Indian Council of World Affairs

Introduction

While global attention in early 2026 remained focused on escalating tensions in the Middle East involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, a significant legal development unfolded in Afghanistan with comparatively limited international scrutiny^[i]. In January 2026, the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akundzada signed the “Criminal Procedure Code for Courts” (Da Muhakimo Jaza’i Usulnama), a 119-article document consolidating aspects of the Taliban’s hybrid justice system into a single, enforceable framework.^[ii] Unlike the ad hoc governance by decree that characterised the movement’s initial years in power after August 2021, the code represents a move toward instuitionalising the Taliban’s interpretation of justice and governance.^[iii] The objective of this article is to examine this development objectively, analysing the key provisions of the new code, their implications for the Afghan population, particularly women and marginalised groups, and the broader context of justice, governance, and human rights under the current administration in Afghanistan.^[iv]

Key Features of the New Penal Code

The  Criminal Procedure Code for courts implemented in Afghanistan at the beginning of this year seeks to formalise judicial procedures, evidentiary standards, and the authority of courts under the Islamic Emirate. At its core lies the primacy of Sharia, interpreted through the Taliban’s strict understanding of Hanafi jurisprudence^[v]. Rather than functioning as a modern penal code comprehensively listing crimes and punishments, it primarily establishes procedures for the application of ta’zir- discretionary punishments determined by judges.^[vi]

One of the most debated provisions is Article 9, which reportedly outlines the differentiated application of ta’zir punishments according to social status. Afghan society is categorised into four groups: religious scholars (ulema), elites (ashraf), the middle class, and the lower class. Punishments for the same offence vary accordingly. Religious scholars may receive advice or admonition, elites may face summons and counselling, while middle-and lower - class individuals can face imprisonment and corporal punishment. ^[vii]

The code has also drawn significant attention for its provisions related to family and gender relations. Reports indicate that Articles 4 and 32 grant husbands authority to impose disciplinary measures within the household in cases of perceived disobedience. Criminal liability for domestic violence reportedly applies only in cases involving severe physical injury proven before a judge. Other forms of violence may not attract equivalent legal consequences. Additional provisions reportedly criminalise a wife’s prolonged absence from the marital home without permission, potentially affecting women attempting to flee abusive situations. Human rights observers argue that these measures effectively normalise certain forms of domestic violence while imposing heavy evidentiary burdens on women seeking legal protection.^[viii]

Concerns have also emerged regarding religious minorities and dissenting beliefs. The code’s emphasis on Hanafi jurisprudence as the primary legal framework has been interpreted by observers as reinforcing religious hierarchy. Provisions allowing punishment for apostasy, promotion of “false beliefs,” or moral offences may disproportionately affect Shia Muslims, Ismailis, Hindus, Sikhs, and others perceived as deviating from the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam. More broadly, the code expands the scope of corporal punishment and strengthens penalties related to narcotics, corruption, forgery, and acts viewed as challenging the authority of the emirate.^[ix]

More recently, the taliban introduced a 31-article family law regulation titled “Principles of Separation Between Spouses” that effectively instuitonalises interpretations of consent that facilitate child marriage for young girls.^[x] One of the most debatable articles of the decree recognises of a “virgin girl” is silent as consent to marriage. It can be legally interpreted as her consent to marriage.^[xi] The regulation further stipulates that marriages involving minor boys or girls arranged by relatives may be deemed valid, provided that the prospective groom is considered socially appropriate, and the dowry conforms to religious requirements.^[xii] Although this legal architecture is articulated in the language jurisprudence, its operational consequences are the systematic dismantling of existing safeguards against child and forced marriage. Critical legal analysis suggests that the law’s view of consent is not merely culturally distinct but fundamentally incompatible with the modern human rights framework’s core tenet that marriage requires the free, full, and explicit consent of both parties.^[xiii]

Historical and Ideological Context

To understand the significance of this code, it is important to situate it within the Taliban’s ideological and historical context. The Taliban is not merely a political movement that returned to power in 2021; it is fundamentally an ideological project rooted in a strict and puritanical interpretation of Sunni Hanafi Islam. Emerging in the mid- 1990s amid the civil war and post-Soviet collapse of Afghanistan, the Taliban promised to restore order, enforce Islamic values, and eliminate the abuses of competing mujahideen factions.^[xiv]

