Indian Council of World Affairs

China-Pakistan strategic relationship

China and Pakistan formally established diplomatic relations in 1951, and currently enjoy a strategic partnership since 1972 (expanded in 2015), with substantial people-to-people ties. The two countries have a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with annual bilateral trade exceeding 23 billion USD in FY 2024 [i]. Both countries regularly conduct tri-service military exercises, with Chinese military technology and weapon platforms now comprising over 80 percent of Pakistan’s arsenal, including granting Pakistan access to the BeiDou satellite constellation for dual-use imaging and guidance [ii]. A cornerstone of the relationship is the 63 billion USD China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), linking the Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea with China’s Kashgar, which passes through the Shaksgam Corridor, part of Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, that was illegally ceded to China in 1963. 

Jiwani, a 24 km-wide peninsula on the Makran coast of Balochistan, is currently making headlines for a reported airbase, and possibly a naval base, which is being developed by the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) for joint China-Pakistan use [iii]. This follows reports from 2018, which projected the establishment of a joint Chinese-Pakistani naval base in the region. It would be only the second Chinese overseas military base after Djibouti, which was operationalised in 2017. The proposed location is approximately 38 km from the Pakistan-Iran border, and lies at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital passage responsible for roughly 20% of oil and liquefied natural gas, 30% of liquid helium, as well significant fertilizer production ad transit worldwide [iv]. 

Image 1: Various ports and facilities in the region. Map approximately to scale.

Source: Base map from Google Earth. Map generated by the author.

The development of Jiwani, originally a World War II-era airfield, has not been officially acknowledged by either the Pakistani or the Chinese government. However, the base was earmarked as a potential Chinese base since 2018 and has been upgraded continuously since then, as a contingency “if the United States and its allies push their Indo-Pacific strategy to the extreme” [v]. Some Chinese military observers have also argued in favour of the base, stating that it was necessary for the upkeep of PLA Navy vessels operating in the Indian Ocean Region, since Gwadar was “now a civilian port” [vi].

Impact on Southern Asia, West Asia and the Indian Ocean Region

Jiwani offers China a strategic foothold in the Persian Gulf, placing its air and naval assets in close proximity to its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). It is envisioned as a “command hub, a surveillance post designed specifically to monitor US 5th Fleet transits through Hormuz” [vii]. It also secures Chinese monitoring of India-led and India-comprised connectivity projects in the region, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which passes through Bandar Abbas, the Chabahar-Zahedan strategic rail link to Afghanistan, and the I2U2 framework involving the UAE. It is also essential to note, that approximately 30 percent of India’s oil and 90 percent of its gas and liquid helium imports pass through the Strait, raising concerns of supply chain disruptions [viii].

China adopted an ‘offshore active defence strategy’ in the later 1980s, which serves, inter-alia, to strengthen Chinese military presence in close proximity to its ‘tributary’ trade routes [ix]. Accordingly, China appears to view Jiwani as an additional security cover for the CPEC and the Gwadar port. Beijing considers this route as crucial to secure China’s oil imports from West Asia (primarily Iran), which account for more than two-thirds of its total oil imports. Therefore, the decision to establish an overseas military base, is seemingly driven by China’s economic dependency on the region. It also helps bypass the Strait of Malacca, wherein China alleges that India intends to disrupt the flow of commerce through it, including that of China’s, by building a “metal chain” from the Andaman and Nicobar tri-service command which straddles the crucial 10-Degree Channel [x]. 

Last but not least, as China expands its outlook towards an increasingly maritime and extra-regional presence, the establishment of a naval and air base at Jiwani allows it to assert its presence in a highly contested region, characterized by the presence of both state and non-state actors. The deployment of nuclear-powered and potentially nuclear-armed submarines to the Indian Ocean for “counter-piracy” operations, which would operate out of Jiwani [xi], has raised concerns about China’s intentions to maintain a long-term observation and combative force in the region [xii] [xiii].

Conclusion

Despite discussions in strategic circles, the absence of official statements regarding Jiwani is unusual for a project of such projected magnitude. One may assume, that the project is being kept under wraps in order to moderate potential responses. However, it is also essential to consider the opposition by Baloch political parties, militant groups and civil society, who allege unilateral acquisitions, human rights violations by military personnel, and the irreparable damages to the predominantly fishing-based and tribal  livelihoods, caused by heavy military presence and infrastructure building in the ocean [xiv] [xv]. Continued attacks by Baloch militant organizations on Chinese and Pakistani engineers working on the CPEC, could have dissuaded both parties from publicly announcing such a project, given guaranteed economic and human attrition. Therefore, the strategic ambiguity surrounding the project is a precarious balance of internal civil and armed resistance, the limits of military impositions, and the imperatives of China and the China-Pakistan strategic partnership.

