Abstract: As climate change intensifies, global interest in the Arctic region will continue to rise. As the largest Arctic coastline nation, Russia has considerable interests in the Arctic. This paper looks at Russia’s expanding military role in the region.
Introduction
Climate transformation is changing the Arctic’s physical environment. It is opening once-inaccessible shipping routes and revealing vast deposits of oil, gas and minerals. This transformation is turning the Arctic from a quiet frontier into a zone of significant economic competition and security challenges.
For Russia, the Arctic is not just a peripheral region, but the geopolitical and strategic base of its national defence. The Russian Federation is the largest of the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean and has the longest coastline, approximately 24,150 km. The region serves as both a primary economic engine and a critical defensive barrier. Russia identifies the Arctic as a “strategic resource base” essential to Russia’s future economy. It also warns of increased potential for conflict. This concern is evident in its “Strategy for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Provision of National Security through 2035”.
To counter emerging challenges, Russia has significantly expanded its military presence to secure its sovereignty and protect the economic assets by reopening Soviet-era bases and deploying advanced technology.[i] Geopolitical tensions have also driven Russia’s military presence in the Arctic, namely to counter NATO’s[ii] expanded role in international Arctic cooperation and activities in the High North.
Given the above, this paper analyses the growing importance of the Arctic in Russia’s defence strategy.
Arctic and Russian Defence Strategy
As highlighted in its Arctic Policy 2035 and Russian Naval Doctrine 2022, the Arctic is crucial for Russian defence strategy. The importance can be understood through four key aspects:
1) The Kola Peninsula and Its Strategic Importance
The Kola Peninsula is located in the extreme northwest of Russia, within the Arctic Circle. It is bordered by the Barents Sea to the north and the White Sea to the east and southeast. The warm North Atlantic Drift ensures the northern coast of the peninsula remains ice-free year-round, making Murmansk the only Russian port with unrestricted access to the Atlantic Ocean.[iii]
Map 1: The Kola Peninsula
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
The Kola Peninsula serves as the headquarters for the Russian Northern Fleet. It houses the country's most powerful naval assets, including its fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines like the Borei-class (Project 955/955A). The deep, cold waters nearby allow submarines to deploy and hide effectively as part of a “Bastion Strategy”[iv] defence.[v] Bases like Gadzhiyevo and Severomorsk are critical for Russia's “second-strike” capability, which are also located here.
The two bases together host Russia’s largest surface warships, including a nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser and modern, high-tech ships equipped with the Poliment-Redut air defence system and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles. Severomorsk is also home to Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia's only aircraft carrier (currently undergoing long-term modernisation/repairs at the 35th shipyard in Murmansk) and Marshal Ustinov, a Slava-class guided-missile cruiser known for its heavy anti-ship missile armament.[vi]
Overall, the Kola Peninsula is a critical to Russia’s military operations in the Arctic and is a vital part of Russia’s national defence and Arctic power projection.
2) Development of the Northern Sea Route
Russia is using the climate-induced melting of ice to turn the Northern Sea Route (NSR) into a national transport communication line, including a maritime corridor for most of its military assets. This risks further militarisation of the NSR and the Arctic transport corridors.[vii]
Russia’s Arctic Policy 2035 and the 2022 Russian Naval Doctrine highlight that Russia’s militarisation of the NSR has evolved from a seasonal effort into a permanent, year-round defensive strategy as climate change is affecting the region. The NSR is a central part of Russia’s defence strategy, as it offers a secure internal waterway that is outside the US Navy’s traditional chokepoints like the Suez Canal or the Malacca Strait.
Russia has focused on creating an “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) exclusion zone along the NSR to ensure that no foreign vessel can pass without Moscow’s consent. It has reopened over 50 Soviet-era military installations and airbases, such as Nagurskoye and Temp, with reinforced runways capable of handling heavy bombers and fighter jets.[viii] The NSR is now lined with S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missiles and Bastion-P coastal defence systems. These systems are specifically designed to sink ships and shoot down aircraft trying to enter the NSR from the Atlantic or Pacific.[ix] It has been reported that Russia has tested and deployed the Kinzhal hypersonic missile in the Arctic, specifically focusing on enhancing defence capabilities along the NSR.[x] The Russian Ministry of Defense has also established permanent “Arctic Motor Rifle Brigades”. These units use unique equipment like the DT-30PM Vityaz articulated all-terrain vehicles and Tor-M2DT missile systems, which are tested to function at minus 50 degrees Celsius.