During its first Empire (1996-2001), the Taliban implemented a highly centralised theocratic system in which justice was administered primarily through religious scholars applying hudud, qisas, and ta’zir punishments^[xv]. Public executions, amputations, and severe restrictions on women’s education and mobility became defining features of the regime. Even after the Taliban’s removal from power in 2001, the movement continued operating in parallel to judicial structures in areas under its control. These “shadow courts” often gained local legitimacy because they were perceived as faster and less corrupt than the formal institutions of the Islamic Republic.^[xvi]

The 2026 Criminal Procedure Code, therefore represents continuity rather than rupture. It formalises principles and practices that have long existed within taliban governance structures. In this sense, the movement’s broader ideological vision of social order, morality, and authority.

Societal Implications

For Afghan society, the implications are significant. Supporters within the Islamic Emirate argue that the code restores Islamic order and provides greater judicial predictability after years of governance through decrees. However, the international community contends that the framework deepens existing inequalities by concentrating discretionary authority in the hands of judges, religious scholars, and family patriarchs.  Women, minorities, and economically disadvantaged groups are likely to be most affected because of limited access to legal protections and the broader social restrictions already imposed since 2021.^[xvii]

The code also reflects the Taliban’s broader governance approach since returning to power: centralising authority while simultaneously relying on localised social and religious hierarchies for enforcement. This may contribute to greater institutional consolidation for the regime, but it also risks widening social divisions and limiting avenues for dissent or legal recourse.^[xviii]

International Response and Strategic Engagement

Human rights organistations and  Afghan civil society groups in exile have criticised the provisions on domestic discipline, class-based sentencing, and religious hierarchy as inconsistent with international human rights standards. UN experts, including Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett, have also expressed concern regarding the code’s implications for women’s rights, equality before the law, and freedom of belief.^[xix]

Most countries continue to withhold formal recognition of the Taliban administration and remain critical of several of its domestic policies, particularly those concerning women and girls. Nevertheless, over the past five years, many states have engaged with the Taliban pragmatically to secure their strategic, political, and economic interests. Regional powers such as China, Iran, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states have maintained varying degrees of diplomatic and economic interaction with Kabul, largely driven by concerns over security, trade, migration, and regional stability. Russia has emerged as the only country thus far to formally recognise the Taliban government.^[xx]

Conclusion

Afghanistan‘s new Criminal Procedure Code for Courts represents far more than a routine legal reform. It marks a significant step in the Taliban’s effort of institutionlise its ideological vision of governance and justice. While the code may provide greater legal coherence within the Islamic Emirate’s system, many of its provisions raise serious concerns regarding equality before law, procedural safeguards, women’s rights, and the protection of minorities. The lack of an independent, transparent judiciary in Afghanistan has worsened in their home, as the new “Criminal Rules of Court” remove even the pre-existing, limited protections for citizens^[xxi]. At the same time, the international response illustrates the growing gap between normative commitments to human rights and the strategic realities shaping state engagement with the Taliban regime. As Afghanistan continues under Taliban rule, the long-term implications of this evolving legal order for governance, legitimacy, and social cohesion will remain an important subject of regional and international concern.

*****

*Sanchita Kashyap, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

References

^[i] Associated Press. “Afghanistan Penal Code Provides Harsher Punishments for Animal Mistreatment than Domestic Violence.” AP News. Accessed May 11, 2026.Afghanistan penal code provides harsher punishments for animal mistreatment than domestic violence | AP News

^[ii]The Diplomat. “Taliban Introduce New Criminal Code in Afghanistan.” The Diplomat. Accessed May 11, 2026.Taliban Introduce New Criminal Code in Afghanistan – The Diplomat

^[iii] Supreme Court Observer. “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Authoritarian Project Takes Root.” Supreme Court Observer. Accessed May 11, 2026.Afghanistan: The Taliban’s authoritarian project takes root - Supreme Court Observer

^[iv] Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. “The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women.” GIWPS. Accessed May 11, 2026.The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women - Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security  

