Indian Council of World Affairs

Background

The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world. Its geographical expanse covers important sub-regions namely South Asia, South-East Asia, West Asia, the East coast of Africa, and various Island states. The importance of maritime trade and commerce, the presence of crucial Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and the availability of natural resources in the Indian Ocean has made the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) a critical geo-strategic space. As a result, the engagement of extra-regional powers has increased in the sub-regions over the years. The paper focuses on understanding how the extra-regional powers are increasingly engaging with the four Island states namely Madagascar, Mauritius, Comoros, and Seychelles in the Western Indian Ocean region, in recent years.

Significance of the Island states in the Western Indian Ocean 

The Island states hold significance due to their strategic location, presence of SLOCs, and critical chokepoints present in the Western Indian Ocean namely the Bab-el Mandeb Strait, the Mozambique Channel, and the Cape of Good Hope which facilitate maritime trade through the Island states with the landlocked countries of Africa and further to Middle-East as shown in Map 1. Among the chokepoints, the Bab-el Mandeb strait holds significance as every year about $700 billion in goods, some 25,000 ships, and 2 billion barrels of oil pass through it^[i]. Thus, the Island states serve as an effective channel to enhance maritime trade and commerce between Asia and Africa. In addition, the presence of mineral reserves in Mauritius, hydrocarbon reserves in Madagascar, and abundant fishing reserves in Seychelles amplify the significance of the Island states. The Island states are also major destinations for tourists from across the world. The number of visitors to Seychelles in 2022 was 82% higher than in 2021^[ii] and in Mauritius the number of tourists increased by 81% in 2022^[iii].

Map 1

Source: Institute for Security Studies
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-can-learn-maritime-lessons-from-its-small-island-states

Given the significance of the Island states, they have witnessed increasing strategic and economic engagement by the extra-regional powers like the United States (US), China, Russia, and Japan. India, on the other hand, being a traditional partner of the Island states and a regional power in the Indian Ocean has also enhanced its outreach towards the Island states. 

The US 

The US has had a presence in the Western Indian Ocean region post second world war, through its military base in Diego Garcia, located in the center of the Indian Ocean. Since September 2001, the US has been engaging in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism operations in the region. Since then the US has started engaging closely with the African Indian Ocean littoral states, particularly the Island states. 

As far as strategic engagement is concerned, the visit of the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Verma in May 2023 to Mauritius, Comoros, and Seychelles, aimed to elevate the relationship with the Island states and deepen engagement in the IOR^[iv] holds significance. With Mauritius, the US seeks to work on areas of maritime security, promotion of sustainable development, and blue economy. Whereas, with Comoros, the US pursues to strengthen its bilateral relationship. In Seychelles, the US conducts anti-piracy operations through its airbase in Mahe Island^[v] and is also planning to increase its diplomatic presence in Seychelles^[vi].  

On the other hand, the US is also engaging in the economic domain with the Island states. In 2022, US imports from the Island states stood at US $1.26 billion^[vii]. The main import items include agricultural products, fish, and seafood. The US views Mauritius as a potential hub for investments in Africa. With Comoros, the US seeks to expand its relationship in the area of economics and commerce^[viii]. The US had expressed its commitment to help Madagascar develop its economy in a sustainable way that is open to American investments^[ix]. The US economic engagement with the Island states is bound to increase further as it seeks to increase its influence in the Western Indian Ocean region. The renewed interest of the US towards engaging with the Island states is not only to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean but also to counter the growing Chinese footprint in the region. 

China 

Over the recent years, China has intensified engagement with the Island states in the Western Indian Ocean region. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been financing several projects to facilitate regional and maritime connectivity. In the case of Island states, China provides financial aid to Seychelles for the construction of projects and has also written off their loans. In early 2011, Seychelles had also invited China to set up an anti-piracy base in the Island state^[x], but since then there has not been any further progress on the development of the base. Madagascar has also shown its willingness to cooperate with China under the BRI in areas of energy, transport, aviation, and port construction^[xi]. China has invested in several infrastructure projects in Comoros. In 2018, Comoros signed a commercial contract with the China Road and Bridge Corporation for undertaking the redevelopment of the port of Moroni^[xii]. Thus, China through the BRI seeks to fulfill its strategic interests by enhancing connectivity with the Island states. 

