Indian Council of World Affairs

Following the Quad leaders meeting on the sidelines of the G7 Summit on 20 May 2023, Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement and Quad Leaders’ Vision Statement were released. The two documents outline the leaders’ principled approach and commitment to a free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific region. It recognises the urgent need to address the region’s infrastructure priorities and the members pledged to continue to support access to quality, sustainable and climate resilient infrastructure. Towards this goal, the Quad announced new initiatives, such as, the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’, the ‘Quad Infrastructure Fellowships Program’ and ‘Quad Investors Network’ among others. This paper seeks to highlight the importance of the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ to India. This is especially important in the current context, as India is moving towards a digitally empowered society and knowledge-based economy.

Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience

The ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ aims to strengthen cable systems in the Indo-Pacific, key to global growth and prosperity, by leveraging the Quad countries’ expertise in undersea cable infrastructure,¹ as a priority of regional infrastructure.² The aim is to utilise the Quad countries’ collective expertise in design, manufacturing, laying and maintenance of undersea cables to build secure cable systems that would help establish better internet connectivity and resilience within the region.

Under the partnership, Australia will establish a new ‘Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program’ which will commission technical and policy research frameworks besides providing technical assistance to governments in the region.³ The US would be providing technical assistance and capacity building to safeguard the undersea cable systems under its ‘CABLES program’.⁴ Japan, United States and Australia have also collaborated on a US $95 million undersea cable project to strengthen Indo-Pacific networks.⁵

What are Undersea Cables?

Undersea cables, also known as ‘submarine cables’, are laid on the ocean floor and help transmit data across two or more landing points using fibre optic technology.⁶  The cables are made of thin glass fibres encased in layers of plastic or steel wires for protection and fitted with rapid firing lasers and receptors on either ends. Their carrying capacity is measured in terabits per second (Tbps) and transmission through such cables has the added advantage of low latency (delay) when compared to satellite transmission.⁷ Presently, almost 97 per cent of the global internet traffic is serviced through roughly 500 undersea submarine cables and only 3 per cent is transmitted by satellites.⁸

Protection of Undersea Cables

Given the importance of undersea cables, their protection has become vital for security of nations. Since the path and location of such cables can be easily identified, they remain susceptible to threats. The attack on two undersea submarine cables linking Taiwan to Matsu Islands in February 2023 is the most recent example of sabotage of cables.⁹

Any disruption to undersea cable infrastructure can incur huge financial losses to the countries involved. The security of undersea cables is also vital for uninterrupted connectivity and therefore, it becomes essential for stakeholders to take proactive steps to protect them.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/231, adopted on 24 December 2011, describes fibre optic submarine cables as “vitally important to the global economy and the national security of all States” and highlights “the need for States to adopt national laws and regulations to protect submarine cables and render their wilful damage or damage by culpable negligence punishable offences”.¹⁰

Aware of the threats to undersea cables, the Quad countries have taken steps to protect their assets. Australia passed laws in 2005, in accordance with the UNCLOS, to establish “Cable Protection Zones” within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which served as the basis for subsequent measures.¹¹ Under the country’s domestic protection regime, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) is allowed to regulate and safeguard the submarine cables with landing stations in Australia. Activities that pose a risk to the seafloor in the protected zones such as, sand mining, certain kinds of fishing, dredging, sea bed trawling, ship anchoring, etc. are prohibited in the ‘cable protection zones’. Furthermore, telecommunication companies have to seek a permit from the ACMA before the installation of undersea submarine cables anywhere in Australian waters.

Japan has taken steps towards full-scale decentralization of landing bases for submarine cables in order to reduce security risks.¹² These include the ‘Digital Rural’ and ‘Urban National Concept’.¹³  The ‘Digital Rural’ project aims to decentralize digital technology to rural areas, eliminating the urban-rural divide and thereby increasing resilience against natural disasters, economic and geopolitical security risks. Through the ‘Urban National Concept’, Japan intends to disperse the landing stations for submarine cables to other areas, as the concentration of cables in specific areas is risky. Through these initiatives, Japan seeks to circumvent the possibility of damage to such critical infrastructure and strengthen economic security.