Nevertheless, it is essential to monitor the developments at Jiwani, which undoubtedly signal a shift in the security and threat matrices of the Western Indian Ocean Region, which already is a highly sensitive and militarized zone. As yet another prong of China’s ‘encirclement strategy’ [xvi]  with a closely aligned Pakistan, it is bound to significantly influence the economic, military and strategic balancing in Southern and Western Asia, but also the Western Indian Ocean Region as well the broader landscape.

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*Yashodhan Deodhar is a Research Intern at the Indian Council of World Affairs.
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.

Endnotes

[i] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Pakistan. Www.fmprc.gov.cn; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2757_663518/. Retrieved June 10, 2026.

[ii] SIPRI. (2026, March 9). Global arms flows jump nearly 10 per cent as European demand soars. SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-arms-flows-jump-nearly-10-cent-european-demand-soars. Retrieved June 10, 2026.

[iii] Katoch, Lt. Gen. P. C. (2026). Jiwani PLA base — Major strategic gain for China. Spsnavalforces.com; SP’s Naval Forces. https://www.spsnavalforces.com/experts-speak/?id=209&h=Jiwani-PLA-base-Major-strategic-gain-for-China. Retrieved June 10, 2026.

[iv] Butler, G. (2026, April 8). What Is the Strait of Hormuz and Why Does It Matter? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n6p09pzno. Retrieved June 19, 2026.

[v] Press Trust of India. (2018, January 9). Stop Guessing About Chinese Naval Military Base In Pakistan: China. Press Trust of India via NDTV World. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/stop-guessing-about-chinese-naval-military-base-in-pakistan-china-1797815. Retrieved 19 June, 2026.

[vi] Chan, M. (2018, January 5). First Djibouti ... now Pakistan port earmarked for a Chinese overseas naval base, sources say. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2127040/first-djibouti-now-pakistan-port-earmarked-chinese. Retrieved June 19, 2026.

[vii] India Today Global Desk. (2026, April 7). Is Jiwani airbase the answer to America’s Hormuz crisis that China won’t let it have? India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/is-jiwani-airbase-the-answer-to-americas-hormuz-crisis-that-china-wont-let-it-have-2892957-2026-04-07. Retrieved June 19, 2026.

[viii] Press Information Bureau. (2026). Inter-Ministerial Briefing held on Recent Developments in West Asia. Pib.gov.in; Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2238525®=3&lang=1. Retrieved June 10, 2026.

[ix] Cole, B. D., & Puska, S. M. (2000). China’s Maritime Strategy. In PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AFTER NEXT (pp. 279–327). Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep12051.10. Retrieved June 10, 2026.

[x] Holmes, J., & Yoshihara, T. (2008). Naval War College Review China and the United States in the Indian Ocean (p. 14). https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1815&context=nwc-review. Volume 61, Number 3 (Summer). Retrieved June 19, 2026.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Jin, H. (2025). CMSI Archive Translation: The Biggest Obstacle to Chinese Nuclear Submarines Going Out Into The Indian Ocean . In US Naval War College Digital Commons. US Naval War College. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=cmsi-translations. Retrieved June 28, 2026.

[xiii] Singh, A. K. (2025, March 6). China’s Subsurface Presence in the Indian Ocean and India’s Options - MP-IDSA. MP-IDSA; Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/chinas-subsurface-presence-in-the-indian-ocean-and-indias-options. Retrieved June 28, 2026.

[xiv] Hussain, A. (2024, March 20). Pakistan’s Gwadar port attacked, eight armed fighters killed. Aljazeera.com; Al-Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/20/pakistans-gwadar-port-attacked-eight-armed-fighters-killed. Retrieved June 19, 2026.

[xv] Bhandari, A., & Shinde, A. (2024). Spiralling violence in Balochistan. Gateway House. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/spiraling-violence-balochistan/. Retrieved June 19, 2026.

[xvi] Prakash, Adm. A. (2017). A Strategic Encirclement. Delhipolicygroup.org; Delhi Policy Group. https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/media/opinion/a-strategic-encirclement. Retrieved June 19, 2026.