^[v]Sethi, Amal. "Afghanistan: The Taliban’s authoritarian project takes root." Supreme Court Observer, March 20, 2026. Afghanistan: The Taliban’s authoritarian project takes root - Supreme Court Observer

^[vi] KabulNow. “Security Implications of the Taliban’s Penal Code: Why Should We Be Concerned?” KabulNow. Accessed May 11, 2026.Security Implications of the Taliban's Penal Code: Why Should We Be Concerned? – KabulNow

^[vii]Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. “The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women.” GIWPS. Accessed May 11, 2026.The Taliban’s New Criminal Regulation Legalizes Slavery, Violence, and Repression of Women - Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security  

^[viii] Penal-Code-05.pdf

^[ix] Next Century Foundation. “Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan: When Exclusion Becomes Governance.” Next Century Foundation. Accessed May 11, 2026.Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan: When Exclusion Becomes Governance - Next Century Foundation

^[x]"Afghanistan Child Marriage: 'Silence of virgin girl can be treated as consent': Taliban formally recognises child marriage with special rules in Afghanistan," The Times of India.Afghanistan Child Marriage: 'Silence of virgin girl can be treated as consent': Taliban formally recognises child marriage with special rules in Afghanistan - The Times of India 

^[xi]"Afghanistan Child Marriage: 'Silence of virgin girl can be treated as consent': Taliban formally recognises child marriage with special rules in Afghanistan," The Times of India.Afghanistan Child Marriage: 'Silence of virgin girl can be treated as consent': Taliban formally recognises child marriage with special rules in Afghanistan - The Times of India 

^[xii]News18, "Taliban Legalises Child Marriage In Afghanistan: What The New Law Says," May 18, 2026. Taliban Legalises Child Marriage In Afghanistan: What The New Law Says

^[xiii]News18, "Taliban Legalises Child Marriage In Afghanistan: What The New Law Says," May 18, 2026. Taliban Legalises Child Marriage In Afghanistan: What The New Law Says

^[xiv] Hasht-e Subh, “The Taliban’s Return: From the Fall to the Struggle for Freedom and Afghanistan’s Political Future,” Hasht-e Subh, August 19, 2025.The Taliban’s Return: From the Fall to the Struggle for Freedom and Afghanistan’s Political Future - Hasht-e Subh

^[xv] KabulNow. “Security Implications of the Taliban’s Penal Code: Why Should We Be Concerned?” KabulNow. Accessed May 11, 2026. Security Implications of the Taliban's Penal Code: Why Should We Be Concerned? – KabulNow

^[xvi] Zahra Rahimi, “What is an Islamic Emirate?,” TOLOnews, March 15, 2021.What is an Islamic Emirate? | TOLOnews

^[xvii]Women’s Media Center. “The Taliban’s New Criminal ode Is Governing Women Out of Existence.” Women’s Media Center. Accessed May 11, 2026. The Taliban’s New Criminal Code Is Governing Women Out of Existence - Women’s Media Center

^[xviii] UNICEF. “Restrictions on Girls’ Education and Women’s Employment in Afghanistan Could Lead to a Loss of over 25,000 Female Teachers and Health Workers by 2030.” UNICEF. Accessed May 11, 2026.Restrictions on girls’ education and women’s employment in Afghanistan could lead to a loss of over 25,000 female teachers and health workers by 2030 - UNICEF

^[xix] OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights). “Afghanistan: International Community Must Reject Taliban’s Violent and Authoritarian Rule, Say UN Experts.” OHCHR. Accessed May 11, 2026.Afghanistan: International community must reject Taliban’s violent and authoritarian rule, say UN experts | OHCHR

^[xx]Observer Research Foundation, "Taliban And The World A Global Reckoning," ORF, June 17, 2025. Taliban And The World A Global Reckoning - Event | ORF

^[xxi]Opinio Juris. “Formal Inequality Under the Taliban and the Limits of the ICC’s Afghanistan Case.” Opinio Juris. Accessed May 11, 2026.Formal Inequality Under the Taliban and the Limits of the ICC’s Afghanistan Case - Opinio Juris