Indian Council of World Affairs

The 13th national elections and the constitutional referendum, known as the “July Charter”, will be held on 12 February 2026 and are expected to play a major role in reshaping Bangladesh’s political trajectory. While the national elections will see a contest among 2,000 candidates, the constitutional referendum aims to establish a new constitutional framework and implement electoral reforms in Bangladesh.[i] Ever since the Awami League (AL) was banned by the Mohammad Yunus-led interim government, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is seen as the largest political force to take over the reins of the country. The national politics has traditionally been bipolar between AL and BNP. However, Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the country’s largest Islamist party, has steadily expanded its political footprint among youth and other sections of society. 

The growing influence of the JeI among the electorate is evident from the outcome of University Central Union elections held between September and October 2025 at major universities in Bangladesh, which include Dhaka University (DU), Jahangirnagar University (JU), Chittagong University (CU), Rajshahi University (RU) and, more recently, Jagannath University.[ii] JeI’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, swept the elections, bagging key executive positions.[iii] For instance, in DU, where the Chhatra Shibir contested under the banner “Oikkobodhho Shikkarthi Jote”, it secured 23 out of 28 seats, including the positions of Vice-President, General Secretary and Assistant General Secretary.[iv] The outcomes signal JeI’s organisational strength and youth appeal emerging against the backdrop of the absence of the Bangladesh Chhatra League, AL’s student wing, which was banned by the present dispensation in October 2024.[v] DU, once considered the bastion of secular and inclusive politics since the Liberation War, has emerged as a new arena of Islamist influence, previously on the periphery of the country’s electoral politics. The student union victory is therefore not a political anomaly but a strategic shift in Bangladesh’s national politics. 

Moreover, an opinion poll conducted in October–November 2025 by the International Republican Institute (IRI) showed that BNP and JeI will face a close contest in the upcoming elections.[vi] According to the survey, in contrast, the National Citizens Party (NCP), formed in February 2025 as an offshoot of the violent student protest that ousted the AL government, has been unable to convert  the support gained during the protests into a viable electoral base.[vii] Against this background, it is important to contextualise the rise of JeI in today’s Bangladesh, taking into account its role as a party in the post-independence years. 

Political Amnesia and the Rise of JeI 

The collaboration of JeI with Pakistani military forces during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War that witnessed genocide and violence against minorities is well-documented. Its controversial stance on the independence of Bangladesh, due to its alignment with the concept of a united Islamic state, and its subsequent position against secular and accommodative politics in post-independence Bangladesh had pushed the party to the margins of political discourse for many years. 

However, despite bearing the stigma of “Razakars” and a crackdown by the Sheikh Hasina government, particularly between 2009 and 2014, when top leaders were convicted and executed for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 1971 war – JeI was able to survive over the years.[viii] JeI entered into a political alliance with the BNP for many years, which came to be known as a “marriage of convenience” in Bangladesh’s political history when the AL government was in power.[ix] Furthermore, JeI has managed to recalibrate its image by operating not only as a political entity but also as a social organisation with links to charities, NGOs, foundations and businesses.[x] These include initiatives, such as healthcare camps, educational programmes and poverty alleviation projects that are part of community outreach in rural and underprivileged areas, such as those run by the Islamic Bank Foundation, Daily Naya Diganta, International Islamic University Chittagong and the Centre for Strategy & Peace Studies, among others.[xi] This has led many analysts to describe JeI’s social outreach as a parallel government infrastructure of “state within a state” and an “economy within an economy”.[xii]

The party re-emerged as a significant political actor after the 2024 July uprising. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh lifted the ban on JeI in June 2025 and allowed the party to reregister with the Election Commission, more than a decade after the Election Commission deregistered it as a political party in 2013 under the Sheikh Hasina administration.[xiii] This decision came nearly eight months after the interim government lifted the ban on the party in August 2024, enabling to reposition itself strategically within its rapidly evolving political landscape of the nation.[xiv]

The electoral success of JeI’s student wing is therefore attributed not only to the increasing religiosity in society, but also to the deepening disillusionment among young people with mainstream political actors, including the BNP. Over the years, sections of society have become disenchanted due to elite-driven power politics led by the AL and BNP. [xv] Against this backdrop, JeI has managed to present itself as a disciplined, morally grounded and organisationally cohesive alternative. Its maintenance of a robust organisational structure, along with strong cadre-based mobilisation strategies at the local level, have played a critical role in sustaining the party’s resilience, especially after the July Revolution of 2024.[xvi]

