Indian Council of World Affairs

At the outset, the delivery of the third and final shipment of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Manila on April 22nd, 2026,^[i] should not be viewed as merely a fulfilment of a $375 Million agreement. While the physical transfer of this military hardware is significant, its true value lies in its role as a symbol of changing security and strategic landscape in the Southeast Asian region. This signals a definitive shift from the "wait-and-watch" diplomacy ^[ii] adopted by both India and the Philippines in the previous decades, toward a more proactive engagement.

In the contemporary Indo-Pacific, the "BrahMos deal" serves as a benchmark for India’s evolving role as a "Net Security Provider."^[iii] For New Delhi, this is not a singular transaction but rather a substantial institutional arrangement for engagement. By providing a partner like the Philippines, with a credible, shore-based anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capability in the South China Sea^[iv], India is participating in calibrating a new regional balance of power. This shift in engagement can be viewed as part of a broader Indian objective, where the maintenance of a rules-based multilateral order can be achieved only through the empowerment of littoral States to manage their own asymmetric security requirements rather than depending on any external player. To better understand the current landscape, it is essential to trace the evolution of their bilateral ties.

Decoding the 'Resource Reluctance'

To understand the current acceleration of ties, the neoclassical realist lens provides an interesting perspective to look at the Delhi-Manila axis.^[v] In this view, the rise of a more assertive regional player should have motivated Manila to immediately explore strengthening defence ties with other regional players like New Delhi. However, the relationship remained characterised by "resource reluctance" for decades. The "resource reluctance" of the Philippines meant these frameworks remained largely symbolic owing to the fact that India was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Philippines was a US ally. Therefore, the focus was on domestic preoccupation with internal security issues for the Philippines and the conflicts with immediate neighbours for India. Hence, between the Treaty of Friendship in 1952 and the early 2000s, the bilateral relations between the two states remained largely dormant.

The 1st India-Philippines Security Dialogue in 2004 and the landmark 2006 Agreement on Defence Cooperation marked a significant shift in the level of commitment between the two countries.  However, it was only after 2016, as India’s “Look East” policy elevated into the “Act East” policy, that the political perceptions in Manila began to align with the changing strategic realities of the Indo-Pacific.^[vi] This transformation coincided with the shift of the Philippines defence priorities, where the emphasis moved from internal terrestrial security and counterinsurgency to the broader Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept  (CADC). Under the Re-Horizon 3 phase of the Armed forces of Philippines (AFP) modernisation programme Philippines aims to fully secure and defend the nation's land and maritime territories, Exclusive Economic Zones, seabed, continental shelf, and air space^[vii], in the past decade alone, the Philippines’ defence budget has more than doubled from $3.33 Billion in 2016 to $7.32 Billion in 2026,^[viii] as the country gears up to build credible deterrence capabilities and operationalise the CADC ^[ix] This has opened up new opportunities for other regional players like India to act as a "Secondary Balancer” in the region.

From Dialogue to Strategic Partnership

The evolution of the relationship from dialogue partners to strategic partners is the result of continued efforts between both countries to build institutional arrangements that survive political transitions. From the 2nd Strategic Dialogue in 2015 to the August 2025 State Visit of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to India, the two sides witnessed a period of intense institutional building,^[x] during which numerous working groups, such as the 2007 Joint Declaration on Combating International Terrorism, served as initial trust-building mechanisms that enabled deeper Defence integration.

The 2017 visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Manila for the 31st ASEAN and EAS Summits marked a historic moment in the bilateral relations. It was during this visit that the two nations signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Industry and Logistics Cooperation, which later materialised into the Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committee and provided the necessary formal architecture for major equipment sales and supply chain integration^[xi]. This momentum was further accelerated following the 2018 visit of Defence Minister Delfin Lorenzana to New Delhi, which laid the groundwork for the $375 Million BrahMos contract. Additionally, the 5th Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) Meeting on September 11, 2024, deepened the technical cooperation required for the April 2026 deliveries. These interactions prove that the relation between the countries is driven by strategic interest rather than symbolic diplomacy.

