa on priority. The way forward is certainly not clear. The AU needs to make more efforts to understand current realities and not continue as a hurdle in the process. If it advocates some flexibility in its approach, it may align with those who support its ambitions rather than remain alone waiting for its campaign to persuade all else about the CAP. African participation with a clearer strategy in text-based negotiations will help the process ahead.

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[i] Former Ambassador of India to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN and the African Union

   Author and Hon. Professor, IIT Indore