Indian Council of World Affairs

Until recently, a bilateral visit by a Head of Government was typically viewed as an effort to strengthen ties between nations without much deeper implications. However, over the past few years, every interaction between states has come to symbolise more than just their shared bonds; it also reflects the growing strategic considerations with global implications. This is evident in the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Malaysia between February 7 and 8, 2026.   

Going beyond inking nearly a dozen agreements,[i] the India and Malaysia have also set the stage to broaden the scope of their bilateral ties beyond existing current areas of engagement by taking forward the Comprehensive Security Partnership (CSP) that was signed in August 2024 amid changing global order filled with inherent uncertainties. It is in this context that the visit and its outcomes are to be assessed, as they established a durable foundation for future collaboration.

Shifting Sands

At the outset, the discussion between Prime Minister Modi and his host, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim encompassed the full spectrum issues pertaining to the bilateral relations. As highlighted in the official handout,[ii] these discussions were not limited to traditional areas of cooperation, such as trade and investment, agriculture, health, education, culture, tourism, and people-to-people contacts. They also explored other emerging avenues, like the digital economy and energy, along with security and defence cooperation, as well as discussions on political engagement.

What makes these lines of intended cooperation or expanding cooperation is their protentional not only to boost bilateral trade from less than US$ 19 billion[iii] but also to assistant the both countries to navigate the geopolitical and geoeconomics challenges. The core aspect of the visit is reflected in its outcomes, which include the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), exchange of letters (EoL) or the exchange of notes (EoN). The most notable of these would be the MoU on Disaster Management; EoN Semiconductors; EoN between the two the nodal supra security agencies, namely India’s National Security Council Secretariat and Malaysia’s National Security Council; and EoN on Health and Medicine. These agreements are also complemented by other points of engagement, like cooperation when it comes to United Nations Peacekeeping, technical and vocational education and training (TVET).

The two sides also inked an arrangement between India’s NIPL and PAYNET SDN BHD of Malaysia to facilitate cross-border payment in their respective currencies, namely the Indian Rupee and Malaysian Ringgit. Additionally, they established a dedicated Thiruvalluvar Centre in University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, along with a Thiruvalluvar scholarships for Malaysian nationals. These initiatives aligned with extending the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) eligibility to Malaysian citizens of Indian origin up to the sixth generation.[iv] This is important, as Malaysia hosts the second-largest community of people of Indian origin,[v] with most of them hailing from the then Madras Presidency during the colonial era. 

Apart from these, the two sides did announce that another India mission will be established in Malaysia, most probably in Malaysia’s Sabah state Borneo Island.[vi] Sabah is Malaysia’s easternmost province, and its coastline is in close proximity to the Philippines as well as the critical South China Sea lanes of communication and the disputed sections of its waters.

Taking the Ties Ahead

The salient features of the visit lie in three important vectors. First, there is an emphasis on enhancing defence and security cooperation between the two nations. Notably, there are agreements regarding cooperation in UN peacekeeping and disaster management, as well as a similar arrangement involving the respective national security agencies of both nations.

Under the framework of UN peacekeeping and disaster management, where the armed forces of most countries often serve as lead agencies, both created opportunities to expand and deepen ties in this area. This development aims to create a substantial institutional arrangement for engagement, free from any perception of political posturing." This does not discount the fact that the two countries since the establishment of the Strategic Affairs working Group (SAWG), a couple of years ago also intend in elevate the defence industrial cooperation to cover co-design, co-production and co-development of equipment and platforms[vii] apart from the existing maintaining and upgrading existing equipment’s and platforms in the Malaysian Armed Forces like the Russian build Su-20 fighter aircraft.[viii]

What is of equal weight is the engagement between the two national security agencies. In an era where the definition and scope of security are constantly evolving, this engagement reflects of the need an adaptable structure in security-related cooperation. Unlike in the past, the geographic space that both India and Malaysia occupy is under considerable stress, thereby illustrating importances of updating the  the state mechanisms to address them. The stress points include human concerns such as basic needs and the resilient supply chain assurances, challenges posed by various non-state actors like criminal syndicates, and future concerns emerging from the overall advancements of science and technology as well as traditional and asymmetric security concerns. 