JeI’s Grand Alliance for the General Elections

On 28 December 2025, JeI formalised a broader electoral coalition with the National Citizens Party (NCP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[xvii] On 24 January, the Bangladesh Labour Party (BLP) also joined the JeI-led alliance.[xviii] Prior to this, JeI had already engaged with seven ideologically aligned parties, including Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Jatiya Ganatantrik Party (NDP) and Nizam-e-Islam Party, among others.[xix] The alliance with the Islamic parties is intended to consolidate the majoritarian Muslim vote, keeping the broader ideological orientation in mind. This strategic seat-sharing is aimed at preventing fragmentation among ideologically orientated, similar constituencies by presenting a unified electoral alternative against the BNP-led coalition.

In contrast, JeI’s alliance with the NCP, LDP and more recently, the BLP represents a more pragmatic electoral calculus aimed at mitigating its long-standing electoral isolation and seeks to secure political legitimacy in Bangladesh’s changing political geometry. Due to the historical gap between its organisational strength and electoral support, JeI has often been described as a “party without ballots”.[xx] In previous elections, JeI struggled to boost its electoral strength, as it had never secured more than 20 seats out of 300 in the Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) of Bangladesh.[xxi] Through this realignment, JeI seeks to capitalise on the NCP’s young voter base as well as sections of the moderate electorate.

Conversely, for the NCP, the alliance offers access to much-needed resources and organisational strength, given its inability to translate the support gained during the protests into sustained electoral presence. JeI has, therefore, positioned itself as a political fulcrum of the grand alliance, which consequently marks a departure from the party's longstanding dependence on the BNP. While the BNP is set to contest around 288 out of 298 seats and hopes to win the elections on its own, JeI has fielded candidates in around 224 seats, and the NCP is set to contest 32 seats.[xxii]

This political reconfiguration has created strategic space for JeI and other Islamist parties to assert and expand their ideological influence into electoral strength, following the 2024 July Revolution. However, questions remain about the role JeI will play in the political landscape of Bangladesh after the elections. The secular polity seems to have weakened after the fall of the AL government. Attacks on minorities and rising religious extremism will pose formidable challenges to address in the post-election period, under a new political dispensation.

Conclusion

With the collapse of the Awami League government, the long-standing alliance between JeI and the BNP has come to a halt, and a new bipolar electoral politics is being reshaped in Bangladesh. Although the BNP remains the most popular contender for the upcoming elections, the emerging numbers nonetheless underscore JeI’s rise as a formidable political force. Through this ideological recalibration and tactical flexibility, JeI seeks to mitigate its historical marginalisation, reclaim political legitimacy, and secure reintegration into mainstream politics. The durability and future trajectory of this alliance, however, will ultimately depend on the post-election political landscape and the result of the referendum on the July Charter.

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*Mohd Hadi Raza, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes 

[i] Abbas, Bashir Ali. 2026. “Expert Explains | Bangladesh’s February 12 Elections Are a Chance at a Fresh Start for All Parties.” The Indian Express. January 26, 2026. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/bangladesh-february-elections-10495818/lite/. Accessed January 2026.

[ii] Chakraborty, Debdutta. 2026. “A 1st in Bangladesh’s History, Major University Campuses under Jamaat’s Control in Post-Hasina Era.” ThePrint. theprint. January 9, 2026. https://theprint.in/world/a-1st-in-bangladeshs-history-all-university-campuses-now-under-jamaats-control-in-post-hasina-era/2823181/. Accessed January 10, 2026.

[iii] Nazmus Sakib. 2025. “Islamist Rise or Vote for Autonomy? How to Read Jamaat’s Recent Win on Bangladeshi Campuses – South Asian Voices.” South Asian Voices. October 29, 2025. https://southasianvoices.org/pol-m-bd-n-student-elections-islam-bangladesh-10-29-2025/. Accessed December 10, 2025.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Kallol Bhattacherjee. 2025. “Awami League Will Not Be Allowed to Participate in Bangladesh Election: Interim Government.” The Hindu. December 24, 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/awami-league-will-not-be-allowed-to-participate-in-bangladesh-election-interim-government/article70434647.ece. Assessed December 15, 2025.