China, on the other hand, is enhancing its economic engagement with the Island states. In 2019, China signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Mauritius^[xiii], making it the first African country to enter such an agreement. For China, Mauritius becomes significant as it provides China an entry to the landlocked countries of Africa and a direct access to the Indian Ocean. In 2022, during the visit of Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Comoros, the Comoros side welcomed the zero-tariff policy, which will help to promote high-quality products from Comoros to enter the Chinese market^[xiv]. Moreover, in 2022 China’s imports from the Island states stood at US $6.57 billion^[xv] making it the top importing country among the extra-regional powers. China’s increasing strategic and economic engagement with the Island states suggests that it aims to play an active role in the Western Indian Ocean region. 

Russia 

Russia’s Maritime Doctrine released in 2015^[xvi] and 2022^[xvii], seeks to pursue a zone of peace, stability and goodwill in the IOR. In recent years, Russia has shown an interest in engaging with the Island states in the Western Indian Ocean region. Since 2017, Russia has entered into bilateral defense and naval agreements with Madagascar and signed an agreement in 2018 on military cooperation^[xviii]. In addition, Russia also makes regular port calls to Madagascar and Seychelles^[xix]. Russia views Seychelles as a leader of blue economy and considers Seychelles to play a strategic role in the Western Indian Ocean^[xx]. 

Besides, on the economic front Russia has also been actively engaging with the Island states. In 2018, Russia and Mauritius signed two Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to enhance trade and investment opportunities^[xxi] and also aspires to cooperate with Mauritius in sectors like energy and agriculture. During the visit by the Foreign Affairs Minister of Comoros to Russia in 2018, the Russian side expressed interest to promote trade and economic cooperation with Comoros^[xxii]. Russia’s economic engagement with the Island states is essentially to strengthen its presence in the region. 

Japan

Japan has maintained a presence in the Western Indian Ocean region through its military base in Djibouti since 2011^[xxiii] and has provided assistance in operations related to anti-piracy and peace. With the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s strategic and economic engagement is increasing with the Island states as it aspires to enhance maritime connectivity and pursue the ambition of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. 

Among the Island states, Japan has a container facility at Toamasina Port in Madagascar. In 2017, Japan provided an Official Development Assistance (ODA) loan of up to 45.214 billion yen for the Toamasina Port Development Project^[xxiv]. In the case of Seychelles, in April 2023, the Japanese government donated a patrol vessel to enhance the capacity of the Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA) to carry out surveillance and help the fishing community to manage their coral reef reserves^[xxv].  In the economic domain, Japan views Mauritius as a gateway to investments in Africa. In 2019, the Economic Development Board of Mauritius (EDB) opened an office in Tokyo to promote trade and investment^[xxvi]. Japan also seeks to deepen its relationship with Mauritius in areas of disaster risk reduction and maritime security^[xxvii]. 

From India’s perspective, the Island states play an important role to ensure stability and maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean region, and considers it important for India to enhance its engagement with the Island states. 

India’s engagement with the Island states 

India is geographically situated at a very strategic position in the IOR and its engagement with the Island states becomes pivotal to secure India’s maritime interest in the Indian Ocean. India’s Maritime Security Strategy released in 2015 titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Maritime Security Strategy mentions that India’s primary area of maritime interest is “the South-West Indian Ocean, including IOR Island nations therein and East Coast of Africa littoral regions”^[xxviii]. In addition, India’s engagement with the Island states has enhanced in recent years. This is evident from the high-level visit that took place in 2015 to Mauritius and Seychelles by the Prime Minister. During the visit, the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative was announced by the Prime Minister which highlighted the importance of maritime security and cooperation in the Indian Ocean. In addition, India and Mauritius signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to improve sea and air transportation facilities at the Agalega Island of Mauritius^[xxix]. India also signed two significant agreements with Seychelles, first on jointly undertaking hydrographic survey and second on the development of infrastructure in Assumption Island^[xxx]. During the pandemic, under the SAGAR initiative, Mission Sagar was introduced to provide medical assistance and food aid to Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar^[xxxi]. 