 The relationship between the Philippines and India was elevated to a strategic partnership in August of 2025 through the Declaration on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership, resulting in the adoption of the Plan of Action (2025-2029)^[xii]. For the Philippines, this pivot is a calculated effort to diversify its defence partnerships. By buying BrahMos from India, Frigates from South Korea and Radar systems from Japan, Manila’s efforts to diversify defence partnerships are intended to enhance strategic autonomy, while reducing overdependency on any single power amid intensifying US-China rivalry. ^[xiii]

Asymmetric Security and the 'CADC' Framework

The operationalisation of the BrahMos system in the Luzon Strait by the 273rd company of the Philippine Marine Corps’ Coastal Defence Regiment^[xiv] symbolises a recalibration of asymmetric security. This is not merely a quantitative addition to Manila’s arsenal but a qualitative shift toward a "deterrence-by-denial" posture. The operational logic is rooted in the (Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept) CADC of January 2024.^[xv] Furthermore, the adoption of an Assertive Transparency Strategy in 2024 by Manila requires a robust kinetic backbone. Without the "hard power" represented by the BrahMos and potential future acquisitions currently under discussion, such as the Akash surface-to-air missile system^[xvi] and Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH), diplomatic transparency remains vulnerable to coercive pushback. India’s growing role as a “defence exporter”^[xvii] ensures that its partners have the material enablement to safeguard vital chokepoints and their sovereignty, thereby contributing to the overall stability of the Indo-Pacific.

Recent simulation exercises conducted during Exercise Balikatan 2026^[xviii] (an annual joint military exercise between the United States and the Philippines, which for the first time in 2026 saw the participation of 5 other players, consisting of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, France and Canada) further demonstrated the growing strategic significance. The BrahMos system enables Manila with the ability to protect itself from threats originating from land to sea, and complicates the tactical calculation of any potential adversary.

Maritime Domain Awareness

The partnership has also institutionalised cooperation in maritime security. During the August 2025 State Visit by President Marcos Jr., India officially invited the Philippines to join the Information Fusion Centre - Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR). The IFC-IOR is hosted by the Indian Navy at Gurugram, and was founded in December 2018 to address the need to promote collaboration for maritime safety and security, by building MDA and acting as a maritime security information sharing hub.^[xix]

By synchronising their maritime tracking capabilities, New Delhi and Manila are strengthening cooperation to combat illicit activities and "grey-zone" manoeuvres. This synergy ensures that the maritime domain remains a "Global Commons," governed by the 1982 UNCLOS rather than by the exercise of raw power. India’s participation in joint naval drills in the region and calls for upholding the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the dispute, backed by UNCLOS, shifts the dispute from being a localised concern to a shared regional responsibility.^[xx]

Taking the Ties Ahead

As New Delhi and Manila move beyond immediate defence procurement, the next phase of the partnership is expected to focus on deepening institutional and industrial collaboration. In March 2026, FICCI hosted the MoD India Philippine Defence Industry^[xxi] Seminar and Exhibition in Manila. Discussions during the seminar centred on strategic partnerships, technology transfers, joint ventures, capacity building and expanding defence ministerial cooperation. By bridging India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat mission with the Philippines’ Self-Reliant Defence Posture (SRDP) initiatives, under the Re Horizon 3 phase, both nations are seeking to institutionalise “industrial co-operation.”^[xxii] This alignment is designed to provide resilient supply chain assurances that transcend the limitations of traditional buyer-seller dynamics. The focus on localised maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) hubs aims to ensure that Manila’s strategic resilience is not tied to external logistical bottlenecks. As evident in ongoing discussions on the co-production of uncrewed systems, the logic of co-production is as much about trust as it is about technology. It is built on the assumption that security is best achieved when partners do not just share hardware, but also share the underlying industrial infrastructure. This creates incentives to co-produce and co-develop,^[xxiii] which will anchor bilateral relations for decades to come.

For the Philippines, its strategic partnership with India strengthens its position within the evolving rules-based multilateral order in the South China Sea and wider Indo-Pacific. This is further supported by attempts to institutionalise the ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (AIME), the participation of the Philippine Navy in multinational exercise MILAN, and joint patrolling conducted by the two navies within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). For India, this is not about hegemony but about preventing it. India's non-hegemonic ambitions make it a preferred partner for states like the Philippines that are wary of being caught in a superpower rivalry, bolstering regional stability.^[xxiv]

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the physical delivery of the BrahMos provides the kinetic foundation for asymmetric security, the partnership’s ultimate value must be judged by its strategic signalling rather than its immediate outcomes.^[xxv] The partnership reflects a growing regional consensus against the emergence of a unidirectional regional order and underscores the emergence of a layered security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

