Indian Council of World Affairs

The month of November 2025 marked a pivotal phase in climate multilateralism with two major forums taking place back to back. The COP30 (Conference of Parties-30) convened in Belem, Brazil, from 9 November 2025 to 21 November 2025,[i] immediately followed by the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 22–23 November 2025,[ii] offering an opportunity for renewed momentum on climate action. However, the proceedings were marred by the absence of the United States from both the Summits. 

Despite their shortcomings, these institutions have been instrumental in shaping global norms and principles around climate action through their robust consensus-based mechanisms. Based on the primary principle of inclusivity, they ensure a seat at the table for all,[iii] including the global south. The withdrawal of major powers from forums of climate governance has precipitated a period of flux. When the primary architects and financiers of global climate action withdraw, multilateral institutions lose both relevance and implementation capacity. In this context, the future of climate governance faces two trajectories: a drift into fragmentation and weakened ambition, or the emergence of alternative leadership rooted in Global South cooperation. 

The Crisis in Climate Multilateralism 

The modern architecture of climate governance was built on the principle of broad-based cooperation, anchored by major powers that would drive global ambition. Its history can be traced back to the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. It led to the creation of the Conference of Parties (COP), a vital instrument for achieving consensus on climate related matter. The first COP was held in Berlin, Germany, in 1995. After three decades of UN climate talks, the history of climate negotiations has been underpinned with many successes but at the same time, it leaves room for much more in the area of climate multilateralism and collaboration. 

Consequently, climate action as an agenda has been adopted at various other multilateral platforms and groupings, including the G20. Gradually, policymakers began to recognize the interconnectedness between climate and economic performance, necessitating a policy orientation in that direction.[iv]

However, these institutions are witnessing a declining trend in terms of participation.  A major blot on COP’s legacy has been the recent absence of the US from COP30 negotiations that comes in the wake of the US withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement and its climate commitments at the beginning of 2025. It is also in consonance with their overarching policy of expanding fossil fuels and slowing down renewable energy. Without major emitters at the table, discussions on energy transitions, sustainable finance, and green growth struggled to gain traction. Moreover, President Trump’s claim of South Africa’s alleged persecution of the white minority population was cited as further impetus for the United States to exclude South Africa from the subsequent G20 Summit to be hosted by the US in 2026, posing as a further roadblock in effective climate multilateralism.[v]

Clean Technology Collaboration through BRICS

The BRICS platform was originally formed in 2009, building on the economic concept proposed by Goldman Sachs in 2001. Brazil, Russia, India and China formed the initial grouping, and 2010, South Africa was added as a new member. The bloc has since expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Indonesia in its fold in 2023, along with a number of “partner countries” in 2024. Collectively, the grouping accounts for 45% of the world’s population, with 35% of the world’s GDP.[vi]

The concept of “BRIC” countries was propped up as a non-western alternative to the hegemony of the G7 economies.[vii] The further expansion of the bloc has signalled a shift towards the need for alternative structures to Western institutions and systems, including economic, technological, and security.[viii] In that regard, the grouping offers significant opportunity in exploring and co-learning patterns of clean energy and devising a common sustainable pathway towards just transition.

In 2024, BRICS crossed an inflection point with fossil fuels no longer accounting for the majority of the total power capacity.[ix] India, China and Brazil have led this expansion, especially in solar and wind energy. Other major players, like South Africa, Egypt, and the UAE have emerged as solar innovation hubs, leveraging geographical advantages and declining costs.

A closer reading of Table 1 reveals several important inferences about the nature of clean technology systems within BRICS. The bloc displays significant technological diversity rather than convergence. While China and India dominate solar and wind manufacturing and deployment with a combined capacity of around 1.23 TW and 653 GW respectively, Brazil’s leadership lies in biofuels (915.5 billion litres/year) and hydropower (209 GW). Russia and the UAE retain strong nuclear capabilities, with Russia as the fourth largest producer with around 37 plants and the UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant providing 25% of the country’s energy needs. Indonesia and Ethiopia rely heavily on geothermal and hydropower, respectively.  Indonesia stands as the top producer of geothermal energy with a capacity of 29 GW. Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance hydroelectricity power plant over the Blue Nile is expected to produce 5,150 MW, making it a landmark project on the continent. The diversity of capabilities possessed by these countries reduces systemic risk and creates scope for intra-BRICS complementarities rather than competition. 