At the multilateral level, India engages with the Mauritius Navy through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), biennial meeting that seeks to increase maritime cooperation among the Indian Ocean littorals. Another platform is the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) which enables dialogue and discussion between India and the Island states in the sphere of economic cooperation and social development in the IOR. A recent initiative introduced by the Prime Minister in 2019 is the Indo-Pacific Ocean's Initiative (IPOI), which aims to strengthen maritime security in the Indian Ocean^[xxxii]. In March 2020, India was granted observer status by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), which is an intergovernmental organization of the Island states. The observer status holds significance for India as it provides a platform to strengthen maritime cooperation with the Island states to ensure peace and maritime security in the Indian Ocean. India’s growing engagement with the Island states is a positive development as it will result in a stable and a prosperous Indian Ocean. 

An Assessment 

It can be comprehended that the Island states have drawn the interests of the extra-regional powers which is evident by their growing strategic and economic engagement in the Western Indian Ocean region. The US engagement with the Island states is driven to fulfill their strategic interests through maritime and economic cooperation and particularly to counter China’s influence in the region. China, on its part, seeks to further its strategic and economic interests by engaging with the Island states under the BRI and to gain secured access to the Indian Ocean. Russia seeks to increase its engagment with the Island states in areas of defence and naval cooperation, whereas, Japan’s interests are to enhance maritime connectivity and economic cooperation. Hence, given the varied aspirations of the extra-regional powers in the Western Indian Ocean region, the Island states will seek to balance among the extra-regional powers and cooperate with them to address their concerns related to non-traditional security issues like drugs and human trafficking, climate change, food security, marine pollution and also fulfill their aspirations for economic development. 

Way Forward 

The African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050, formulated by the African Union, emphasizes on “enhancing collaborative, concerted, cooperative, coordinated, coherent and trust-building efforts throughout the continent and with partners to augment global maritime safety and security standards”^[xxxiii]. A collective and consensus based approach can be adopted by the extra-regional powers while engaging with the Island states to ensure maritime security and economic development of the Western Indian Ocean region. 

Going forward, the increasing engagement by the extra-regional powers with the Island states indicates the evolving geopolitics and growing strategic competition in the Western Indian Ocean region with implications for regional peace, security, and stability.

*****

*Yashvi Barot, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

^[i] Macaes, B (2018, January 29). The strait at the center of the world. Politico.

https://www.politico.eu/blogs/the-coming-wars/2018/01/the-strait-at-the-center-of-the-world/#:~:text=BAB%20EL%2DMANDEB%20STRAIT%2C%20Djibouti,continents%20of%20Africa%20and%20Asia (accessed on June 12, 2023)

^[ii] Nicette, S. (2023, April 21). Upward climb in 2022: Seychelles' economy grew by 8.4 percent. Seychelles News Agency. http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/18549/Upward+climb+in++Seychelles%27+economy+grew+by+.+percent#:~:text=presentation%20on%20Thursday.-,In%202022%2C%20the%20number%20of%20visitors%20to%20Seychelles%20was%2082,the%20year%2C%22%20added%20Rath. (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[iii] Statistics Mauritius, ‘International Travel and Tourism- Year 2022’, https://statsmauritius.govmu.org/Pages/Statistics/ESI/Tourism/Tourism_Yr22.aspx (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[iv] U.S. Department of State, ‘Deputy Secretary Verma’s Travel to Mauritius, Comoros, and Seychelles’, May 26, 2023, https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-vermas-travel-to-mauritius-comoros-and-seychelles/ (accessed on 14 June, 2023).

^[v] Melvin, Neil. The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region. SIPRI Background Paper, Solna: SIPRI 2019.

^[vi] U.S. Department of State, ‘Deputy Secretary Verma’s Travel to Mauritius, Comoros, and Seychelles’, May 26, 2023, https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-vermas-travel-to-mauritius-comoros-and-seychelles/ (accessed on 14 June, 2023).

^[vii] UN Comtrade Database, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, https://comtradeplus.un.org/ (accessed on June 14, 2023)

^[viii] U.S. Mission Comoros, ‘PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT AZALI’, June, 8, 2023, https://km.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-deputy-secretary-verma-during-press-conference-with-comoros-president-azali/ (accessed on July 20, 2023).                                                                        

^[ix] U.S. Embassy Antananarivo, ‘REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR CLAIRE PIERANGELO’, November 23, 2022, https://mg.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-pierangelo-at-the-american-chamber-of-commerce-gala-dinner/ (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[x] Bennett, J. (2011, December 27). Seychelles: An Invitation for China. Geopolitical Monitor. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/seychelles-an-invitation-for-china-4567/ (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xi] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, ‘China welcomes to join Belt and Road Construction’, March 27, 2017, http://za.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zfgxss/zyjw/201703/t20170328_7686722.htm (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xii] Shakti, B (2022, June 10). Will Comoros Be China’s Next “Djibouti” In Indian Ocean Region? Dyrad Global. https://channel16.dryadglobal.com/will-comoros-be-chinas-next-djibouti-in-indian-ocean region#:~:text=The%20work%20for%20dredging%20and,build%20the%20Port%20of%20Moheli (accessed on July 20, 2023).                                             

^[xiii] Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, ‘China FTA Network’, October 2019, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enmauritius.shtml (accessed on 12 June, 2023).