The evolution of the bilateral relationship from a static partnership to a strategic partnership by bridging domestic industrial priorities with regional and national security objectives is indeed a welcome step. The "decoding" of this relationship reveals that today, a robust defence cannot be achieved through isolation or by putting all your eggs in a single basket, i.e., depending on a single ally, but through building partnerships with like-minded partners^[xxvi]. As we move forward, the success of the Delhi-Manila partnership will be measured by its ability to sustain strategic momentum, deepen institutional cooperation and contribute to preserving a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

*****

*Sarvesh A Gurav, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

References

^[i]“Philippines to receive second batch of BrahMos missile system from India.” Reuters, April 22, 2025. Philippines to receive second batch of BrahMos missile system from India | Reuters.

^[ii] Don McLain Gill, 'A neoclassical realist analysis of the evolving Philippines-India defense partnership in the twenty-first century,' Asian Security 19, no. 3, 2023, p. 253.

^[iii] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, 'India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,' The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[iv] 'Special Briefing on the 2026 Defense Modernization and Industrial Co-production,' Ministry of External Affairs, India, February 2026.

^[v] Don McLain Gill, "A neoclassical realist analysis of the evolving Philippines–India defense partnership in the twenty-first century," Asian Security, Volume 19, Issue 3 (2023), pp. 249–267.

^[vi] Don McLain Gill, ‘A neoclassical realist analysis of the evolving Philippines–India defense partnership in the twenty-first century,’ Asian Security 19, no. 3 (2023): p. 258.

^[vii] The Philippines’ Horizon 3 Military Modernisation Programme - MP-IDSA

^[viii] 'FY 2026 General Appropriations Act (RA 12314),' Department of Budget and Management, Philippines, January 5, 2026;

^[ix] 'The Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC): A Strategic Roadmap,' Department of National Defense (DND), Philippines, 2024.

^[x] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, ‘India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,’ The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[xi] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, ‘India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,’ The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[xii] ‘Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Republic of the Philippines,’ Ministry of External Affairs, India, August 5, 2025.

^[xiii] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, ‘India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,’ The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[xiv] ‘Philippine Marine BrahMos Force Stands Up Northern Luzon Unit,’ Naval News, March 2026.

^[xv] admin. 2025. comprehensive archipelagic defence concept’ (cadc) of the Philippines and opportunities for India arising therefrom.” national maritime foundation. July 24, 2025. “COMPREHENSIVE ARCHIPELAGIC DEFENCE CONCEPT” (CADC) OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIA ARISING THEREFROM - National Maritime Foundation.

^[xvi] Admin, and Admin. 2025. “Philippines Eyes Indian ADs as Replacement for Ageing MIM-23 HAWK Air Defence Systems.” Indian Defence Research Wing. December 4, 2025.

^[xvii] Defence Atmanirbharta: Record Production and Exports

^[xviii] Admin, and Admin. 2026. “BrahMos Joins Balikatan 2026: Philippines to Conduct Simulated Firing With US Forces.” Indian Defence Research Wing. April 20, 2026. BrahMos Joins Balikatan 2026: Philippines to Conduct Simulated Firing with US Forces - Indian Defence Research Wing.

^[xix] The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), hosted by the Indian Navy, was established by the Government of India at Gurugram on 22 Dec 18 to address this need to promote collaboration for maritime

^[xx] India's World. 2026. “India in the South China Sea: Act East Policy and the Quest for Strategic Relevance.” April 17, 2026. India in the South China Sea: Act East Policy and the quest for strategic relevance.

^[xxi] FICCI, Federation House. n.d. “India - Philippines Defence Industry Delegation Seminar & Exhibition 2026.” https://ficci.in/event-details/28012625647325.

^[xxii] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, ‘India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,’ The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[xxiii] “5th India-Philippines Joint Defence Cooperation Committee Meeting Held in Manila.” n.d. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2053803®=3&lang=2.

^[xxiv] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, ‘India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,’ The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[xxv] Rubul Patgiri and Deep Gogoi, ‘India-Philippines in the Indo-Pacific: an emerging strategic partnership,’ The Pacific Review, March 13, 2026.

^[xxvi] Don McLain Gill, 'A neoclassical realist analysis of the evolving Philippines-India defense partnership in the twenty-first century,' Asian Security 19, no. 3, 2023, p. 253.