[vi] “National Survey of Bangladesh | September - October 2025.” 2025. International Republican Institute. December 1, 2025. https://www.iri.org/resources/national-survey-of-bangladesh-september-october-2025/. Accessed December 13, 2025.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ahsan, Mohammad Amimul. 2025. “Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh in the Post-July 2024 Uprising Era: An Analytical Study of Political and Social Challenges ‫يوليو ‫انتفاضة ‫بعد ‫ما ‫مرحلة ‫في ‫بنغالديش ‫في ‫اإلسالمية ‫الجماعة 2024: ‫واالجتماعية ‫السياسية ‫التحديات ‫في ‫تحليلية ‫دراسة ‫اإلحسان ‫عميم ‫محمد (1).” ResearchGate. December 18, 2025. https://doi.org/10.15849/ZJJHSS.251130.0. Accessed December 31, 2025.

[ix] Kumar, Upendra. 2018. “The Networks of Social Infrastructure Linked with Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh.” Upendra Kumar. January 1, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382994336_The_Networks_of_Social_Infrastructure_Linked_with_Jamaat-e-Islami_in_Bangladesh. Accessed January 10, 2026.

[x] Abu Rayhan. 2024. “The Bright Future of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami in Politics.” ResearchGate. February 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32965.97762. Accessed December 30, 2025.

[xi] Kumar, Upendra. 2018. “The Networks of Social Infrastructure Linked with Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh.” Upendra Kumar. January 1, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382994336_The_Networks_of_Social_Infrastructure_Linked_with_Jamaat-e-Islami_in_Bangladesh. Accessed January 10, 2026.

[xii] Ibid

[xiii] PTI. 2025. “Bangladesh’s Supreme Court Restores Jamaat-e-Islami’s Party Registration.” The Hindu. June 2025. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladeshs-supreme-court-restores-jamaat-e-islamis-party-registration/article69645620.ece. Accessed December 31, 2025.

[xiv] Ibid

[xv] Ahsan, Mohammad Amimul. 2025. “Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh in the Post-July 2024 Uprising Era: An Analytical Study of Political and Social Challenges ‫يوليو ‫انتفاضة ‫بعد ‫ما ‫مرحلة ‫في ‫بنغالديش ‫في ‫اإلسالمية ‫الجماعة 2024: ‫واالجتماعية ‫السياسية ‫التحديات ‫في ‫تحليلية ‫دراسة ‫اإلحسان ‫عميم ‫محمد (1).” ResearchGate. December 18, 2025. https://doi.org/10.15849/ZJJHSS.251130.0. Accessed December 31, 2025

[xvi] Abu Rayhan. 2024. “The Bright Future of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami in Politics.” ResearchGate. February 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32965.97762. Accessed December 30, 2025.

            [xvii] Site Admin. 2025. “Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami Announces Expanded Electoral Alliance with NCP and LDP.” Newsonair.gov.in. 2025. https://www.newsonair.gov.in/bangladesh-jamaat-e-islami-announces-expanded-electoral-alliance-with-ncp-and-ldp/. Accessed January 1, 2026.

[xviii] PTI. 2026. “Labour Party Joins Electoral Alliance Led by Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh.” The Hindu. January 24, 2026. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/labour-party-joins-electoral-alliance-led-by-jamaat-e-islami-in-bangladesh/article70547623.ece. Accessed January 26, 2026.

[xix] “Jamaat, 7 Allied Parties Plan to Join Elections on Consensus-Based Approach.” 2025.
The Business Standard. November 19, 2025. https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/politics/jamaat-7-allied-parties-plan-join-elections-consensus-based-approach-1290151. Accessed December 10, 2025.

[xx] Ahsan, Mohammad Amimul. 2025. “Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh in the Post-July 2024 Uprising Era: An Analytical Study of Political and Social Challenges ‫يوليو ‫انتفاضة ‫بعد ‫ما ‫مرحلة ‫في ‫بنغالديش ‫في ‫اإلسالمية ‫الجماعة 2024: ‫واالجتماعية ‫السياسية ‫التحديات ‫في ‫تحليلية ‫دراسة ‫اإلحسان ‫عميم ‫محمد (1).” ResearchGate. December 18, 2025. https://doi.org/10.15849/ZJJHSS.251130.0. Accessed December 31, 2025.

[xxi] Islam, Md Nazrul, and Md Saidul Islam. 2018. “Islam, Politics and Secularism in Bangladesh: Contesting the Dominant Narratives.” Social Sciences 7 (3): 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030037. Accessed January 2, 2026.

[xxii] Abbas, Bashir Ali. 2026. “Expert Explains | Bangladesh’s February 12 Elections Are a Chance at a Fresh Start for All Parties.” The Indian Express. January 26, 2026. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/bangladesh-february-elections-10495818/lite/. Accessed January 27, 2026.