Moreover, the table points to a structural advantage in potential geographical endowments across BRICS. South Africa’s development in solar and wind, Indonesia’s dominance in transition metals like nickel and cobalt, Brazil’s bioenergy capacity, and China’s dominance over clean technology manufacturing collectively position the bloc to shape global clean energy supply chains. Iran also boasts geographical advantages that render solar and geothermal energy resources viable for exploration. If coordinated, these strengths could reduce reliance on Western-dominated value chains and mitigate vulnerabilities associated with trade restrictions, export controls, or geopolitical shocks.  

Table 1: Clean Energy targets and progress by BRICS countries

[Table made by author from various sources]

While renewable capacity is expanding rapidly across BRICS, fossil fuel infrastructure, particularly coal, continues to dominate operational capacity and remains deeply embedded in future energy planning, reflecting a transition that is additive rather than transformative. The Global Energy Monitor Tracker (Table 2) flags the predominance of fossil fuels within operational capacity, indicating a legacy issue.  However, a critical distinction needs to be made between the present status and the future trajectory. While fossil fuels, especially coal, continue to dominate existing power capacity in BRICS countries, the path towards future expansion increasingly favours renewable energy.

Table 2: Power Capacity by Technology and Status (BRICS)

[Source- Global Energy Monitor Report, “Energy in the BRICS”]

Creating a Coordinated Platform for Climate Finance and Funding 

The 17^th BRICS Summit, which took place in July 2025 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, resulted in the adoption of a ‘Leader’s Framework Declaration on Climate Finance’. This marked a significant institutional advancement.[x] The BRICS nations face similar issues, such as the need to phase out coal,  adaptation finance shortfalls, and infrastructure deficits. A complementary fund, if not an alternative to the current climate finance framework within the Paris Agreement, can help bridging the financial gap that is holding back the use of clean energy energy.[xi] Moreover, by leveraging a climate finance fund built on resilience and shared prosperity, the countries can ensure a more reliable financial flow and hedge against over-reliance on volatile alternate funding.[xii]

While the declaration represents a positive step, BRICS has made major advances towards securing funding for just transition, climate adaptation and mitigation over the past decade. The New Development Bank (NDB) was established under the BRICS framework in 2015 with the aim of supporting and funding projects in emerging and developing economies. The NDB General Strategy for 2022–2026 focused on ‘Scaling Up Development Finance for a Sustainable Future’, aims to provide 40% of its total funds towards climate change mitigation and adaptation over the aforementioned period.[xiii] The NDB’s contribution to climate finance amounted to a total of $8,091 million by the end of 2024, with more than three-fourths of it dedicated to climate mitigation.[xiv]

Moreover, the table below (Table 3) flags critical trends in the just energy landscape, marked by sustained growth and expanding sectoral coverage between 2016 and 2024. The prominence of transport infrastructure and multi-sector projects points to a strategic emphasis on building foundational economic and physical connectivity that are key enablers for long-term productivity, regional integration, and future energy transitions. These investments strengthen supply chains, reduce logistical inefficiencies, and create the structural conditions necessary for scaling clean technologies over time.

At the same time, the steady allocation to clean energy and energy efficiency demonstrates that climate considerations have been progressively embedded within broader development priorities rather than treated as standalone objectives, balancing immediate development needs with longer-term sustainability goals.

Table 3: Evolution of NDB’s Portfolio by Area of Operation (USD Million, As of 31 December 2024)

[Source- NDB’s Report on Sustainable Development Financing for 2024]

Towards Just Transition 

Across BRICS, transitions occur amidst stark regional inequalities and rampant industrialisation. At the 17th BRICS Summit 2025, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva emphasised that climate action must be aligned with development priorities, employment security, and social justice, underpinning the same. He stated, ‘Climate justice is an ally in the fight against hunger, poverty, and racism, and in promoting more inclusive global governance’.[xv]

Several BRICS members remain structurally dependent on fossil fuels. Coal-dependent regions in India, South Africa, and Indonesia, alongside oil- and gas-producing economies such as Russia, Iran, and the UAE, underscore the complexity of rapid phase-outs.[xvi] In this context, a just transition requires deliberate planning, worker reskilling, regional diversification, and social protection, rather than abrupt decarbonisation. While fossil fuels, especially coal, continue to dominate existing power capacity in BRICS countries, the path to future expansion increasingly favours renewable energy.