While icebreakers have civilian uses, Russia’s new project 22220 nuclear icebreakers, like the Artika and Sibir, are classified as strategic assets. These ensure that Russian warships can move through the NSR even in winter, a capability that no other nation currently possesses.[xi]
Together, these developments allow Russia to move its naval fleet across the Pacific to the Atlantic seamlessly in the event of a conflict and ensure Russia’s dominance of the NSR.
3) Militarisation to Secure Economic Opportunities through Increased Accessibility of Resources
Russia’s strategy for securing the Arctic’s natural resources integrates military and economic interests. Official Russian documents treat the region not just as a border but as a key resource base that is essential for the nation[xii] with climate change enhancing the accessibility of these resources. To secure these economic opportunities, Russia has implemented several specific military measures.
Russia’s Arctic Policy 2035 explicitly links military readiness to the protection of the “resource base” that states 80 per cent of Russia’s natural gas and 17 per cent of its oil are produced here. Further, the 2022 Russian Naval Doctrine identifies the exploitation of natural resources of the continental shelf as a top priority. It grants the Russian Navy the authority to use force firmly and at all costs to protect these interests. Presidential decrees further reinforce this, mandating the military to protect the region and its resources.
To protect its economic interests, Russia has built a “Specialised Protective Dome” to shield key sites, such as the Yamal LNG Plant and the Prirazlomnaya oil platform. It has built three major high-tech bases: Nagurskoye, Arkticheskiy Trilistnik (Arctic Trefoil) and Severny Klever (Northern Clover). These are self-sustaining hubs designed to provide air cover and coastal defence for nearby energy fields.[xiii] Together, they form the “Specialised Protective Dome”.
Russia has deployed Bastion-P and Bal missile systems along the coast. According to the Ministry of Defense, these systems are tasked with preventing foreign vessels from interfering with Russian offshore drilling and mining activities.
Additionally, Russia has reopened 10 radar stations and 13 air bases across the Arctic to monitor commercial traffic. As President Putin stated during the 2023 “Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” forum, this infrastructure is required to ensure the safety of navigation and the protection of the environment, often interpreted as a justification for military monitoring.[xiv]
4) Militarisation to Deter the Presence of NATO
Russia’s strategy to deter NATO in the Arctic is officially framed as a necessary defence of its vital interests against western encroachments.[xv] Since 2024, this has shifted from general posturing to a targeted military reorganization command to face an enlarged NATO, following the accession of Finland and Sweden.[xvi]
Map 2: NATO Members and the Northern Sea Route
Source 1: The Economist
https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/05/14/nato-is-facing-up-to-russia-in-the-arctic-circle
In February 2024, President Putin signed a decree officially re-establishing the Leningrad Military District (LMD).[xvii] The Northern Fleet, which previously operated as an independent Joint Strategic Command, has been integrated into the LMD. This move specifically targets the new 1340 km land border with Finland. It allows Russia to centralise command for full-scale land, air and sea operations in the northwest, directly opposite to NATO’s northern flank.
Russia’s 2022 Naval Doctrine also deems the Arctic as the most important region for national security. Russia has intensified its Bastion strategy to deter NATO naval groups, along with its second-strike nuclear capabilities (Borei-class SSBNs) in the Kola Peninsula. Official statements emphasise that these assets are the ultimate deterrent against the NATO interventions.
In response to NATOs heightened focus on the Arctic, Russia is also increasing its military readiness. In September 2024, Russia conducted its largest naval exercise in decades in the Arctic region. According to official Kremlin reports, the exercise involved over 400 vessels and aimed at defending national interests in the World Ocean and repelling large-scale aggression from the sea.[xviii]
Conclusion
Russia’s official stance, as articulated in the Arctic Strategy 2035 and the 2022 Naval Doctrine, is that the Arctic has transitioned from a remote frozen frontier into the strategic resource base of the Russian Federation. The melting of the ice is not viewed by the Kremlin as merely an environmental issue but as a catalyst that removes Russia’s natural northern defences while unlocking trillions of dollars in energy wealth and a global trade shortcut.