The US reviews ownership of cables with landing stations in the country in order to identify and mitigate security risks. Under the Cable Landing License Act of 1921¹⁴ and Executive Order 10530¹⁵ of 1954, the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) is authorized to issue, withhold or revoke cable landing licenses.¹⁶ Additionally, as per Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934,¹⁷ commercial undersea telecommunication cable providers may need to apply for permission for international services.¹⁸ Under Section 310(b) of the Act, cable operators that co-invest with other entities may also need to report foreign ownership interests if foreign ownership exceeds 10 per cent.¹⁹ In such cases, the FCC refers the applicant for review to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, established by Executive Order 13913²⁰ of 2020. Besides, the US also restricts certain vendors and cable equipment, monitors cable outages and invests in cable repair ships to address damages.²¹

Article 70 of India’s Information Technology Act 2000²² speaks of safeguarding any “computer resource”; undersea submarine cables could fall under this definition. The TRAI (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) has recently made recommendations to the government to establish norms to bring submarine cables under the scope of NCIIPC²³ (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre).

India’s strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, adjacent to the vast network of undersea submarine cables coupled with its skilled pool of tech professionals create a conducive environment for it to emerge as a hub for data flows and a leader in global connectivity. Furthermore, India’s used global bandwidth range is also estimated to increase tenfold at a compounded annual growth rate of 38 per cent between 2021 and 2028.²⁴ Steps towards boosting investment in the sector have been taken by the Government of India as part of its ‘Digital India’ mission. These include providing high speed internet connectivity to citizens under the ‘BharatNet Project’, reclassifying data centres as vital infrastructure to raise funds, TRAI’s (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India) efforts to improve landing sites and maintenance of cables and fostering connectivity through the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure. With the 5G expansion happening in full swing from October 2022, India is also gearing up to roll out 6G services by 2030 under the ‘Bharat 6G project’.²⁵

Australia’s ‘Indo-Pacific Cable Connectivity and Resilience Program’ and the US’ ‘CABLES program’ are both expected to step up the game in securing undersea cable infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific and India could explore the possibility of collaboration with these countries. With undersea submarine cables carrying more than 97 per cent of the global internet traffic, it is imperative for India to cooperate with other like-minded countries in the region to ensure the security of critical undersea cable infrastructure for its economic and national security.

India also forms a connecting link for most of the undersea cables that run through Africa, Asia and Europe and hence it becomes important for India to develop a robust policy for its submarine cable industry. In this context also, the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ becomes increasingly important.

An added advantage for the Quad countries is that they also dominate the submarine cable industry with the US’ SubCom and Japan’s NEC being leaders in the sector. Thus, the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ offers an opportunity for India to partner in initiatives to protect critical undersea infrastructure. Additionally, the partnership holds opportunities for home-grown players to improve and develop their foothold in the submarine cable industry.

Conclusion

The ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ becomes important for India in light of its growing telecom sector and its ambitions of expanding its digital footprint. India’s telecom sector is becoming increasingly data driven and poses a demand for uninterrupted, high speed internet connectivity. India’s data centres have been estimated to rise in market value from US $4 billion to US $11 billion between 2021 and 2024.²⁶ Adding to it, India’s geographical location and its skilled tech force make it well-positioned to emerge as a data hub. As a connecting link for many undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific, India can benefit from developing its clout in the submarine cable industry. Thus, the ‘Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ aligns with India’s goals of becoming a data hub by building on its digital infrastructure.

The protection of undersea submarine cables is crucial since any damage to critical infrastructure can risk global connectivity and adversely impact the global economy. The ‘Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience’ offers opportunities for India to come up with such initiatives as well as cooperate with other Quad countries to safeguard undersea cables. In India’s pursuit to become a US $10 trillion economy by 2035, the partnership offers a platform to enhance its capabilities, foster collaboration with like-minded countries and contribute to a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific.

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*Alphy Joseph, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views are of the author.  