Conclusion

As the two most consequential climate negotiations began in two of the most vital Global South countries, Brazil and South Africa, the complacency displayed by major powers marks a shift towards how collaboration and cooperation can be reinvented. The withdrawal or diminished engagement of major powers has weakened the consensus-driven model that once defined multilateralism. Yet this moment of flux also reveals a historic opening. Countries of the Global South now possess the political space, technological capability, and collective weight to become norm-shapers in their own right.

An expanded BRICS framework offers one such pathway. By bringing together diverse energy systems, complementary technological strengths, and significant regional influence such as the NDB, the grouping can pioneer a model of climate cooperation that is not only equitable but genuinely multipolar. Their shared experiences with transition challenges, combined with their capacity for innovation and institution-building, position them to articulate a development-centred vision for the global climate regime.

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*Anoushka Singh, Research Intern, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
Disclaimer: Views expressed are personal. 

Endnotes

[i] 2025. Unfccc.int. 2025. https://unfccc.int/cop30/about-cop30.

[ii] Lawal, Shola. 2025. “G20 Summit in South Africa: Who’s Attending and What’s on the Agenda?” Al Jazeera. November 22, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/11/22/g20-summit-in-south-africa-whos-attending-and-whats-on-the-agenda.

[iii] Volcovici, Valerie, and Richard Valdmanis. 2025. “Planet in Peril: 30 Years of Climate Talks in Six Charts.” Reuters, November 6, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/cop/30-years-climate-talks-progress-pitfalls-planet-peril-2025-11-06/.

[iv] Solikova, Angela. n.d. “G20 and the Ongoing Fight to Contain Climate Change.” https://ris.org.in/newsletter/RIS%20Latest%20Publications/2020/April/G20%20Digest/G20%20Digest%20March-may%202020_vol_1_No_5/pdf/Angela%20Solikova.pdf.

[v] News, PBS. 2025. “G20 Summit in South Africa Ends with Glaring US Absence after Trump’s Boycott.” PBS News. November 23, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/g20-summit-in-south-africa-ends-with-glaring-u-s-absence-after-trumps-boycott.

[vi] Patrick, Stewart, Erica Hogan, and Oliver Stuenkel. 2025. “BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 31, 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en.

[vii] Ferragamo, Mariel. 2025. “What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding?” Council on Foreign Relations. June 26, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding.

[viii] “BRICS Expansion: Redefining Global Structural Power in a Changing World Order.” 2025. SAIIA. February 5, 2025. https://saiia.org.za/research/brics-expansion-redefining-global-structural-power-in-a-changing-world-order/.

[ix] Norman, James. 2025. “BRICS Can Lead Clean Energy Transition in New Members, Where Fossil Fuels Predominate.” Global Energy Monitor. April 28, 2025. https://globalenergymonitor.org/report/brics-can-lead-clean-energy-transition-in-new-members-where-fossil-fuels-predominate-2/.

[x] “Leaders’ Framework Declaration on Climate Finance.” n.d. Accessed December 15, 2025.

[xi] “A BRICS Agenda for Enhancing Climate Finance |.” 2025. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). August 15, 2025. https://unctad.org/publication/brics-agenda-enhancing-climate-finance.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] “Scaling Up Development Finance for a Sustainable Future New Development Bank General Strategy for 2022-2026.” n.d. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/NDB_StrategyDocument_eVersion_07.pdf.

[xiv] “Report on Sustainable Development Financing | 1 Report on Sustainable Development Financing for 2024.” n.d. Accessed December 18, 2025. https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025_FC_IS32_002-Report-Sustainable-Development-Financing-for-2024-1.pdf.

[xv] Das, Puja. 2025. “Brazilian President Lula Calls for ‘Planned and Just’ Exit from Fossil Fuels as COP30 to Begin in the Amazon.” Down to Earth. November 6, 2025. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/brazilian-president-lula-calls-for-planned-and-just-exit-from-fossil-fuels-as-cop30-to-begin-in-the-amazon.

[xvi] “New Report Reveals BRICS Governments’ Revenues from Fossil Fuels.” 2019. International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2019. https://www.iisd.org/articles/press-release/new-report-reveals-brics-governments-revenues-fossil-fuels.