It is also in this context that the engaging in the fields of semiconductors, TVET and health should be understood. While the latter two directly concern the citizens of the two countries, the former is to be viewed in the context of the future developments. This is so, as Malaysia over the past few decades has come to have a robust semiconductor sector, which today contributes to a quarter of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, or about 13 per cent of the world’s semiconductor testing and packaging output.[ix] With both countries aiming to expand their existing semiconductor sector, TVET emerges as key area  of shared interests, as there is a growing demand for trained manpower to drive innovation and research as well as industrial collaboration. It is in this context that the existing cooperation between IIT Madras Global and Malaysia's Advanced Semiconductor Academy is to be seen.[x] Furthermore New Delhi’s ’s Critical Minerals Mission should be seen as a strategic initiative that aims to position India as a reliable player in the semiconductor value chain, serving as a partner for global technology resilience.[xi]

In a world that is increasingly focuses on resilience, reliable supply chains, and value chains, Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Malaysia represents an initial first step towards achieving strategic resilience--a national security prerogative that can be replicated with other partners.

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*Dr. Sripathi Narayanan, Research Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are personal.

End Notes

[i] “List of Outcomes: Official Visit of the Prime Minister to Malaysia”, Ministry of external Affairs, Government of India, February 8, 2026, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/40712/List_of_Outcomes_Official_visit_of_the_Prime_Minister_to_Malaysia_February_07__08__2026, accessed on February 10, 2026.

[ii] “India – Malaysia Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official visit by PM of India to Malaysia”, PM of India, February 8, 2026, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/india-malaysia-joint-statement-on-the-occasion-of-the-official-visit-by-pm-of-india-to-malaysia/ , accessed on February 12, 2026.  

[iii] “Malaysia, India deepen trade ties as Anwar and Modi vow to grow friendship rooted in trust”, Straits Times, February 8, 2026, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-india-deepen-trade-ties-as-anwar-and-modi-vow-to-grow-friendship-rooted-in-trust , accessed on February 11, 2026.

[iv] “Prime Minister’s address to the Indian Community in Malaysia”, Prime Minister’s Office, Press Information

Bureau, February 7, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2224939®=3&lang=2, accessed on February 16, 2026.

[v] “Prime Minister’s address to the Indian Community in Malaysia”, Prime Minister’s Office, Press Information

Bureau, February 7, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2224939®=3&lang=2, accessed on February 16, 2026.

[vi] “India and Malaysia pledge to bolster trade, defence collaborations”, al Jazeera, February 8, 2026,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/8/india-and-malaysia-pledge-to-bolster-trade-defence-collaborations, accessed on February 10, 2026.              

[vii] “Defence Secretary co-chairs 13th Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur”,

Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, September 19, 2023, February 19, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2104611®=3&lang=2,  accessed on February 9, 2026.

[viii] “Defence Secretary co-chairs 13th Malaysia-India Defence Cooperation Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur” Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, September 19, 2023, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1958830®=3&lang=2#:~:text=Strategic%20Affairs%20working%20Group%20(SAWG)%20to%20formulate,the%20MIDCOM%20and%20the%20two%20Sub%2Dcommittees%20to, accessed on February 9, 2026.

[ix] “The State of Semiconductor Industry in Malaysia at the End of 2024”, Advance Semiconductor Academy of Malaysia, December 19, 2024, https://www.asemedu.com/2024/12/19/the-state-of-semiconductor-industry-in-malaysia-at-the-end-of-2024/, accessed on February 16, 2026.

[x] “Semiconductors, Trade, Defence To Form Backbone Of India-Malaysia Ties”, NDTV, February 8, 2026,  https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/semiconductors-trade-defence-to-form-backbone-of-india-malaysia-ties-10968697, accessed on February 9, 2026.

[xi] https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/semiconductors-trade-defence-to-form-backbone-of-india-malaysia-ties-10968697