^[xiv] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Wang Yi Holds Talks with Comorian Foreign Minister Dhoihir Dhoulkamal’, January 6, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/2913_665441/2939_663884/2941_663888/202201/t20220108_10480237.html (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xv]  UN Comtrade Database, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, https://comtradeplus.un.org/ (accessed on June 14, 2023)

^[xvi] Davis, A. (2015), ‘The 2015 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, United States Naval War College, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/rmsi_research/3 (accessed on July 25, 2023)

^[xvii] Davis A., & Vest, R. (July 31, 2022). ‘Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, United States Naval War College, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/20220731_ENG_RUS_Maritime_Doctrine_FINALtxt.pdf?sv=2017-04-17&sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=2zUFSaTUSPcOpQDBk%2FuCtVnb%2FDoy06Cbh0EI5tGpl2Y%3D (accessed on July 25, 2023).

^[xviii] Russian News Agency, ‘Russia, Madagascar sign agreement on military cooperation’, October, 2018, https://tass.com/defense/1024770 (accessed on July 20, 2023).                                                                  

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^[xxi] Government Information Service, Prime Minister’s Office, Port Louis, Mauritius, ‘Memoranda of Understanding signed to explore Mauritius-Russia trade and investment opportunities’, November 20, 2018,  http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Memoranda-of-Understanding-signed-to-explore-Mauritius-Russia-trade-and-investment-opportunities.aspx

(accessed on July 3, 2023).

^[xxii] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks at the meeting with Mohamed El-Amine Souef, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Comoro Islands, Moscow, November 9, 2018’, https://www.mid.ru/en/maps/km/1577954/ (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xxiii] Melvin, Neil. The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region. SIPRI Background Paper, Solna: SIPRI 2019.

^[xxiv] Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), ‘Signing of Japanese ODA Loan Agreement with Madagascar: Contributing to the economic growth of Madagascar through the expansion of the Port of Toamasina, the country’s largest commercial port’, March 24, 2017, https://www2.jica.go.jp/yen_loan/pdf/en/6834/20170324_01.pdf (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xxv] Karapetyan, S. (2023, April 18). Japan donates patrol vessel to Seychelles for surveillance of marine protected areas. Seychelles News Agency. http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/18533/Japan+donates+patrol+vessel+to+Seychelles+for+surveillance+of+marine+protected+areas (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xxvi] Economic Development Board, Mauritius, ‘Mauritius-Japan Business Investment Forum: Strengthening Economic Ties and Fostering Collaboration’, May 6, 2023, https://edbmauritius.org/newsroom/mauritius-japan-business-investment-forum#:~:text=He%20highlighted%20the%20opening%20of,Japan%20Institute%20of%20Overseas%20Investment (accessed on July 20, 2023).

^[xxvii] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ‘State Minister Yamada’s Meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Mauritius’, March 2, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press3e_000560.html (accessed on July 3, 2023).

^[xxviii] Ministry of Defence (Navy) (2015). Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. Naval Strategic Publication, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf (accessed on June 15, 2023).

^[xxix] Ministry of External Affairs. GoI, ‘Treaties/Agreements Signed During Visits by Prime Minister’, https://mea.gov.in/Images/amb1/ru1375_22_09_20_02.pdf (accessed on June 20, 2023).

^[xxx] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, March 11, 2015, https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=116767 (accessed on June 20, 2023).

^[xxxi] Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, ‘Mission Sagar’, February 7, 2022, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1796165 (accessed on June 14, 2023).

^[xxxii] Ministry of External Affairs, Indo-Pacific Briefs, February 7, 2020, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf, (accessed on July 20, 2023)

^[xxxiii] 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy. African Union, 2012, https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/33832-wd-african_union_3-1.pdf (accessed on June 13, 2023).