Endnotes

1. White House. (2023, May 20).  Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-joint-statement/ [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
2. Australian Government. (2023). Quad Leader's Summit 2023. (n.d.). Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/resource/download/2023-quad-leaders-summit-1.pdf [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
3. White House. (2023, May 20). Quad Leaders’ Summit Fact Sheet. The White House. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-summit-fact-sheet/ [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
4. Ibid
5. ANI News. (2023, June 20). Japan, US, Australia collaborate on USD 95 mn undersea cable project to strengthen Indo-Pacific networks. ANI News. Retrieved July 19, 2023, from https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/japan-us-australia-collaborate-on-usd-95-mn-undersea-cable-project-to-strengthen-indo-pacific-networks20230620142016/ [Accessed on July 19, 2023]
6. Swinhoe, D. (2021, August 26). What is a submarine cable? Subsea fibre explained. Data Center Dynamics. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/analysis/what-is-a-submarine-cable-subsea-fiber-explained/ [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
7. Ibid
8. Arha, K. (2023, April 6). India at the Centre of the Indian Ocean Submarine Cable Network: Trusted Connectivity in Practice. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-at-the-centre-of-the-indian-ocean-submarine-cable-network/ [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
9. Mishra, A. (2023, March 18). Concerns arise over safety of India’s undersea data cables. The Sunday Guardian. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/concerns-arise-over-safety-of-indias-undersea-data-cables [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
10. United Nations. (2011, December). UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/66/231: Oceans and the law of the sea. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_66_231.pdf [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
11. Australian Government. (2005). Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Protection of Submarine Cables and Other Measures) Act 2005, No. 104, 2005. Federal Register of Legislation. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2005A00104 [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
12. Datacenter Forum. (2022, January 13). Government of Japan disperses submarine cable bases to reduce security risks. Datacenter Forum. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://www.datacenter-forum.com/datacenter-forum/government-japan-disperses-submarine-cable-bases-to-reduce-security-risks [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
13. Government of Japan. (2022, January 25). Vision for a Digital Garden City Nation: Achieving Rural-Urban Digital Integration and Transformation. The Government of Japan. Retrieved July 7, 2023, from https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2022/01/vision_for_a_digital_garden_city_nation.html [Accessed on July 7, 2023]
14. Federal Communications Commission. Cable Landing License Act. Federal Communications Commission. Retrieved July 19, 2023, from https://www.fcc.gov/cable-landing-license-act [Accessed on July 19, 2023]
15. National Archives, Office of the Federal Register, “Executive Orders” (Executive Order 10530, Part IV), Retrieved June 30, 2023, from https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10530.html [Accessed on June 30, 2023]
16. Congressional Research Service. (2022, September 13). Undersea Telecommunication Cables: Technology Overview and Issues for Congress. CRS Reports. Retrieved June 30, 2023, from https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47237 [Accessed on June 30, 2023]
17. Federal Communications Commission. Communications Act of 1934: as amended by Telecom Act of 1996. Federal Communications Commission. Retrieved July 19, 2023, from https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf [Accessed on July 19, 2023]
18. Cit 16, Congressional Research Service.
19. Ibid
20. National Archives. (2020, April 8). Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector. Federal Register. Retrieved July 19, 2023, from https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/08/2020-07530/establishing-the-committee-for-the-assessment-of-foreign-participation-in-the-united-states [Accessed on July 19, 2023]
21. Cit 16, Congressional Research Service.
22. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2021, August 16). Information Technology Act 2000. MeitY. Retrieved July 7, 2023, from https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/itbill2000.pdf [Accessed on July 7, 2023]
23. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India. (2023, June 20). Recommendations on 'Licensing Framework and Regulatory Mechanism for Submarine Cable Landing in India. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India. Retrieved July 7, 2023, from https://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/Recommendation_19062023_0.pdf[Accessed on July 7, 2023]
24. Lee, K. (2022, July). Expectations for India’s Used International Bandwidth. TeleGeography. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from https://blog.telegeography.com/expectations-for-indias-used-internationalbandwidth [Accessed on June 25, 2023]
25. Ministry of Communications. (2023, March). Bharat 6G Vision. Department of Telecommunications. Retrieved June 28, 2023, from https://dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Bharat%206G%20Vision%20Statement%20-%20full.pdf [Accessed on June 28, 2023]
26. Cit 8, Arha, K.