For the first time, Russia is deploying specialised Arctic-ready hardware, such as tracked Pantsir-SA missile systems and combat icebreakers that are designed to fight and navigate in a warming environment.[xix] By reactivating its Soviet-era installations, deploying advanced A2/AD systems, and establishing the Leningrad Military District, Russia is officially signalling that its military expansion is a permanent, non-negotiable response to NATO’s northern expansion and the increased accessibility of the NSR. As President Putin stated in his March 2025 address in Murmansk, Russia views the Arctic as a core interest, where economic development and military security are now completely inseparable.
Through Russia’s actions in the Arctic, particularly its stress on defence preparedness in recent years, one can conclude that changes in the physical and geopolitical environment of the Arctic will continue to shape the country’s military outlook towards the region. The Arctic is moving from being a vital economic asset to holding a pivotal position in Russia’s Arctic defence strategy.
*****
*Rachita Mansingh, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[i] President of Russia. "Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035." October 26, 2020.
SIPRI. "Russia’s New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather than Change." April 5, 2020. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2020/russias-new-arctic-policy-document-signals-continuity-rather-change
[iii] Arctic Russia. “Murmansk: The Largest City North of the Arctic Circle.” February 24, 2025. https://arctic-russia.ru/en/article/murmansk-the-largest-city-north-of-the-arctic-circle/.
Bastion Strategy- a military doctrine, primarily associated with the Soviet Union and modern Russia, focused on protecting strategic nuclear-armed submarines (SSBNs) within heavily defended, near-home maritime zones, such as the Barents Sea or Sea of Okhotsk.
High North News. “The Russian Northern Fleet: New Acting Commander...” March 21, 2024. https://en.highnorthnews.com/politics/the-russian-northern-fleet-new-acting-commander-and-several-new-submarines/239771.
[vi] Barents Observer. “Northern Fleet Faces Wide Gap...” February 7, 2025. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/northern-fleet-faces-wide-gap-between-ambitions-and-resources-intel-report/424194.
Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035. (Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation on October 26, 2020, No. 645).
[viii] Heather A. Conley and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. "The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence." Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 26, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Executive Order No. 400, July 2, 2021).
Jyri Lavikainen, “Strengthening Russia’s Nuclear Forces in the Arctic: The Case of the Kinzhal Missile,” CSIS, CSIS White Paper, September 14, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/strengthening-russias-nuclear-forces-arctic-case-kinzhal-missile.
Rosatom. The nuclear icebreaker fleet. https://rosatom.ru/en/rosatom-group/the-nuclear-icebreaker-fleet/.
[xii] Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond. (Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on September 18, 2008, No. Pr-1969).
TASS. (2025, December 17). S-500's capabilities unachievable for Russia’s military-industrial rivals — expert. https://tass.com/defense/2060495.
[xiv] Heather A. Conley and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. "The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence." Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 26, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. (Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2014, No. Pr.-2976)
NATO. (2024, October 21). NATO will defend Allied interests in the Arctic, says Chair of NATO Military Committee. https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/10/21/nato-will-defend-allied-interests-in-the-arctic-says-chair-of-nato-military-committee
[xvii]Leningrad Military District (LMD)- headquartered in Saint Petersburg, is one of Russia's five military districts as of 2024, spanning 1.7 million km² across Karelia, Komi republics; Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov oblasts; Nenets AO; and St. Petersburg. Re-established by Putin’s decree on February 26, 2024 (effective March 1), it split from the Western Military District, absorbed Northern Fleet territories, and downgraded fleet status to bolster land operations against NATO’s Finland-Sweden expansion.
President of Russia. "News: Meeting with Graduates of Military Institutions." Kremlin.ru, May 27, 2022. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75083.
“Russian Army to Receive Pantsir-SA Systems Designed for Arctic in 2016,” Sputnik International, updated August 20, 2016, https://sputnikglobe.com/20160820/russia-pantsir-aerospace-forces-1044470100.html.